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This thesis explores the potential for external actors to promote regional cohesion 
in post-Soviet Central Asia through a study of the requisite factors, internal to the 
region, for regional integration to proceed. Specifically, the thesis explores the 
potential benefits from economic integration, through a study of trade potentials, 
and the absence or presence of demand for and supply of regional integration pol-
icies. The study finds that Central Asian republics may benefit from economic 
integration through increased intra-regional trade potential as well by pursuing, 
jointly, trade facilitation with external partners. The study also finds that demand 
for market enlargement through regional integration from the Central Asian busi-
ness community is limited owing to the scarcity of growth-oriented businesses. 
This dearth stems from under-appreciation of free market business models and 
lack of business skills, as well as business environments, which discourage busi-
ness growth. Regional economic integration policies are pursued by some Central 
Asian governments, namely the Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments, though this 
takes the form of a wider Eurasian integration, not Central Asian regionalism. To 
the extent integration policies are pursued, they are a reflection of government 
preferences not bottom-up driven demands by the business community. 
The thesis further finds that the pursuit of Eurasian integration is detrimental to 
the development of Central Asian regionalism, as the prominent role of Russia in 
the Eurasian framework, discourages participation of other Central Asian repub-
lics. The Kazakh pursuit of regional leadership through promotion of Eurasian 
integration, therefore, contributes to regional fragmentation. Similarly, Uzbeki-
stan’s protectionist policies cause fragmentation, for instance by encouraging the 
Kyrgyz government’s pursuit of Eurasian integration. Moreover, the political 
structures of the Central Asian republics are found to be detrimental to trade facil-
itation and regional integration policies as powerful elites have vested interest in 
the status quo. Consequently, attempts to promote regional cohesion in Central 
Asia by actors external to the region are deemed to be premature. 
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Over the past ten years states external to post-Soviet Central Asia have sought to 
facilitate regional, economic cooperation between the Central Asian republics 
(CARs) through interregional frameworks. In 2004 Japan initiated the Central 
Asia plus Japan dialogue, an interregional framework inter alia aimed at facilitat-
ing regional cooperation in Central Asia. Later, in 2007 the European Union (EU) 
launched a Central Asia strategy, similarly committed to bringing the countries 
closer together through political cooperation and economic development; while 
the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea) introduced its Korea-Central Asia Co-
operation Forum, also with intentions of facilitating greater regional cohesion in 
Central Asia. Even earlier, countries neighbouring the region, notably Russia and 
China, sought to cooperate and integrate with the CARs in wider regional frame-
works. Russia has engaged Central Asia through a series of post-Soviet integra-
tion frameworks culminating in the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), while 
China has sought integration with Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), which also involves Russia. Meanwhile attempts at fostering 
regional cohesion amongst the Central Asian republics alone have failed. In a re-
view of Central Asian area studies, Sally Cummings (2012: 135, 169), thus, con-
cluded that external actors have served to temper regional tensions between the 
Central Asian states and facilitated the management of shared challenges, where 
intra-regional cooperation has disappointed.  
Central Asia faces many significant challenges of a cross–border nature. Indeed, 
the cross-border nature of environmental and other challenges in Central Asia 
leaves the region susceptible to wars motivated by for instance access to resources 
(Ibid: 153). This points both to the relevance of cooperative solutions but more 
fundamentally, also, the need to manage relations so as to avoid instability, or in 
the worst case, war. Islamist terror and drug trafficking are examples of challeng-
es of a transnational nature, which affect Central Asia. Hizb ut-Tahrir is active in 
all Central Asian states; and while not espousing a violent ideology, it may be a 
step on the ladder of radicalisation towards militancy (Ibid: 115-117). Similarly, 
the use and distribution of water and energy resources are strongly interlinked and 
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of a cross-border nature. Whilst downstream countries, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, are dependent on upstream countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz-
stan, for river flows; the latter are dependent upon the former for electricity sup-
plies. 90 per cent of water resources for Central Asia originate in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, which are only allocated 0.4 and 11 per cent of available water, while 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan together receive 73 per cent (Ibid: 
152). The lack of cooperation has led to a situation in which upstream countries 
pursue expensive hydro-electricity projects, which would augment their domestic 
electricity supplies, while destabilising the irrigation systems of the downstream 
countries. The only way to escape this situation is through a cooperative solution. 
Twenty years since independence, regional cohesion in Central Asia continues to 
be weak, however. This begs the question whether the factors requisite for region-
al cooperation to proceed are present in Central Asia, and by extension, what the 
role of an external actor seeking to facilitate regional integration could, or should, 
be. As Irina Gurova and Maria Efremova (2011: 59) have noted, students of Cen-
tral Asia have not given sufficient consideration to the question of prerequisites 
for economic integration within the post-Soviet space. This thesis will seek to 
explore these themes. 
Economic development and integration 
The Soviet Union brought previously unknown levels of development in terms of 
infrastructure, human and technological development to Central Asia. However, 
in the two decades since gaining independence socio-economic development has 
lagged behind, creating problems of unemployment and poverty. We do not have 
to look far to see how economic opportunities for all citizens are critical for socie-
ties’ political stability. In December 2010 a Tunisian fruit vendor in protest 
against seemingly unjust hindrances to his small business unknowingly triggered 
what has come to be known as the Arab Spring. Protests across the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) have seen ordinary people demand improvements to 
their economic situation and opportunities as well as political freedoms. The Arab 
Spring has not reached Central Asia but has unnerved Central Asian leaders and 
even caused Russian officials to encourage reforms in Central Asia (Laruelle and 





 and for good reason. The levels of poverty and inequality in 
Central Asia are high, and political freedoms for people to openly express their 
frustration are lacking; a socio-economic picture not unlike that of the MENA-
region. While nation-wide protests leading to regime change have hitherto been 
limited to Kyrgyzstan; Kazakhstan has seen a series of protests with roots in peo-
ple’s demands for improved socio-economic conditions.  
Unemployment, poverty and authoritarianism encourage the youth to join Islamist 
groups, including the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir (Spechler, 2008: 5). Thus economic 
development is directly linked to the region’s hard security challenges. Kazakh-
stan, which was previously thought less at risk of Islamic terror, saw a number of 
terrorist attacks in 2011 (Zenn, 2013). The terror risk is augmented by the proxim-
ity of Afghanistan, and the approaching withdrawal of International Security As-
sistance Force (ISAF) troops. Afghanistan poses additional challenges to the 
CARs, not least the issue of drug trafficking. Economic development is thus a 
challenge with direct, potentially positive, security implications both as regards 
domestic social instability as well as intergovernmental relations over resource 
use, as noted above. 
Whilst the issue of water and energy, may seem an obvious starting for studying 
regional relations given the need for cooperation on the issue; I believe the very 
perception of it as an integral part of the republics’ national securities acts to un-
dermine efforts towards cooperation on this issue. Moreover, as others have 
pointed to before, the sensitive issue of cotton production is intimately linked to 
the problems of water management, and the two cannot be separated (Partzch, 
2011: 178). Given the vested economic interests in the cotton industry, as dis-
cussed below, a solution to water management problems is unlikely to be found 
without addressing fundamental issues of economic, and thus political, structures. 
Similarly, the challenge of drug trafficking has economic aspects including cor-
ruption and organised crime, in some cases linked to political elites, while also 
                                                 
1
 Alexey Malashenko, for instance, has highlighted how the Arab Spring is being keenly studied in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Chatham House, 2013). 
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inherently being a security issue addressed through border management and with 
potential links to Islamic militants (Cummings, 2012: 150). 
An underlying assumption of the current study is that cooperation in the area of 
economics, specifically trade, may build trust between the states, political and 
non-political actors and thereby smooth cooperation within other areas. The focus 
in the thesis is therefore on economic integration, trade facilitation in particular, 
which has historically been seen to facilitate such trust-building between nations 
in conflict – for instance in the case of European and Southeast Asian integration. 
The CARs all share the legacy of Soviet central planning, unfamiliarity with open, 
market economies and the rule of law. During the Soviet era, the republics were 
all dependent on Moscow for economic transfers. These were the poorest repub-
lics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in per capita terms; econ-
omies on the margins of the Soviet economic complex supplying industry in the 
Western parts of the Union with raw materials in the form of oil, gas, cotton and 
grain. Industry was only rudimentarily developed and anything from machinery to 
consumer goods was imported from other Soviet republics; thus, they all faced 
stark challenges in terms of economic development (Dawisha and Parrott, 1994: 
28). The breakup of the Soviet Union not only involved establishing independent 
state structures and institutions but also independent economies. As the vertical 
integration that characterised the Union vanished, new economic systems needed 
to be developed. This was a significant challenge in a part of the world that had 
not, prior to Russian colonisation and subsequent inclusion in the USSR, known 
of modern state structures.  
During the Soviet era, Central Asian economies were part of a closed trading sys-
tem, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), based on nearly 
complete specialisation, not necessarily founded on comparative advantages. 
Since then the geographical, as well as the sectoral, patterns of trade have gradual-
ly changed. However, a study by the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD) (1999: 90-92) showed that after nearly ten years of transition, 
in 1997, the five Central Asian states continued to export significantly more than 
expected to other transition economies, relative to their trade with the EU and the 
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rest of the world (ROW). The figures indicate that the Central Asian economies 
had failed to integrate with the world economy, and that potential for further trade 
with the ROW was significant. The CARs, thus, had not turned their location at 
the centre of the Eurasian landmass into a driver for economic growth.  
The five post-Soviet Central Asian states are surrounded by some of the world’s 
more dynamic economies, including China, Russia, India and the EU. The failure 
to integrate with such centres of economic growth may be explained by a range of 
factors: landlockedness and distance to markets, the legacy of the USSR infra-
structure, small domestic markets, and partial (or non-existent) economic and po-
litical reform. Moreover, all these factors are arguably compounded by the lack of 
cooperation between the states. As Vladimir Paramonov and Alexey Strokov 
(2006: 2) have phrased it: ‘The history of Uzbekistan is a success story when there 
were integration processes and there was a free movement of capital, goods and 
people. … On the other hand the history of Uzbekistan is the history of failure 
when there was economic disintegration’. 
The global economy today is increasingly dominated by trade in intermediate 
goods through regional and global value chains, which only works to amplify the 
need for integration through trade facilitation and infrastructural links. Marléne 
Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse (2013: xviii) have recently highlighted that most 
contemporary studies of Central Asia ignore such questions of globalisation and 
the link between economic development and geopolitical choices. While it is be-
yond the scope of current study to identify possible future comparative advantages 
of the Central Asian states, a consideration of Central Asia’s potential for integrat-
ing in regional and global value chains is warranted. 
The assumption underlying the study is that socio-economic development requires 
openness to trade and integration into the world economy, and that this may facili-
tate expansion of domestic production and economic growth. Openness to trade 
enables import of technological and human capital advances, and specialisation 
according to comparative advantage. Moreover, it is assumed that a reduction of 
inequality is necessary to ensure that economic growth is sustainable and pro-
motes stable societal relations, and that effective economic exchange depends on 
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the development of strong institutions. Economic integration can be an instrument 
to achieve these objectives as it entails market enlargement and increased open-
ness to trade and, in the right specification, may prompt institutional development. 
These assumptions will be further developed in the following chapter. 
Research questions 
Regional integration within Central Asia has hitherto largely failed, including co-
operation on the issues of water use and energy sources, which are perceived as 
critical to the viability of the respective states and their economies. On issues of 
both hard security, such as terrorism, and economics, wider regional initiatives 
have had greater success, for instance in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the for-
mer including China and Russia, the latter only Russia. This suggests, as noted 
above, that external actors may facilitate regional cooperation. Within the litera-
ture on interregionalism  -that is, cooperation between two distinct regions-  the 
notion of ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ has developed. This concept de-
scribes the situation by which interregionalism leads to region-building in the less 
cohesive of the two interacting regions. The thesis sets out to explore whether the 
requisite factors for regionalism to develop in Central Asia are present and for 
external actors to play a role in facilitating regional integration. 
The academic literature has explored a tendency toward ineffectiveness of region-
al forums involving Central Asia. However, there has been less effort in identify-
ing which prerequisites for regional integration are missing; thus enabling a de-
bate about potential remedies. As demonstrated with the issue of water and ener-
gy, it is hard to imagine a way forward that does not involve regional cooperation. 
Identifying the prerequisites for integration, and which are present or missing, will 
be an essential stepping stone for moving forward. As the Chinese general and 
military strategist Sun Tzu allegedly noted: tactics without strategy is like noise 
before defeat. 
The research questions to be explored are:  
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1. Would economic integration impart economic benefits on the Central 
Asian republics? 
1.1. Where do CARs have unexploited trade potential? 
1.2. Are their patterns of trade similar? 
1.3. Could intra-regional integration boost trade extra-regionally? 
2. Are factors requisite for economic integration to happen present in Cen-
tral Asian republics? 
2.1. Is there demand for economic integration in the Central Asian repub-
lics, and if not, why not? 
2.2. Is there (potential for) supply of economic integration policies in Cen-
tral Asian republics, and if not, why not? 
2.3. Is there regional leadership to drive Central Asian regional integra-
tion? 
Following an exploration of these questions, I will discuss the potential for actors 
external to the Central Asian region facilitating regional economic integration. 
Definitions and scope  
In 1993 the former Soviet Central Asian republics themselves adopted the term 
Central Asia as a designation for their five countries (Akiner, 1994: 32). A clear 
spatial delimitation of what is covered by the term Central Asia has, however, 
been elusive, which reflects that such definition cannot be made solely with refer-
ence to geography but must take into account factors such as culture, economic 
links, historical bonds and self-perception (Ferdinand, 1994: 1).  
The term region is not understood purely as a geographical label. The term also 
includes economic, social and political values and objectives, which are shared by 
the states comprising the region. Regions are dynamic entities, which interact with 
both domestic and external stimuli, continuously adjusting states’ interests. Re-
gion-building contains a functional dimension, as regions differ in accordance 
with the role they are supposed to play, for example within the realms of the 
economy or security. It follows that regional forums can overlap as their member-
ship is defined by the role they perform (Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland, 2006: 5). For 
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instance, the region (post-Soviet) Central Asia may be seen as a construct, coex-
isting with overlapping constructs such as Eurasia. The construct of Central Asia 
considers Russia an external force, whereas the concept of Eurasia includes Rus-
sia as an authority internal to the region (Qoraboyev, 2010: 225). With this in 
mind, Russia is, thus, not a typical external actor to the region of Central Asia. 
Rather it is a promoter of an overlapping regional construct, namely Eurasia. Sim-
ilarly China is contiguous to Central Asia with its Western province Xinjiang, 
which has both natural and cultural features and challenges in common with the 
CARs. 
With that in mind, it should be clear that by defining the five post-Soviet Central 
Asian republics as the region of study, I do not suggest that this is a definitive 
entity. However, it is recognised that there are natural and man-made phenomena  
-from geography over history and culture to infrastructure and language-  that tie 
the five countries together. Furthermore, the nature of the challenges some of 
these phenomena pose are not only common to the five republics but rely on a 
cooperative response. As Uzbekistan’s President Karimov has written ‘the Central 
Asian region is a knot of various political, economic, military, transport and eco-
logical problems’ (Karimov, 1997: 4). 
Forces of globalisation have impelled cooperation between states, particularly 
among developed countries. Cooperation enables states to reap mutual benefits by 
allowing each other influence over domestic regulation; each state benefiting by 
influencing the other in a quid pro quo (Jackson and Sørensen, 2003: 282-283). 
Cooperation between states can be more or less formalised through institutions 
but often refers to more informal interaction based on non-binding agreements 
(UNDP, 2005: 23). Integration can be seen as one particular form of cooperation, 
whereby states manage the forces of globalisation. Cooperation itself being a dif-
fuse concept escaping precise definition and, thus, framework for study, I will in 
this thesis apply a framework for the study of regional integration as an expres-
sion of cooperation. Integration as a concept involves two main ideas; firstly, it 
refers to ‘the degree of coherence in a system or [secondly] a process which in-
creases the degree of coherence in a system’ (Kelstrup, 1998: 18). The thesis ex-
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plores the desirability of such cohesion on an economic level, and the requisite 
factors for a process increasing such cohesion to occur. 
The exploration of Central Asian integration with the world economy focuses in 
particular on relations with the European and Asian continent, between which 
Central Asia is located. In this context, the EU and its member states act as a 
proxy for Europe as a whole. During work on the thesis the role of ASEAN was 
given particular consideration. However, as the data in the following chapters will 
illustrate, trade relations between Central Asian republics and ASEAN member 
states currently is limited. Moreover, fieldwork in the region revealed that 
ASEAN and its member states are considered relatively insignificant players. 
Consequently, within Asia, the thesis is primarily focused on exploring relation-
ships between the CARs and China, Japan and South Korea. 
Methodology 
In answering the research questions I intend to employ two diverse methodolo-
gies. The first cluster of research questions addresses the issue of trade potentials 
and thus requires a quantitative approach. The issue of trade agreements and inte-
gration schemes are traditionally studied ex ante by means of a computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) model. However, as elaborated upon below, I will instead 
employ a gravity model approach, which has traditionally been used for studying 
trade potentials between economic regions, particularly in the case of transition 
economies. The second cluster of questions, meanwhile, commands a qualitative 
approach. Within the theoretical framework of The Logic of Regional Integration 
(Mattli, 1999), which outlines the requisite forces for integration to occur, I will 
analyse various qualitative sources, from policy statements to interviews with rel-
evant stakeholders throughout the region.  
Gravity model 
Ex ante studies of economic integration typically employ CGE-models, which are 
comprehensive economic models describing all elements of an economy and their 
interactions making them apt for evaluating policy choices (Burfishcer, 2011: 10-
11). However, this approach has certain drawbacks. As the models consist of a 
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large number of underlying equations, the results are difficult to evaluate. Also, 
the CGE is a simulated rather than estimated model, which leaves its reliability 
uncertain (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2001: 3). Most importantly, owing to the 
complexity of such models, their use involves detailed data, which can be difficult 
to obtain for developing economies. I have made serious attempts to obtain data 
for the countries in question but was only able to obtain such for Kazakhstan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic. In this regard, it should also be noted that the quality and 
veracity of statistics published by Central Asian republics is often considered 
questionable. Consequently, simpler methodologies may be preferable. 
Instead, I have chosen to employ the gravity model of trade, which has become a 
‘workhorse’ model of trade studies (Cernat, 2003: 7); advantages of which include 
the ease of access to the necessary data (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006: 1). The 
gravity model takes its name from Newton’s law on gravity. It was suggested in 
1962 by Jan Tinbergen that a similar functional form could be applied to trade 
flows: that is, that a trade flow between two countries could be determined as the 
product of their economic mass with the factor of proportion determined by the 
degree of trade resistance between them (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008: 
442). The specifics of the model and its application will be outlined in detail in 
chapter 3. 
Whilst the model has become standard for studying economic integration ex post 
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2009: 63), it is not without merit in addressing the research 
question posed above. Four types of applications of the model can be discerned. 
Firstly, the gravity model is employed to study the cost of trade barriers, the so-
called border effect. Secondly, the model is used to explain trade patterns, separat-
ing inter- and intra-industry trade. Thirdly, the model is, as mentioned, often em-
ployed to study, ex post, the effects of regional trade agreements (RTA); and, 
fourthly, the model can be used to calculate the trade potential between two eco-
nomic regions (ITC, 2003: 3-4). 
Gravity model studies of regional integration schemes include one or more dum-
my variables to represent the economic impact of the RTA. The model is then 
estimated, and the effect of the RTA evaluated on the basis of whether the param-
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
24 
 
eter estimates are statistically significant, and of their operational signs (Cernat, 
2003: 9). As this approach is directed at ex post studies, it is not appropriate for 
current purposes. Conversely, employing the model to study trade potential is 
highly pertinent. For such purposes, a gravity model is estimated on the basis of a 
sample of countries judged to be representative of international trade flows. This 
model is then used to calculate potential trade flows of the countries under study. 
Comparing the expected trade flows with observed trade, allows inferences of the 
extent to which the trading partners have further trade potential (ITC, 2003: 4). 
Specifically, if the expected trade flows are higher than observed trade, the model 
is interpreted to indicate that the two trading partners have unexploited trade po-
tential. Conversely, if expected trade flows are lesser than observed trade, the 
model is interpreted to suggest that the two partners are over-trading, that is, trad-
ing above the level expected given the bilateral characteristics of their economic 
relationship. This is the approach taken in the following to explore trade potential 
within Central Asia and of Central Asian republics with international trade part-
ners. The emphasis will be on Europe and Asia representing two of the three ma-
jor poles in the global economy between which Central Asia is located. In order to 
explore the economic potential inherent in regional integration ex ante, I further-
more apply the model in a novel way by contrasting the benchmark model with 
alternative models, which simulate different configurations of regional integration 
within and beyond the Central Asian region.  
If unexploited trade potential between the Central Asian republics and the trading 
partners is suggested by the following gravity model analysis, it would suggest 
that in the long run, trade levels will converge towards the expected without the 
need for characteristics of bilateral relationships to change. If, however, the analy-
sis finds that the CARs trade more than expected with a given trading partner, it 
suggests that to increase exports to these partners, the CARs would need to active-
ly implement policies aimed at this (Ruiz and Vilarrubia, 2007: 6). Furthermore, 
the results from simulating Central Asia as a single region, and contrasting of 
these with the results for the CARs individually will give an indication of whether 
the states would benefit from integrating regionally. 
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The specific estimation procedures of the gravity model applied is explored fur-
ther in chapter 3. It should be noted, however, that for current purposes the model 
serves to study trade volumes and that the estimation cannot be extended to draw 
conclusions regarding the impact of country-specific explanatory variables such 
as the impact on trade of the quality of infrastructure and institutions. Such analy-
sis requires a different estimation methodology to the one employed in this thesis 
(Bacchetta et al., 2012: 109). 
Qualitative analysis 
The second part of the analysis will address the forces for and against economic 
integration within the region. The analysis will be framed by Walter Mattli’s The 
Logic of Regional Integration (1999), which is outlined in the next chapter. Brief-
ly, the framework suggests that two primary forces are required for regional inte-
gration processes to take off: firstly, a demand for integration stemming primarily 
from domestic business actors seeking the development of a regional market, and 
secondly, supply of regional integration demonstrated in national leaders’ willing-
ness to cooperate with partner states.  
The data for the analysis of supply and demand principally rests on interviews 
conducted, primarily in the region in the autumn of 2013. I have conducted 108 
formal interviews with 118 participants including government officials, business 
association representatives, businessmen and -women, local academics, experts 
and NGO representatives, representatives of the international community and do-
nor organisations. These groups of stakeholders were chosen on the basis of the 
theoretical framework, which suggests that the business community are most like-
ly to advocate and demand regional integration, while integration policies are 
supplied by governments. Academics, experts and representatives of the interna-
tional community were included so as to triangulate the information given by 
stakeholders with a direct role in the processes under study. Moreover, the latter 
group were instrumental in gaining data on the role of external actors in the re-
gion. A full list of the 108 interviews is provided in the bibliography. The majori-
ty of interviewees have asked for anonymity, in most cases allowing disclosure of 
their profession. To ensure anonymity when referencing the interviews as sources, 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
26 
 
the reference provided is a code generically referring to the participants’ profes-
sion, for instance “i/w BA” indicates interview with representative of business 
association. A key to the referencing of interviews is given in appendix F and the 
relevant key included in the list of respondents in the bibliography. Where ano-
nymity has been fully waivered, the respondent is referenced with surname, num-
ber with which the person is listed in the list of interviewees in the bibliography, 
as well as the relevant key, for example “Drakinos (#99/IF)” indicate that the in-
terviewee referenced is Alkis Drakinos, a representative of an international finan-
cial institution, full details listed as number 99 on interviewee list.   
Interviews were conducted primarily in capital cities or provincial capitals. Field-
work in Central Asia involved visits to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan between 24 August and 28 November 2013. Partic-
ipants were identified through my personal and professional network and through 
snow-balling.  
Interviews were guided by a semi-structured interview guide formulated on the 
basis of theory. Interviews were not audio recorded with a view to ensuring as 
free an exchange as possible. With Central Asia being dominated by authoritarian 
governments and subject to Soviet legacy, it was my expectation that participants 
would be more comfortable talking about economic relations and policy, in many 
cases considered high politics, if the interview was not recorded. All interviews 
were instead documented in hand-written notes during interviews with notes sub-
sequently typed on my laptop and saved as encrypted files. Interviews were coded 
according to theoretical concepts upon return to London during winter and spring 
2014. Given the lack of ad verbatim transcription of interviews, few direct quotes 
are included in the text. When I have opted to include excerpts of interviews, 
these will either be paraphrased or short phrases or terms, which I recorded ad 
verbatim in my notes. The latter will appear italicised in quotation marks, the 
former merely in quotation marks. 
The majority of interviews were conducted in English; a few in Scandinavian lan-
guages and one in a combination of German, Russian and English. In the case of 
the few interviews that were conducted in Russian or in English but where the 
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participant requested the presence of an interpreter, a local professional interpreter 
or a local research assistant, all subject to confidentiality agreements, were em-
ployed by me to facilitate the interview. 
In addition to interviews, the analysis is based on other primary sources, including 
online news and analytical articles, as well as secondary literature. 
Overview 
The following chapter outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the project. This 
includes both theories of international trade and economic integration, which un-
derlie both the assumptions of the study, the gravity model approach and subse-
quent analysis of trade performance and potential, as well as potential for regional 
economic integration. Additionally the chapter outlines in more detail the theoret-
ical framework for studying the underlying dynamics of regional integration as 
well as theories on interregionalism and so-called regionalism through interre-
gionalism. 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review serving to illustrate the state of, and differ-
ences and similarities between, the economies of the region, as well as intra- and 
extra-regional trading relationships and existing studies thereof. Furthermore, the 
chapter gives an overview of historic and existing integration schemes and coop-
erative frameworks; as well as existing relations between the CARs and the EU 
and Asian partners. In chapter 3 the gravity model to be applied in the analysis is 
presented along with the findings of its application on trade within Central Asia 
and between Central Asian republics and global trade partners with a focus on 
Europe and Asia. Moreover, the chapter presents an analysis of the potential bene-
fits to regional integration, including the impact of suggested integration schemes 
on extra-regional trade. The chapter addresses the first cluster of research ques-
tions, that is, whether economic integration may offer economic benefits to Cen-
tral Asian republics in the form of increased trade potentials. 
In chapter 4 I analyse the underlying dynamics believed to enable regional inte-
gration processes. The chapter, thus, explores the second cluster of research ques-
tions, namely whether there is demand on part of business communities for re-
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gional integration, and whether regional governments are likely to supply regional 
integration. Chapter 5 subsequently discusses the potential role of external actors 
in facilitating regional integration in Central Asia. Lastly, the conclusion will dis-
cuss the findings, draw out conclusions and point to perspectives for policy mak-
ing as well as for future research. 
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Chapter 1 Theoretical framework 
This chapter introduces the theoretical underpinnings for the assumptions and 
research questions outlined in the introduction, while at the same time introducing 
the theoretical framework guiding the subsequent analyses. Section 1.1 outlines 
the theory of international trade, the links between openness and growth, the im-
portance of efficient institutions for economic development as well as the theory 
of economic integration with a particular emphasis on less developed economies. 
Section 1.2 then outlines the theoretical framework for analysing the factors facili-
tating integration processes. As opposed to classic political science theories on 
regionalism and regional integration, the chosen framework focuses specifically 
on what factors are requisite for economic integration schemes to develop. Lastly, 
section 1.2 also introduces the theory of interregionalism, specifically the concept 
of regionalism through interregionalism. 
1.1 International trade and economic integration 
This section initially presents a brief outline of the principles underlying the theo-
ry of international trade, which implies that exchange of goods contributes to the 
creation of economic wealth. Secondly, the section considers the links between 
trade and growth, as well as the role of institutions in economic development, be-
fore turning to economic integration theory with which I will seek to draw togeth-
er the strains of thought on trade, growth and institutions.  
1.1.1 Theory of international trade 
The existence of distinct political entities and the consequent potential for imped-
iments to trade yield problems outside the scope of traditional economics and has, 
thus, given rise to the field of international economics. The latter can be divided 
into a pure theory of international trade, which deals with causes, structure, ef-
fects, volume, and gains from international trade and assumes that trade takes 
place as barter; and a theory of international money focused on the issues arising 
from inter alia balance-of-payments disequilibria (Gandolfo, 1994: 3-5). In the 
following, I present the basics of the pure theory of international trade in order to 
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establish the benefits to economic development from trade; the theory contains 
two fundamental models the classical, or Ricardian, theory, and neo-classical the-
ory.  
Orthodox theory holds that international trade benefits nations by allowing them 
access to goods at lower prices than under autarkic conditions or by providing 
access to collections of goods that would be unattainable under autarky (Ibid: 54). 
Orthodox international trade theory starts from the assumption of perfect national 
mobility and perfect international immobility of factors of production, and the 
assumption of perfect mobility, nationally and internationally, of produced goods. 
Classical theory suggests that trade is possible and will benefit countries involved, 
when there is a difference between comparative costs of production of a given 
good, and when the terms-of-trade fall between the (extreme) comparative costs 
being equal to neither. A great advance of international trade theory was the 
demonstration that even in cases when one country has absolute advantage in pro-
duction of all goods, international trade is not only possible but beneficial to all 
countries involved (Ibid: 8). As long as the two conditions are met  -difference in 
comparative costs and terms-of-trade lying between these-  international trade is 
beneficial to all involved countries, each producing according to its comparative 
advantage.  
Neo-classical theory explains the presence of international trade with variations in 
factor endowments, technology and tastes between countries.
2
 Such variations 
result in differences of equilibrium price ratios between countries, which create 
scope for international trade; similarly to classical theory, international trade is 
possible when the international price ratio (terms-of-trade) lie between the internal 
equilibrium price ratios (Ibid: 42). 
Gains from trade 
According to neo-classical theory, the gains from trade can be divided into a con-
sumption and a production gain; both represent an increase in a country’s welfare. 
                                                 
2
 Giancarlo Gandolfo (1994: 5) argues that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory can be considered a special 
case of neo-classical theory in which factor endowments and tastes are held constant. 
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The consumption gain represents a welfare increase for the consumer in that in-
ternational exchange allows a shift in consumption to a more cheaply priced good, 
thus, allowing the consumer to consume more of it or freeing up income for other 
consumption. The production gain works to increase welfare by making produc-
tion patterns more efficient through specialisation (Ibid: 56-57). 
International trade is beneficial for the world as a whole, as well as individual 
countries. The maximum welfare of society can be interpreted as the maximum of 
consumption possibilities. Under autarky, consumption possibilities equal produc-
tion possibilities. Under conditions of international trade, consumption possibili-
ties are expanded by the consumption gain; consequently, international trade rep-
resents an increase in society’s welfare (Chacholiades, 1978: 427-431).3  
Theory of commercial policy  
Imposition of various trade barriers are often referred to as expressions of protec-
tionism, which can be defined as a government intervention causing divergence 
between domestic and world relative prices of the same goods (Gandolfo, 1994: 
134). Protectionism can be based on economic motivations, such as the argument 
on infant industry protection according to which developing industries require 
protection in order to reach a level at which they can compete internationally. Al-
ternatively, protectionist initiatives can be based on non-economic motivations 
such as national security considerations. Protectionism is thus not necessarily irra-
tional but can be an expression of non-economic considerations trumping eco-
nomic objectives (Ibid: 135-137, 141-142). 
                                                 
3
 The explanation for why international trade is beneficial for individual countries and the world as 
a whole follow Miltiades Chacholiades (1978), whose explanation is based on a Paretian welfare 
function. The latter involves the general ethical assertion that it is advantageous to make one per-
son better off without making anyone worse off; that is, it does not involve interpersonal compari-
son (Chacholiades, 1978: 417). Social welfare functions aim to establish the socially optimal allo-
cation of resources and rewards in an economy based on interpersonal comparison, and thus re-
quire value judgements. Social welfare functions express the welfare of society as a function of 
individuals’ utility. Pareto optimality defines economic efficiency at which production and con-
sumption cannot be reorganised with a view to improving utility of some without being to the 
detriment of others. In a paretian welfare function, welfare is improved (diminished) if as a mini-
mum one person’s utility is improved (diminished) without change to any other’s utility (Hender-
son and Quandt, 1980: 286, 308). 
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When talking of barriers to trade, one typically distinguishes between tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs); the latter including inter alia quantitative restrictions, 
duties and subsidies, as well as standards and regulations. The imposition of a 
tariff leads to reduction in demand of the good, an increase in the domestic supply 
of the good and a decrease in imports of the good. Overall, a tariff represents a net 
cost for society because the consumer surplus (the excess of the price that con-
sumers would be willing to pay over that which they actually pay, rather than 
forego the good) is reduced by more than the sum total of the tariff revenue and 
increase in producer surplus (firms’ profit), which together represent the econom-
ic benefits to society (Ibid: 109-110).
4
 In the general equilibrium, the effect of a 
tariff on the volume of trade can be divided into the import and export effect; both 
decrease by the sum of the consumption and production effects. Thus, the net re-
sult of a tariff imposition is a reduction in the volume of trade. Though the impo-
sition of a tariff has a fiscal revenue effect, the net result is a social cost represent-
ed by the decrease in the value of real national output (Ibid: 112-116).  
A tariff imposition will improve the terms-of-trade of the country imposing the 
tariff by causing a decrease in the international relative price of the imported 
commodity. However, the improvement in terms-of-trade for the tariff-imposing 
country will come at the expense of its trading partner(s). Though it is not possi-
ble to determine whether world welfare is increased or decreased, for the individ-
ual country there always exists an optimum tariff situation superior to free trade. 
This, however, disregards the fact that trade partners, plausibly, will retaliate by 
introducing tariffs of their own seeking to recover part of their loss. Such retalia-
tion may continue through a tariff war, the result of which cannot be determined a 
priori (Ibid: 116-122). It is important to note, however, that small countries can-
not influence world prices and therefore generally lose out from imposing trade 
barriers (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009: 32). 
                                                 
4
 It can be argued that the economic cost of protection in addition to the reduction of the consumer 
surplus includes administrative costs from customs and border controls. Assuming full employ-
ment, such administrative costs represent a straightforward cost; however, if this is not the case the 
administrative costs can involve an employment effect (Gandolfo, 1994: 111). 
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Other barriers to trade include quotas, subsidies, duties, embargoes, and state trad-
ing. The effects of import quotas are similar to those of tariff imposition, though 
the government does not collect fiscal revenue (Gandolfo, 1994: 123). Tariffs are 
superior to quantitative restrictions for a number of reasons, inter alia, that they 
are transparent, maintain the link between domestic and foreign prices, thereby 
ensuring that the more efficient producers stay in business and reduce lobbying 
incentives (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009: 185-187). Export duties have the oppo-
site effect to tariffs by inducing producers to shift their supply from foreign to 
domestic markets, the domestic price decreases to the benefit of consumers and 
detriment of producers. The net result, however, is also a social cost (Gandolfo, 
1994: 125-126). Embargoes are used to ban trade in specific commodities with 
certain countries with a view to exerting political pressure or blocking access to 
technology. Through state trading a government can conduct a country’s interna-
tional trade by itself, creating monopolistic-monopsonistic power (Ibid: 134-135). 
Technical regulation and standards (TRS) can also inhibit trade, when they vary 
between countries. For instance, to the extent that variation in TRS raises the cost 
of production, they may act as a barrier to entry, thus, inhibiting cross-border 
trade. The facilitation of international trade in the face of market segmenting-TRS, 
thus, requires mutual recognition of standards or harmonisation thereof. Develop-
ing countries, in particular, are disadvantaged by TRS as they often lack facilities 
to comply with or check compliance with standards (Hoekman and Kostecki, 
2009: 236-240). Latterly, trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) can act as a 
trade barrier. TRIMs are used to ensure that foreign investors meet certain stand-
ards of performance, for instance the use of domestic inputs in production. Local 
content requirements are the most prevalent form of TRIMs. While equivalent to a 
tariff imposition local content regulations are considered inferior to tariffs because 
the government does not earn revenue (Ibid: 260). 
It is clear that from a traditional economic perspective, tariff and other trade barri-
ers distort the international market. According to orthodox theory, liberalising 
trade policy, or eliminating trade barriers, brings benefits on two levels. For the 
economy as a whole, resources are allocated more productively as they are di-
rected towards activities in which the economy enjoys a comparative advantage. 
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Meanwhile, consumption opportunities expand as the increased efficiency in pro-
duction leads to income increases and improved opportunities for buying foreign 
goods and services. These gains are also found at industry-level, where more pro-
ductive firms in the industry expand at the expense of less efficient firms, which 
either contract or fail. Heterogeneity within industries is a key source of welfare 
gain from economic liberalisation (Ibid: 32-33). 
Nevertheless, in the real world elimination of tariffs and other barriers may not 
necessarily increase economic efficiency, nor will the imposition of further barri-
ers necessarily decrease efficiency. According to the ‘theory of second best’ once 
one or more Paretian conditions are violated, it does not automatically follow that 
the second best situation is that in which all remaining conditions are satisfied.
5
 In 
other words, one cannot a priori determine if eliminating or replacing one viola-
tion of Pareto optimality with another will improve or worsen the situation.
6
 This 
has direct implications for considerations of real world economies where distor-
tions and restrictions to free trade are rife; paradoxically a protectionist policy can 
improve on an (already suboptimal) situation (Gandolfo, 1994: 142-144).  
Illicit trade 
Refinements have been made to the orthodox theory of international trade; for 
instance, a loosening of the assumption of absolute immobility of factors and ac-
commodating for the uncertainties characterising real world trade. Of particular 
interest in the case of Central Asia is the economic effect of illicit trade. 
Previously smuggling was considered to improve economic welfare as it repre-
sented an avoidance of tariffs and other trade restrictions, thus amounting to a 
partial removal of such. However, this is now considered a simplistic analysis. 
The cost of illicit goods will lie between the domestic and international prices of 
the goods; the nearer the price is to the domestic price, the more likely that illicit 
                                                 
5
 Pareto efficiency or optimality requires that no one can be made better off without making some-
one worse off (Chacholiades, 1978: 417).   
6
 Apart from the particular case where there is only one violation of Paretian conditions, when the 
elimination of this necessarily will mean an improvement from a suboptimal to the Pareto optimal 
situation (Gandolfo, 1994: 142-44). 
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trade represents a reduction of welfare. Where legal and illegal trade in the same 
commodity exist, it has been demonstrated that the illegal trade represents a re-
duction of welfare. Certainly, if one takes into account the reasons for which a 
trade restriction was introduced, it follows that illicit trade represents a reduction 
in welfare as it circumvents this aim (Ibid: 247-250). 
More relevant to the current case is perhaps another perspective according to 
which illicit trade entails the use of primary factors of production. Consequently, 
it modifies the economic structure so that legal economic activity cannot be de-
termined independently of illegal economic activity; and it becomes incorrect to 
claim that illegal economic activity necessarily reduces welfare. A third perspec-
tive considers how legal trade can provide a cover for illegal trade, in which case 
the former becomes an input to the latter; again, it is possible that the illicit trade 
either improves or reduces welfare (Ibid: 250-251). Related to this is the econom-
ic effect of bribery, a practice underpinning informal trade reducing the efficiency 
of economic exchange, cf. below discussion of institutions. 
While this suggests that the consequences of illicit trade in Central Asia are not 
straightforwardly negative, there are arguably factors related to the pervasiveness 
of illegal trade, which hinders economic development. Firstly, illicit trade in Cen-
tral Asia covers both informal trade in basic goods for the consumer, as well as 
trade in illegal goods, such as trafficking of drugs and people. Bringing the former 
into the legal economy may boost national economic growth by facilitating the 
development of the small businesses involved and raising tax uptake (Byrd and 
Raiser, 2006: 3). Furthermore, bringing the informal trade in legal goods into the 
formal economy could free up administrative resources to fight trade in illegal 
goods, as well as free up resources for the general economy by eliminating the 
bribery involved in informal cross-border trade. 
1.1.2 Openness and economic growth 
I shall now turn to the links between international trade and economic growth. In 
the neo-classical, or Solow, growth model, sustained economic growth is ex-
plained by, exogenous, technological progress, which raises the efficiency of la-
bour. Factors such as increases in investment, while contributing to growth, can 
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only do so transitorily as it results in a new steady state of the economy, not sus-
tained economic growth (Mankiw, 2003: 210). In other words, technological pro-
gress represents a growth (sustained) effect, whereas investment represents a level 
(transitory) effect (Lucas, 1988: 12). To determine if the openness of an economy, 
and the international trade that follows, contributes to sustained economic growth, 
it is thus critical to determine if it represents a level or a growth effect. 
According to Robert Lucas (1988: 12) liberalisation in the form of removal of 
trade barriers merely represents a level effect that can shift the economy upward 
but does not lead to consistently higher growth. However, modern endogenous 
growth theory links international trade to sustained economic growth as it seeks to 
explain from where technological progress arises, considering it endogenously. As 
opposed to the neo-classical growth model that assumes diminishing returns to 
capital, endogenous growth theory suggests that capital has constant returns to 
scale. This distinction stems from the inclusion of knowledge as a form of capital; 
logically knowledge does not exhibit decreasing returns but can even be argued to 
involve increasing returns (Mankiw, 2003: 222-224).  
Paul Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) provided early and seminal contributions to 
the theory of endogenous growth. Both criticised neo-classical growth theory for 
its single-minded emphasis on technological change as the explanatory variable 
behind growth, noting how it inhibits such theory from explaining the diversity in 
growth rates observed across the world (Romer, 1986: 1012; Lucas, 1988: 17). 
Lucas brought to the fore the theory of human capital, which he distinguishes 
from technology; the latter referring to a factor common to all countries (Lucas, 
1988: 15). Noting that neo-classical theory predicts a tendency toward factor price 
equality and equality in growth rates, which is not observed in the real world, Lu-
cas demonstrated the inadequacies of neo-classical growth theory accounting for 
the effect of international trade (Ibid: 16-17). According to Lucas, human capital 
and the accumulation thereof represent an alternative engine of growth, which 
facilitates the explanation of variable growth rates (Ibid: 40). In a similar vein, 
Romer suggests that growth in the long run primarily is driven by the accumula-
tion of knowledge, which he theorises as an input with increasing marginal prod-
uct (Romer, 1986: 1003). Furthermore, Romer notes that the creation of new 
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knowledge has positive externality effects, not only between firms but also be-
tween countries (Ibid). Growth in a country, which is not leading the world econ-
omy, reflects, at least in part, imitation of knowledge in leading economies (Ibid: 
1008). It follows that openness is theoretically linked to higher growth, as open-
ness better allows for imitation. 
Economic growth, basically, can be said to embody two factors; on the one hand 
increases in input, and, on the other, increases in output per unit of input or 
productivity increases (Krugman, 1994: 66). Productivity growth has two poten-
tial sources: a domestic, which is associated with innovation, and an international, 
associated with imitation or absorption. Internationally driven productivity growth 
is, as suggested, naturally linked to the degree of openness of an economy (Ed-
wards, 1998: 386-387). Economies starting with a relatively low stock of initial 
knowledge will tend to imitate faster than those with a high stock of knowledge 
(Ibid); the equilibrium growth rate of poorer economies depend on their initial 
level of knowledge and the cost of imitation. If the latter is lower than the cost of 
innovation, a poorer country will grow relatively faster than an advanced econo-
my causing a tendency towards convergence (Ibid: 383-384).  
Following the logic of endogenous growth theory, more open economies are bet-
ter able to absorb technological advances from leading economies (Ibid). It fol-
lows that liberalisation may be conducive for economic growth. However, this 
notion has not been uncontested. The empirical literature was initially inconclu-
sive, partly owing to differences in proxies for liberalisation and openness of an 
economy, and has been vulnerable to related methodological criticisms (Greena-
way, Morgan and Wright, 2002: 230).
7
 At its most basic, liberalisation can be 
thought of as tariff reduction. Following the theory of second best, liberalisation 
will entail the switch to more efficient instruments, such as tariffs instead of quo-
tas (Ibid: 231). Such conceptual ambiguity has been reflected in the empirical lit-
erature, where a simple measure of liberalisation has been changes in nominal 
tariffs, while more sophisticated proxies for the openness of an economy have 
                                                 
7
 See for instance Rodrik, 1995. 
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included the combination of trade policy instruments into indices. Whereas the 
simplicity of the former allows for straight-forward comparisons, the complexity 
of the latter may better reflect the degree of openness of an economy but mean-
while inhibits comparisons over time or across countries (Ibid: 231-33). Conse-
quently, studies have ranged from finding positive links between openness and 
economic growth to finding no association – a common feature of the studies gen-
erally being a lack of robustness in their findings (Ibid: 234).  
There has, furthermore, been scepticism of the causality of the relationship sug-
gesting that it is growth that leads to openness and not vice versa (Edwards, 1993: 
1388). More recently it has, however, been demonstrated that higher growth rates 
do indeed follow trade liberalisation and some suggest that no economy has de-
veloped without opening up and integrating with the world economy (Hoekman 
and Kostecki, 2009: 18-19).
8
 Today economists generally accept that trade per-
formance is a significant driver of economic growth (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 
32-33).  
1.1.3 Distributional aspects of trade and economic growth 
Introduction of trade may involve winners and losers. This can be demonstrated 
with an example of the effects of international trade on workers and landlords: say 
a relative increase in the price of the land-intensive, as opposed to the labour-
intensive, good is caused by international trade, the economy will specialise in its 
production, and the relative income of landlords as opposed to workers will in-
crease, leaving the worker relatively worse off (Chacholiades, 1978: 408).  
                                                 
8
 For instance, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner in a 1995-study found that open developing 
economies grew by an average of 3.5 percentage points faster than closed developing economies 
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009: 16). David Greenaway, Wyn Morgan and Peter Wright in a dy-
namic panel analysis introduce three proxies for liberalisation in order to establish robustness of 
their results and find that there is indeed a positive relationship between liberalisation and econom-
ic growth (Greenaway, Morgan and Wright, 2002). Also, Sebastian Edwards has found, using 
different proxies for trade policy, a significantly positive relationship between openness and 
productivity growth, which was confirmed when the author constructed a composite index for 
trade policy. Further, when testing the results robustness against inclusion of such variables as 
institutions, political and macroeconomic instability, the association held (Edwards, 1998). 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
39 
 
Furthermore, while it is well-established that lifting people out of poverty requires 
sustained economic growth, it is also increasingly recognised that robust econom-
ic growth does not automatically ease poverty levels (Stiglitz, 2002: 78). In fact, 
extremes of inequality can significantly hamper sustained economic growth, par-
ticularly when it involves political and social instability (Ibid: 155). Thus, reduc-
ing inequality in itself becomes an instrument to sustained economic growth.  
Given the lack of access to detailed statistical data, and the consequent use of the 
gravity model for subsequent analysis, I will not be able to address the distribu-
tional impact of the CARs increasing trade with one partner over another as the 
gravity model does not allow for this.  
1.1.4 Institutions 
Transitions in the post-Soviet world were not merely transitions from planned to 
market economies but also societal and political transitions. While many institu-
tions in the Soviet Union had names similar to institutions in the West, which are 
key in the running of a market economy, they had different functions in the Soviet 
system (Ibid: 138). Many post-Soviet states, including some of the CARs, fol-
lowed a shock-therapy transition path, ignoring the fact that market economies 
and the institutions supporting them had developed over decades in the Western 
world (Ibid: 139). Market economies to a large extent rely on economic exchang-
es, which implicitly involve interpersonal relationships, and, thus, trust. Such trust 
is in developed market economies underpinned by legal systems and the rule of 
law (Ibid: 158). In his seminal work, Douglass North examines the importance of 
institutions for economic performance with a central focus exactly on the way in 
which human cooperation allows economies to reap the gains from exchange, and 
how institutions can facilitate or hamper such cooperation (North, 1990: vii). 
North defines institutions as the rules of the game in society, or the constraints, 
which shape human interaction by structuring incentives for political, social and 
economic exchange (Ibid: 3). The central argument is that institutions in modern, 
developed economies lower the transaction costs involved in economic exchange, 
thereby allowing economies to reap the benefits thereof and grow at a higher rate 
than economies, where fewer, less complex transactions take place. At a low stage 
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of economic development, economic exchange involves small-scale production, 
local trade  -characterised by repeated exchanges between the same actors-  and 
cultural homogeneity, which reduce the need for third party enforcement or adju-
dication. Transaction costs of exchange are low, but so is the level of economic 
specialisation and, thus, economies at this stage tend to be small (Ibid: 34). In tra-
ditional societies, the lack of formal rules and institutions were compensated by 
dense social networks (Ibid: 123). The increased variety and number of exchanges 
involved in modern economies call for more complex agreements, and personal-
ised exchange, thus, becomes less effective (Ibid: 34). In other words, for devel-
oped economies trust needs underpinning by third party enforcement; credible 
institutions and consistent enforcement of the rule of law. 
According to North, institutional development hinges on the interplay between 
institutions and organisations. The latter are formed to assist individuals in taking 
advantage of the opportunities created by institutions; as organisations evolve, 
institutions are altered. Importantly, North acknowledges that individuals are not 
rational but act on imperfect information according to subjective interpretations 
(Ibid: 8, 16). Consequently, the persistence of imperfect institutions, such as inad-
equate property rights, are at least partially explained by insufficient information 
and subjective constructs, while the existence of institutions, which facilitate effi-
cient economic exchange, are a product of the concurrence between such institu-
tions and the private objectives of the power brokers (Ibid: 16). Modern European 
economies saw the development of voluntary enforcement mechanisms through 
merchant organisations and guilds, alongside the state emerging as a trustworthy 
adjudicator (Ibid: 128). The state in early modern Europe gradually began acting 
as a protector and promoter of merchants as it saw increased potential in extract-
ing revenues from them. Meanwhile, as the state in these early days was not a 
wholly credible enforcer, voluntary organisations developed to keep it in check 
and protect the merchants, who themselves were acting on the incentives created 
by potential for economies of scale in increased trade (Ibid: 35).  
Today, economic exchange in modern, developed economies take the form of 
impersonalised exchange with third party enforcement. This is critical for the suc-
cessful development and growth of modern economies, which are characterised 
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by complex economic exchanges (Ibid: 35). North suggests that many traditional 
economies, particularly those dominated by bazaars, lack the incentive structure to 
develop modern economic institutions which support impersonal exchange 
through third party enforcement owing to the prevalence of widespread, relatively 
impersonal exchange and small, high-cost transactions (Ibid: 123). Indeed, North 
suggests that bazaar, as well as traditional or tribal, economies historically have 
required an external impetus for change and development (Ibid 125).  Like Lucas 
and Romer before him, North’s work also highlights the inaccuracy of neo-
classical growth theory, which predicts convergence over time of economic per-
formance, and suggests that institutions play a critical role in explaining divergent 
economic paths (Ibid: 3).  
*** 
The above outline of trade theory and related economic theories indicates that 
what is needed for attaining sustainable economic development in developing 
countries is not merely openness to trade to facilitate growth through technologi-
cal and human capital advances and specialisation but also policies aimed at re-
ducing inequality and developing institutions, which facilitate efficient exchange. 
In the next section, I shall turn to economic integration theory relating it to these 
propositions.  
1.1.5 Liberalisation and economic integration  
Within the field of economics integration refers to the elimination of forms of 
discriminations, for instance the removal of barriers to trade, and can, as previous-
ly noted, be understood as process and also as a state of affairs. Bela Balassa 
(1962: 1) in his seminal work on economic integration defines the former as 
‘measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging 
to different national states’, and the latter as ‘the absence of various forms of dis-
crimination between national economies’. The focus of the thesis is on enablers of 
a process of integration. However, it should be noted that integration as state of 
affairs can be subdivided into different types. Balassa identifies the following five 
ideal types: free trade area (FTA), customs union, common market, economic 
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union and complete economic integration – each representing a higher level of 
integration (Ibid: 2).  
Rationales 
As shall be elaborated upon below, the enlargement of markets through economic 
integration offers possible gains from increased competition, economies of scale, 
increased consumer choice and potential reduction in internal inefficiencies of 
firms (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 31). However, evidence of such benefits accru-
ing from regional integration is sparing, while evidence in favour of unilateral 
liberalisations (understood as removal of discriminatory barriers) abound (Ibid: 
51). Thus, it can be argued that in terms of trade performance alone, regional inte-
gration schemes are inferior.  
Broadly speaking three motivations for regional integration can be discerned: 
firstly, the aim of attaining better access to foreign markets; this particularly goes 
for attaining access to larger markets and (potential) trade partners with high trade 
barriers. Secondly, international agreements on integration can act as focal points 
for domestic reform as well as increase the credibility of a country’s commitment 
to reform. Thirdly, certain political objectives require economic integration, in-
cluding the facilitation of club goods such as improved infrastructure or the reso-
lution to shared problems – such as the use of shared natural resources (Hoekman 
and Kostecki, 2009: 479-481). Other political objectives relate to the forces of 
globalisation; integration offers a means of retaining sovereignty through pooling 
as well as meeting the drive for increased efficiency through enlarged markets and 
increased competition (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 6). Less productively, interna-
tional trade agreements can be used to give the appearance of reform or strength-




                                                 
9
 For developing countries industrial development was through the 60s and 70s a rationale for 
economic integration, the idea being infant industry protection within a wider area than the nation-
al economy. However, the economic rationale for this is flawed (see for instance Gandolfo, 1994: 
135-137) and such integration schemes must therefore be based on non-economic objectives 
(Schiff and Winters, 2003: 65).  
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Effects of economic integration 
As noted, it is now widely accepted that a strong international trade performance 
is an important source of economic success. Reduction of trade barriers through 
economic integration can be a means to increasing trade performance. However, 
as demonstrated by the theory of second best, partial reduction of barriers does not 
necessarily optimise an economy’s trade performance. Thus, to judge the effects 
of economic integration schemes one must consider its net effect on trade. 
Jacob Viner (1950) in his pioneering work on customs unions established the net 
effect of such to be determined by their trade creating and trade diverting effects. 
The former refers to the improvement of resource allocation following economic 
integration; that is, the elimination of trade barriers leading to trade in commodi-
ties not previously traded between partners. Lifting of trade barriers allow for 
production to shift to the more efficient producers. Trade diversion on the other 
hand, refers to the diversion of trade from more efficient producers in non-partner 
economies to less efficient producers in partner economies made lucrative by the 
abolition of intra-union trade barriers. This in effect means a worsening of re-
source allocation (Gandolfo, 1994: 148). 
The net effect of four factors determines whether the establishment of an FTA 
represent a move towards free trade or in fact increase discrimination. The four 
factors are: production effects, consumption effects, terms-of-trade effects and 
administrative economies. The latter straightforwardly affect real income by in-
creasing or lowering administrative costs (Balassa, 1962: 24). Both the production 
and consumption effects have trade creating and diverting elements. When refer-
ring to trade creation and diversion in the broad sense, it is as a product of the two 
(Gandolfo, 1994: 150). 
Production effects can either be negative or positive. Negative production effects 
occur when the integration scheme causes a shift in source of supply from lower-
cost foreign (non-partner) to higher-cost partner country suppliers, that is trade 
diversion; positive production effects occur when the integration scheme con-
versely causes a shift in supply from a more expensive domestic to a cheaper 
partner-country supplier, that is trade creation (Balassa, 1962: 23). It is impossible 
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to make precise a priori judgements on the net production effects of specific inte-
gration schemes but certain rules of thumb exist. Integration between competitive, 
rather than complementary, economies is more desirable because competitiveness 
facilitates efficient reallocations of resources when intra-industry trade is more 
prevalent (Ibid: 29, 33). Furthermore, intra-industry trade gives rise to less ad-
justment costs than inter-industry trade as jobs lost to consumer shifts can be off-
set by job expansion owing to increased foreign demand of similar goods. Also, 
political opposition to inter-industry trade may be stronger as less competitive 
industries will fight it. Intra-industry trade does involve adjustments but injury is 
generally at the firm not industry level, which typically reduces the likelihood of 
lobbying (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009: 482).  
Proximity can similarly be assumed to favour positive production effects if it 
leads to the (re-)establishment of continuity of economic flows, which are other-
wise hindered by national borders. This assumption rests on notions such as lower 
transport costs in cases of proximity as well as similar tastes across consumers 
(Balassa, 1962: 39-40). Latterly, it can be assumed that positive production effects 
will be larger where initial tariffs are relatively high on trade between the partici-
pating countries, where the tariff level on non-partners is low, and the lower the 
tariff level is in export markets outside the area (Ibid: 44-45). Trade diversion 
occurs only when an economy’s production costs are out of line with the costs and 
prices in the rest of the world. If a country has low tariffs before entering into 
economic integration scheme this will not be the case, and trade diversion unlike-
ly (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 34).  
The consumption effect arises from efficiencies of exchange owing to the equali-
sation of price ratios, which diverged as a consequence of pre-integration tariffs. 
Similar to the production effect, consumption effects can be negative or positive; 
the former arising from discrimination against third countries and the latter from 
the abolition of discrimination between member states. Consumption effects tend 
toward the positive, that is, trade creating, when consumers substitute partner 
country goods for domestic rather than foreign goods (Balassa, 1962: 57-59). 
Given changes to trade patterns, positive consumption effects will be larger, when 
initial differences in price ratios are high between member countries. Negative 
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effects, or trade diversion, occur when consumers have to substitute more expen-
sive foreign goods, from partner economies, for cheaper goods from non-member 
economies, which have become non-competitive following an integration scheme 
(Gandolfo, 1994: 149-150). Trade diversion will be less when the price ratios of 
traded goods differ less between partner and non-partner economies (Balassa, 
1962: 59).  
As a rule of thumb, the more trade conducted between (prospective) partner coun-
tries as opposed to between partners and non-partners, the more likely it is that the 
consumption effects of integration will be positive; likewise, the smaller the de-
gree of trade with non-partners by prospective members, the unlikelier are nega-
tive consumption effects. Further, the higher the initial tariff level between mem-
bers, the greater is the distortion remedied, and thus the greater the gain from in-
tegration. As the assumption is that proximity and competitive production struc-
tures facilitate positive production effects, so one can also assume that the greater 
the degree of competitiveness between members, the greater the consumption ef-
fects, as this implies substitutability of goods and thus higher likelihood of trade 
increases. Likewise, complementarity with non-members is akin to low-
substitutability and thus indicates a lower degree of trade diversion (Ibid: 60-61). 
Certain factors mitigate the trade creating and diverting effects. Goods produced 
in different countries are rarely perfect substitutes, which along with transport 
costs and other non-tariff barriers limit the shifts of imports. Thereby both the 
costs of trade diversion and benefits of trade creation are moderated (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003: 35). 
Terms-of-trade are affected by integration in the short term via trade diversion and 
exchange rate adjustments. Trade diversion shifts the reciprocal demand of mem-
bers’ for foreign goods, that is members’ demand for goods from another country 
and vice versa, and causes an improvement of their terms-of-trade; ceteris pari-
bus, the greater the shift, the greater the improvement (Balassa, 1962: 63). Mean-
while, the need to equilibrate balance of payments post-integration will lead to 
exchange rate shifts depending on the height of pre-integration tariffs in the indi-
vidual member countries. Currencies in countries with higher tariffs are likely to 
depreciate as other member countries may encroach upon their markets. In the 
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long run, terms-of-trade are influenced by the income effect, whereby an increase 
in real income deteriorates the FTA’s terms-of-trade, and the substitution effect, 
whereby terms-of-trade deteriorate if a productivity increase leads to a general 
reduction in the price level. Conversely, if the productivity increase is focused in 
the import-competing sectors, the price reduction will favour the terms-of-trade 
(Ibid: 63-64). It has been questioned, however, whether terms-of-trade effects are 
a noteworthy source of gain in the case of developing countries (Cooper and Mas-
sell, 1965: 461); and improvement of terms-of-trade rarely acts as a rationale for 
economic integration (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 65).  
To summarise, for the world economy, integration will ceteris paribus increase 
static efficiency when the participating economies are of a competitive structure, 
the greater the pre-integration difference in cost of commodities produced, the 
larger the size of the union, the higher the proximity, the higher the level of pre-
union tariffs, and the greater the degree of pre-union economic exchange between 
participating economies. As noted, an additional factor is administrative econo-
mies, which in the case of a free trade area (as opposed, for instance, to a customs 
union) are likely to be negative as increased administration is likely, cf. below 
(Balassa, 1962: 68). 
Economic activity is fundamentally about increasing welfare; consequently eco-
nomic integration schemes must be judged by their effect on welfare. Four aspects 
of welfare are influenced by integration: change in the quantity of goods pro-
duced, change in the degree of discrimination between foreign and domestic 
goods, redistribution of income between countries as well as within countries 
(Ibid: 10-11). The former two aspects represent potential welfare, or efficiency, 
changes; whereas the latter two are distributional aspects of welfare. 
Efficiency can be evaluated in terms of static and dynamic effects. Static efficien-
cy refers to the economy working on the frontier of its production possibilities, 
while dynamic efficiency improvements involve pushing that frontier outwards, 
and thus represent the real test of economic integration schemes (Ibid: 13-14). 
Static efficiency concerns increased (decreased) potential welfare, where the 
quantity of goods and services produced with given inputs increase (decrease). 
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Additionally, static efficiency refers to efficiency in exchange, an improvement of 
which through removal of tariffs and other forms of discrimination, also repre-
sents an increase in potential welfare (Ibid: 11). Dynamic efficiency, meanwhile, 
refers to the hypothetical growth rate of national income, which can be achieved 
with given resources and savings ratio (Ibid: 13). The main factors affecting dy-
namic efficiency are technological progress, the allocation of investment, dynamic 
inter-industry relationship in production and investment along with uncertainty 
and inconsistencies in economic decision-making (Ibid: 14). Dynamic benefits of 
integration relate to larger market size and increased competition. Firstly, larger 
markets facilitate economies of scale, which can operate at a number of levels. For 
instance, certain production techniques or equipment, which may increase effi-
ciency, only become viable at larger scale production; higher rates of output econ-
omises certain non-proportional activities such as planning, design and research; 
and production of larger quantities can allow for specialisation within the labour 
force (Ibid: 122). 
Furthermore, with respect to the size of markets, it is instructive to consider per 
capita income. When there is a rise in income per head, the consumption of goods 
which experience increasing returns (typically manufactured goods) tend to show 
a disproportionate increase. Consequently, higher per capita income reflects larger 
markets for goods experiencing increasing returns (Ibid: 107). It follows that for 
sectors experiencing increasing returns, that is, in which productivity depends on 
the size of the market, a widening of the market through integration should theo-
retically contribute to productivity growth. This suggests that integration can 
boost economic growth – though this may be a level, or transitory, effect (Ibid: 
108). The larger market affects diffusion of technological change through differ-
ent industries in addition to the effects on specialisation. Furthermore, it can be 
speculated that larger markets reduce the risk and uncertainty with respect to the 
introduction of new products or processes, suggesting that quantitative measures 
may underestimate the correlation between market size and productivity (Ibid: 
112). 
A further source of dynamic gains from integration is intensified competition, 
which contributes to elimination of inefficient producers and stimulates techno-
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logical change. Enlarging markets de-personalises market competition and may 
thus make competition more efficient as the individual manufacturer will be less 
fearful of encroaching on competitors’ markets and of retaliation. Also, market 
enlargement is likely to untie monopolistic and oligopolistic markets shifting the 
former towards the latter and reducing the scope for collusion in the latter (Ibid: 
164-66). Economic integration, furthermore, can contribute towards reducing the 
risks and uncertainties involved in international trade, and thereby augment it. 
International agreements, if credible, will serve to reduce uncertainties with re-
spect to erection of future trade restrictions as well as changes to such barriers; 
though without complete harmonisation of economic policies some risk and un-
certainty will persist (Ibid: 179). Reduction of risk and uncertainty, particularly 
with respect to investment decisions, is critical for developing economies integra-
tion into the world economy.  
Policy integration 
Policy integration occurs when countries negotiate agreement on the treatment of 
goods and/or firms; this is distinguished from agreements by which foreign goods 
and firms are treated as domestic which does not constitute integration (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003: 149).
10
 Integration can occur through intergovernmental policy 
coordination, harmonisation or recognition of standards. It involves deliberate 
government action, which goes beyond national treatment seeking to reduce mar-
ket segmentation stemming from differences in regulatory regimes (Ibid: 151-
153). By reducing transaction costs policy integration can increase competition 
and facilitate elimination of market failures. While most integration schemes 
merely reduce market segmentation by limiting the use of national trade policy, 
policy integration can facilitate implementation and enforcement of a trade 
agreement, and can enhance the gains from forming a trade bloc (Ibid: 147). 
Policy integration facilitates the internalisation of externalities; that is, situations 
under which the actions of one government negatively affect another country’s 
                                                 
10
 National treatment is sometimes referred to as ’shallow policy integration’ (Schiff and Winters, 
2003: 151). 
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economy. This raises the possibility that cooperation under an economic integra-
tion agreement may over time increase trust between member states, thus, facili-
tating cooperation in other policy areas (Ibid: 164). 
Developing economies 
Developing economies face a series of challenges, which economic integration  -
or specifically market enlargement-  may alleviate. Developing markets in them-
selves have a restrictive effect on economic development; that is, industry will 
struggle to develop without a certain level of domestic demand and profitable ex-
port opportunities. Obstacles to the latter include both international trade barriers 
and the more developed production structure of modern economies (Balassa, 
1962: 153). Whether less developed economies seek to develop their industrial 
sector via nurturing a few branches of manufacturing or seeking the parallel de-
velopment of several industries, they face challenges. The latter, for instance, will 
involve supply limitations, while the former requires building capacity ahead of 
demand (Ibid: 153-55). Integration will not absolve developing economies of this 
type of dilemma; however, enlarged markets may prove a means through which to 
release external economies. For instance, larger markets contribute to the spread 
of existing knowledge among given industries across countries and increased 
competition within industries is likely to lead to a higher rate of technological 
change (Ibid: 155-156).  
It has been suggested that integration efforts involve more substantial benefits 
from increased competition for developing countries vis-à-vis developed, because 
small economies have more scope for exploiting economies of scale and reducing 
monopolistic power (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 52). Empirical studies have, how-
ever, not confirmed this directly. Indirect empirical evidence suggests that gains 
depend on the level of intra-industry trade, which tends to be of less significance 
between developing countries (Ibid: 47). In summary, there may be important 
gains from increased competition and scale economies involved in integration for 
developing countries; however, such gains are not automatic but depend on poli-
cy, such as ensuring low barriers to entry and free competition (Ibid: 54).  
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Domestic supply constraints are key to releasing potential trade gains as they ex-
plain the lack of trade-led growth and diversification in poor economies. Improv-
ing supply capacity, reducing transport costs from remote areas and increasing 
farm productivity is necessary for potential trade gains to be utilised (Hoekman 
and Kostecki, 2009: 564-565). Industrial development is a pillar of economic de-
velopment, which is why less developed economies often protect their manufac-
turing sector in an effort to nurture it. This, however, implies a bias against small-
er entrepreneurs, who particularly find it difficult to obtain credit (Ibid: 553). Fur-
thermore, the tariffs and subsidies employed to promote industry do not incentiv-
ise competition and acquisition of knowledge; rather as they are output-based, the 
incentives are for greater production, which means that firms will seek to increase 
output in the least costly way – not seeking technological advances in production 
methods (Ibid). The potential liberalising trend of FTAs along with the competi-
tive pressure of enlarged markets may alleviate such protectionist tendencies of 
developing economies. 
Acquisition of knowledge and technology transfer often occurs through foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which can be boosted by the lowering of trade barriers. 
Potential knowledge transfer through FDI is three-fold. Local firms will increase 
productivity by copying technology introduced to local competitors affiliated with 
foreign firms. Entry of a foreign affiliate also intensifies local competition forcing 
local producers to use existing resources and technology more efficiently, as well 
as forcing them to search for new, more efficient technology. However, foreign 
firms may seek to limit knowledge spillover, and may even negatively impact the 
productivity of domestic companies. Foreign firms are likely to engage the best 
skilled workers and their entry may reduce the market share of domestic compa-
nies, thus, shrinking their scale economies (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 133-134).  
Critical to attracting investment is the institutional environment. That is to say that 
general policy reform ensuring inter alia a sound macro-economic policy and pro-
tection of property rights is more important than integration. A stable macro-
economic environment, liberalisation and privatisation raise returns to all factors 
and thus foster investment. Accordingly, it is not the regional integration scheme 
itself that will encourage investment but it may enhance investment potential by 
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boosting credibility of a country’s commitment to reform (Ibid: 102-103). Credi-
bility in and of itself is critical for reform to succeed. If reform efforts are not 
judged by investors to be credible, they are unlikely to respond positively. Lack of 
credibility can stem from a government’s historic tendency towards reform rever-
sal, or the risk that a shift in government leads to shifts in policy. Moreover, raids 
on firms or investors by kleptocratic regimes strongly deter investment (Ibid: 
107). The benefit of an integration scheme is not only that it can help ‘lock in’ 
reforms but its potential for altering incentives for behaviour and policy. By per-
mitting punishment of non-compliance, an integration scheme can incentivise 
desired behaviour as well as increase credibility of reforms (Ibid: 108). 
For developing countries, integration schemes involve certain challenges. For in-
stance, entering an integration scheme erodes trade tax revenues. This happens 
directly as tariffs are reduced or eliminated between members and indirectly when 
trade diversion occurs as imports shift from external imports subject to tariffs. 
This is a challenge particularly for developing countries because they tend to rely 
more on import tariffs as this is a more reliable and easy source of tax revenue. 
Consequently, entry to an integration scheme may need to be accompanied by 
efforts aimed at increasing tax take from other sources such as excise, sales or 
value-added taxes – and ensure that an alternative source of tax revenue is in place 
before the integration scheme takes effect (Ibid: 94). A further tax-related problem 
is the downward pressure on indirect taxes caused by integration schemes. With 
free flow of goods across borders, governments may be tempted to capture more 
of the trade by lowering indirect taxes (Ibid: 98-99). In the case of developing 
countries, which often struggle to bring in sufficient tax revenue, such downward 
pressure can be considered problematic. On the other hand, a shift towards more 
direct taxation may have the effect of increasing domestic demand for improved 
accountability of public spending, potentially contributing to improved govern-
ance. 
For developing countries it can furthermore be a problem, when some members of 
a trade bloc account for a disproportionate share of the bloc’s import-competing 
production, and thus tariff-free trade. Other members are likely to feel a need for 
compensation (Ibid: 96-97). As is suggested in section 1.2 below, the participation 
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of an undisputed regional leader willing to compensate partners may help alleviate 
such concerns. 
Developed and developing country integration schemes 
Determining the desirability of economic integration is a case-by-case exercise, 
which cannot be separated from the question of who participates or how it is im-
plemented. The level of trade between economies does not necessarily make for a 
useful indicator as proponents of the ‘natural trading partner’-argument have 
claimed; trade flows, for instance, can be high because of distortions and thus 
need curbing rather than nurturing (Ibid: 66-69). Certain rules of thumb can be 
discerned, however. For instance, for any given country, a larger country is pref-
erable to a smaller as the former is more likely to satisfy import demand without 
price increases, and also less likely to reduce price on target country’s export 
goods by ceasing imports from the ROW, where price is determined by world 
price plus external tariff (Ibid: 68).  
For developing countries it is preferable to integrate with a large, developed econ-
omy, which can supply the developing country’s entire import demand as in that 
case domestic prices will fall to the level of those in the developed partner coun-
try. Thereby the country may benefit from both increased consumption and re-
duced production cost of high-cost domestic substitutes. What is critical is how 
frequently and by how much the developed partner’s costs exceed the internation-
al minimum – for instance on many products the EU, pioneering developed-
developing country integration schemes, is not the least-cost producer. Secondly, 
the developing partner must be confident that prices will indeed fall to the level of 
the developed partner. If imports continue from third countries, which still face a 
tariff, the domestic price will not fall undermining the potential for gain (Ibid: 73). 
Furthermore, any curtailment of competition between developed economy-partner 
firms in the developing country market will undermine the potential for price re-
duction. In that case, the developing country government would lose tariff reve-
nue, firstly, to domestic consumers to the extent that prices fall, and secondly, to 
foreign producers to the extent prices rise above the level experienced before inte-
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gration. The former is merely a transfer within the developing country, whereas 
the latter would represent a transfer to the developed country (Ibid: 74).  
In the case of developed-developing country integration schemes, it is likely that 
the developing partner should gain if it is closer to world average rather than be-
ing extremely poor in capital and skills; in the latter case, it is likely to gain only if 
the partner country is extremely rich (Ibid: 70). A regional integration scheme 
between smaller, developing countries, on the other hand, is likely to have only 
trade diverting, not creating, effects. This is because in the face of unchanged con-
sumption level, consumption is shifted from more efficiently produced, and thus 
cheaper, foreign imports to less efficiently produced goods from the partner coun-
try no longer facing tariffs but unable to fully provide for the market. The result is 
trade diversion and at the aggregate a loss for both developing countries (Ibid: 
35). Furthermore, while empirical surveys of the effect of integration schemes on 
growth are not methodologically robust, they nevertheless consistently show that 
integration of developing countries does not stimulate growth, whilst it may posi-
tively affect growth in the case of developed-developing country integration (Ibid: 
123). Studies have for instance suggested that the latter is likely to generate 
productivity gains through knowledge transfer from the developing partner (Ibid: 
125).  
It has also been suggested that integration between developing countries can delay 
economic transformation because it skews development towards low-R&D inten-
sive industries, whereas developed-developing country integration favours the 
development of R&D-intensive industries in the developing country, thus, ad-
vancing economic transformation. Developing countries, thus, should choose a 
partner with a high stock of knowledge (Ibid: 129). Attraction of FDI from 
knowledge economies however typically requires strong protection of intellectual 
property rights (Hoekman and Kostecki: 2009: 403-404). Thus, for the developing 
countries to reap the benefits of integrating with a developed, knowledge econo-
my, institutions are likely to require strengthening. Again, this suggests that inte-
grating with an external actor may, if this be a developed country or region, sup-
port the long-term economic growth of developing states through development of 
more efficient institutions.  
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Integration schemes will stimulate investment to the extent that the expected re-
turns are raised and/or costs are lowered. This is unlikely to be the case for inte-
gration between developing economies, whereas it has been suggested that for 
integration of developed and developing countries the rate of return on capital 
could increase in both economies. Typically, integration schemes reduce transac-
tion costs of tradables relative to non-tradables. The former is commonly assumed 
to be more capital-intensive than the latter, thus, the integration scheme will in-
crease demand for capital and raise its rate of return. Also, lower tariffs and trad-
ing costs on capital equipment can reduce the price of investment goods, increas-
ing the rate of return and accumulation. Integration with a developed country, 
furthermore, can raise the efficiency of the financial sector in the developing 
country (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 114). Evidence is sparing but suggests that 
increased investment is most likely when integration occurs between developed 
countries, less likely when between developed and developing, and least likely in 
case of integration between developing countries (Ibid: 121). The removal of in-
ternal barriers in an integration scheme may encourage producers to allocate their 
operations across all member states more efficiently. This may stimulate vertical 
FDI, where the members differ in factor endowments, for instance in the case of 
developed-developing country integration, the developing country can attract la-
bour-intensive activities (Ibid: 119). 
The argument for improved market access through integration schemes is at times 
used to argue the superiority of integration schemes over unilateral liberalisation 
because the former involves preferential trading access. This is, however, only 
part of the story. The preferential access to foreign markets gained by producers 
come at the expense of domestic consumers and government revenue, and thus 
represents a transfer of resources. The state’s tariff revenue is transferred to either 
foreign producers or domestic consumers. The size of the transfer depends not 
only on volume of trade diverted or created, but overall volume of trade in affect-
ed commodities – and transfers can be significant (Ibid: 36). This is critical par-
ticularly for the case of integration between developed and developing countries, 
where the latter are at higher risk of losing. Developing countries typically import 
relatively more than developed countries, which means that the flows on which 
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revenue is lost will be relatively higher than on the flows from which they gain. 
Furthermore, developing countries tend to have higher tariffs; consequently, pro-
ducers in developed countries stand to gain more than producers in developing 
countries.
11
 Here again, the question of compensation becomes relevant. 
The tendency of integration schemes to be between neighbouring countries can 
partly be explained by motivations such as reducing the risk of conflict or sharing 
of resources. There is, however, also the possibility that a regional group of coun-
tries constitute a ‘natural market’ for certain goods that are, for reasons of tastes or 
excessive transport costs, not traded with the wider world (Ibid: 71-73). As for 
Central Asia one could perhaps make exactly such a case given the countries’ 
shared historical experiences and remoteness from world markets. Reduction of 
transaction costs related to customs clearance is another common rationale for 
neighbouring country integration (Ibid). 
As previously noted, entering an economic integration scheme can be a means of 
signalling and establishing trustworthiness around a commitment to reform and 
trade liberalisation. Integration between developing countries is unlikely to deliver 
on this front; in fact, it may have the opposite effect. When integrating with a de-
veloped country, such an effect is arguably more likely. However, the developed 
partner, expected to act as the enforcer, must be large and stable and have suffi-
cient interest in the developing partner to make it worth its while to take discipli-
nary measures (Ibid: 102). 
Supply chain trade 
In recent years, supply chain trade (SCT) has come to dominate world trade pat-
terns. The trend towards SCT opens opportunities for low-income countries, 
which may, for instance, supply foodstuffs to global retailers or become special-
ised suppliers of intermediate goods that build on particular comparative ad-
vantages (Hoekman, 2014: 17). The share of value added accruing to a developing 
                                                 
11
 A solution to this is unilateral tariff reduction. Empirical studies of Latin American economies 
have supported this conclusion, showing that regional integration had a lesser effect on their trade 
flows than the unilateral liberalisations they undertook (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 43). 
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economy may in the first instance be small, but may gradually increase, whilst in 
the shorter term participation in SCT also bring employment benefits (Ibid: 18). 
This trend demands open and transparent trade and investment regimes for the 
benefit of domestic as well as foreign companies. The burden of tariffs and NTBs 
on both imports and exports affects decisions regarding location of foreign in-
vestment but also enable or prohibit the integration of domestic firms in regional 
or global value chains (RVCs and GVCs). Trade policies, which restrict imports 
or raise the costs thereof, damage the ability to import intermediate inputs and 
services and thus damage a country’s ability to participate in SCT. A variety of 
policies may impact on a firm’s ability to engage in GVCs, the marginal value of 
one change may be offset by other cost-inducing policies. Consequently, it is in-
creasingly necessary to approach trade policy and trade facilitation in a compre-
hensive manner considering not only tariffs but also customs procedures, rules of 
origin, quality standards and infrastructure et cetera (OECD, 2013; Hoekman, 
2014: 1).  
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is an example of a multilateral policy 
framework aimed at enabling its members to tap into SCT. By eliminating intra-
regional trade barriers enabling supply chains to be created, AFTA enables lever-
aging intra-regional division of labour and specialisation with a view to increasing 
exports to ROW (EBRD, 2012b: 64). AFTA reflects the ‘flying geese paradigm’, 
which suggests that as the lead goose divests of its labour-intensive production in 
favour of more capital-intensive production, the low-productivity activities are 
transferred down the chain. The paradigm is contingent on FDI and the involve-
ment of multinational companies, which facilitate the transfer of technology 
(Ibid). 
*** 
In summary, the initial presentation on economic theory suggests that economic 
development requires openness to trade alongside reduction of inequality and in-
stitution-building. As the above discussion of economic integration suggests, this 
may represent a means through which developing countries can simultaneously 
move forward on these parameters. Integrating with a developed partner economy, 
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can potentially boost the trade performance of the developing country, as well as 
open the economy to technology and knowledge transfers, which in the long run 
can lift growth levels. Furthermore, institutional reform is likely encouraged and 
may even be boosted by the enforcement role played by the developed partner. 
The trend towards SCT augments the need for trade facilitation policies, and ap-
proaching trade facilitation in a comprehensive manner. As suggested by the 
AFTA, regional integration may also be a means by which to integrate in GVCs. 
1.1.6 Analysing economic potentials of Central Asian trade integration 
As I have outlined in the introduction, the traditional method of studying integra-
tion ex ante is by CGE models. Owing to lack of relevant data, this is not possible 
in the case at hand. Therefore, the following analysis will alternatively model ex-
pected trade flows between CARs and international partners. This will enable an 
indication of whether there is further potential for trade between Central Asia and 
the ROW as well as whether regional integration may carry benefits. However, as 
is possible with CGE models, this approach inhibits analysis of the distributional, 
welfare effects of integrating with the suggested regions. Likewise, the impact of 
informal trade lies beyond the scope of this methodology, which is otherwise de-
tailed in chapter 3. 
1.2 Achieving regional integration 
A first step towards examining region-building is to consider its preconditions. As 
Gurova and Efremova have noted (2011: 59), scholars have not given sufficient 
consideration to the question of prerequisites for economic integration within the 
post-Soviet space. Region-building can occur through two complementary pro-
cesses. Regionalisation represents bottom-up processes of trade-driven interac-
tions and transactions by private and other non-state actors. The process incurs 
increasing interdependency of societies and economies within the region, while 
diminishing  -relatively-  external interdependencies. Regionalism, on the other 
hand, is a top-down process of intentional policies designed to manage the process 
of regionalisation concerning both economic and security-related challenges in a 
given region. Regionalism can occur through highly informal policy-coordination 
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as well as through regime-building or inter-governmental, supranational institu-
tions (Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland, 2006; 4). 
Theories of regional integration were initially concerned with ensuring the avoid-
ance of war. Federalists approached this through proposed supranational levels of 
government, while functionalists were concerned about establishing the most effi-
cient form of governance introducing the mantra that ‘form follows function’ 
(Rosamund, 2000: 1-2, 32). The European experience of integration provided a 
case for further study and theorising on regional integration leading to the devel-
opment of neo-functionalist theory, which explored the interplay of economic and 
political integration (Ibid: 2). Neo-functionalism is largely focused on the pro-
cesses of ongoing integration, and thus less appropriate for studying the processes 
that instigate integration; though Ernst Haas did identify pluralistic social struc-
tures, economic and industrial development and common ideological patterns as 
requisite factors for successful integration (Ibid: 69). To put it differently, the the-
ory does not explore the process that lead country a and country b to decide to 
cooperate; the focus instead is on what integration in one area can or should lead 
to, and how (Ibid: 58). Accordingly, the theory’s key concept is ‘spill-over’, 
which describes the process by which one element of integration forces the next. 
Also technocratic, supra-national institutions play a key role in the explanation of 
integration representing an apolitical impetus for the spill-over processes (Wæver, 
1992: 74).  
Neo-functionalism along with federalism has been seen as a normative medium 
for the promotion of European regional integration (Rosamund, 2000: 8, 23). The 
main debate within the study of integration theory has been between neo-
functionalist and intergovernmentalists (Ibid: 2). With liberal intergovernmental-
ism theorists sought to move beyond the sui generis characteristics of neo-
functionalism applying only to the European case of integration, creating a gen-
eral theory of integration (Moravcsik, 1994: 29-30). This strand of theory offers a 
perspective on what causes integration by conceptualising demand and supply for 
integration. Demand stems from national governments, and is largely explained 
by the existence of negative, international policy externalities creating incentives 
for policy coordination (Ibid: 41). Supply, meanwhile, is represented by responses 
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of the institutions of integration to intergovernmental bargaining (Ibid: 37). While 
liberal intergovernmentalism does provide the opportunity for explaining the ini-
tialisation of integration schemes, its focus is on the operation of existing schemes 
with supply driven by intergovernmental institutions. 
In a study of Eurasian integration processes Anastassia Obydenkova found that 
contrary to the theories of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, 
functional pressures are not sufficient to drive integration. The study suggests that 
factors missing are voluntary and publicly supported associations as well as dem-
ocratic regimes (Obydenkova, 2011: 97). Further exploring such ideas, I will base 
my analysis around Walter Mattli’s The Logic of Regional Integration (1999). The 
framework, like intergovernmentalism, also operates with demand and supply as 
key variables, but primarily at the national level. Where the supply and demand in 
liberal intergovernmentalism are seen as separate, staged processes (Moravcsik, 
1994: 73), The Logic of Regional Integration considers demand and supply in 
parallel. That is, demand is to be found at the level of national societies and busi-
ness communities, and supply from national governments; the latter mediated by 
international factors. The framework is designed to explain instances of regional 
integration, which are voluntary in nature, and is explicitly focused on the creation 
of groups set up in response to another regional grouping (Mattli, 1999: 41). Mat-
tli has recognised, though, that his findings are useful in exploring the potential of 
regional groupings generally (Ibid: 17). 
1.2.1 Demand for integration 
The first of the two key factors identified by Mattli is a demand for integration; 
this is theorised to derive from domestic business actors seeking the development 
of a regional market. The explanatory variable here is economic gains from mar-
ket exchange. The benefits to economic actors from economic integration have 
been treated in more detail above; they include potential for economies of scale in 
production and exploitation of a country’s comparative advantage. Trade barriers 
make international trade and investment risky and incur potentially prohibitive 
costs through uncertainty and risks such as unexpected tariff changes, changes to 
non-tariff barriers, risk of late delivery or an unanticipated price hike. It is, thus, 
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business actors keen on increasing trade and investment, who are expected to de-
mand the elimination of risks and costs through market integration (Ibid: 46-50).  
Consumers are among the most likely to gain from market enlargement but as 
their individual gains are marginal they are less likely to organise and push for-
ward demands for integration. As noted above, there are also likely to be losers 
from economic integration, in the short if not the long term. Such groups, particu-
larly import-competing sectors, are likely to lobby against integration schemes, 
and will thus act as a countervailing force to any potential demand for integration 
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 151). Liberalisation of trade policy may over time shift 
the balance of power favouring the export-oriented economic actors, which ceteris 
paribus are more likely to have a liberal stance (Ibid: 38).  
1.2.2 Supply of integration 
The second main prerequisite is supply: the willingness of national governments 
to integrate. The main variable suggested by Mattli is economic growth. Assum-
ing that political leaders care about maintaining autonomy, they will be less likely 
to engage in integration schemes which diminish this, when an economy is expe-
riencing significant growth. In times of economic difficulty, leaders are more like-
ly to pursue an economic policy that may improve the economy’s performance 
(Ibid: 50-51). Thus, the willingness of a national leader to engage in cooperation 
with other states depends on the political pay-off. In a democratic state, this pay-
off is directly linked to national economic growth as that is key to re-election. In 
an authoritarian state this link is mediated by the particular power structures and 
links between the political and economic elite, which keep the leader in power. In 
addition to the political power struggles, also bureaucratic resistance or inertia can 
hinder a political leader from committing to or implementing desired policies 
(Schiff and Winters, 2003: 86).  
As established in the previous section, unilateral liberalisations are generally su-
perior to regional integration schemes, where mere trade performance is con-
cerned. Thus, for a political leadership interested in liberalising trade policy, the 
integration scheme must involve greater expected gain vis-à-vis unilateral 
measures (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2006: 38). Meanwhile, certain developing 
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countries may be interested in foregoing some national income, if the integration 
scheme is likely to assist the country in developing an industrial sector (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003: 65). Expected gains, however, do not necessarily have to be quan-
tifiable. For instance, international agreements on trade or integration can offer 
support to a political leader wishing to push through trade policy reforms in the 
face of bureaucratic resistance. Alternatively, the pay-off of an integration scheme 
can relate to the potential for improving relations with partner countries, thus al-
lowing for the resolution of non-economic difficulties in bilateral relations. In-
creased trade involves an increase in economic exchanges, which may facilitate 
mutual understanding and trust (Ibid: 189-190). Latterly, one can imagine that for 
weaker states regional integration offers a means to more effective governance 
through resource pooling and collective action on shared challenges (Ibid: 203-
204). 
 
Following an analysis of collective action dilemmas Mattli concludes that the 
likelihood of regional integration is greatly enhanced by two complementary sup-
ply-side factors. One the one hand, an undisputed regional leader prepared to 
compensate less-willing states will increase the likelihood of an integration pro-
cess succeeding (Mattli, 1999: 55-56). In trade blocs a situation may, for instance, 
occur by which some countries suffer trade diversion, while others gain. The for-
mer are likely to feel a need for compensation; particularly so if trade policies, not 
just trade, is imbalanced (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 96-98). Compensation, how-
ever, is a complicated matter illustrated by the fact that costs are direct and appar-
ent, whereas benefits are diffuse and accumulate over the long term. Nevertheless, 
addressing it may be indispensable as history has seen regional integration 
schemes falter on the failure of compensation schemes (Ibid). Compensation 
schemes are critical to fostering a sense of community or cooperative spirit on 
which potential appeasing effects of integration would rest. Such are more likely 
when integration occurs between relatively balanced partners, who perceive bene-
fits to be evenly distributed (Ibid: 188).  
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The second supplementary supply-side factor outlined is commitment institutions 
(such as the European Court of Justice or the Commission in the case of the EU) 
ensuring that all participants play along with the commonly agreed rules increases 
the likelihood of the national political leadership playing along (Mattli, 1999: 53-
55).   
1.2.3 Regionalism through interregionalism 
Globalisation and associated interdependencies have been accompanied by devel-
opments in the structures of governance leading to a multi-layered international 
system of different actors and entities with varying capacities to act and engage 
(Doidge, 2011: 31-32). Such developments have renewed the academic interest in 
regions but also the interaction between regions, so-called interregionalism. Re-
search in the field has covered issues such as the forms and functions, culture, 
degree of institutionalisation and collective identity building such relationships 
involve (Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland, 2006: 6-12).  
Functions of interregionalism have been defined to include balancing of interna-
tional relations, institution-building, rationalising, agenda-setting and collective 
identity formation (Doidge, 2011: 34-48; Hänggi, Roloff and Rüland, 2006: 11). 
The balancing function can operate at two levels. One the one hand, balancing can 
be focused on increasing a region’s autonomy and avoiding marginalisation in the 
global system. On the other, balancing can be a means of reducing the influence 
of other global actors (Doidge, 2011: 35-36). The function institution-building 
refers, on the one hand, to institutions as the product of interregionalism  -both at 
the regional and interregional level-  and the way in which such institutions con-
tribute to the institutionalisation of global political relations (Ibid: 36-37). Ration-
alising involves the use of interregionalist structures to manage the complexity of 
wider multilateral negotiations (Ibid: 38-39), while agenda-setting indicates the 
use of interregional fora to cooperatively set the agenda at the international level 
(Ibid: 38). Latterly, the function of collective identity making suggests that inter-
regional dialogue can build or strengthen the identity of a region engaging in such 
interaction (Ibid: 45-48). This function is of particular interest for current purpos-
es. 
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The function of collective identity formation is most relevant where the collective 
identity of one region in the interregional relationship is weak at the outset (Ibid: 
48). This builds on the notion that collective identity formation is prompted by 
external stimulation (Ibid: 47). One conception of such dynamics is that of ‘re-
gionalism through interregionalism’, which according to Heiner Hänggi (2003: 
199) works through two dynamics. At one level, interregional cooperation can 
strengthen the degree of cohesiveness of both regions, particularly the less cohe-
sive of the two. Secondly, interregional relations may be used by individual states 
to pursue their own regional objectives (Ibid: 199). The Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) in its early years provides an example of both mechanisms. The need for 
the Asian partners in ASEM to coordinate positions internally drove closer re-
gional cooperation and cohesiveness among East Asian member states (Ibid: 209-
212). Moreover, it has been argued that ASEM was used by East Asian member 
states, Singapore in particular, to foster greater regional cohesiveness with a view 
to establishing East Asia as a Triad region (Ibid: 212).  
Another relevant perspective of interregionalism is the concept of ‘external co-
gency’ whereby integration is stimulated by external pressure. External cogency 
can be positive in the form of expected benefits from integration  -the most com-
monly given example of this being the Marshall Plan’s impact on European inte-
gration-  or negative in the form of a common external threat. Examples of nega-
tive cogency include the presence of a common external enemy or danger 
(Doidge, 2011: 37-38). Latterly, it should be noted that collective identity for-
mation in response to external stimuli may be reactive or adoptive. That is, the 
weaker region in the interregional relationship may respond to the external stimuli 
of the other region by adopting or accepting the positions posited by the other, or 
by adopting a different stance (Ibid: 47). As noted above, Mattli’s framework, 
while being generally applicable, is aimed specifically at voluntary groupings that 
organise in response to an original group. Parallel to the notions of reactive or 
adoptive identity formation, Mattli suggests that responses may either be to seek 
to integrate with the original group, or set up a competing regional grouping (Mat-
tli, 1999: 61).  
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Building on the notion of commitment institutions as key to successful integra-
tion, and the credibility developed countries can bring to a developed-developing 
country integration scheme, chapter 5 will discuss the potential for regionalism 
through interregionalism in Central Asia. The logic of this idea is what lies behind 
initiatives such as Central Asia plus Japan and the EU’s Central Asia strategy, as 
outlined in the subsequent chapter, namely that the external actor facilitates re-
gion-building in the less cohesive region, in this case Central Asia. The question 
to be explored in the following chapters is whether the basic conditions for re-
gionalism to unfold in Central Asia are present, or whether attempts at regional-
ism through interregionalism are premature. 
1.3 Summary 
According to theory, international trade provides benefits in the form of lower 
prices and wider variety of goods to consumers as well as production gains to 
producers through specialisation. Protectionist trade policies amount to interven-
tions in free trade that result in diverging prices. Whilst non-economic motiva-
tions may lie behind protectionist policies, such barriers reduce trade at a cost to 
society. Liberalising trade policy allows more efficient allocation of resources 
towards an economy’s comparative advantage as well as increased consumption 
opportunities. Once transgressing the optimal situation of no barriers, it is howev-
er impossible a priori to determine whether elimination or the replacement of any 
one barrier to trade will improve the economic allocation of resources. The second 
best situation may be one in which other measures are moved (further) away from 
optimum. In the real world, where trade barriers are widespread, paradoxically, a 
protectionist policy can improve on an (already suboptimal) situation.  
Changes to trade policy may create winners and losers. Groups that benefit from 
any one protectionist measure, for instance, may lose out from changes to this, 
whilst others will gain. An example of this, pertinent to Central Asia, might be in 
relation to informal trade, where restrictive trade policies have led to significant 
informal trade in both legal and illegal goods, as further explored below. Illicit 
trade modifies the economic structure so that legal economic activity cannot be 
determined independently of the illegal economic activity. While this suggests 
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that the consequences of illicit trade in Central Asia are not straightforwardly neg-
ative, there are arguably factors related to the pervasiveness of illicit trade, which 
hinders economic development. Bringing informal trade in legal goods into the 
official economy would benefit state coffers through increased tax take but also 
businesses, which may allocate their funds more efficiently and grow their busi-
nesses. On the other hand, those currently benefiting from barriers to trade may no 
longer be able to collect bribes or earn rents. 
Economic growth has been showed to be positively related to knowledge creation 
and human capital, and through this international trade. Two sources of economic 
growth can be discerned: domestically generated innovation and internationally 
sourced imitation. Openness to trade facilitates the absorption of superior techno-
logical standards from more advanced economies. Economic growth also man-
dates distributional considerations because extreme inequality has been shown to 
inhibit sustained growth. For Central Asian societies, where inequality is high, 
this is a pertinent consideration, though beyond the scope of subsequent analysis. 
Economic exchange requires trust between transacting parties. In developed econ-
omies such trust is underpinned by institutions such as the rule of law and third 
party enforcement thereof. This reduces transaction costs and enables more com-
plex transactions, facilitating economic specialisation. In Western economies such 
institutions were developed through interplay with organisations representing 
economic actors. Organisations both enabled market actors to take advantage of 
the opportunities economic institutions provided and allowed the shaping of these 
institutions. Traditional, bazaar-based economies have been suggested to lack the 
incentives, and thus require external impetus, for the development of market eco-
nomic institutions. 
Regional economic integration involves market enlargement, which can boost 
competition, enable economies of scale and increase consumer choice. The driv-
ing forces behind regional integration include obtaining access to larger markets 
and markets protected by high trade barriers, creating a focal point or credibility 
behind domestic reforms, and political objectives, such as shared use of resources. 
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The key measures for evaluating the benefits of economic integration revolve 
around the notions of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade diversion indicates 
that trade is shifted from more to less efficient producers, while trade creation 
reflects improved resource allocation through new trade or shifts in trade to more 
efficient producers. While evaluating economic integration schemes is an exercise 
specific to each scheme, certain rules of thumb can be identified. Economic inte-
gration is generally more beneficial, when occurring between competitive rather 
than complementary economies, between proximate economies, where pre-
integration tariffs are high, the initial price ratios are high between members, and 
where there is a high level of trade between the participating economies, and rela-
tively less with the rest of the world. 
For developing economies, problems of economic development include low do-
mestic demand, barriers to export markets, supply limitations and the need to 
build supply ahead of demand. Enlarging markets may alleviate some of these 
concerns by increasing potential demand and gaining access to foreign technolo-
gy. Access to technology and investment is more likely to arise, when developing 
economies integrate with larger, developed economies. Such knowledge transfers 
are more likely to lead to productivity gains for the developing economy, and 
thereby growth. Developing-developing economy integration schemes on the oth-
er hand favour low R&D intensive industries and tend to shift consumption to-
wards less efficiently produced goods, and are therefore typically inefficient. An 
added benefit of integrating with a developed economy may be that this adds 
credibility to the commitments and any related economic reforms. Accessing FDI 
requires a strong institutional and credible environment. Where reforms are not 
seen to be credible, economic actors are unlikely to respond. 
The global economy is increasingly dominated by supply chain trade. Integrating 
with regional or global value chains necessitates a comprehensive approach to 
trade facilitation addressing tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers, qualitative stand-
ards and infrastructure. As such, policy integration aimed at reducing market 
segmentation arising from regulatory regimes is increasingly important. 
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Region-building can occur through two complementary processes: regionalisation 
and regionalism. The former denotes bottom-up processes of interaction between 
economic actors, whilst regionalism denotes a top-down process of intentional 
policies designed to manage the process of regionalisation.  
Traditional theories of regional integration, such as neo-functionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism, are considered ill-appropriate for current purposes, as their 
main focus is on ongoing integration frameworks. The Logic of Regional Integra-
tion, on the other hand, is aimed at explaining the initiation of integration 
schemes. The framework emphasises both the need for a demand for integration, 
particularly on part of national business communities, and supply of regionalism 
from national governments. Demand arises from economic actors, who would 
gain from the further opportunities for market exchange offered by integration. 
This demand may be counteracted by vested interest in the status quo, such as 
from import-competing industries. Supply for integration policies is likely to 
arise, where economic performance is poor, and the political leadership expects 
political pay-off from economic integration through higher economic growth. 
Such supply may also be counteracted by strong interests against, such as a politi-
cal elite or the bureaucracy with contrary interests. Unilateral liberalisation may 
be a more effective means of improving economic performance; therefore, supply 
of integration policy is likely to require demonstrable economic benefits over and 
above those of unilateral economic reforms. On the other hand, regional integra-
tion may offer other benefits such as raising the credibility of economic reforms 
and tying such into an international framework, or non-economic benefits such as 
building trust or sharing resources. 
In addition to supply of and demand for regionalism, successful regional integra-
tion may be facilitated by an undisputed regional leader willing to compensate 
losers, for instance countries losing tariff income or experiencing trade diversion; 
and commitment institutions to lock in policies. An alternative to commitment 
institutions may be integrating with a developed economy, which can act as en-
forcer of agreed norms or rules, and infuse credibility to an integration project. 
This may be considered under the framework of interregionalism, which studies 
the interaction of regions. Interregionalism can be aimed at balancing in interna-
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tional relations, institution-building within or between regions, rationalising or 
setting international agendas, and contributing to collective identity formation. 
The latter may be referred to as regionalism through interregionalism, whereby 
the cohesiveness of the weaker of two regions is strengthened through interaction 
with another. Also relevant to this is the idea of external cogency, where an exter-
nal actor either incentivises (positive cogency) or stimulates through threat (nega-
tive cogency) collective identity or region-building.  
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Chapter 2 Economies and integration of Central Asia 
The five post-Soviet Central Asian states are surrounded by some of the world’s 
more dynamic economies, including China, Russia, Turkey, India and the EU. 
Nevertheless, the CARs have not managed to turn their location at the centre of 
the Eurasian landmass into a driver for economic growth. A range of factors may 
explain this: landlockedness and distance to markets, the legacy of the USSR in-
frastructure, small domestic markets, as well as partial economic and political 
reform. These factors are arguably compounded by the lack of cooperation be-
tween the states. 
The Soviet Union brought previously unknown levels of development in terms of 
infrastructure, human and technological development to the region; on the eve of 
independence the CARs were, thus, left with a certain potential to build on. To-
day, the CARs are still characterised by high levels of literacy, educational at-
tainment, and health care, when comparing to countries at similar levels of eco-
nomic development – but, on all these parameters, the CARs are exhibiting nega-
tive trends (UNDP, 2005: 42-43). While the states have all reached impressive 
growth levels after the initial transition period, their growth can be characterised 
as growth without development. The failure to build on their potential has led to 
social problems, which endanger the stability of the region and by extension the 
stability of the Eurasian landmass, most immediately of neighbouring provinces 
within Russia and China. Despite the fact that the region has experienced econom-
ic growth since the mid-to-late 1990s, poverty indicators have not improved sig-
nificantly – save for Kazakhstan, which despite improvements in living standards 
has recently been characterised by social tensions in the form of labour strikes and 
Islamic extremism.  
This literature review serves to demonstrate that the lack of integration with the 
world economy hinders economic development in Central Asia. The first section 
considers the economic development of and policies pursued by the Central Asian 
republics since independence. Section two, then, looks at trade patterns within the 
region as well as with the rest of the world, and the impact of the landlocked posi-
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tions and infrastructure on trade and production structure. Latterly, section three 
considers historic and current attempts at regional integration within Central Asia 
and with external partners. 
2.1 Economic policies and development post-independence 
The breakup of the Soviet Union not only meant that the Central Asian republics 
had to establish independent state structures and institutions but also independent 
economies. As the vertical integration that characterised the Union vanished, new 
economic systems were needed. This was, and continues to be, a significant chal-
lenge in a part of the world that had not, prior to Russian colonisation and subse-
quent inclusion in the USSR, known modern state structures. The Soviet legacy 
was, on the one hand, an asset in the sense that the newly independent states 
emerged with a set of institutions, administrative infrastructure and educated pop-
ulations. On the other hand, the legacy also acted as a restraint on transition as it 
involves a history of centralised planning (and, correspondingly, unfamiliarity 
with open market economies), absence of the rule of law, an oversized bureaucra-
cy marred by patronage politics and a social contract threatened by the transition 
process (Luong, 2004: 1-2).  
The CARs were, during the Soviet era, dependent on Moscow for economic trans-
fers. These were the poorest republics of the USSR in per capita terms; economies 
on the margins of the Soviet economic complex supplying industry in the Western 
parts of the Union with raw materials in the form of oil, gas, cotton and grain. 
Industry was only rudimentarily developed and anything from machinery to con-
sumer goods was imported from other Soviet republics. Thus, they all faced stark 
challenges in terms of economic development (Dawisha and Parrott, 1994: 28). 
The economic structure of the CARs and their related dependence on the wider 
USSR economy meant that the immediate disruption to their economies following 
the Union breakup was greater than elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
(Akiner, 1994: 23). As a consequence of the disintegration of the CMEA, indus-
trial complexes collapsed which increased the commodity dependence of the 
CARs (Grafe, Raiser and Sakatsume, 2006: 163). The Central Asian republics 
already had the lowest standards of living in the USSR and the Central Asian in-
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dustrial workers the lowest productivity among Soviet workers (Bondarevsky and 
Ferdinand, 1994: 37). Moreover, the CARs were at the same time faced with 
higher birth rates and relatively high ratios of dependents per wage earner placing 
high demands for employment and social services on the Central Asian govern-
ments (Akiner, 1994: 23).  
In the following, I will briefly characterise the economies and post-independence 
economic policies of each republic and highlight similarities and differences. As 
previously noted, statistical data from Central Asian republics is generally consid-
ered of lesser quality, and thus, the statistical data presented in the following 
should be read with caution in mind. 
2.1.1 Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan’s main role in the Soviet economy was that of a supplier of primary 
products, particularly grain but also coal, oil and uranium. Manufacturing was 
developed only to a minor degree (Noren and Watson, 1992: 94). Despite Ka-
zakhstan having the third largest GDP of Union republics, the republic had a poor 
economic record with decline in labour productivity and per capita GDP falling in 
the decades leading up to the dissolution of the USSR (Olcott, 1997: 206). 
Economic policy 
Upon independence the Kazakh government rapidly defined a market-oriented 
reform plan (Nazarbayev, 2008: 10-11). As a vast country with a thinly spread 
population of low purchasing-power, the Kazakh economy does not allow for 
economic growth built solely on the Kazakh domestic market (Zhukov, 2005b: 
385). Moreover, given Kazakhstan’s need to attract both FDI and international 
expertise to develop its oil sector, the country was amenable to international de-
mands for liberalisation of its economy, and early upon independence began im-
plementing shock therapy-style liberalisation reforms (Esanov, Raiser and Buiter, 
2006: 46). In 1996 Kazakhstan also applied for World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership (WTO, 2014a). 
Initial reform steps included the abolition of subsidies, price liberalisation and 
privatisation of assets, which were completed through the first decade of inde-
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pendence, though many assets continued to be under state control (Gleason, 2003: 
45-47). With the introduction of the Kazakh Tenge (KZT) in November 1993, 
from 1999 a floating currency, Kazakhstan also liberalised its fiscal and monetary 
policies successfully (Ibid: 45).  
The initial reforms were followed up at the end of the 1990s with Kazakhstan’s 
Development Strategy to 2030, which inter alia aimed at making Kazakhstan one 
of the 50 most competitive economies in the world with a diversified economic 
structure (Nazarbayev, 2008: 24-30). At the annual presidential meeting with for-
eign ambassadors, February 2014, Nazarbayev emphasised the need for foreign 
partnerships to underpin the most recent strategy for economic development, Ka-
zakhstan 2050, particularly with a view to increasing technology transfer and local 
skills and knowledge through FDI (Weitz, 2014a). The importance Nazarbayev 
applies to this is clear from his later threat of sacking the government over its al-
leged failure to attract foreign investment (TengriNews, 2014a). 
Kazakhstan’s commitment to integrating with the global market, Europe in partic-
ular, is evidenced through the 2008 Path to Europe policy, which emphasises the 
adoption of European legal, technical and living standards (Kassenova, 2011: 50-
51). In recent years Kazakhstan has, however, prioritised economic integration 
with former Soviet partners through the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) and sub-
sequent EaEU as further discussed below. President Nazarbayev has pursued 
these integration schemes inter alia to attract foreign investors (TengriNews, 
2014b).  
Economic performance 
As a consequence of the rapid liberalisation, the economy contracted over the first 
years of independence. However, the increase in oil production combined with 
high oil prices transformed Kazakhstan into a world leader in terms of economic 
growth (Zhukov, 2005b: 38). Since 1996 Kazakhstan has seen impressive growth 
levels and from 2000 to 2007 GDP growth per annum averaged over 9 per cent. 
After a period of slow growth, immediately following the global economic crisis 
in 2008-9, annual growth returned to above 7 per cent of GDP in 2010-2011. Pres-
ident Nazarbayev has consequently sought to evoke comparisons with the so-
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called Asian Tigers by describing Kazakhstan as a Central Asian ‘Snow Leopard’ 
(Schmitz, 2009: 11).  
 
Table 2.1 – Annual GDP growth 2001-2011, per cent; Kazakhstan (World Bank, 2013) 
Kazakhstan is considered to have an open economy with few quantitative and 
administrative restrictions on foreign trade (EBRD, 2010a: 120-121). For in-
stance, the country has maintained low tariffs with a weighted mean applied tariff 
rate of 3.0 per cent over the period 2009-2013 (World Bank, 2014).
12
 Joining the 
ECU, however, meant a near-doubling of (simple mean) applied tariff rates from 
6.5 per cent to 12.1 per cent (Dreyer and Popescu, 2014: 1). On the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, which measures economic freedom on 
indicators covering the rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency and 
open markets, Kazakhstan is considered ‘moderately free’ (Heritage Foundation, 
2014a). Kazakhstan scored moderately on trade freedom (78.2), which reflects the 
use of NTBs in addition to the trade-weighted average tariff rate. Kazakhstan 
scored lower, however, on the other two indicators, which together with trade 
freedom indicate the degree of openness: investment freedom (40.0) and financial 
freedom (50.0); these lower scores reflect complex legal and regulatory systems 
(Heritage, 2014a). 
The Kazakh economy is dominated by services and industry, which in 2011 were 
estimated to represent 56.9 per cent and 37.9 per cent respectively, while agricul-
ture only made up 5.2 per cent of GDP (CIA, 2014a). A significant share of the 
labour force, meanwhile, is employed (2012 figures) in agriculture (25.8 per cent), 
while industry employs only 11.9 per cent. The majority of the labour force, 62.3 
per cent, is employed in services (Ibid). The level of intra-republican inequality in 
Kazakhstan is significant and reflects the dominance of oil in the economy. Ac-
                                                 
12
 Weighted mean applied tariff is the average of effectively applied rates weighted by the product 
import shares corresponding to each partner country. For comparison, EU member states have a 
weighted mean applied tariff rate of 1.0, while African countries typically maintain a level of 
around 10 (WDI). 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
13.5 9.8 9.3 9.6 9.7 10.7 8.9 3.3 1.2 7.3 7.5
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cording to Kazakhstan’s Statistics Agency average nominal income per capita in 
oil-rich Atyrau and main cities Almaty and Astana exceeded the national average 
by 2.4-1.8 times, while agriculturally dominated South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl and 
Almaty oblasts (provinces) had per capita incomes 23-40 per cent below average 
(Baimanov, 2014). The shadow economy is estimated to represent 25-30 per cent 
of the Kazakh economy (Kazakova, 2012). 
One particular success story of Kazakh transition has been the adaptation of inter-
national standards in the financial services sector, leading to rapid development of 
financial institutions – though the industry has yet to be entrenched in local prac-
tices and capital and stock markets are yet to attract significant foreign investment 
(Gleason, 2003: 50-51). The Kazakh financial sector was by 2008 experiencing a 
domestic crisis relating to banks’ overexposure to the domestic real estate market. 
These difficulties fused with the global financial crisis, but the country was in a 
position to weather the storms after accumulating oil earnings in the preceding 
decade (Pomfret, 2011: 139). 
Kazakh oil reserves are estimated at 30 billion barrels, proven natural gas reserves 
to 1.5 trillion cubic metre and coal reserves to 33,600 million tonnes (BP, 2014: 6, 
20, 30). The oil industry was in 2009 estimated to produce 1,785 thousand barrels 
per day of which 287 thousand barrels per day were consumed domestically (Ibid: 
8-9). Western countries are the main source of FDI to Kazakhstan, and more than 
half of this investment is directed towards the energy and mining sectors (Weitz, 
2013a). Kazakh government revenues are heavily reliant on the export of oil and 
minerals, which are in large degree exported to Russia, thus leaving the country 
vulnerable to the Russian economy, as was seen following the Russian financial 
crisis in 1998 (Gleason, 2003: 48-50). This reliance, now augmented through the 
ECU, was recently demonstrated when Nazarbayev ordered the Kazakh govern-
ment to draw up a plan to protect the Kazakh economy from Western sanctions 
against Russia (RFE/RL, 2014a). 
Liberalisation and economic diversification has not been pursued wholeheartedly 
as reflected by the underinvestment in physical and human capital. For instance, 
the National Oil Fund, which was set up in 2000, ostensibly to stabilise the econ-
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
75 
 
omy and provide savings for future generations (Kalyuzhnova, 2008: 51), has di-
verted funds from the national economy. The Fund functions opaquely, thereby 
sustaining corrupt practices of rent extraction, and has hitherto only invested in-
ternationally, thus not contributing to the development of Kazakhstan’s domestic 
economy (Zhukov, 2005b: 402). From 2014 the Fund is, however, set to start in-
vesting domestically in the Kazakh economy (TengriNews, 2013). Meanwhile, 
Samruk-Kazyna  -which was created in 2008 as a merger of the previously inde-
pendent funds Samruk, a national holding company intended to manage and pri-
vatise large state enterprises, and Kazyna, a national fund for development 
(Schmitz, 2009: 14, 25)-  with the aim of cushioning the national economy from 
fluctuations in the world economy and supporting economic diversification 
(Samruk-Kazyna, 2009-2014), is, arguably, a vehicle for state involvement in the 
market. The Kazakh Prime Minister chairs the board of Samruk-Kazyna, which 
controls assets worth 45 per cent of GDP, and work according to presidential 
strategies (Delovoy Kazakhstan, 2014a). Samruk-Kazyna is now seeking to re-
form itself into a more commercial organisation (Ibid), though there are concerns 
that continued state interference may inhibit this (Khamidov, 2014). Also in the 
hydro-carbon sector the state has further increased its involvement by renegotiat-
ing agreements with existing foreign investors, thereby increasing the state’s share 
in the sector (Schmitz, 2009: 9).  
Despite the early application for WTO membership in 1996, Kazakhstan has not 
yet become a member. Entry to WTO is currently held back by three issues: veter-
inary and phytosanitary measures, the harmonisation of import duties with other 
ECU members, and subsidies, including in agriculture (Ospanova, 2014). 
A World Bank study in 2012 suggested that with the then-setup of the ECU Ka-
zakhstan was losing 0.2 per cent in real income per year as a consequence of join-
ing the customs union with costs for businesses and consumers going up. The 
study suggested that the ECU had reduced real wages by 0.5 per cent and the real 
returns to capital by 0.6 per cent. Moreover, the study indicated that Kazakhstan’s 
trade with the ROW was reduced by entering the ECU with a consequent negative 
impact on the import of technology from advanced economies, negatively affect-
ing productivity over the long term (World Bank, 2012: 9).  
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The study also suggested that ECU membership may contribute to a shift in the 
structure of the economy away from services towards manufacturing (Ibid: 10). 
Meanwhile, the World Bank has previously found that WTO accession would 
result in 6.7 per cent gain in consumption, four to five times the positive effect of 
the optimistic scenario of ECU impact on the Kazakh economy (Ibid: 15). Posi-
tive impact from WTO accession is expected to arise from reform to FDI regula-
tion, local content laws and improved market access inter alia (Ibid).  
Kazakhstan scores well on regulatory efficiency in the Heritage Economic Free-
dom Index but the country’s record on rule of law  -measured by protection of 
property rights and freedom from corruption-   is considered poor and the judici-
ary subject to political influence (Heritage Foundation, 2014a). According to both 
the EBRD (2013a) and Heritage Foundation (2014a), diversification remains one 
of the main challenges for Kazakh economic policy; the EBRD also emphasising 
the need to reform domestic capital markets (EBRD, 2013a). 
2.1.2 Kyrgyzstan 
Though Kyrgyzstan also exported raw materials during the Soviet era, its econom-
ic structure was different to its regional neighbours. Initially, industrialisation of 
the republic was also focused on agriculture and mining of raw materials but dur-
ing World War II large industrial enterprises engaged in manufacturing for the 
military were moved from occupied parts of the USSR to Kyrgyzstan. Following 
the war, many continued to specialise in machinery and other types of output of 
heavy industries. However, like its neighbouring republics, Kyrgyzstan was reli-
ant on the import of manufactured products, and on budget subsidies from Mos-
cow, which were instantly withdrawn upon the breakup of the Union (CASE-
Kyrgyzstan, 2005: 9-10, 12).  
Economic policy 
Kyrgyzstan’s external debt eclipsed 100 per cent of GDP by 2000 with debt ser-
vice swallowing over half the budget revenue (Denizier, 2006: 97). Primarily as a 
consequence of its need for international aid and investment Kyrgyzstan, thus, 
opted for a shock-therapy liberalisation of its economy after gaining independence 
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(Pryde, 1995: 117). This path was possibly also facilitated by a relatively liberal 
outlook on the part of President Akayev (Ibid; Gleason, 2003: 81). Early Kyrgyz 
reforms were aimed at establishing the legal and regulatory basis for an open 
market economy, the privatisation of small enterprises, reform to the financial 
services industry, and allowing ownership of land (Gleason, 2003: 66, 69-70). As 
the first FSU republic to join the WTO, Kyrgyzstan removed export restrictions in 
the late 1990s (Ibid: 66, 71).  
Kyrgyzstan plans to join the Eurasian Customs Union in 2015, though it does not 
expect to meet all commitments prior to 2020 (RFE/RL, 2014b). This aim was 
listed in the country’s 2012 National Strategy for Sustainable Development for the 
Kyrgyz Republic. For the period 2013-17 (National Council for Sustainable De-
velopment of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014) as one of the country’s main priorities 
(Voloshin, 2013).  
Economic performance 
By 1997 the majority of Kyrgyz enterprises had been privatised which deprived 
the state budget of its main source of income. Tax revenues dropped from 27.1 per 
cent of GDP in 1990 to 13.5 per cent in 1996-2000 (Zhukov, 2005a, 313). Mean-
while, despite reducing the size of the public sector under international pressure 
(Gleason, 2003: 70), the state did not reduce expenditure sufficiently, thus, in-
creasing its reliance on foreign transfers (Zhukov, 2005a, 313). Growth rates have 
been highly precarious since independence as the table below suggests reaching a 
high of 8.4 per cent annual growth in 2007 and a low of -0.5 per cent in 2010.  
 
Table 2.2 – Annual GDP growth 2001-2011, per cent; Kyrgyzstan (World Bank, 2013) 
The EBRD (2010a: 122-123) ranks Kyrgyzstan an open economy, which is also 
reflected in a moderate trade freedom score (75.2) on the Heritage Economic 
Freedom Index. The weighted average mean applied tariff of Kyrgyzstan was as 
low as 2.4 per cent over the period 2009-2013 (World Bank, 2014). The Heritage 
index scores Kyrgyzstan less open on the parameters of investment freedom 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
5.3 0.0 7.0 7.0 -0.2 3.1 8.5 8.4 2.9 -0.5 5.7
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(60.0) and financial freedom (50.0), owing to weak legal enforcement and state 
interference (Heritage Foundation, 2014b). WTO-membership has led Kyrgyzstan 
to become the transit point for cheap Chinese goods to the region as a conse-
quence of its open borders (EBRD, 2010a: 122-123), and the country attracts a 
high level of investment (Heritage Foundation, 2014b). FDI in 2011 amounted to 
USD 693.5 million, the vast majority of which is directed towards manufacturing 
(IFC, 2013: 13).  
The Kyrgyz civil code outlines the basic principles of a free market, and equality 
under the law, and as such has been regarded one of the most progressive legal 
systems among former communist countries (Gleason, 2003: 75). The banking 
sector was, however, not reformed in compliance with international standards, and 
directed loans to loss-making state companies continued into the 1990s. The sec-
tor consequently went through a crisis induced by a high share of non-performing 
loans, despite improvements to the regulatory framework supported by the inter-
national community (Ibid: 74). 
In 2013 services were estimated to account for 44.8 per cent of economic activity, 
followed by industry (34.4 per cent) and agriculture (20.8 per cent) (CIA, 2014b). 
With the agricultural sector losing access to inputs from FSU partners, the sector 
regressed into subsistence farming following independence (Gleason, 2003: 66). 
Similarly, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and individual entrepre-
neurs account for 42 per cent of GDP, nearly one fifth of this group are individual 
entrepreneurs (2011-figures) (IFC, 2013: 17). Many operate in the shadow econ-
omy which has been estimated at 39 per cent of GDP covering mainly trade, pro-
cessing industry, construction, real estate deals, utilities, social and personal ser-
vices (AKIpress, 2013). A survey has suggested that while the share of SMEs par-
ticipating in the shadow economy has been on a downward trend, falling from 68 
per cent in 2008 to 49 per cent in 2011, the amount of hidden revenue grew, over 
the same period, from 31 per cent to 37 per cent (IFC, 2013: 4). 
Poverty is high in Kyrgyzstan with 52-57 per cent of the population living below 
the poverty line by the mid-90s. Poverty has remained at this level, or even in-
creased (Zhukov, 2005a: 305). In 2005 48 per cent of the labour force was esti-
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
79 
 
mated to be employed in agriculture, 39.5 per cent in services and 12.5 per cent in 
industry (CIA, 2014b). Meanwhile, an estimated one fifth of the Kyrgyz popula-
tion have emigrated for work. The vast majority (92 per cent), according to offi-
cial statistics, have migrated to Russia. Kazakhstan is the second most popular 
destination with 8 per cent of Kyrgyz migrants located there (Beishenaly, 2013: 4-
5). Despite over 40 per cent of migrants having post-secondary education, they are 
primarily employed in unskilled occupations. This indicates in the short term a 
brain drain impact on the Kyrgyz economy, and while the majority of migrants 
plan to return to Kyrgyzstan (Ibid: 10-11), they may in the interim be losing skills 
whilst working in unskilled occupations. Migrants, who typically act as self-
employed in the trade and services sectors, return remittances, which ease poverty 
and reduce inequality overall, but also contribute to subnational discrepancies as 
remittances mainly go to Bishkek and Osh, and are rarely invested in production 
resources (CASE-Kyrgyzstan, 2005:38-39). The World Bank estimated remit-
tances to amount to 31 per cent of GDP in 2012 (Chorshanbiyev, 2013).  
The EBRD notes improvements to investment climate, banking sector and energy 
sector reform as key challenges to the Kyrgyz economy (EBRD, 2013b). Heritage 
on the other hand focus on the need for governance reform, particularly with a 
view to establishing effective rule of law, reducing political interference and 
strengthening property rights (Heritage Foundation, 2014b). 
2.1.3 Tajikistan 
Tajikistan’s economy during the Soviet era was heavily reliant on transfers from 
Moscow. The economy was oriented towards external markets exporting primary 
products, including cotton and hydro-electricity. Consequently Tajikistan, despite 
some industrial production, was reliant on the import of both investments  -with 
up to 60 per cent of the budget subsidised from Moscow-  and of manufactured 
goods (Olimova, Kurbonov, Petrov and Kahhorova, 2006: 7-8). 
Economic policy 
Tajikistan’s economic development was impeded during most of the 1990s by the 
country’s civil war, though price liberalisation was undertaken quickly after inde-
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pendence (Cummings, 2012: 126). Following the war, under the influence of in-
ternational financial institutions (IFIs), the Tajik government introduced structural 
reform aimed inter alia at improving governance, restructuring the banking sector, 
privatisation and land reform (Gleason, 2003: 88).  
The National Development Strategy (NDS) sets out the Tajik government’s firm 
commitment to furthering market economic reforms of the Tajik economy (Re-
public of Tajikistan, 2006: 5). The strategy aims to boost economic growth; trig-
gering structural shifts of the economy, widening the private sector; improving the 
judiciary and law enforcement systems, and harmonisation with international 
standards (Ibid: 8). The NDS can be described as a roadmap in which timelines 
and figures do not match reality. The strategy, for instance, is considered discon-
nected from financial reality. While the government largely is committed to the 
implementation of the strategy, which was worked out with the support of the 
international donor community, ministers supposedly see it as a wish list for oth-
ers (the donor community) to finance (i/w WS). 
Economic performance 
The civil war delayed transition and a return to economic growth, while signifi-
cant parts of Tajik infrastructure were destroyed. Economic damages are estimat-
ed to have reached USD 7 billion (Olimova, Kurbonov, Petrov and Kahhorova, 
2006: 9). Public finances and monetary policy disintegrated, and inflation was 
rampant reaching triple-figure annual rates. By late 2000, external debt exceeded 
100 per cent of GDP with debt service representing over half of the budget reve-
nue (Denizier, 2006: 96-97). From 1997 growth slowly resumed, and annual 
growth rates reached 7.4 per cent of GDP in 2011 after slowing somewhat follow-
ing the global economic crisis in 2008-9. Public finances are now considered to be 
in good order (i/w IF), and expats suggest that the country has developed positive-
ly in recent years, noteworthy results include controlled inflation, poverty reduc-
tion and infrastructure developments (i/w Bjorvatn (#47/IO); WD). 
 
Table 2.3 – Annual GDP growth 2001-2011, per cent; Tajikistan (World Bank, 2013) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
10.2 9.1 10.2 10.6 10.5 -15.7 21.7 21.2 3.9 6.5 7.4
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Tajikistan joined the WTO in 2012 becoming the second CAR to enter the trade 
body (RFE/RL, 2012a). Almost all quantitative and administrative restrictions on 
foreign trade have been eliminated; while current account convertibility is nearly 
complete (EBRD, 2010a: 146-147). Tajikistan has relatively low tariffs, the 
weighted mean applied tariff level averaging 5.2 per cent over the period 2009-
2013 (World Bank, 2014); consequently Tajikistan scores moderately on trade 
freedom (73.2) in the Heritage Economic Freedom Index. However, this is a de-
cline on previous years, and on investment freedom and financial freedom, which 
together with trade freedom indicates the openness of the economy, Tajikistan 
scores rather low (25.0 and 40.0 respectively) (Heritage Foundation, 2014c).  
The service sector is estimated to dominate the economy accounting for 55.7 per 
cent of GDP (2013), with industry and agriculture representing 23.2 per cent and 
21.1 per cent respectively (CIA, 2014c). Traditionally, Tajiks are rural people and 
46.5 per cent of the labour force are estimated (2013) to work in agriculture (Ibid). 
A further 42.8 per cent are employed in services and just 10.7 per cent in industry 
(CIA, 2014c). Following land reforms, dekhon (household) farms’ share in agri-
cultural production rose to 70 per cent. Highlighting the subsistence nature of 
farming, these are largely non-mechanised and lack access to credit (Olimova, 
Kurbonov, Petrov and Kahhorova, 2006: 13). The Freedom to Farm Act of 2009 
is estimated to cover roughly 60 per cent of farmland, while the remaining 40 per 
cent are dedicated to cotton. However, farmers are directed in their crop selection 
by local strongmen. Moreover, the number of farms is increasing owing to a pro-
cess of dekhon disintegration (i/w WS). 
In 1999 95 per cent of the population lived below the provisional official mini-
mum consumption basket with 80 per cent considered poor, 33.3 per cent very 
poor, and 20 per cent extremely poor (Torm, 2003: 16). The government has had 
some success addressing such acute poverty. According to a 2007 survey, 53.5 per 
cent of the population was considered poor (according to basic household need 
methodology) down from 72.4 per cent in 2003. Rural areas have a markedly 
higher share of poor with 55 per cent classed as poor, against 49.4 per cent of the 
urban population (Republic of Tajikistan, 2010: 6-7). Poverty and unemployment 
have led to high levels of labour migration (Olimova, Kurbonov, Petrov and 
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Kahhorova, 2006: 48-50). Remittances in 2012 accounted for 48 per cent of GDP 
(Chorshanbiyev, 2013).  
In recent years there has been focus on the possibility that the country possesses 
reserves of oil and natural gas. Tethys Petroleum has suggested that Tajikistan 
could have reserves of up to 27 billion barrels of recoverable oil equivalent. While 
Gazprom has been active in Tajikistan for years, and the Tethys announcement 
prompted the interest of other global players, none has yet gone beyond explora-
tion phase (Parshin, 2013). There is some suspicion that ‘the hype’ is designed to 
boost political support for President Rakhmon (Ibid). Certainly the lack of trans-
parency surrounding official records of natural resource reserves has led geolo-
gists to question official claims (i/w WS). 
The financial services sector of Tajikistan is significantly underdeveloped with a 
loan portfolio of less than 10 per cent of GDP. Trading represents more than half 
of credit extended (Ibid), thus not supporting the productive capacity of the econ-
omy. Thus, there is further need for reform of financial services. The banking sec-
tor is weak, with banks privatised in principle but subject to government interfer-
ence in the form of both directed lending and corporate raiding (Torm, 2003: 9; 
Heritage Foundation, 2014c; i/w WS). 
Looking forward, the EBRD, in addition to the need for banking sector reform, 
calls for improvements to the business environment for smaller businesses as well 
as governance reform, including improved transparency (EBRD; 2013c). Similar-
ly, Heritage emphasises the need for governance reform going forward, with an 
emphasis on establishing the effective rule of law, while also noting the underin-
vestment in human capital (Heritage Foundation, 2014b). 
2.1.4 Turkmenistan 
Turkmenistan is a potentially wealthy state with large gas reserves and potential 
for agricultural production based on extensive irrigation. Along with Russia, 
Turkmenistan was a net donor to other Union republics, when considering that the 
Turkmen Soviet republic received below-world market transfer prices for the raw 
materials  -cotton and gas-  it supplied to industries in other parts of the Union. In 
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exchange Turkmenistan was given direct budget transfers from Moscow (Esanov, 
Raiser and Buiter: 2006: 48-49). The readjustment of prices following the dissolu-
tion of the USSR in fact led to a 50 per cent terms-of-trade gain for Turkmenistan 
(Anceschi, 2009: 72). 
Economic policy 
Political and economic reforms in independent Turkmenistan have consistently 
been aimed at preservation of the political system. Consequently, political liberal-
isation has been anathema (Ibid: 32). Turkmenistan was able to realise its natural 
resource rents, from gas and cotton and to a lesser extent oil, without resorting to 
foreign investment. Turkmenistan has therefore been able to maintain a closed, 
centrally planned economy, following a self-sufficiency strategy where popular 
support is maintained through consumption subsidies (Canzi, 2004: 183). Follow-
ing the Russian introduction of price liberalisation in 1992, the Turkmen govern-
ment opted to ration basic foodstuffs, including flour, rice and sugar, at subsidised 
prices, while also restricting the export of such goods (Gleason, 2003: 106). In 
1995 and 1996 the government announced economic development policies aimed 
at restructuring the economy, privatisation, introducing convertibility of the 
Turkmen Manat (TMT), and attracting foreign investment. Proposed reforms in-
cluded privatisation and banking reform (Ibid: 106-108) 
The foreign policy Doctrine of Positive Neutrality at an economic level involved 
three main objectives: establishing new routes for gas exports, attracting FDI to 
ensure development of the energy sector, and increasing international trade (An-
ceschi, 2009: 63).
13
 All three objectives, arguably, relate to reducing reliance on 
Russia and other FSU markets, while increasing ties with other foreign partners, 
including the West (Ibid: 64). The Doctrine was supplemented by the Open 
Door’s Policy aimed at broadening trade links and patterns (Ibid: 74). Political 
                                                 
13
 The foreign policy Doctrine of Positive Neutrality has guided foreign relations since 1992 (An-
ceschi, 2009: 9) and is a key plank, alongside the Rukhnama  -President Niyazov’s reflections on 
the history and culture of the Turkmen people-  of the personality culture built around the presi-
dent himself (ibid: 38). Linked to the reverence for Niyazov both thus became idealised policies 
and should, as argued by Luca Anceschi, be seen as integral parts of the process of regime consol-
idation (Ibid: 55). 
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transition following President Niyazov’s death involved subtle political shifts. 
President Berdymukhamedov eagerly projected an image of change inter alia by 
announcing an agenda of political liberalisation (Ibid: 43-44).  
While stability is prioritised over freedom, contemporary interlocutors in the 
country emphasise, that there is openness and political will on part of President 
Berdymukhamedov to grow the private sector as a means towards diversifying the 
economy (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF); LE; IF; NN; WD).
14
 In May 2010, Turkmeni-
stan introduced a national programme for socio-economic development, which 
outlines a plan for diversification of the economy – including privatisation of 
SMEs. Changes have been made to laws on foreign investment, which in combi-
nation with the discovery of new onshore gas fields has led to a boom in foreign 
investment since 2009 (EBRD, 2010a: 150-151). Official policy is aimed at the 
development of a production and export-oriented, import-substituting manufactur-
ing sector (i/w NN), and the budget surplus is directed towards private sector 
growth (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF); NN).  
Economic performance 
The first years following independence saw economic decline owing to the dis-
ruption of gas exports, unfavourable world prices, poor harvest and economic 
mismanagement. Since 1998 when Turkmenistan achieved a 7 per cent annual 
growth rate its economy has been recovering, though the reliance on primary 
products remains (Badykova, 2005: 63).  
 
Table 2.4 – Annual GDP growth 2001-2011, per cent; Turkmenistan (World Bank, 2013) 
                                                 
14
 Luca Anceschi writing in 2009 (45-46), on the other hand, considered announced political re-
forms to be nothing more than symbolic, and pratical changes a reflection of Berdymukhamedov’s 
consolidation of power. Similarly, Najia Badykova (2005: 65) claims that with the rents from the 
country’s resources, which during the latter half of the 1990s were estimated at 33-64 per cent of 
GDP (Pomfret, 2006: 84), concentrated in elite circles, which hold all political power, there is little 
likelihood of economic liberalisation and diversification. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
4.3 0.3 3.3 5.0 13.0 11.0 11.1 14.7 6.1 9.2 14.7
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The EBRD notes Turkmenistan’s limited degree of foreign trade liberalisation, 
lack of full currency convertibility as well as the foreign exchange regime’s non-
transparency (EBRD, 2010a: 150-151). Most recent data (2002) on weighted 
mean tariff rates suggest low tariffs at 2.88 per cent (Index Mundi, 2014; Heritage 
Foundation, 2014d). Heritage ranks Turkmenistan moderately on trade freedom 
(79.2), though notes the complete absence of investment freedom and scarce fi-
nancial freedoms, whilst overall categorising the Turkmen economy as ‘re-
pressed’ (Heritage Foundation, 2014d). 
The Turkmen economy is dominated by the services industry estimated (2013) to 
represent 68.4 per cent of the economy with industry representing 24.4 per cent 
and agriculture 7.2 per cent (CIA, 2014d). There is little economic activity outside 
of the natural resource sectors (Pomfret, 2006: 79-80). Meanwhile, the agricultur-
al sector employs 48.2 per cent of the work force, services 37.8 per cent and in-
dustry 14 per cent (CIA, 2014d). With controls on foreign exchange there is a 
strong distortion of prices and a flourishing black market (Pomfret, 2006: 79-80). 
Turkmenistan has recently been estimated to hold as much as 26.3 trillion cubic 
metre of gas reserves (Fitzpatrick, 2011b) with proven reserves of 17.5 trillion 
cubic metre gas (BP, 2014: 20). Production is estimated to be 62.3 billion cubic 
metre per year (Ibid: 22), thus, there is significant potential for production and 
export expansion as the country consumes only 22.3 billion cubic metre domesti-
cally (Ibid: 23).  
Whereas the main issue facing the energy sector during the Presidency of Niyazov 
was how and where to export natural gas, the question has since shifted to how to 
extract it. Domestically Turkmenistan lacks capacity both in terms of financial 
resources and technical skills and expertise (Crude Accountability, 2011: 7). 
Thus, continued gas exploration and production of offshore fields will be reliant 
on foreign expertise, necessitating international engagement (Chatham House, 
2011: 8). Since 1997, Turkmenistan has increasingly engaged with international 
oil companies in contractual relationships, which have improved the sophistica-
tion of natural gas exploration and development (Gleason, 2003: 105). The in-
volvement of foreign contractors is, however, still under direct control of the pres-
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ident (Gleason, 2003: 106), which represent an obstacle to increased foreign en-
gagement (Anceschi, 2009: 82) 
The Open Door’s Policy failed as a consequence of the inability to reform the 
economic structure and production pattern of the Turkmen economy as well as a 
failure to establish new economic partnerships beyond the FSU (Ibid: 74). Turk-
menistan did not sufficiently reform trade regulations and the government did not 
actively engage in establishing new economic relationships (Ibid: 75). The Open 
Door’s Policy was consequently abandoned by 1998, though this had little actual 
impact (Ibid: 80-81). In practice, Turkmenistan’s economy has undergone negli-
gible reform as suggested by the absence of significant shifts in industrial and 
agricultural production patterns as well as the continued dominance of the state 
over the economy (Ibid: 68-70). While management of strategic sectors such as 
energy and agriculture has been decentralised to specialised supervisory agencies 
such as Turkmengazprom, Turkmenneftegaz and Turkmenpagta, the central gov-
ernment maintains control (Ibid: 71; Gleason, 2003: 105). 
The state’s control of the hydro-carbon sector has led to extensive corruption at 
the highest levels (Badykova, 2005: 65). The high level of corruption and elite 
capture of public resources is detrimental to the wider economy as the resources 
are not employed to diversify the economy (Pomfret, 2006: 84). The establish-
ment of stabilisation funds, which ostensibly aim to support diversification of the 
economy but in reality divert funds from the domestic economy through non-
transparent investment, indicates a disconnect between policy and practice 
(EBRD, 2010a: 150-151; Chatham House, 2011: 8; Rumer, 2005a: 11). Similarly, 
the EBRD points to weaknesses of the legislation aimed at implementing privati-
sation and diversification policy (EBRD, 2014: 16). However, there are also indi-
cations of the private sector being given space to grow. Abolition of the subsidies 
programme is a means by which the government is seeking to create space for the 
private sector and achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. As of July 
2014 free petrol allocations have been scrapped (RFE/RL, 2014c), while the price 
of flour had already been increased (i/w IF). One industry in which the govern-
ment has sought to increase opportunities of the Turkmen private sector is in con-
struction, which appears to have paid off (Annayev, 2014). 
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Poverty in Turkmenistan is eased through an extensive social safety net and may 
be lower than in other CARs; however, the actual level of poverty in the country 
is unclear (Badykova, 2005: 67). Though poverty is alleviated through the system 
of public subsidies, including free access to water, gas and electricity, this form of 
state support is arguably to a certain degree symbolic as in many parts of the 
country the population has no access to water, gas or electricity (Chatham House, 
2011: 9; Sadykov, 2013a). 
The EBRD emphasises commercialisation of bank lending, liberalisation of for-
eign trade and increasing the private sector as priorities for Turkmen economic 
transition and development going forward (EBRD, 2013d). Heritage similarly 
emphasises the problematic nature of heavy state involvement in the economy, the 
need to diversify and the absence of rule of law (Heritage Foundation, 2014d). 
2.1.5 Uzbekistan 
Uzbekistan’s role in the USSR economic structure was focused on the production 
of cotton for transfer to the Western parts of the Soviet Union. Cotton production 
accounted for half the agricultural sector, which was the largest sector of the 
economy, and only 12 per cent of the cotton production was processed in Uzbeki-
stan. Manufactured goods were largely imported and, overall, imports vastly ex-
ceeded exports. Meanwhile, about 40 per cent of the budget income was provided 
in the form of direct subsidies from Moscow (Paramonov et al., 2006: 6-12). Uz-
bekistan was the most diversified of the CARs, economically, at the time of inde-
pendence including agriculture, light and heavy industry as well as primary com-
modities as sectors of the economy (Gleason, 2003: 117). 
Economic Policy 
Following independence, Uzbekistan was able to sustain its cotton, gold and natu-
ral gas industries without seeking international investments. The cotton and gold 
industries, which represent the larger share of Uzbek exports, rely on flexible 
means of transport; whereas the pipeline-dependent gas industry was oriented 
towards domestic consumption. Thus, Uzbekistan was neither dependent on the 
wider international community, nor on Russia in particular, and as such, could 
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outline an independent path for economic development without submitting to in-
ternational pressure for reforms to the economy (Pomfret, 2006: 80; Rumer, 
2002a: 21). Moreover, Karimov’s training as an economist with direct experience 
administering the Uzbek Soviet republican economy enabled him to identify such 
an independent path for Uzbekistan, being less reliant on external advice vis-à-vis 
for instance Kazakh and Kyrgyz leaders who were less well versed in economics 
(Spechler, 2008: 38). 
President Karimov initially announced an Uzbek transition path towards a market 
economy but at the same time, the Uzbek economic transition strategy favoured 
stability over market forces with state institutions playing a key role across finan-
cial, commercial and industrial sectors (Gleason, 2003: 117). In fact, as argued by 
Martin Spechler (2008: 30), it is misleading to suggest that the Uzbek transition 
has been an import substitution strategy throughout the period of independence, 
though such policies have dominated in what were deemed strategic sectors, in-
cluding the automobile industry. Five principles characterise the Uzbek model: 1) 
de-politicisation of the economy, 2) state direction of gradual transition to a mar-
ket economy, 3) the rule of law, 4) social protection, and 5) gradual transition to 
market economy (Karimov, 1997: 115).  
By presidential decree, however, President Karimov in January 1994 introduced 
wide-ranging economic liberalisation policies with a particular emphasis on ena-
bling foreign investment (Bondarevsky and Ferdinand, 1994: 49); also in 1994, 
Uzbekistan applied for WTO membership (WTO, 2014b). This policy of gradual 
opening, nevertheless, failed as a consequence of falling commodity prices and 
the impact of price liberalisation and trade reforms in neighbouring countries 
(Spechler, 2008: 43; Gleason, 2003: 123). In 1996 the country experienced a trade 
deficit encouraging the authorities to introduce import substitution policies to 
promote domestic production and prevent capital flight (Gleason, 2003: 118, 124).  
Foreign exchange and import controls led to a drop in imports and monopolies on 
the imports of certain goods controlled by members of the political elite (Spech-
ler, 2008: 44; Gleason, 2003: 124-125). The aftermath of 9-11 2001 led to an in-
crease in support from and influence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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and the USA (Spechler, 2008: 47). Moreover, since, 2002 Uzbek gas consumption 
has overtaken domestic production (Blackmon, 2011: 19). The combined influ-
ence of such factors saw the Uzbek government introduce relatively liberal poli-
cies aimed at currency convertibility, reducing state involvement in the economy 
and attracting foreign investment (Blackmon, 2011: 19; Paramonov et al., 2006: 
18; Spechler, 2008: 47). 
Karimov in a speech in August 2014 re-confirmed the Uzbek model of economic 
transition emphasising the primacy of the state as driver of phased, gradual re-
forms. Karimov metaphorically stated: ‘Do not destroy the old house until you 
build a new one’ (Karimov, 2014). In the speech Karimov stressed particularly the 
need for access to export markets and foreign investment to modernise domestic 
technology and build storage and logistics facilities enabling such exports (Ibid).  
Economic performance 
The avoidance of shock-therapy style reforms led to a relatively smooth transition 
with Uzbekistan showing the strongest economic performance of the FSU coun-
tries by the mid-90s (Trushin and Trushin, 2005: 340). Since 2004 Uzbekistan has 
experienced annual growth rates above 7 per cent of GDP. 
 
Table 2.5 – Annual GDP growth 2001-2011, per cent; Uzbekistan (World Bank, 2013) 
The EBRD considers Uzbekistan a largely closed economy with only limited lib-
eralisation of foreign trade, lack of full currency convertibility as well as a non-
transparent foreign exchange regime (EBRD, 2010a: 154-55). The weighted mean 
applied tariff has reduced during transition years, averaging 5.1 per cent over the 
period 2009-2013 (World Bank, 2014). Nevertheless, the Heritage Economic 
Freedom Index also indicates a comparatively closed economy with trade freedom 
considered relatively low (66.1), investment freedom non-existent and financial 
freedom very low (10.0) (Heritage Foundation, 2014e). Overall, Heritage de-
scribes Uzbekistan as a ‘repressed’ economy (Ibid). 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
4.2 4.0 4.2 7.7 7.0 7.3 9.5 9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3
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Privatisation processes complied with the notion of state directed transition, en-
suring a high degree of state ownership and interference in nominally privatised 
companies (Gleason, 2003: 125; Spechler, 2008: 35-36, 47). Accordingly, Neil 
Melvin (2000: 69) has suggested that the market reform agenda has been a mere 
rhetorical disguise for the actual continuation of political control over the econo-
my. Consequently, private Uzbek citizens are, for instance, reluctant to use do-
mestic banking services out of concern that government authorities may review 
their holdings in banks (Gleason, 2003: 126). The state sector has previously been 
estimated to account for as much as 50 per cent of the economy as well as the la-
bour force. The state’s dominance obstructs private initiative and force entrepre-
neurs into the shadow economy (Trushin and Trushin, 2005: 348), which is esti-
mated to account for 30-35 per cent of GDP covering half of all retail trade turno-
ver and more than half of cross-border trade and financial flows (Paramonov, 
2006a: 23).  
Services are estimated (2013) to account for nearly half (48.7 per cent) of the 
economy with industry accounting for 32.2 per cent and agriculture 19.1 per cent 
(CIA, 2014e). Services employ an estimated (2012) 60.9 per cent of the labour 
force, agriculture 25.9 per cent and industry 13.2 per cent of the labour force 
(Ibid). Other estimates suggest that 65 per cent of the population work in agricul-
ture, with a third of the workforce engaged in the cotton industry (Allnutt, 2013). 
Remittances from migrant workers in Russia to Uzbekistan have been estimated at 
13 per cent of GDP in 2012 (Sadykov, 2013b). 70 per cent of Uzbek labour mi-
grants are estimated to work in Russia (Spechler and Spechler, 2010: 167). 
Uzbek economic dependence on cotton weakens the sustainability of long-term 
growth. Cotton is a highly water intensive crop, and Uzbekistan lacks domestic 
water supplies, while cotton production is marred by Soviet-era, poorly main-
tained irrigation systems. Uzbekistan has, however, succeeded in shifting agricul-
tural production away from cotton, despite the corresponding loss to foreign cur-
rency earnings. The government has encouraged wheat production in place of 
cotton, as well as increased the size of personal plots. The shift in production pat-
tern has economised on water consumption, and farm production grew by 41 per 
cent from 2000 to 2005 (Spechler, 2008: 68). Cotton fibre at the end of the 2000s 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
91 
 
represented as little as 10 per cent of Uzbek export earnings (Spechler and Spech-
ler, 2010:166), and it is allegedly gas exports that now props the Uzbek economy 
up as it de-diversifies with energy increasing as a share of exports (i/w WD; AC). 
Uzbekistan has 1.1 trillion cubic metres of proven gas reserves (BP, 2014: 20), 
producing 55.2 billion cubic metres daily (Ibid: 22) of which 45.2 billion cubic 
metres are consumed domestically (Ibid: 23).  
While the currency regime was liberalised in the early 2000s problems remain 
regarding currency convertibility. Moreover, trade barriers were simultaneously 
introduced, for instance on the free movement of people (Trushin and Trushin, 
2005: 344-347; Spechler 2008: 52-53). More generally, measures such as targeted 
subsidies and price controls have delayed structural transformation (Gleason, 
2003: 119). Foreign investment was facilitated through liberalising the investment 
regime, including allowing free repatriation of profits, with limited success, in-
cluding Korean investment in car manufacturer UzDaewoo (Spechler, 2008: 37). 
The controls on foreign exchange create opportunities for rent extraction (Pom-
fret, 2006: 84-85), which increases prices of consumer goods and is therefore det-
rimental to the potential for expansion of consumer goods production (Trushin 
and Trushin, 2005: 344-345).  
Martin Spechler (2008: 68) argues that the incompleteness of Uzbek transition 
reflects implementation issues, not deficiency of concept or understanding. In-
deed, despite Karimov’s training as a Marxist economist; and belief in strong state 
involvement in the economy (Rumer, 2002a: 21; Spechler, 2008:33; i/w NN), 
Kathleen Collins (2006: 265-266) has claimed that Karimov in 1995, when 
growth rates were negative, was open to the IMF’s proposals for liberal reforms 
but was blocked by clan factions seeking to protect their economic interests. Also, 
the absence of full currency convertibility despite reforms to that effect purported-
ly can be explained by this battle. 
Looking ahead, the EBRD emphasise the need for privatisation, liberalisation of 
the foreign exchange system and commercialisation of bank lending as priorities 
for transition and economic development (EBRD, 2013e). Heritage likewise ar-
gues for the need to reduce the role of the state with a view to diversifying the 
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economy, as well as the need for governance reform with a focus on effective rule 
of law (Heritage Foundation, 2014e). 
2.1.6 Summary 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both followed so-called shock therapy transition 
paths introducing liberal reform policies quickly upon independence. Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan on the other hand followed more gradualist approaches to eco-
nomic transition. Tajikistan’s transition was delayed by the country’s civil war but 
since 1997 the country has pursued a liberalising economic policy. As is reflected 
in the individual presentations above, and in the table below of EBRD Transition 
Indicators, for the five Central Asian states, these diverging paths have led to de-
viating economic environments. For instance, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan have achieved significant progress in terms of privatisation, price liberalisa-
tion and trade and foreign exchange systems, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
are lagging behind on all of these measures.
15
 On the other hand, the Transition 
Indicators also suggest that all five Central Asian republics still face similar chal-
lenges in terms of institutional reforms, as all suffer from poor corruption stand-
ards and lacking performance on governance and enterprise restructuring. Similar-
ly Spechler has suggested that from the perspective of ordinary Central Asians 
(except Turkmens), the difference in economic rights is negligible (Spechler, 
2008: 101). 
 
Table 2.6 – EBRD Transition Indicators 2012, rank from 1 to 4+ (EBRD, 2012a) 
The rents involved in the natural resource sectors have been captured by elites for 
their own enrichment and for the maintenance of the patronage systems that un-
                                                 
15
 Rankings may not be directly comparable across countries as they represent judgements by the 














Kazakhstan 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.7 3.7 2.0
Kyrgyzstan 3.7 4.0 2.0 4.3 4.3 2.0
Tajikistan 2.3 4.0 2.0 4.0 3.3 1.7
Turkmenistan 1.0 2.3 1.0 3.0 2.3 1.0
Uzbekistan 2.7 3.3 1.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
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derpin the presidential rule of each state. As such, they have all hitherto failed to 
grasp their biggest potential for sustainable economic growth, namely diversifying 
their economies. By siphoning off the rents from their economies’ main sectors, 
the competitive development of other sectors in each economy has been under-
mined (Auty, 2006b: 20). Similarly, in all countries a significant proportion of 
economic activity occurs in the shadows. The size of the shadow economy is typi-
cally estimated at around 30 per cent; a significant increase since the Soviet era, 
when the estimate was only 6 per cent (Kaser, 2005: 151). 
The CARs consequently share many future challenges. Particularly the need for 
governance reform and improvements in the protection of property rights, and the 
rule of law more generally, are challenges shared by all. Reforms of financial ser-
vices are also shared challenges, though the emphasis varies across the region – 
from Kazakhstan, where the need is to liberalise the domestic capital market, to 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan where institutional reform of the sector is required. 
Diversification of the production structure is similarly a shared challenge.  
2.2 Foreign trade 
The Central Asian republics generally are trade intensive economies. Kyrgyzstan 
and Turkmenistan in particular trade at significantly higher levels than other low 
and middle income countries, respectively; but also Tajikistan and Kazakhstan 
have relatively high ratios of trade to GDP. Only Uzbekistan broadly mirrors its 
peers among middle income countries though, generally, performing slightly 
above this benchmark. These relatively high ratios of foreign trade to GDP sug-
gest that Central Asian economies are open to trade. 
 
Table 2.7 – CARs’ foreign trade as a share of GDP, 2002-2011 (World Bank, 2013) 
 
Country/group 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Kyrgyz Republic 83 84 94 96 121 137 146 133 133 136
Tajikistan 142 137 128 79 80 89 89 70 76 74
Low income 44 47 50 57 61 63 67 59 63 69
Kazakhstan 94 91 96 98 92 92 94 76 73 77
Turkmenistan 122 119 121 113 108 114 104 120 123 123
Uzbekistan 60 68 73 67 69 76 84 73 62 59
Middle income 54 56 60 62 63 62 63 53 57 61
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Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian republic to have consistently experienced a 
trade surplus in the period from 2002 to 2012. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan, on the other hand, have had steadily increasing trade deficits over the five 
years to 2012. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan’s position has changed between signifi-
cant surpluses and deficits to being near zero in recent years. 
On the eve of independence, the CARs trade patterns were dominated by trade 
with other Soviet republics. 80-87 per cent of the CARs imports originated in oth-
er Soviet republics, while 85-98 per cent of their exports were destined for other 
Soviet republics (Ceviköz, 1994: 46). Moreover, even the trade with non-USSR 
markets was dominated by trade with the CMEA (Anceschi, 2009: 72). The fol-
lowing two sections consider, firstly, the pattern of trade within Central Asia, and 
secondly, Central Asian trade with the ROW. Thereupon follows a discussion of 
the impact of the republics’ landlocked geography and infrastructure. 
2.2.1 Intra-regional trade 
Studies have shown that following the break-up of the Soviet Union, CIS coun-
tries generally, including Central Asian republics, were slow in re-orienting trade 
patterns, and tended to over-trade amongst themselves, that is trade more than 
suggested by economic modelling.
16
 In other words, most of the potential for trade 
with other parts of the world economy remained untapped. For instance, using the 
gravity model Babetskii et al. (2003: 5) found that the CIS was less integrated into 
the world economy than other regions of the world, including other parts of the 
CMEA.  
Studies specifically on Central Asia have been less clear in conclusions. For in-
stance, Elvira Kurmanalieva and Ziyodullo Parpiev (2008) suggested that disinte-
gration of trade relationships in Central Asia has occurred to a degree that the re-
publics now have significant untapped trade potential with each other. The Eura-
sian Development Bank’s (EDB’s) System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration 
most recently suggested that a trend towards disintegration has stalled (EDB, 
                                                 
16
 See for instance Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco, 2004; EBRD, 1999. 
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2014: 9). Other studies establish a continued trend of over-trading. For instance, 
Clemens Grafe, Martin Raiser and Toshiaki Sakatsume (2006: 161) concluded 
that there was scope, though limited, for expanding intra-regional trade; while in 
another study the authors (Grafe, Raiser and Sakatsume, 2005) found the level of 
regionalisation and market integration to be very high when taking into considera-
tion informal trade. Jesus Felipe and Utsaev Kumar (2010) found that, though the 
level of intra-regional trade in Central Asia is comparatively low, trade facilitation 
measures could increase potential trade.  
The increase in natural resource exports to the wider world has shifted trade pat-
terns towards trade with the ROW but intra-regional trade has diminished also in 
absolute terms (Grafe, Raiser and Sakatsume, 2006: 157-160). The pattern of in-
tra-regional trade is remarkably asymmetrical as evidenced in tables 2.9 and 2.10. 
Significant shares of Kyrgyz exports are directed to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
Uzbekistan also sends a notable share of its exports to Kazakhstan, and relies on a 
similar share of its imports from Kazakhstan, which also represent noteworthy 
shares of imports to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan’s trade with the rest 
of Central Asia is negligible. 
 
Table 2.9 – Central Asian trade: share in exports, 2011 (IMF, 2013) 
 
Table 2.10 – Central Asian trade: share in exports, 2011 (IMF, 2013) 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Kazakhstan 0.63% 0.45% 0.16% 1.50%
Kyrgyzstan 19.40% 1.38% 0.47% 25.44%
Tajikistan 4.43% 0.77% 0.14% 0.97%
Turkmenistan 0.80% 0.03% 1.12% 0.47%








Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Kazakhstan 1.13% 0.23% 0.31% 3.51%
Kyrgyzstan 6.14% 0.09% 0.03% 2.19%
Tajikistan 8.36% 0.36% 1.96% 1.68%
Turkmenistan 1.82% 0.08% 0.02% 1.95%
Uzbekistan 12.30% 2.95% 0.10% 0.36%
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Roman Mogilevskii (2012b: 23) in a study of the impact of the ECU on Central 
Asian trade suggests that it has had a minor effect, finding only a few cases of 
possible trade creation or diversion. Kazakhstan appears to be establishing itself 
as an integration core independently of Russia in terms of both labour and trade 
migration (Libman and Vinokurov, 2011: 481). Moreover, the Kazakh financial 
services industry is a key investor in neighbouring countries with over 70 per cent 
of assets in the Kyrgyz banking sector owned by Kazakh stakeholders, which are 
expanding into the Tajik market also (Pomfret, 2011: 138).  
Scepticism of the potential for increased intra-regional trade in Central Asia ow-
ing to lack of trade complementarity fails to take account of the dynamic trade in 
foodstuffs and energy in the region, whereby Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan export 
hydro-electricity and import oil and gas, while Uzbek fruits and vegetables are in 
high demand, exchanged for Kazakh grains (Spechler, 2008: 123). Moreover, 
construction materials are traded in the region, while informal trade in fuel and 
cotton is ongoing. These are trends that could be increased through the elimina-
tion of trade barriers (Ibid: 123-124). In fact, trade-driven integration of the region 
is led by the informal sector. Grafe, Raiser and Sakatsume’s (2005: 1) study of 
price variation in Central Asia concluded that obstacles to trade within countries, 
including internal check points, the corruption of traffic police, road blocks, and 
local officials restricting access to local markets and bazaars, are just as large as 
the obstacles to cross-border trade. The authors do find indication of a strong bor-
der effect  -particularly between Uzbekistan and its neighbours-  but the effect 
disappears almost fully once the effects on purchasing power of exchange rate 
fluctuations are taken into account. 
The study finds that price dispersion within Kazakhstan alone is large enough to 
contain all price variations found across the region. Average price differences are 
in the range of 30-50 per cent, and are present not only for goods which are mani-
festly difficult to transport owing to trade restrictions, such as cotton, cloth, milk 
and cigarettes, but also goods, which ought to be easily tradable including pota-
toes, onions and carrots. Trade barriers beyond borders are significant obstacles to 
integration both within and between markets (Ibid: 10-20). Even when staying in 
the informal economy, enterprises are hampered by barriers such as restrictions on 
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the free movement of people, particularly in the case of Uzbekistan, where bor-
ders have been mined and visa requirements are strict out of security concerns 
(Grafe, Raiser and Sataksume, 2006: 169). In several cases, the Fergana Valley 
notably, bilateral borders are still disputed with the first seven months of 2014 
alone seeing more than 20 border-related incidents (Muzalevsky, 2014). Whilst 
such incidents have usually been between local communities, armed border 
guards have increasingly been involved (Ibid). The securitisation of border areas 
is further inhibiting regional as well as extra-regional trade (Ibid). 
The informal economy is critical for the livelihood of many people across the re-
gion and the governments would benefit from legitimising this trade. This would 
increase their tax and customs revenue and release significant potential for eco-
nomic growth. Informal enterprises tend to remain small ventures and thereby not 
contribute significantly to national economic growth (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 3). 
Diversity can be a source of gain from trade when countries trade with one anoth-
er on the basis of their comparative advantages. However, the conflicting trade 
policies in Central Asia both hinder and drive trade underground (Ibid: 5; 
Kourmanova et al., 2008: 14). Thus, for the Central Asian governments to realise 
the potential for increased tax and customs revenue, as well as increased economic 
dynamism, by bringing the informal sector into the formal economy, it will re-
quire cooperation on convergence of trade regimes, and formalisation of existing 
informal integration (regionalisation). So far the knee-jerk reaction by the CARs 
has, however been to increase trade barriers, further stifling economy activity. Not 
only does this make business harder for the informal traders but also for formal 
traders, for instance through high transportations costs as evident by the need for 
escort services (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 68). 
The restrictions on trade reduce competitiveness of the wider economy and there-
by further the dependence on natural resource trade; particularly SMEs are hurt by 
trade and transit restrictions (Grafe, Raiser and Sakatsume, 2006: 166-168). In 
addition to unleashing the potential for growth from the informal sector and 
SMEs, making it easier to conduct business, stronger integration of the post-
Soviet Central Asian states would create potential for increased inward investment 
as a larger market is more attractive to investors (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 9).  
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The region continues to have untapped comparative advantage, which could arise 
from increasing economies of scale, product differentiation and labour cost differ-
entials all to be released through trade facilitation (Spechler, 2008: 123). A re-
gional division of labour could arguably boost long run growth of the Central 
Asian republics (Ibid: 127-128). Liberalised, open economies across Central Asia 
would likely increase intra-regional, relatively more than extra-regional, trade 
owing to the transport costs arising from distance and natural barriers (Ibid: 134). 
2.2.2 International Trade 
The EBRD 1999 Transition Report (EBRD, 1999) noted that trade between Cen-
tral Asia and Europe, and with non-transition economies generally, were ¼ to ½ 
less than what had been expected. This indicated significant scope for increased 
trade between the Central Asian republics and non-CIS economies, whereas trade 
with Russia has been thought unlikely to return to Soviet era-levels (Grafe, Raiser 
and Sakatsume, 2006: 161). The CARs however, continue to have, in terms of 
trade and migration, stronger links with Russia than they do amongst each other 
(Libman and Vinokurov, 2011: 478). Table 2.11 lists the top trade partners of the 
CARs. While Kazakhstan sends less than 10 per cent of its exports to Russia, it 
relies on the latter for over 40 per cent of its imports. For Uzbekistan, Russia is 
the largest import and export partner and for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan it is in the 
top-3. Russia is also a top-3 source of imports for Turkmenistan, though only in 
tenth place as export destination for Turkmenistan. These figures reflect the large 
interdependencies between the Central Asian economies and Russia’s, which is 
considered to be the most attractive market for Central Asian goods (Kourmano-
va, 2014).  
Russia also is the main destination for labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan (Beishenaly, 2013: 4-5; Spechler and Spechler, 2010: 167). 
This interdependence suggests that the Central Asian economies face significant 
challenges ahead in the case of a Russian economic downturn (Kourmanova, 
2014). On the other hand, the Russian-imposed embargo on imports of food prod-
ucts from the West may benefit the Central Asian states, creating an opportunity 
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for increasing their exports to Russia. Currently former Soviet republics account 
for 25 per cent of Russian food imports (Rickleton, 2014a). 
Despite the fact that tariffs on imports from other Central Asian countries have 
not been directly impacted by the ECU because of existing free trade agreements 
within CIS, which have remained in force (Mogilevskii, 2012b: 8), the ECU has 
had a negative impact on ECU members’ trade with non-members. For instance, 
Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek exports to Russia reportedly have declined by 33.4 per 
cent, 24.2, per cent and 25.1 per cent respectively (Dreyer and Popescu, 2014: 4). 
Meanwhile, from 2009 to the end of 2011 trade between the three ECU members 
increased by 
2
/3; however this in part reflects a return to pre-2008 crisis trade lev-
els (Isakova, Koczan and Plekhanov, 2013: 2). Most recently it has been suggest-
ed that Kazakh trade turnover with other ECU members, Russia and Belarus, has 
decreased by 23 per cent from the first half of 2013 to the first half of 2014 (Ten-
griNews, 2014c). 
Kazakhstan relies heavily on trade with the EU and China, which receive 52.5 per 
cent and 19.8 per cent of Kazakh exports (2011), respectively. Similarly, China 
dominates as export destination for Turkmenistan, receiving 56.2 per cent of 





Kyrgyzstan on the other hand primarily exports to its immediate neighbours, Uz-
bekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan and China, as does Uzbekistan which, nevertheless 
has the most diversified export structure relying on no one partner for more than 
20 per cent of its exports. Russia, Turkey, China, Kazakhstan and Ukraine all re-
ceive between 10 and 20 per cent of Uzbek exports. Turkey is Tajikistan’s largest 
export market receiving 29.6 per cent of Tajik exports, which are otherwise also 








Table 2.11 – Top export and import partners of Central Asian republics, 2011 (IMF, 2013; Agency of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Statistics, 2014)  
Kazakhstan top export partners, 2011 Kazakhstan top import partners, 2011
Partner Value (USD) Share in exports Partner Value (USD) Share in imports
European Union 42,129,734,389 52.5% European Union 7,620,857,528 35.6%
China 15,866,649,929 19.8% China 5,007,925,517 23.4%
Switzerland 5,002,258,122 6.2% Ukraine 1,753,114,847 8.2%
Ukraine 2,581,630,064 3.2% United States 1,624,823,853 7.6%
Turkey 2,560,824,469 3.2% Turkey 758,025,156 3.5%
Canada 2,531,964,860 3.2% Uzbekistan 752,500,047 3.5%
Israel 1,296,837,698 1.6% Korea, Republic of 647,065,102 3.0%
Bermuda 1,247,243,600 1.6% Japan 641,099,543 3.0%
Uzbekistan 1,202,666,101 1.5% Brazil 344,750,879 1.6%
Iran 1,047,210,467 1.3% India 246,440,993 1.2%
Kazakhstan export to ECU partners, 2011 Kazakhstan import from ECUpartners, 2011
Partner Value (USD) Share in exports Partner Value (USD) Share in imports
Russia 6,998,600,000 8.3% Russia 15,332,000,000 41.5%
Belarus 104,700,000 0.1% Belarus 593,800,000 1.6%
Kyrgyzstan top export partners, 2011 Kyrgyzstan top import partners, 2011
Partner Value (USD) Share in exports Partner Value (USD) Share in imports
Uzbekistan 288,836,263 25.4% China 5,366,414,015 59.1%
Russia 252,582,067 22.2% Russia 1,247,883,464 13.7%
Kazakhstan 220,287,800 19.4% European Union 602,270,900 6.6%
China 88,628,555 7.8% Kazakhstan 557,663,322 6.1%
United Arab Emirates 62,824,910 5.5% Belarus 239,996,350 2.6%
Afghanistan 57,180,638 5.0% Uzbekistan 199,201,413 2.2%
Turkey 47,384,885 4.2% Turkey 198,265,014 2.2%
European Union 28,872,455 2.5% Korea, Republic of 156,329,356 1.7%
Tajikistan 15,665,847 1.4% Ukraine 122,410,860 1.3%
Iran 12,963,636 1.1% United States 113,190,000 1.2%
Tajikistan top export partners, 2011 Tajikistan top import partners, 2011
Partner Value (USD) Share in exports Partner Value (USD) Share in imports
Turkey 294,802,552 29.6% China 2,196,652,394 46.0%
European Union 82,552,364 8.3% Russia 785,482,419 16.5%
Russia 81,117,964 8.1% Kazakhstan 399,164,458 8.4%
Iran 68,547,820 6.9% European Union 201,563,450 4.2%
China 65,447,406 6.6% United States 196,020,000 4.1%
Korea, Republic of 65,341,494 6.6% Turkey 189,832,981 4.0%
Afghanistan 58,516,640 5.9% Iran 179,879,752 3.8%
Kazakhstan 44,160,627 4.4% Turkmenistan 93,527,168 2.0%
Norway 32,472,072 3.3% Uzbekistan 80,398,192 1.7%
Bangladesh 24,857,497 2.5% United Arab Emirates 77,450,188 1.6%
Turkmenistan top export partners, 2011 Turkmenistan top import partners, 2011
Partner Value (USD) Share in exports Partner Value (USD) Share in imports
China 4,266,521,120 56.2% Turkey 1,642,669,140 21.4%
Ukraine 669,091,727 8.8% European Union 1,275,510,940 16.6%
European Union 555,382,909 7.3% Russia 1,093,575,885 14.2%
Turkey 357,011,214 4.7% China 864,339,535 11.2%
United Arab Emirates 309,062,565 4.1% United Arab Emirates 619,110,835 8.1%
Afghanistan 241,181,152 3.2% Iran 302,731,651 3.9%
Iran 205,696,364 2.7% Japan 296,874,232 3.9%
Bermuda 137,692,666 1.8% Korea, Republic of 266,955,996 3.5%
Bangladesh 130,718,277 1.7% Ukraine 266,089,780 3.5%
Russian Federation 129,701,945 1.7% Belarus 253,138,380 3.3%
Uzbekistan top export partners, 2011 Uzbekistan top import partners, 2011
Partner Value (USD) Share in exports Partner Value (USD) Share in imports
Russia 1,043,773,654 18.7% Russia 2,116,644,879 19.7%
Turkey 854,438,517 15.3% Korea, Republic of 1,890,950,744 17.6%
China 733,436,956 13.1% European Union 1,881,109,780 17.5%
Kazakhstan 684,090,952 12.2% China 1,494,934,813 13.9%
Ukraine 585,339,273 10.5% Kazakhstan 1,322,932,711 12.3%
Bangladesh 432,214,271 7.7% Turkey 389,938,468 3.6%
European Union 366,940,546 6.6% Ukraine 389,133,360 3.6%
Kyrgyz Republic 181,092,194 3.2% Kyrgyz Republic 317,719,889 3.0%
Turkmenistan 136,446,944 2.4% Japan 256,969,855 2.4%
Iran 109,250,000 2.0% United States 110,330,000 1.0%
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On the import side, Kazakhstan is similarly reliant on the EU and China, where 
35.6 per cent and 23.4 per cent of Kazakh imports originate, respectively. Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan, conversely, are almost wholly reliant on China and Russia for 
their imports, which together represent nearly three quarters of Tajik and Kyrgyz 
imports with the majority thereof originating in China (59.1 per cent for Kyrgyz-
stan, 46 per cent for Tajikistan). For both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the EU and 
Kazakhstan are the third or fourth largest import partners. The heavy reliance on 
China for imports, and consequent bilateral trade imbalance, of Kyrgyzstan  -and 
increasingly Tajikistan-  reflects significant re-export trade, whereby Chinese 
products are routed via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to other markets in Central Asia 
and beyond. 
Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have more diversified import structures. Tur-
key, the EU and China each represent a significant share of Turkmen imports, 
whereas Korea, the EU, China and Kazakhstan are the main partners for Uzbeki-
stan, outside of Russia. 
China is increasingly becoming one of the most important trade partners for all 
Central Asian states. China is a top-5 import and export partner for all CARs, 
though this underplays the singular reliance on China for either exports or imports 
borne by some of the republics. However, while first and foremost a partner for 
Kazakhstan; the EU is also an important trade partner for other Central Asian re-
publics on either the import or export side, or both. Turkey similarly is a signifi-
cant trade partner for the region represented in top-7 or higher in all Central Asian 
import and export structures, having the weakest foothold in the Kyrgyz market. 
Iran is an important trade partner to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan 
is the sixth largest export market for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan 
alike, though both are less represented on Central Asian markets more widely. 
There appears to be relatively little trade with Asian markets beyond China, 
though Korea does, as noted, supply a significant share of Uzbek imports. How-
ever, trade relationships with Japan and Korea are somewhat masked in statistics 
because products are imported from China or Southeast Asia, where Japanese 
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companies have located production (i/w GO). Similarly some imports from the 
EU go via Russia or Turkey (i/w WD). 
Impacts of the Eurasian Customs Union on trade patterns 
The ECU and the subsequent Common Economic Space (CES) do not represent 
significant trade liberalisation and has not brought with it palpable improvements 
in investment climates. Rather, the process has been focused on restricting trade 
with third countries (Wiśniewska, 2013: 38). An early study of the ECU suggested 
that in its present format, the ECU is a GDP-reducing framework in which the 
trade-diverting effects exceed the positive effects of trade creation. In the case of 
Kazakhstan, the results appear insignificant, whereas they are negative for both 
Belarus and Russia. When including the energy sector as planned for, 2025 cf. 
below, the net result for Kazakhstan, however, also becomes negative (Vinhas de 
Souza, 2011: 5). 
A critical drawback of a customs union between former Soviet republics is the 
impediments it may create to import of new and advanced technologies from the 
global market, which is required to boost the development and growth rates of 
FSU economies (Tarr and Michalopoulos, 1997: 12). Mogilevskii (2012b: 24-25) 
has found evidence of exactly this in the case of the ECU. Mogilevskii suggests a 
significant case of trade diversion, where machinery from Russia and China has 
displaced machinery imports to Kazakhstan from the ROW, mainly Germany, 
Italy, the US and Ukraine. Mogilevskii interpreted this as a shift in demand from 
more expensive, higher quality machinery to lower quality, cheaper machinery 
from Russia and China. Thus, this represents a reduction in high-technology im-
ports to the Kazakh economy and may impact negatively on the economic growth 
over the long term. At the same time, this trade diversion impact appears to have 
reduced the export of Russian machinery to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Ibid: 
25). Moreover, Mogilevskii finds indications that there has been a diversion of 
informal imports of Chinese goods via Kyrgyzstan to formal imports of Chinese 
goods directly to ECU markets (Ibid: 28). An EBRD-study of the early impacts of 
the ECU found minor trade diversion effects in the case of imports from China to 
Kazakhstan, and suggested that trade creation effects were negligible (Isakova, 
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Koczan and Plekhanov, 2013: 3), while David Tarr (2012: 2) has found evidence 
of Russian goods displacing European imports from the Kazakh market, a conclu-
sion similar to that of Mogilevskii.  
Over time, implementation of Russian WTO commitments will reduce the applied 
tariff level of the ECU, which in turn may reduce the trade diversion cost of ECU 
membership on Kazakhstan (Ibid: 4). However, the EBRD study concludes that 
the impact of tariff changes is limited and that benefits from the integration pro-
ject could only arise from the removal of NTBs, as also suggested by a 2012 
World Bank study (Isakova, Koczan and Plekhanov, 2013: 19; World Bank, 2012: 
9). 
2.2.3 Landlockedness, distance to markets, infrastructure and trade costs 
The costs of trade and transit are among the chief impediments to the economic 
development of Central Asia (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 20). These costs are partly a 
consequence of the geographic location of the region as all countries are land-
locked; a feature which results in increased import prices and relatively minor 
export revenues owing not only to transportation costs but also the costs involved 
in transiting neighbouring countries (Ibid: 52).  
Transport and insurance cost have been found to be twice as high for landlocked 
as for coastal states owing to the dependence on neighbouring countries for 
transport and costs per mile being higher for overland than sea transport (Grigori-
ou, 2007: 3). Central Asian landlockedness is estimated to reduce trade by more 
than 80 per cent as a consequence of trade and transit costs, not the distance to 
markets per se (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 53). According to a gravity model study, 
landlocked states generally trade 28 per cent less than coastal states, ceteris pari-
bus; this confirms that the landlocked position of the CARs alone cannot explain 
the lack of integration with the global market. This geographic trait is compound-
ed by policy because uncoordinated trade and transit policies lead to excessively 
high trade and transport costs (Ibid). Moreover, infrastructure is a critical deter-
minant of trade taking place at all (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009: 329). The inter-
action between geographical position, poor infrastructure of not only the states 
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themselves but also their neighbouring countries, as well as the impact of uncoor-
dinated transit policies, must be considered (Grigoriou, 2007: 2). 
The state of Central Asian infrastructure remains poor even when one controls for 
the countries’ income level. The low density of transport infrastructure is exacer-
bated by its poor and deteriorating quality. Part of the problem in terms of invest-
ments is that the countries tend to prioritise new national links improving inter-
connectedness within their borders over the existing regional links.
17
 Moreover, 
the lack of maintenance causes damage to means of transports which raises the 
transport costs further. These extra costs decrease the competitiveness of products 
from the region (Ibid: 7-8). Christopher Grigoriou (2007: 24-25, 29-30) estimated 
that an improvement of the CARs infrastructure from the median level to that of 
the top quarter among landlocked states would raise export by 6.5 per cent and 
imports by 8.6 per cent, while raising the level to that of median coastal countries 
would raise export and import by 14.5 per cent and 19.6 per cent respectively. 
Moreover, an upgrade of infrastructure in transit countries to the level of top-
quartile landlocked countries could raise exports of the Central Asian republics by 
52 per cent, while access to transit countries with an infrastructure of similar qual-
ity to that enjoyed by other landlocked countries, would increase imports by 14.6 
per cent and exports by 44.8 per cent. These figures underscore the importance of 
cooperation beyond the CARs. Merely improving the infrastructure and transit 
conditions within Central Asia will have limited effect. Moreover, the interaction 
with the quality and availability of transit countries’ infrastructure limits the re-
turns to investment on infrastructure internal to the region (Ibid: 10). 
The high level of transit-related costs and the relative costs involved in different 
types of transport affect not only the level of trade but also the composition of 
production and trade. A study by the World Bank found that these differences in 
costs have constrained product diversification and perpetuated the structure estab-
lished under the Soviet central planning regime (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 72). 
Similarly, Gaël Raballand, Antoine Kunth and Richard Auty (2005: 16-18) have 
                                                 
17
 For instance, Uzbekistan is attempting to reconnect the country internally, thereby avoiding any 
need to traverse Tajik territory (Azernews, 2014). 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
106 
 
argued that transportation costs have contributed to the high commodity depend-
ence of the region, and the near-collapse of light manufacturing and agro-
processing industries in the first decade of independence. The dominance of rail-
roads hinders the development of export industries, which are not based on large-
volume exports. Transportation costs for metals and cotton have been estimated at 
6 per cent and 7 per cent of wagon value respectively, while for tobacco freight 
costs amount to 16 per cent of the selling value and fruit, canned fruits and vege-
tables are even pricier to export. These goods are not exported in volumes eco-
nomical for rail transport, while transport by road involves higher transit barriers 
including border checks. Smaller export companies are further inhibited by vari-
ous demands by rail freighters, which they cannot meet, and strategic goods are 
prioritised by governments so that non-strategic goods meet relatively high infor-
mal barriers to trade (Ibid).  
Given the link between infrastructure and production, it is clear that improve-
ments in transportation and freight forwarding services are indispensable parts of 
an economic diversification strategy (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 72). Critically, the 
neighbouring transit states’ infrastructure must be part of a strategy for infrastruc-
tural upgrades, while harmonisation of transit as well as trade policies is critical to 
expanding trade.  
2.2.4 Potential comparative advantages 
The emphasis put on development of infrastructure on part of both the Central 
Asian governments themselves but also international donors and trade partners, to 
a certain extent, reflects a perception that Central Asia’s most promising potential 
is as a transit region for European and Russian trade with China (Laruelle and 
Peyrouse, 2013: 19). However, this disregards the fact that only Kazakh territory 
is suitable for this. Transit through Kyrgyzstan, for instance, is, at best, a second-
ary, inferior alternative given the difficult topography and more southern location 
(Ibid: 309; i/w NN; AC). Moreover, geography, infrastructure and trade policies 
limit the ability of Central Asian republics to establish new trade links and pro-
duction patterns. The immediate challenge is, thus, to develop new comparative 
advantages on the basis of domestic and regional demand but also to find oppor-
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tunities in the proximity to its large and economically growing neighbour, China 
(Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013: 310). 
Matthias Lücke and Jacek Rothert (2006: 11) have proposed two alternative strat-
egies for the expansion of Central Asian exports and integration into the global 
market. Firstly, these authors suggest that the CARs could seek to integrate into 
European value chains by focusing on the production of specific inputs, where 
they enjoy comparative advantage, for instance owing to low labour costs. This 
strategy, it is cautioned, would see the CARs compete with countries in the West-
ern FSU and the Western Balkans. Moreover, as discussed above, distance, infra-
structure and difficult transit conditions inhibit the potential for leveraging the 
large European market to the CARs advantage. The second proposed strategy 
would be to build vertically integrated industries within the region based on the 
processing of raw materials indigenous to the region, such as cotton. The chal-
lenge of this approach is competition from Asian exporters that not only benefit 
from low labour cost but also better transport links to global markets (Ibid).  
Table 2.11 below shows the share of parts and components of manufacturing ex-
ports and imports for the CARs, which can be used as an indicator of the econo-
mies’ integration in international value chains. It should be recalled, however, that 
in all CARs industry represents a relatively small share of the economy from just 
23 per cent in Tajikistan to nearly 38 per cent in Kazakhstan. 
 
Table 2.12 – Trade in parts and components and their shares in manufacturing, 2005-2010 (World Bank, 
2011) 
Kazakhstan, with the largest industrial sector as share of GDP, appears to be the 
least integrated in GVCs as parts and components represent less than 2 per cent of 
Country / Group 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Kyrgyz Republic 15.5 12.8 15.8 14.8 19.4 13.7 20.9 24.9 23.4 21.6 20.0 18.8
Tajikistan ** 29.9 36.9 34.6 25.4 24.5 33.3 24.2 25.7 21.8 18.2 20.7 23.1
Low Income 6.3 6.3 8.6 8.8 7.1 6.3 28.9 30.1 29.7 29.3 29.1 29.0
Kazakhstan 3.3 3.8 3.2 2.3 2.6 1.3 16.7 15.8 14.9 14.9 16.3 13.9
Turkmenistan ** 50.6 29.5 55.3 48.2 44.8 58.5 17.6 21.9 23.4 22.5 20.0 24.4
Uzbekistan ** 22.0 19.3 14.2 12.6 24.3 21.9 34.6 35.9 30.1 27.4 27.9 29.5
Middle Income 28.2 28.4 27.3 26.2 28.0 27.9 33.8 33.7 31.7 29.7 31.6 31.9
Developing countries 27.9 28.1 27.0 26.0 27.6 27.5 33.7 33.6 31.6 29.7 31.5 31.8
High Income OECDs 26.7 26.5 25.0 24.3 24.3 24.5 24.7 24.8 24.3 24.0 24.0 24.6
** Due to the missing data, trade data is replaced by partner data in these countries. 
Share of Parts & Comp in Manuf Exports (%) Share of Parts & Comp in Manuf Imports (%)
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manufacturing exports (2010) – compared to an average of nearly 28 per cent 
among other middle income countries. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, compares 
very favourably with other middle income countries in its exports of parts and 
components; though less so on the import side. Conversely, Uzbekistan has a rela-
tively low share of parts and components in manufacturing exports but is roughly 
at the level of other middle income countries in its imports of shares and compo-
nents. Low income countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan both have significantly 
higher shares of parts and components in their manufacturing exports than other 
low income countries, though lesser shares on the import side.  
The relatively high indications of GVC participation indicated by table 2.12 may, 
however, be questioned on account of more detailed analysis of Kyrgyz and Ka-
zakh trading patterns. Richard Pomfret and Patricia Sourdin (2014) in a study of 
Central and West Asian supply-chain trade suggest that Central Asian participa-
tion in SCT is limited. Kazakhstan scores 0.15 per cent on imports, 0.02 per cent 
on exports and Kyrgyzstan only 0.09 per cent on imports and 0.06 per cent on 
exports. This contrasts with emerging Asia, where corresponding figures range 
between 0.17 per cent and 0.39 per cent, and emerging Europe, where figures 
range between 0.19 per cent and 0.34 per cent (Pomfret and Sourdin, 2014: 19). 
The authors conclude that Central Asian participation in GVCs is low, and sug-
gest that countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are unlikely to be much 
engaged in SCT owing to the countries’ closed trade policies (Ibid: 18). In all 
countries there, thus, appears to be some scope for improving integration with 
GVCs. 
A skilled, low-paid abundant workforce may be a starting point for the CARS in 
creating new comparative advantages, building on the regions resources in pro-
duction of for instance hydro-carbon-based synthetic fibres, cotton processing and 
chemical industry, as well as other light industries such as agribusiness (Trushin 
and Trushin, 2000: 208; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013: 153, 264-266; i/w AA). 
As living standards grow food consumption patterns change, and the demand for 
meat will increase (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013: 153). Developing a livestock 
industry would create potential for value added production in leather production 
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and the processing of meat and dairy (i/w AC). Production of fruits and vegetables 
similarly has potential for value added processing, for instance juice production 
(i/w IA; WS). The reputation for organic, ecological produce may be leveraged by 
local producers to their advantage (i/w DI; IA). The development of agriculture 
combines well with development of regional trade (i/w WD) but does require im-
proved logistical and storage facilities as well production to international stand-
ards and investment in laboratories for certification (i/w GO; BA). 
A regional chemical industry could inter alia provide fertilisers to the agricultural 
sector and introduce value added through processing of the region’s hydro-
carbons. The sector was originally developed during Soviet times, and Kazakh-
stan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are now investing in upgrading the industry. 
Kazakhstan focuses primarily on production of fertiliser, while in Uzbekistan 
chemical production includes plastic, glass, fibres and paint in addition to fertilis-
ers and pesticides. Turkmenistan aims to build capacity in the production of iron 
sulphate and potassium salts (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013: 264-266). The coun-
tries’ productions are thus complementary and, particularly for fertilisers but also 
potentially textiles, there is already a local, mostly informal market (i/w IA). 
With significant cotton production and a budding chemical industry, which could 
further develop the region’s capacity to produce artificial fibres and dye (Laruelle 
and Peyrouse, 2013: 270), textile production provides a potential for building a 
regional value chain. Indeed Turkmenistan is said to be increasing domestic pro-
cessing capacity with up to 50 per cent of cotton processed in the country (i/w 
DI), while as little as 20 per cent of Uzbek cotton is believed to be processed do-
mestically (i/w NN). Kyrgyzstan has gradually built a strong reputation in the 
production of clothing and apparel with a strong footprint on the Russian and Ka-
zakh markets given the cultural understanding of design demands in these coun-
tries (i/w AC). Turkmenistan already has a full value chain in textile production, 
including dying capacity and production of artificial fabrics, producing at a quali-
ty up to high street standards (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF)). Uzbek silk production and 
ikat designs are, furthermore, in high demand within the region as well as in the 
West (i/w EN). Nevertheless, it will be a challenge for Central Asia to establish 
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itself globally in an industry dominated by low-cost producers in Southeast Asia 
and China (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013: 272; i/w Drakinos (#99/IF)).  
2.2.5 Summary 
In the formal economy, trade integration within Central Asia is limited. Kyrgyz-
stan and Uzbekistan export significant amounts to neighbours, Kazakhstan in par-
ticular, which also represents noteworthy import shares in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. However, trade integration in Central Asia is driven by the infor-
mal sector. Such shadow trade deprives all states of budget revenues, which illus-
trates how they would all benefit from bringing informal businesses into the for-
mal economy through coordination of trade facilitation measures. Enterprises are 
not only driven into the shadows by weak governance and corruption but also by 
the diverging trade and border restrictions. Formalising it and improving busi-
nesses opportunities for growth, would benefit state coffers as well as the general 
public.  
Russia and increasingly China are the main trading partners of Central Asian re-
publics. The EU and Turkey are also significant trade partners, the former particu-
larly for Kazakhstan. The ECU appears to have had a negligible effect on trade 
within Central Asia but Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek exports to Russia have been hit 
by the new trade barriers. The ECU does not represent significant trade liberalisa-
tion and has not brought with it palpable improvements in investment climates. 
Rather, the process has been focused on restricting trade with third countries 
The geographical isolation and dependence on transit countries demonstrate the 
need for cooperation not only within the region but beyond it. Diverging trade 
policies and complicated customs procedures increase transportation costs as does 
the poor density and quality of transport infrastructure. Transit opportunities, in 
turn, affect the competitiveness of local production and, thus, the development of 
new comparative advantages. The latter could be built on the region’s resources in 
sectors such as agribusiness, chemical industry and textiles, which together may 
enable the development of RVCs. 
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2.3 Regional economic frameworks 
As explored in the first section of the chapter the economic development of the 
Central Asian region hinges upon its integration into the world economy. To this 
effect integration of the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics could be an inter-
im step. Given their landlocked position, there is also a need for the CARs to inte-
grate with their neighbours in the wider region surrounding Central Asia with a 
view to easing the restrictions on trade stemming from the difficult transit of 
goods. The following will examine earlier and ongoing processes of regional eco-
nomic cooperation and integration within and beyond Central Asia.  
2.3.1 Frameworks within the post-Soviet space 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet space has seen a variety 
of regional cooperation and integration frameworks that have overlapped with, 
replaced each other or co-existed. This section examines the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian 
Economic Community and ongoing process of Eurasian integration in the Eura-
sian Customs Union, the Common Economic Space and the Eurasian Economic 
Union. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created on 8 December 
1991 when Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed the Minsk Declaration, which ef-
fectively dissolved the Soviet Union. On 21 December the Alma-Ata Declaration 
extended the CIS founding members to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Gleason, 1997: 
75-76). The CIS was intended to mediate the potentially negative consequences of 
the Union break-up by maintaining coordination and a single economic space, 
while protecting the new-found sovereignty and independence of the member 
states (Gleason, 2001: 1084). As such, the CIS initially had a certain amount of 
success (Weitz, 2008: 18). Agreements were entered inter alia on non-visa sys-
tems, registration of labour, social benefits payments, which all eased the transi-
tion from Union Republics to newly independent states. The CIS, thus, provided 
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the institutional framework for an orderly dissolution of the Union, and for the 
formation of relations between the newly independent states (Arunova, 2002: 8).  
Inherent in this role, however, were two conflicting objectives. On the one hand, 
the CIS was to serve as an institution facilitating the establishment of independent 
states; that is untying the USSR in an orderly fashion; while, on the other hand, 
institutionalising cooperation and new forms of integration (Sakwa and Webber, 
1999: 379). This schism, reinforced by a fear, in many member states, of the re-
establishment of supranational governance, yielded weak institutions, which in the 
longer run has led to the CIS typically being branded an inefficient body (Aruno-
va, 2002: 7). Decisions are made by consensus or more precisely by the absence 
of protest, and are valid for member states participating in the decision. Imple-
mentation, however, is voluntary (Ibid: 9). The lack of commitment institutions as 
a significant explanatory factor behind the limited success of the CIS aligns with 
Mattli’s framework for successful integration schemes. A further weakness of the 
CIS as an integrating body stems from the difficulty of striking a balance on what 
role Russia should play. While the CIS represents a means by which to accommo-
date Russia in a low-cost manner (Allison, 2004: 468), the newly independent 
states were eager to sustain their sovereignty, and were therefore averse to Russia 
playing a leading role in cooperative frameworks. Meanwhile, Russia is unwilling 
to settle for a position as a member on a par with others (Arunova, 2002: 11). Fol-
lowing on from the theoretical discussion, it is clear that the organisation’s effec-
tiveness was hampered by the disputed nature of Russian regional leadership.  
The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality led Turkmenistan to lessen ties with Russia 
bilaterally as well as through the multilateral framework of the CIS (Anceschi, 
2009: 103). In 2005 Turkmenistan unilaterally downgraded its relationship with 
the CIS to one of associative connection with reference to membership being ir-
reconcilable with the Doctrine (Ibid: 103-104). The Turkmen government consid-
ered economic and political integration to constitute constraints on the country’s 
sovereignty (Ibid: 106-108). 
While the CIS continues to provide an institutional framework for dialogue be-
tween the post-Soviet states, the constituent members’ hesitant commitment to the 
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organisation, and the consequent weakness thereof, have resulted in limited im-
plementation of decisions made. The failure of the CIS fed the development of 
two trends within the organisation: bilateralisation and regionalisation (Sakwa and 
Webber, 1999: 396-400).
18
 Activity in the CIS framework resurfaced with the 
signing of a free trade agreement mid-October 2011, which is suggestive of this 
pattern. While on paper a regional, multilateral agreement, in effect implementa-
tion occurs on bilateral basis (i/w Paramonov (#96/AC)). Moreover, not all signa-
tories have proceeded to ratification of the agreement, including Tajikistan (i/w 
Soliev (#31/GO)). The ensuing discussion of the Central Asia Cooperation Organ-
ization and other post-Soviet integration projects reflects the second suggested 
pattern of regionalisation within the CIS.  
Central Asia Cooperation Organization 
In 1994 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan joined forces in the Central Asia 
Cooperation Organization (CACO).
19
 The countries were joined by Tajikistan in 
1998, while Turkmenistan, consistent with the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, 
declined invitations to join (Bohr, 2004: 486). While decision-making was by 
consensus at presidential and prime-ministerial level, the organisation itself was 
staffed through the establishment of an Executive Committee (Spechler, 2008: 
126). Intentions were to create common policies on trade and fiscal policies as 
well as conditions for the free movement of trade and resources. No substantial 
advances were, however, realised owing to diverging economic and political pri-
orities of the CARs; though a regional bank funded a series of small-scale cross-
border projects (Bohr, 2004: 486-487; Spechler, 2008: 126-7). One reason put 
forward for the lack of achievements has been that too many, very different objec-
tives were associated with the project, including integration in the global market, 
environmental issues such as the Aral Sea, balancing the influence of Russia and 
                                                 
18
 Regionalisation in this context does not refer to bottom-up processes of trade-driven interactions 
and transactions by private and other non-state actors but to the fragmentation of the CIS into sub-
regions. 
19
 The organisation went through a number of name-changes from the Central Asian Union to the 
Central Asian Economic Community to ultimately being named the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization in 2002 (Spechler, 2008: 125-126). 
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obtaining intra-regional unity (Qoraboyev, 2010: 215). Again, the lack of com-
mitment institutions can be added as an explanation for the organisation’s failure. 
The creation of CACO could be interpreted as a means by which to confront the 
dilemma of Russia’s role in the CIS by seeking integration free of Russia’s influ-
ence (Allison, 2004: 473-475). However, as discussed below, CACO was later 
subsumed into the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community. 
The Eurasian Economic Community 
EurAsEC, the Eurasian Economic Community, has proved to be a more success-
ful initiative within the frame of CIS multispeed-integration. EurAsEC was 
formed on the basis of initial CIS Customs Union agreements signed by Russia 
and Belarus, which Kazakhstan joined in 1995, later to be joined by Kyrgyzstan in 
1996 and Tajikistan in 1999 (Ultanbaev, 2003: 133). The 1995-agreement on a 
customs union highlights the contested position of Kazakhstan in Central Asia. It 
is arguable whether the Kazakh leadership considers the country to be part of a 
Central Asian region, excluding Russia, and merely was recognising the im-
portance of Russia to its foreign trade, when entering, or considers Kazakhstan a 
part of a wider Eurasian region with Russia at its core. Regardless, the customs 
union agreement shifted alignments, and the centre of gravity in regional relations 
of Central Asia became the Astana-Moscow bond, rather than the Astana-
Tashkent relationship. Meanwhile, the initial exclusion of Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan points towards their marginalisation (Bohr, 2004: 492-493).  
This interpretation is supported by current events, where the now implemented 
Eurasian Customs Union between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan is ready to 
accept Kyrgyzstan as a member, though indications are that it may be as a second-
tier member (Smith, 2011). This is suggestive of a pattern whereby Eurasian re-
gionalism occurs at the cost of Central Asian regionalism, as further discussed in 
subsequent chapters. Indeed, EurAsEC was formally established in 2000 at Presi-
dent Nazarbayev’s initiative. In 2005 upon Uzbek accession to EurAsEC, the 
Community absorbed CACO (Weitz, 2008: 25-26) thereby cementing the centrali-
ty of Astana-Moscow relations to Central Asian cooperation. Uzbekistan later 
suspended its membership in 2008 (Vinhas de Souza, 2011: 1).  
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Through reduction in customs tariffs, taxes, duties and other trade barriers, Eur-
AsEC was envisioned to promote trade and economic ties between member states. 
Aims included the creation of a free trade zone and a uniform transport network 
and energy market, agreement on external tariffs, harmonisation of external rela-
tions with bodies such as the WTO, as well as harmonisation of educational and 
legal systems and cooperation in the cultural and scientific spheres (Weitz, 2008: 
27). The Community originally built upon abovementioned customs union agree-
ments but extended the framework to consider harmonisation of policy (Gleason, 
2001: 1092). The advance of objectives, however, did not imply that the goals of 
previous agreements had been reached (Ultanbaev, 2003: 133). 
The Community covers 92 per cent of CIS territory and, upon formation, 64.5 per 
cent of the population (Askolskiy and Bezzubova, 2002: 118). Three quarters of 
CIS foreign commercial transactions originate in EurAsEC. As such, as Richard 
Weitz has argued, EurAsEC was a ‘logical alternative’ to the unmanageable CIS 
(Weitz, 2008: 27). However, it would appear that even EurAsEC was too un-
wieldy, since Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus eventually separated out and 
formed a customs union between the three of them. 
The Eurasian Customs Union and a future Eurasian Economic Union 
Though EurAsEC proceeded towards harmonisation, particularly in eliminating 
certain trade barriers; progress was held back by internal conflicts of interest de-
riving from the members’ disparate production structures and levels of economic 
development (Ultanbaev, 2003: 135; Wiśniewska, 2013: 8). Consequently, the 
three states, which had made the most progress  -the Troika of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan-  at the EurAsEC Intergovernmental Council in October 2007 signed 
an agreement on the establishment of a Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) consist-
ing only of the Troika states (Weitz, 2008: 29-30). In June 2009, President Putin 
announced that the three states had begun the creation of the ECU (Wiśniewska, 
2013: 7). 
The impetus for renewed efforts at economic integration was both political and 
economic. The global economic crisis impacted heavily on the Russian economy, 
and trade facilitation was seen as a means to strengthen recovery. Meanwhile, the 
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EU’s Eastern Partnership and China’s increasing expansion into Central Asia was 
considered a threat to Russia’s leading position within the FSU (Wiśniewska, 
2013: 8-9). Russia’s dominance of the Union is clear from the fact that it repre-
sents 86 per cent of the group’s GDP and 84 per cent of the population covered 
(Dreyer and Popescu, 2014: 2). 
The ECU and CES are widely considered to be more successful than previous 
integration initiatives in the FSU. Iwona Wiśniewska (2013: 9) has ascribed this 
to better prepared, more detailed drafting of agreements, including an emphasis on 
compliance with international standards, as well as concessions made by creating 
a relatively greater symmetry of benefits. For instance, the formula for sharing of 
import duties, which are now jointly collected and subsequently dispersed be-
tween the three member states, means that Russia receives 87.97 per cent, Ka-
zakhstan 7.33 per cent and Belarus 4.7 per cent, which according to the Russian 
government has resulted in a budget revenue loss for the Russian Federation of 
USD 1.15 billion in 2011 (Felgenhauer, 2011). Kataryna Wolczuk and Rilka 
Dragneva (2012: 2) in a study of the institutional structures of the ECU have sug-
gested that it is more robust than previous attempts at regional integration in the 
FSU. Authority over the ECU and CES lies with the Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council, which operate at the level of presidents or head of governments, and the 
Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), which consist of a political council 
formed of deputy prime ministers, and an executive board consisting of nine 
commissioners, three from each member state (Wiśniewska, 2013: 23). Both the 
supreme and the commission council take decision by consensus, while the com-
mission board operate on the basis of two thirds qualified majority voting (Ibid: 
23-24). Additionally the Court of the Eurasian Economic Community is charged 
with economic dispute resolution, and its decisions are binding on member states 
(Ibid: 25).  
The Eurasian integration project, thus, both provides for commitment institutions, 
in the form of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Community, the EEC and the 
Supreme Council, and a regional leader willing to compensate other member 
states, with Russia making concessions on the sharing of revenues. Nevertheless, 
the EBRD in commenting on Eurasian integration has pointed to the lack of varia-
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tion in institutional quality and the absence in all countries of institutions of suffi-
cient strength to serve as a model for other members. This limits the ability to 
build strong supranational institutions that can facilitate deeper integration as well 
as raise the institutional quality within member states (EBRD, 2012b: 78). 
Wolczuk and Dragneva (2012: 5) correspondingly have emphasised the need to 
maintain ‘healthy scepticism’ as regards the future of the ECU and its transition to 
the EaEU. One obstacle noted is the large volume of agreements underlying the 
regime, suggesting a complex and fragmented legal regime, which inhibits inter-
pretation and application (Ibid: 6). On the other hand, Wolczuk and Dragneva also 
noted a high level of political will and institutional mechanisms such as the Court, 
whose rulings are defined to be legally binding (Ibid). Wiśniewska (2013: 25) and 
Olga Shumylo-Tapiola (2012: 9) meanwhile have questioned the effectiveness 
and authority of the EEC pointing to limited competence and unwillingness of 
national ministries to transfer authority, which means that decision-making con-
tinues to be driven by national governments. Moreover, given the prevalence of 
national interests and protectionist measures it is claimed that the ECU is not truly 
a customs union in the ‘textbook’ sense (Ibid: 10). Shumylo-Tapiola furthermore 
suggested that the effectiveness of the ECU may be hindered by lack of trust be-
tween member states (Ibid: 17).  
Thus, while institutionally the Eurasian integration project suggests a new phase 
in post-Soviet integration providing for more effective commitment institutions it 
appears the dominance of Russia over these institutions may be causing Belarus-
sian and Kazakh reluctance towards compliance and transfer of powers.  
The common customs code came into force in July 2010 on the basis of Russia’s 
existing tariff structure (EBRD, 2010a: 121). By spring 2014 85 per cent of im-
port duties are believed to have been harmonised. The speed with which the cus-
toms code was negotiated meant that not all details have been agreed, and that 
national regulations often apply as a consequence (Wiśniewska, 2013: 14-15). In a 
transitional period a list of 400 goods will be exempt from the single tariff. More 
importantly, the customs code does not apply to export duties creating a barrier to 
internal trade between member states (Ibid: 13-14). For the first five years of the 
ECU, members have the freedom to apply their own tariffs, and can grant tariff 
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exceptions or impose national export or import bans with consent of other mem-
bers (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2012: 12). Most recently, Russia has imposed an embargo 
on import of Western food products, which has not been imposed in ECU partner 
country Kazakhstan (Trilling, 2014a).  
As discussed above, a significant impact of the ECU and CES on members’ inter-
nal trade has been hampered by already having low tariff barriers as a conse-
quence of existing free trade agreements, and the persistence of NTBs (Wiśniew-
ska, 2013: 38). Progress on harmonisation of standards has to date been slow, 
while there is no mutual recognition applied (Dreyer and Popescu, 2014: 3). ECU 
agreements continue to be outstanding on areas such as the elimination of multiple 
and non-tariff barriers on inter alia medicine, alcohol, and construction materials 
(Voloshin, 2014a). Reduction in NTBs could potentially bring significant benefits 
to the ECU members compensating for the losses incurred by Kazakhstan through 
tariff increases (Tarr, 2012: 3). Mandatory regulations apply in areas that could 
more efficiently be subject to voluntary standards. Whilst legislation in Russia and 
Kazakhstan have opened for a shift to voluntary standards implementation is lag-
ging and is now complicated by authority having shifted to the ECU level (Ibid).  
The elimination of border controls officially took effect from the start of 2012 
creating the CES (EBRD, 2010a: 121). Supporting legislation had, however, to a 
large extent not been agreed upon, leaving significant implementation to be com-
pleted in the period towards 2020, including the free movement on capital and 
services (Wiśniewska, 2013: 16, 21-22). Kazakhstan has not achieved sought con-
cessions from Russia in the energy field with a common oil and gas market envi-
sioned only from 2025. Moscow reportedly stands to lose USD 40 billion annual-
ly from removing all internal restrictions on oil trade (Voloshin, 2014a). The ex-
clusion of energy markets from the operation of the ECU means that it effectively 
only applies to import policy with 80 per cent of Kazakh and 70 per cent of Rus-
sian exports, thus, excluded (Wiśniewska, 2013:15). 
In autumn 2011 President Putin championed the development of the ECU into an 
economic and political Eurasian Union on a par with the European Union (Putin, 
2011). In the article Putin suggested that the formation of the ECU and the CES 
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has laid the foundation for the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union, which 
may be joined by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Putin went further, however, to sug-
gest that the members would not stop there but aim for a more ambitious, deeper 
level of integration: the Eurasian Union (Ibid). This demonstrates Russia’s desire 
to maintain supremacy within the post-Soviet sphere. As Robert Cutler points out, 
it is noticeable how Putin in his article on the Eurasian Union ignored the role of 
the SCO which in membership terms overlaps with the Eurasian project (Cutler, 
2011).  
The proposed Eurasian Union was presented as a value-based integration project 
based on democracy and free market principles, and thus defined in parallel, not 
opposition, to the EU (Hoffmann, 2012: 2). Presidents Putin and Nazarbayev have 
sought the recognition of the EaEU by the EU as an equal partner with a view to 
negotiating a free trade agreement between the two groups (Weitz, 2014a). In 
seeking wider international recognition, the ECU is negotiating trade agreements 
with Vietnam, New Zealand, Switzerland and Norway (Forbes.kz, 2013a) and 
exploring possibilities with India and Egypt (Delovoy Kazakhstan, 2014b).  
As with the ECU and CES, however, also the notion of a Eurasian Union reflects 
differences of opinion among the Troika states. For instance, while President 
Nazarbayev is minded towards extensive integration, he maintains that this is to 
be kept to the economic level, and that Kazakhstan will not cede sovereignty on 
other matters or to a considerable extent (Hoffmann, 2012: 2). This version of 
Eurasian integration does not match Putin’s ideas for a voluntary political com-
munity (Ibid). In an August 2014 live broadcast Q&A a seemingly planted ques-
tion prompted Putin to address the Kazakh reluctance to political union, emphasis-
ing that the Eurasian project would eventually be taken to its ‘logical conclusion’ 
(Putin, 2014; Schenkan, 2014). Discord is reflected even in the forthcoming 
EaEU. Initial statements suggested that the EaEU would be agreed upon and 
agreements signed by spring 2012 but compromise was not attainable by this time 
(Wiśniewska, 2013: 37). The treaty on the establishment of the EaEU was eventu-
ally signed in May 2014, set to enter into force from 1 January 2015 (RFE/RL, 
2014d).  
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Kyrgyzstan is set to join the ECU in 2015 but expects to take five years before 
being fully compliant (RFE/RL, 2014b). In agreeing the roadmap for entry, Russia 
has committed significant financial support for Kyrgyzstan, as further discussed in 
chapter 4. Such subsidies also questions whether the expansion of the ECU re-
flects voluntary sign-up (Dreyer and Popescu, 2014: 2). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan continuing on a path towards Eurasian regionalism may be cementing the 
failure of Central Asian regionalism as previewed by CACO’s inclusion into 
EurAsEC. This will be further explored in subsequent chapters. 
2.3.2 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
The SCO developed from a series of border agreements and confidence-building 
measures between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan dating 
back to 1996. The ‘Shanghai Five’  -so named as the 1996-agreement was signed 
in Shanghai-  eventually held annual summits between presidents as well as regu-
lar ministerial meetings. The contacts reached a level of institutionalisation, which 
led the states to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, and in 2002 
adopt a Charter for the organisation (Akiner, 2010: 6-7). The organisation is built 
on principles of equality and mutual trust, advantage and consultation. Decisions 
are made by consensus but members are welcome to opt out, and also to join at a 
later stage (Ibid). The SCO is an intergovernmental organisation in which deci-
sions are driven forward at recurrent summits rather than the by the SCO Secretar-
iat. The operations of the organisation are intransparent, and announcements 
vague (Lain, 2014). 
The SCO embodies more a network than a rigid organisation. This is exemplified 
in the external relations of the SCO, which can be said to form concentric circles. 
At the core are the members, which in addition to the Shanghai Five, now also 
count Uzbekistan. Around the core is a circle of observer states, including Mongo-
lia, India, Iran and Pakistan. In 2008 their status was reconfirmed when the ob-
servers were allowed greater involvement in SCO affairs. The next circle consists 
of dialogue partners Belarus and Sri Lanka. The SCO network, including observ-
ers and dialogue partners, covers a significant part of the Eurasian landmass with 
a population close to 3 billion. Immense energy resources are controlled by mem-
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bers of the network, of which four states are declared nuclear states. The SCO’s 
growing influence is clear from the list of states wishing to attend its summits as 
observers, partners – or merely guests, as Turkmenistan regularly does. Iran and 
Pakistan have formally submitted applications for full membership but this has 
been deferred with reference to the organisation not having formal procedures for 
this (Akiner, 2010: 6-12).
20
 Several member states are believed unwilling to ex-
pand the inner circle of formal members. For instance, Kazakhstan is averse to 
seeing its influence in the organisation diluted by inclusion of further members 
(Blank, 2008). More generally, the CARs appear hesitant, particularly towards 
Iranian membership as this could strengthen the impression that the SCO is an 
anti-Western alliance which the CARs are keen to communicate that it is not 
(Weitz, 2008: 36). Meanwhile, China and Kazakhstan are believed opposed to 
India playing a stronger role in Central Asia (Blank, 2008). 
Whereas the Shanghai Five was originally focused on border delimitation, the 
SCO Charter outlines a variety of objectives relating to as diverse matters as the 
international political and economic order, regional security in the form of de-
fence and law enforcement as well as environmental protection, culture, science, 
technology and education, and energy, transport and finance (Akiner, 2010: 12-
13). Despite the rhetorical emphasis on regional security through fighting the 
three evils of separatism, terrorism and extremism, the practical impact of the 
SCO in security matters is limited, the pinnacle suggested to be the creation of a 
terrorist ‘black list’ (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013: 32). The limited impact in the 
security sphere is suggested by the organisation’s absence in situations of instabil-
ity. When Kyrgyzstan in 2010 experienced ethnic tensions in Osh oblast, the 
country’s leadership called on the assistance of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) rather than the SCO, for instance (Kaukenov, 2013).  
Economic cooperation appears to have more substance. The SCO is specifically 
focused on freeing trade and improving infrastructural links. Trade is a somewhat 
controversial issue between the member states, as they generally fear that a free 
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 As discussed in chapter 5 the SCO at the 2014 summit in Tajikistan made provisions for adopt-
ing new members. 
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inflow of Chinese goods will make their domestic industries uncompetitive. Bei-
jing has thus seemingly accepted a gradual approach to freeing of trade. Mean-
while, cooperation in infrastructure is less toxic, and progresses both in terms of 
road, rail and pipelines (Akiner, 2010: 14-15). The construction of a gas pipeline 
from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China demonstrates the 
feasibility of regional projects. Meanwhile, it illustrates the fluid nature of coop-
eration within the SCO, and the way in which China operates in the region. The 
SCO in some cases merely provides a framework for cooperation that in practice 
often happens on a bilateral basis (Kaukenov, 2013). In the case of the pipeline, 
China did not negotiate its construction by way of multilateral discussions but 
through bilateral talks with each of the three CARs, including Turkmenistan, not 
formally an SCO member (Chatham House, 2011: 6).  
Such Chinese-led projects suggest a different strategy of engagement on part of 
China relative to that of Russia. Whereas Russia follows a traditional divide-and-
rule approach to Central Asia, exploiting disagreements between the CARs for 
own gain, China appears to consider such disagreements and barriers contrary to 
its interests, and thus seeks to resolve them (Peterson, 2013).
21
 Correspondingly, 
Chinese President Xi has raised the need for regional cooperation at the political 
level with a view to trade facilitation, including the role of the SCO in this area 
(Tashkinbayev, 2013); as Chris Rickleton has reported: Beijing seemingly ‘re-
mains confident there is no problem that its deep pockets can’t solve’ (Rickleton, 
2013). Beijing employs the SCO as a vehicle for promoting its economic interests 
under a multilateral umbrella, seeing investments as its main lever (ICG, 2013: 
11-12). For the CARs China is a welcome partner as it is perceived as a source of 
finance that does not come with strings attached, whereas Russia and Western 
partners often attach conditionality to its financial support (Ibid). Meanwhile, the 
SCO represents a forum of little concern to wider society. As argued by Adil 
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 Chris Rickleton suggests Chinese investment in the Kara Balta oil refinery, which would reduce 
Kyrgyz reliance on Russia and Kazakhstan for fuel, in Kyrgyzstan is an example of this. The re-
finery has, though, not (yet) become operational owing to local protests against the environmental 
impact (see Trilling, 2014b). 
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Kaukenov (2013): ‘no one considers the SCO to be an entity capable of changing 
their everyday lives’. 
For the CARs, the SCO can be seen as a method of accommodating the rising 
super power China. Likewise, it is a framework in which the CARs can balance 
the influence of Russia and China. The presence of China puts a break on Russia’s 
divide-and-rule approach to Central Asia, while it also allows for integration with 
China in a forum where Russia can help limit the degree of influence China 
achieves (Allison, 2004: 468). Over time, Russian economic decline may 
strengthen the relative power of China in the forum. China used the 2011 SCO 
summit to demonstrate how it has overtaken Russia in terms of economic growth 
and political influence in the Central Asian region, and aimed at deepening eco-
nomic relations between itself and the CARs (Marat, 2011). Already China is the 
main driver of the economic aspects of the SCO, as well as the organisation more 
widely (Kaukenov, 2013), as is also suggested by Russia’s concurrent emphasis 
on pursuing its economic interests vis-à-vis the CARs through the ECU, and in 
future the EaEU, and security cooperation through the CSTO. Indeed, contention 
between Russia and China reportedly is limiting the effectiveness of the SCO and 
hindering some measures from taking off (ICG, 2013: 5, 9, 21; Gabuev and Cher-
nenko, 2012). Specifically, Russia’s policy towards the SCO is impeding progress 
with Russian diplomats supposedly boasting of their success in marooning Chi-
nese initiatives (Kaukenov, 2013). 
While the SCO appears to function well as a multilateral framework in which 
China can, and does, pursue trade facilitation measures, infrastructural links in 
particular, it is unlikely to succeed as an integrationist framework. It is to some 
extent a multilateral framework for bilateral dialogue, and lacks commitment in-
stitutions. Moreover, China’s leadership within the organisation is contested by 
Russia. 
2.3.3 The Economic Cooperation Organization 
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) dates back to 1985, when it was 
formed as an intergovernmental body to promote economic, cultural and technical 
relations between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet 
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Union Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan joined, while Ka-
zakhstan initially joined as an associate member. The expansion of ECO led to 
speculations of the organisation developing into a common Islamic market 
(Bondarevsky and Ferdinand, 1994: 41-42). The independence of Central Asian 
republics inspired both enthusiasm for and fear of the prospect of increasing Turk-
ish and Iranian influence in the region. Whilst Turkey was motivated by creating a 
Turkish-led international community of Turkic states, Iran was similarly motivat-
ed by a sense of isolation in the Middle East and consequent need to create a 
community (Robins, 1994: 66-67; Warkotsch, 2011: 69-70).  
Luca Anceschi has suggested that Iran and Turkey were considered the main 
competitors for influence on economic and political developments of the Central 
Asian republics on the eve of independence (Anceschi, 2009: 14). In both cases 
fear and enthusiasm proved exaggerated. Linguistic ties were overstated, in some 
cases masking significant differences in the Turkic languages spoken (Robins, 
1994: 62), whilst Turkey also faced significant geographic barriers to building a 
presence in Central Asia (Ibid: 64). Iran, on the other hand, was constrained by its 
revolutionary ideology, which inspired wariness on part of the Central Asian lead-
ers (Ibid: 62, 117). While the inclusion of the CARs into ECO, on the one hand, 
created a space for competition for influence between Iran and Turkey; it, on the 
other hand, indicated the illusory nature of the notion that either power could es-
tablish an exclusive zone of influence in the region (Robins, 1994: 70). Pakistan, 
the third initial member of ECO, had clear economic interests in Central Asia in-
cluding obtaining access to raw materials and energy supplies (Ibid: 87). Moreo-
ver, Pakistan is likely to have been inspired by the opportunity for new allies in its 
stand-off against India (Ibid: 86). The continuing instability in Afghanistan has, 
however, inhibited Pakistan from developing these links (Ibid: 91). 
The CARs had diverging priorities within the organisation with the Turkic-
speaking nations prioritising links with Turkey, whilst Tajikistan emphasised rela-
tions with Iran (Bondarevsky and Ferdinand, 1994: 42-43). Substantial coopera-
tion has never materialised. Instead ECO functions as a forum for dialogue for 
regional states (Herzig, 2004: 514). For instance, in keeping with the bilateral em-
phasis of the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, Turkmenistan has used ECO as a 
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platform for bilateral cooperation on energy infrastructure (Anceschi, 2009: 89). 
Notably, neither Kazakhstan nor Uzbekistan appears to prioritise cooperation 
within the forum. Kazakhstan at the summit in 2012 was not represented at head 
of state level, while Uzbekistan wholly ignored the summit (Valiev, 2012). The 
CARs participation in ECO alongside other cooperation schemes may suggest that 
some of these to a certain extent were seen as insurance policies, or ways of keep-
ing options open (Bondarevsky and Ferdinand, 1994: 54). 
2.3.4 Frameworks with extra-regional actors 
In the 2000s, actors external to the Central Asian region began to introduce dip-
lomatic frameworks through which the CARs are approached as a regional entity. 
For instance, Japan since 2004 has pursued the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue, 
and in 2007, the EU introduced its Central Asia strategy, containing a significant 
regional element. This section explores Japanese, Korean, European and Ameri-
can initiatives in this area. 
Central Asia plus Japan 
Japan began establishing diplomatic relations with Central Asian republics al-
ready in 1992. Since 1997 Japan has pursued a regional strategy towards Central 
Asia, originally under the Eurasian diplomacy doctrine of Prime Minister Hash-
imoto. As suggested by the designation ‘Eurasian’, Central Asia was seen as part 
of a wider Eurasian region (Nurgaliev, 2009: 95). Since 2004, Japan has pursued a 
regional dialogue with the five post-Soviet CARs under the ‘Central Asia plus 
Japan dialogue’ (ibid: 96). Japan’s main interest in Central Asia has been to gain 
access to the natural resources of the region in order to improve domestic energy 
security (Ibid: 97). The approach of Japan to Central Asia has been defined as 
‘developmental’ as opposed to geopolitical, reflecting that Japan does not see it-
self as competing for influence in the region with other actors such as Russia and 
China (Len, Uyama, Hirose, 2008: 11-12). However, the shift from an emphasis 
on Eurasia to one on Central Asia does indicate exclusion of Russia. 
While Japan supports democracy promotion in Central Asia, it does not apply 
pressure or conditionality; an approach that suits Central Asian leaders well 
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(Nurgaliev, 2009: 99). The Central Asia plus Japan dialogue is based on principles 
of respect for differences of opinion, competition coordination and open coopera-
tion, and specifically aims to improve intra-regional cooperation in Central Asia, 
particularly on issues of economic development and regional security in Central 
Asia (Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue, 2012). Reflecting Japan’s desire to con-
tribute towards regional integration in Central Asia through this forum is the con-
sideration that was given to opening a dialogue with CACO. This was dismissed 
because Russia was considered too engaged in the latter (Kavato, 2008: 23), con-
firming that the dialogue is aimed at an exclusive Central Asian region. 
While Central Asian experts have recognised the potential for Japan to play a pos-
itive role in Central Asia given the absence of direct geopolitical interests, there is 
wide scepticism as to the effectiveness of the forum (Rakhimov, 2014: 84). In part 
this may be explained by the dialogue forum currently having too wide a set of 
objectives (Ibid: 85). Another obstacle to strong Central Asia-Japan relations is 
the lack of mutual understanding; Japanese lack sufficient understanding of cur-
rent political and economic issues in Central Asia, just as Central Asians do not 
have a high appreciation of Japanese culture (Nurgaliev, 2009: 98; Rakhimov, 
2014: 79). Indeed, when Central Asia plus Japan was launched in 2004, key Japa-
nese political institutions, including the Diet and the prime minister’s office were 
uninterested (Kavato, 2008: 23). 
The Republic of Korea and Central Asia 
South Korea has been diplomatically and economically active in Central Asia 
since the CARs gained independence. Korea has, first and foremost, centred its 
activity on Uzbekistan, where Korea already in 1992 was the largest foreign in-
vestor, as well as Kazakhstan. Both countries have significant minorities of ethnic 
Koreans, which may in part explain Korea’s focus on these countries (Hwang, 
2012: 3-4).  
On the whole, Central Asia was not high on the Korean foreign relations agenda 
until the mid-to-late 2000s (Fumagalli, 2012: 71). The Korea-Central Asia Coop-
eration Forum was launched in 2007, which along with other regional forums of 
Korean diplomatic relations is designed to provide for regular dialogue (Hwang, 
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2012: 2). Korean President Lee Myungbak in 2009 introduced the ‘New Asia Ini-
tiative’, with which Korea redefined its understanding of Asia to include the coun-
tries of Central Asia, and through which Korea has sought to provide an example 
of economic development and modernisation for emulation by less developed 
economies (Ibid: 3). The initiative was, in part, specifically aimed at extending 
Korean influence in Central Asia (Fumagalli, 2012: 72, 85). Korea’s interest in 
Central Asia is primarily driven by a need to access energy resources, including 
uranium. Moreover, Central Asia provides a potential source of cheap labour in-
put, which Korea is now lacking (Hwang, 2012: 2). From a Central Asian per-
spective, stronger economic links with Korea has the benefit not only of providing 
a model of development but also the potential for technological and capital trans-
fers (Ibid: 2). 
While the Cooperation Forum has introduced a regional element to Korean di-
plomacy towards Central Asia, the approach has primarily been bilateral with Ko-
rea building on existing relations and investments in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
(Fumagalli, 2012: 86). 
The EU’s Central Asia strategy 
Throughout the 1990s, EU engagement with Central Asia was extremely limited 
but increased during the 2000s owing to an increased interest in the region’s ener-
gy resources; security threats emanating from criminal and terrorist networks, 
gaining particularly in prominence following the events of 9-11 and intervention 
in Afghanistan; and the increased proximity of Central Asia to Europe following 
the EU’s Eastern enlargement and Eastern Partnership programme (Schmitz, 
2011: 4; Council of the EU, 2007: 8-9). The EU in 2007 launched The European 
Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, which signalled an in-
tensified engagement with the region (Schmitz, 2011: 11). The new strategy was 
driven forward by Germany during its EU Presidency in 2007 and followed on 
from the German New Ostpolitik by which Germany strengthened its engagement 
with the FSU (Warkotsch, 2011: 1).  
The EU can be considered to have a particular interest in promoting regional inte-
gration in other regions of the world as a means of promoting mirror images of 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
128 
 
itself, thus increasing the legitimacy of its own actorness (Allahverdiyev, 2008: 
15). The EU’s general approach to its external relations suggests a view of region-
al integration as a process that contributes to regional and international stability, 
and reflects the European experience of such a benefit (Doidge, 2011: 53.) Mat-
thew Doidge (2011: 53) has suggested that ‘The promotion of regionalism, then, 
has become increasingly central to the EU’s view of its own place on the world 
stage.’ Correspondingly, the EU’s Central Asia strategy involves a regional ele-
ment; specifically, the strategy stated that ‘The aim of the European Commission’s 
assistance to Central Asia includes facilitating regional cooperation.’ (Council of 
the EU, 2007: 11). 
The strategy, however, signalled a more pragmatic approach to the facilitation of 
region-building than EU policy had previously. The strategy was aimed at balanc-
ing a regional and bilateral approach to the region, but the EU, in effect, reduced 
its emphasis on regionalism in favour of bilateral channels to better target the is-
sues of individual republics. This is reflected in two thirds of EU funding for the 
Central Asia strategy being reserved for bilateral programmes (Laruelle and Pey-
rouse, 2013: 63). This more pragmatic approach possibly reflects a recent ac-
ceptance of the limits to what the EU can achieve in terms of region-building in 
Central Asia. Doidge (2011: 173) has argued that Christopher Hill’s concept of 
capability-expectations gap applies to the EU’s interregional approach generally. 
While the EU on the one hand has accepted the weakness of counterpart regions, 
exemplified through a focus of capacity-building in interregional relationships, 
Doidge argued that it had not correspondingly lowered expectations of what it can 
achieve through such relationships. Thus, while the centrality of interregionalism 
to EU external relations provides a different impetus for a regional approach to 
Central Asia, when compared to actors such as Japan or Korea, the pragmatism in 
the 2007 strategy perhaps signals such lowered expectations of what can be 
achieved in terms of region-building in the case of Central Asia. 
The strategy listed as many as seven areas of cooperation, ranging from human 
rights and the rule of law, over economic development, to combating common 
threats. The strategy did not, however, prioritise between these diverse goals 
(Council of the EU, 2007) but suggested transnational crime; environmental con-
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cerns, energy and water; border and migration management; people-to-people 
contacts; and transport infrastructure as focus areas for regional level efforts (Ibid: 
11). The regional strategy paper for assistance, supporting the overall strategy, 
identified three priority areas: regional cooperation, improved living standards as 
well as governance and economic reform (European Community, 2007: 3). At the 
regional level three key initiatives were launched on rule of law, education, and 
environment and water, respectively (Schmitz, 2011: 14). The rule of law initia-
tive specifically has focused on commercial and trade law, and economic-legal 
norms consistent with a market economy (Ibid). At the same time, the EU’s initia-
tives on border management contributes to the securitisation of borders, thus in-
hibiting the regional trade other parts of its programme is designed to foster 
(Czerniecka and Heathershaw, 2011: 77, 89, 91). 
The lack of prioritisation of objectives complicates implementation of the strate-
gy, as does the absent focus on consistency and complementarity of objectives. 
Andrea Schmitz (2011: 17) has ascribed this weakness to the strategy being a re-
sult of a maximalist approach incorporating various objectives of EU institutions, 
member states and private groups simultaneously. This is further complicated by 
EU programmes co-existing with bilateral initiatives of individual member states, 
which may reflect diverging interests (Gower, 2011: 33; Laruelle and Peyrouse, 
2013: 59). Others have criticised the EU for making generic expressions of inter-
est, which are too vague to have intelligible meaning (Emerson and Boonstra, 
2010: 8-9).  
In Central Asia, the EU is considered a marginal actor with low visibility 
(Schmitz, 2011: 18); however, since the mid-2000s a growing number of EU 
member states are taking an increased interest and are increasingly present in the 
region. This interest is centred on Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. Despite the increased interest, member states are, on the 
whole, agreed on the goals of EU engagement in the region. The disagreements 
that persist surround tactics rather than principles both as regards energy diploma-
cy and the human rights and good governance dimension (Gower, 2011: 43-45). 
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The New Silk Roads Initiative 
While the USA established diplomatic relations and played a significant role in 
Central Asia in the 1990s, the 2000s saw American influence wane. The introduc-
tion of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), the logistics chain facilitating 
supplies to the ISAF in Afghanistan, restored some influence, though the immi-
nent withdrawal from Afghanistan of US troops, suggests that Central Asia is 
likely to be low on the radar of American policy in the future (Laruelle and Pey-
rouse, 2013; 43).  
Since 2011 the USA has been advocating the vision of the New Silk Road as a 
means of releasing economic development in Central and South Asia through in-
ternational trade. Consequently, the vision commands liberalisation of trade regu-
lation and the implementation of infrastructure developments to link the region 
with the global economy (Lee, 2012: 9). Being centred on the NDN, the strategy 
reflects a view of Central Asia as being part of a wider region including Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. Indeed then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009 referred 
to ‘Afghanistan, Pakistan, and all their neighbours’ (Ibid: 10), suggesting that the 
pivot of the American approach is Afghanistan, and the CARs an appendix to the 
strategy. 
The New Silk Road vision is linked to the NDN but contrary to the aims of the 
vision, the NDN does not appear to have facilitated trade liberalisation in Central 
Asia. Rather barriers to trade in the form of border closures and rail blockades 
have marked the period, as have increases in regional shipping fees, corruption 
and bureaucratic procedures required for border crossing (Ibid: 18-20, 26; Cooley, 
2013: 47). Frederick Starr, who long advocated that the US promote a New Silk 
Road strategy in Central Asia, has noted the lack of prioritisation of projects as 
well as too strong a focus on infrastructural projects, and too little on trade proce-
dures, including border and customs regulations (Kucera, 2011). Furthermore, the 
lack of involvement of the CARs’ neighbours  -China, India, Iran and Russia-  
which all have direct transport links that circumvent the region limit the potential 
of re-establishing the Silk Roads (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 18). 
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Central Asian leaders interpret the limited economic and commercial engagement 
of the USA in Central Asia as a lack of long term commitment to the region’s 
development. As the New Silk Road is not aimed at an exclusive Central Asian 
region, I will not consider the impact of the US as an external actor, when return-
ing to the issue in chapter 5. 
2.4 Summary 
The Central Asian republics have pursued different paths through the period of 
transition from the USSR. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both introduced so-called 
shock therapy reforms quickly upon independence, while Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan followed more gradualist approaches to economic transition. Mean-
while, Tajikistan’s transition was delayed by the country’s civil war but since 
1997, the country has pursued a liberalising economic policy.  
These diverging transition paths have led to deviating economic environments, 
where Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  -to some extent Tajikistan-  are considered 
more liberal and open economies, than are Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. At the 
same time all five Central Asian republics face similar challenges in terms of in-
stitutional reforms, as all suffer from poor corruption standards and lacking per-
formance on governance and enterprise restructuring. The capture of economic 
rents by elites have also contributed to a delay of economic diversification and 
sustainable economic growth; and in all five republics substantial economic ac-
tivity is pushed into the informal economy depriving governments of budget in-
come. 
In the formal economy, trade integration within Central Asia is limited. Kyrgyz-
stan and Uzbekistan export significant amounts to neighbours, Kazakhstan in par-
ticular, which also represent noteworthy import shares in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. However, trade integration in Central Asia is driven by the infor-
mal sector. The shadow trade deprives all states of budget revenues, which illus-
trates how they could all benefit from bringing informal businesses into the formal 
economy. Enterprises are not only driven into the shadows by weak governance 
and corruption but also by the diverging trade and border restrictions. Formalising 
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it and improving businesses opportunities for growth, would benefit the general 
public as well as state coffers.  
Russia and, increasingly, China are the main extra-regional trading partners of 
Central Asian republics. The EU and Turkey are also significant trade partners, 
the former particularly for Kazakhstan. The ECU appears to have had a negligible 
effect on trade within Central Asia but Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek exports to Russia 
have been hit by the new trade barriers. In fact, the ECU does not represent signif-
icant trade liberalisation and has not brought with it palpable improvements in 
investment climates. Rather, the process has been focused on restricting trade with 
third countries. Early studies of the ECU suggest that a significant reduction in 
non-tariff barriers is required for the integration project to bring significant eco-
nomic benefits to its members. 
The geographical isolation and dependence on transit countries demonstrate the 
need for cooperation not only within the region but beyond it. Central Asian land-
lockedness has been estimated to reduce trade significantly more than is the case 
for landlocked states generally. This suggests that the diverging trade policies and 
complicated customs procedures further impede trade by increasing transportation 
costs, which are also impacted by the poor density and quality of transport infra-
structure. These transit opportunities, in turn, affect the competitiveness of local 
production and the development of new comparative advantages. Physical integra-
tion with neighbouring countries as well as harmonisation of trade and transit re-
gimes may, therefore, benefit both trade potential and diversification of produc-
tion structures in Central Asia.  
Central Asia may be able to develop new comparative advantages by focusing on 
value added processing of the region’s resources, leveraging its low-cost, abun-
dant workforce and regional demand for basic consumer products such as food-
stuffs and clothes. Agribusiness, textiles and chemical industry have been sug-
gested as potential comparative advantages, which may involve regional value 
chains. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet space has seen a variety 
of regional cooperation and integration frameworks that have overlapped with, 
replaced each other or co-existed. The CIS has facilitated the disintegration of 
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economic links within the former Soviet Union, though generally criticised for its 
ineffectiveness. Consequently other organisations developed to manage the eco-
nomic links in the FSU, including the CACO, which was subsequently subsumed 
into EurAsEC, which again led to the formation of a smaller ECU and CES, des-
tined to become the EaEU by 2015. With each new step it appears the institutional 
sophistication of regional integration in the post-Soviet space has improved, 
though there continue to be question marks over the economic benefits from Eura-
sian integration as well as its viability. These processes point to the limited suc-
cess of Central Asian regionalism and the dominance of Eurasian integration pro-
jects at the expense of Central Asian regional cohesion. This will be further ex-
plored in subsequent chapters. 
While the Central Asian republics have not succeeded in forming a Central Asian 
regional organisation, they participate in a variety of fora with external players. 
Aside from Eurasian integration schemes, including Russia, all CARs are engaged 
in the SCO with China, though Turkmenistan only as a guest. The SCO is largely 
a Chinese driven framework focused on cooperation in security and economic 
spheres, and through which China promotes bilateral economic engagement in 
Central Asia. All CARs participate in the Economic Cooperation Organisation 
along with Iran and Turkey, though this is not seen to have any noteworthy im-
pact. 
Latterly, a series of initiatives involving non-neighbouring external players seek 
to engage the CARs as a region. Japan, Korea and the EU all operate dialogue 
frameworks, which seek to facilitate cooperation between the Central Asian re-
publics. As was demonstrated in the Japanese shift of focus from Eurasia to Cen-
tral Asia, these frameworks are aimed at facilitating regional cohesiveness in an 
exclusive Central Asian region. As all three external actors in part were driven by 
an interest in access to Central Asian energy resources, this may have been a driv-
ing force behind approaching the CARs as a region separate to Russia, which has 
dominated the transit of the region’s natural resources. In chapter 5, I will return 
to these frameworks discussing their potential for success on the basis of an anal-
ysis of the underlying dynamics of regional integration in chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3 Gravity model and economic analysis22 
Central Asia has been described as ‘persistent periphery’ (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 
2013: xvii) and as one of the last frontiers of global economic integration (Linn, 
2011: 1). This chapter considers the potential for regional trade integration and for 
increasing trade between Central Asia and the rest of the world, particularly Eu-
rope and Asia – two of the global economy’s three main poles between which 
Central Asia is located. 
Employing a properly specified gravity model, this chapter challenges the propo-
sition of Kurmanalieva and Parpiev (2008) that the Central Asian republics no 
longer over-trade between themselves, and supports the suggestion by Felipe and 
Kumar (2010) of gains to trade from trade facilitation measures in the region. Ad-
ditionally, the gravity model is employed to explore whether Central Asian econ-
omies have untapped trade potential with two of the major centres of global eco-
nomic activity – Europe and Asia; and estimates impact of the suggested intra-
regional integration on the potential trade with extra-regional trading partners, 
again with a focus on Europe and Asia. Moreover, the chapter considers the po-
tential impact on extra-regional trade of three specific scenarios of trade facilita-
tion through economic integration. The first scenario is of economic integration 
between the five post-Soviet Central Asian states Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, that is, Central Asian regionalism, 
the main topic of the thesis. The second scenario reflects the more isolationist 
economic policy of the latter two states, which suggest that their membership of 
integration schemes may be unlikely, and therefore models integration between 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan only. Latterly, in light of current devel-
opments towards an expansion of the Eurasian Customs Union, the third scenario 
models an extension of the ECU to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the former 
of which is already set to join, and the latter subject to speculation that it may do 
so in the future. 
                                                 
22
 Please note that an earlier version of this analysis was printed in the Kazakh Economic Review, 
No. 4, 2013, pp. 11-37 under the title “Central Asia – regional integration and its potential impact 
on extra-regional trade”. 
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Through these scenarios, the chapter explores whether would-be regional integra-
tion could extend the frontier of trade potential for Central Asia. Using the gravity 
model approach, an equation is estimated by which the trade potential of all in-
cluded economies can be calculated. For each of the three integration scenarios 
alternative gravity equations are estimated. Each of the three alternative equations 
is calculated on the basis that the relevant integration configurations make up one 
economic region. This allows one to compare the predicted trade potential of the 
three stipulated groupings against the predictions of the benchmark model in 
which the states represent individual economies. 
3.1 The gravity model 
In the following, the gravity model is applied to explore both the trade potential of 
the individual Central Asian republics as well as the potential benefits from stipu-
lated regional integration schemes. The latter is a non-traditional approach. Ex 
ante studies of economic integration typically employ computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) models, which are comprehensive economic models describing all 
elements of an economy and their interactions making them apt for evaluating 
policy choices (Burfishcer, 2011: 10-11). Owing to the complexity of such mod-
els, their application involves detailed data, which has proved impossible to obtain 
for all Central Asian republics. Hence, an attempt is made to estimate potential 
benefits to regional integration in Central Asia by means of the gravity model, 
which has become a workhorse model of international trade.  
The basic logic of the gravity model follows Newton’s theory of gravity suggest-
ing that bilateral trade between any two countries can be estimated by the product 
of their economic mass with the factor of proportion determined by the degree of 
trade resistance between them (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008: 442). Ap-
plying the model to study trade potential, a typical application of the model, one 
calculates a gravity equation based on which trade flows can be predicted.
23
 The 
predicted flows can then be compared with effective trade flows to indicate the 
                                                 
23
 See Introduction for further information of different applications of the gravity model. 
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degree of realisation of bilateral trade potential. As the model is focused on esti-
mating trade potentials, the results regarding integration potential should be con-
sidered indicative. 
When the gravity model was originally proposed in the early 1960s it lacked theo-
retical foundations. Since, however, there have been repeated attempts to define 
the theoretical underpinnings of the model. It has been shown that the gravity 
equation can be derived from economic models as diverse as Ricardian, 
Heckscher-Ohlin as well as increasing returns to scale models with each model 
predicting different types of trade. For instance, Simon Evenett and Wolfgang 
Keller (2002: 283) have found that while a perfect specialisation model with trade 
in differentiated and homogenous goods explains trade between developing coun-
tries adequately, an imperfect specialisation Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade in 
homogenous goods is more appropriate for explaining trade between developed 
and developing economies. This is because the level of specialisation and trade 
are positively correlated to the share of intra-industry trade (Ibid: 310). Mean-
while, for trade between developed and developing countries imperfect specialisa-
tion, owing to relative factor abundance differences, is key to explaining bilateral 
trade patterns (Ibid).  
Nevertheless, the model, which the following analysis is based on, is a model of 
perfect specialisation. I have chosen to base the study on the model developed by 
James E. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop (2003) as this is the generally accepted 
standard specification of the gravity model today. The model is based on the as-
sumptions that all goods are differentiated by region of origin, each region is spe-
cialised in the production of only one good, and the supply of each good is fixed. 
Assumptions on the demand side are identical homothetic preferences estimated 
by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function (Anderson and van Win-
coop, 2003: 174). The significant contribution of this model was to highlight that 
trade resistance is a relative factor denoted as multilateral trade resistance. Specif-
ically, the authors divide trade resistance into three elements: (i) the bilateral trade 
barrier between origin region o and destination region d, (ii) o’s resistance to trade 
with all regions, and (iii) d’s resistance to trade with all regions (Ibid). Exclusion 
of the multilateral resistance term from the gravity equation causes significant 
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omitted variable bias, given the variable’s correlation with trade costs (Ibid: 188-
189). If omitted, the factors would be included in the stochastic error term, which 
would then be correlated to the trade cost variable causing bias (Ruiz and Vilarru-
bia, 2007: 9). It is this contribution that has made the Anderson-van Wincoop 
model the standard specification used today. 
I follow the example set by Juan Ruiz and Josep Vilarrubia in their study of the 
trade potential of Mediterranean economies, when deriving the system of equa-
tions. The specification assumes that consumers in destination d maximise utility 
according to the following function, where 𝑥𝑜𝑑𝑡 denotes exports from region o to 
region d: 
 









, (1)  
subject to the budget constraint: 
 ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑡𝑥𝑜𝑑𝑡 = 𝑦𝑑𝑡
𝑜
 , (2)  
where 𝛽𝑜𝑡 measures the number of goods within the bundle produced by region o: 
𝜎 expresses the elasticity of substitution between goods from different regions, 
under the assumption of 𝜎 > 1 signifying that region d consumers have a prefer-
ence for consuming the highest possible number of varieties; 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑡 is the c.i.f. 
(cost, insurance and freight) import price from region o to region d at time t, 
whilst 𝑦𝑑𝑡 represents the nominal income of region d at time t (Ruiz and Vilarru-
bia, 2007: 8). 
Transport costs are modelled following the melting iceberg-assumption, implying 
that a fraction of the good is lost in transit (Andersen and van Wincoop: 2003: 
174). 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑡 units of region o’s good must be shipped for one unit to reach region d. 
As it is assumed that the exporter bears the transport costs, and passes it on to the 
importer; transportation costs increase the export price of the good. Thus, 
𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑡 =  𝑝𝑜𝑡 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑡 where 𝑝𝑜𝑡 represents the exporter’s price, and (1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑡) the 
amount lost in transit, i.e. the trade cost (Ruiz and Vilarrubia, 2007: 8). 
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𝑦𝑑𝑡  , (3)  








 (4)  
Imposing market clearing condition (𝑦𝑜𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝑜𝑑𝑡𝑑 ), the gravity equation can be 










, (5)  
where 𝑦𝑤𝑡 represents world income. 
3.1.1 Estimation procedure 
Anderson and van Wincoop express multilateral resistance by consumer price 
indices for each trading partner, which include all three elements of trade re-
sistance (Anderson and van Wincoop: 2003: 176). Prices differ between locations 
owing to unobservable trade costs (Ibid: 174). In order to derive the gravity equa-
tion, Anderson and van Wincoop employ a controversial, though practical, simpli-
fication, which is that trade barriers are symmetric. Barriers then can be interpret-
ed as an average of the barriers in both directions. This provides a simple solution 
to the price indices as functions of bilateral trade barriers and income shares (Ibid: 
175). It has been noted by Richard Baldwin and Daria Taglioni that this simplifi-
cation limits the application of the Anderson-van Wincoop model to cross-section 
data. The authors note that while the two terms are proportional, the factor of pro-
portionality depends on GDPs and trade costs, which vary over time. Thus, a par-
ticular factor of proportionality is needed for every set of GDPs and trade costs, 
that is, for every point on the time dimension (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006: 5-6). 
Including time-varying region-specific effects, however, takes this into account 
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(Bacchetta et al., 2012: 124). Estimation with panel data is used in the following 
because it diminishes bias from heterogeneity across countries (Ibid: 108).  
Given the multiplicative nature of the gravity equation, one can take the natural 
logarithms of the terms, thereby achieving a log-linear equation relating the 
logged bilateral trade flow to the log of economic mass and the log of trade barri-
ers, which can be estimated by least squares regression (Head, 2003: 4). This is 
the standard method for estimation of the gravity equation (Bacchetta et al., 2012: 
105). However, the inclusion of the multilateral resistance terms, which are not 
directly observable, complicates this. Anderson and van Wincoop, when develop-
ing the above-specified gravity equation, applied a complicated multi-step proce-
dure. As this estimation technique requires a non-linear least square (NLS) pro-
gramme, it is not commonly replicated. Alternatively, the inclusion of importer 
and exporter fixed effects takes into account the multilateral resistance, and allows 
for a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Ibid: 106; Ruiz and Vilarru-
bia, 2007: 9). This also has the advantage of avoiding measurement error associat-
ed with assessing countries internal distances as is required in the multi-step, NLS 
approach (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009: 78).  
The advantage of the computational burdensome NLS estimation is the generation 
of consistent and efficient estimates of coefficients, which allow the exploration 
of the impact of individual factors such as quality of infrastructure or institutions, 
and indeed the multilateral trade terms themselves (Ibid). However, as discussed 
in the introduction, the aim of current study is to explore trade volumes. Moreo-
ver, NLS estimation may be inefficient as it often gives more weight to observa-
tions with larger variance (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006: 644). Consequently, 
the OLS estimation with fixed effects can be considered adequate for current pur-
poses. Indeed Anderson and van Wincoop tested this approach themselves, and 
found that it led to consistent parameter estimates (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003: 188). 
The following log-linear equation results from taking the natural logs of equation 
(5), and adding a stochastic error term to account for deviations from theory: 
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 ln 𝑥𝑜𝑑𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑦𝑜𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽4 ln 𝑦𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂𝑜𝑑𝑡 
(6)  
(Ruiz and Vilarrubia, 2007: 9). 
Substituting importer and exporter dummies for importer-time varying and ex-
porter-time varying dummies allows one to take into account not only the multi-
lateral resistance effect but the time-varying component of this. Therefore, the 
subsequent estimation of the gravity equation is based on the following equation, 
where equation (6) is augmented with time-varying origin and destination dum-
mies, 𝑑𝑜𝑡 and 𝑑𝑑𝑡 respectively, as well as the time dummy 𝑑𝑡: 
 ln 𝑥𝑜𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑜𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑜𝑑𝑡 . (7)  
The time dummy include the effect of world GDP, whereas the importer-/exporter 
-time varying dummies include the effects of the regions’ GDPs as well as other 
region-specific traits such as landlockedness. The trade cost function therefore 
excludes region-specific variables comprised by the dummy effects, and is limited 
to pair-specific characteristics. The basic gravity equation substitutes distance for 
trade costs. As noted previously, it is common to augment the model with further 
indicators of trade costs. Commonly used variables in addition to distance are 
dummies for common border, common language, common colonial relationships 
and/or common colonisers, as well as membership of trade blocs. In the following 
trade cost function 𝑍𝑜𝑑 is a vector of pair-specific explanatory variables that are 
constant over time, such as contiguity and common language, and 𝑍𝑜𝑑𝑡 a vector of 
pair-specific, time-varying explanatory variables, such as whether the two econo-
mies are in a free trade agreement: 
 ln 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼𝑍𝑜𝑑 + 𝛾𝑍𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝑣𝑜𝑑𝑡 (8)  
Substituting the trade cost function (8) into equation (7), one obtains equation (9) 
to be implemented on the dataset: 
 ln 𝑥𝑜𝑑𝑡 = 𝑏𝑍𝑜𝑑 + 𝑐𝑍𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑜𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑜𝑑𝑡 . (9)  
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3.1.2 Pitfalls of employing the gravity model approach 
Evaluating modern applications of the gravity model, Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2006: 7) distinguish three commonly made mistakes, which they denote the gold, 
silver and bronze medal mistakes, respectively, where a higher ‘prize’ reflects a 
more severe mistake. The gold medal mistake entails omitting terms, which are 
correlated to the trade costs term, and is  -for reasons outlined above-  avoided by 
employing the Anderson-van Wincoop model (Ibid: 7-9). The silver medal mis-
take applies when researchers working with averages of two-way exports take the 
log of the average, instead of the average of the logs (Ibid: 9-11). Most empirical 
gravity model applications focus on average trade flows. However, as the interest 
of this study is the potential for the Central Asian republics to increase their ex-
ports, and thus production, I will focus on one-way flows. This avoids the silver 
medal mistake. Latterly, the bronze medal mistake relates to improperly deflating 
nominal trade values; such error is taken into account by the use of region-specific 
and time dummies (Bacchetta et al., 2012: 111), and thus is also not an applicable 
critique of the chosen approach.  
Two more relevant difficulties of the gravity model approach do apply, however. 
The validity of the log-linearisation of the gravity equation rests on the assump-
tion that the error term is in fact stochastic, that is, that the error term is statistical-
ly independent of the regressors (Santo Silva and Tenreyro, 2006: 642). Joao San-
tos Silva and Silvana Tenreyro (2009: 7) assert strong evidence that error terms in 
applied gravity models have often been heteroscedastic, and that this affects esti-
mations even when controlling for fixed effects. To address the issue, White-
corrected robust standard errors are applied in estimation, to take into account the 
tendency towards heteroscedasticity (Bacchetta et al., 2012: 107, 133). 
A second prevalent problem when applying a log-linearised gravity model is the 
presence of zero value observations stemming from the fact that the log of zero is 
undefined. The gravity model, per se, predicts positive, if small, values of trade 
flows. However, trade flows between small and distant countries are often zero; 
whilst presence of zero value observations can also reflect errors in the reporting 
of trade (Linders and de Groot, 2006: 3). Different approaches to this problem 
have been suggested. The perhaps most common approach have been to simply 
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drop zero observation pairs from the sample. This is an ad hoc approach, which 
potentially ignores valuable information regarding the absence of trade flows. 
Other approaches include replacing zero values with a small constant preventing 
omission but again an inherently ad hoc approach (Ibid: 4). Alternative approach-
es include a two-step sample selection approach, in which a sample selection 
equation determines, whether trade is observed between pairs of regions, and sub-
sequently a regression equation determines the expected size of that trade (Ibid). 
The two-step approach prohibits use of OLS regression (Bacchetta et al., 2012: 
115-116), which has the advantage of computational simplicity. Moreover, while 
the two-step approach is preferred on theoretical grounds, evidence suggests that 
the simple method of dropping zero value observations often does not significant-
ly bias estimation results (Linders and de Groot, 2006: 14). This method will 
therefore be used in the OLS estimation below. 
3.1.3 Trade potential 
Following Peter Egger (2002), two conceptually different approaches to estimat-
ing trade potentials of transition economies with the gravity model can be dis-
cerned. One, termed the out-of-sample projection approach, estimates the gravity 
equation based on a sample of countries believed to have reached full trade poten-
tial; the equation is then used to project predicted trade flows of transition econo-
mies, the difference between actual and predicted flows interpreted as unexhaust-
ed potential. The second approach, referred to by Egger as the in-sample projec-
tion approach, includes the transition economies under study in the estimation of 
the equation. Under this approach, the residual of the estimated equation is inter-
preted as the difference between actual and potential trade (Egger, 2002: 297-
298). 
Egger argues that the in-sample approach is liable to misspecification and parame-
ter inconsistency because systematic variation in residuals cannot result from a 
properly specified econometric model, which should yield mean zero residuals 
(Ibid: 299). However, the out-of-sample approach precludes the application of the 
proper specification of the Anderson-van Wincoop model to study trade potentials 
because of its inclusion of region-specific fixed effects (Ibid). As noted by Ruiz 
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and Vilarrubia, the inclusion of time and region-year dummies, leave region-pair 
specific characteristics as the only source of misspecification (Ruiz and Vilarru-
bia, 2007: 11). Meanwhile, also the out-of-sample approach could lead to bias, if 
the estimated gravity equation with benchmark regions is misspecified (Ibid). 
Grigor Hayrapetyan and Viktoriya Hayrapetyan in their study of Armenia’s trade 
potential consider both the in-sample and out-of-sample approach and find similar 
results (Hayrapetyan and Hayrapetyan, 2011). Thus, despite Egger’s critique of 
the approach, the in-sample projection will be applied in subsequent estimation. 
The in-sample trade potential index can be defined by the formula: 
 𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑜 =  
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑜
𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑜
 , (10)  
where EFFTRADEo represent the real export flow from the exporter o to the trade 
partner d, and FITTRADEo the fitted export flow predicted by the gravity equation 
(de Benedictis and Vicarelli, 2004: 13). By the following equation, the index can 
be standardised to take values between 1 and -1, where a positive value indicates 
higher effective bilateral trade than the model predict, and negative values lesser 
effective bilateral trade than predicted by the model: 
 
𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑜 =  
𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑜 − 1
𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑜 + 1
 (11)  
(Ibid). 
Negative values of the SPT index suggest that in the long run, trade levels will 
converge towards the expected without the need for characteristics of bilateral 
relationships to change. In other words, negative values suggest that two econom-
ic partners have unexploited trade potential. Positive values on the other hand are 
interpreted as indicating that the two economic regions trade more (over-trade) 
than the model’s prediction, and that, hence, trade promoting policies are required 
to increase the volume of trade (Ruiz and Vilarrubia, 2007: 6).  
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3.1.4 Studying regional integration with the gravity model 
The gravity model is, as noted, an established method by which to examine the 
effects of regional integration schemes ex post. In such studies, one or more 
dummy variables representing the economic impact of the RTA are included. The 
model is then estimated, and the effect of the RTA evaluated on the basis of 
whether the parameter estimates are statistically significant and of their operation-
al signs (Cernat, 2003: 9). As the current study attempts to study integration sce-
narios ex ante this approach is unenforceable. Instead, a benchmark equation is 
estimated in which the Central Asian republics are included individually. Three 
alternative equations are estimated each representing an integration scenario. In 
evaluating the implications of the suggested integration scenarios, the analysis 
considers the predicted trade flows of the alternative equations in relation to the 
total predicted trade flows of the respective constituent economies based on the 
benchmark equation. 
In the first scenario, the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajik-
istan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are removed from the sample of economies, 
and substituted by a simulated economic union; that is their trade flows and GDPs 
are summed together, while other features such as common language, religion and 
external trade agreements are determined for the union as a whole. Similarly, in 
the second scenario a simulated union of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
is substituted for the three republics as individual economies, and latterly the same 
approach is used on Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – 
representing an extension of the ECU. 
3.1.5 Data and estimation results 
The database was built using data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade statistics 
(DOTS), the CEPII-database including distance and region-specific characteristics 
as well as GDP data from the World Development Indicators.
24
 The dataset covers 
192 economies over 20 years from 1992 to 2011. The relatively short period fol-
lows directly from the fact that the countries of interest became independent in 
                                                 
24
 Further details on data is to be found in appendix A. 
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late 1991. Given the in-sample approach applied, this disallows a longer time span 
of study. Estimations were done also on three reduced samples of 90, 100 and 150 
countries respectively. These different estimations serve to check the robustness 
of the sample, as it is known that particularly small economies are likely to bias 
the results. Thus, the specification chosen for the estimation of trade potentials 
includes the bilateral trade of 100 economies, accounting for upwards of 98.6 per 
cent of world trade. 
A number of different specifications of the gravity model were estimated. Firstly a 
simple pooled OLS regression, that is, a regression including no fixed effects. 
Secondly, the equation was estimated including importer, exporter, and time 
dummies, a commonly used specification of the Anderson-van Wincoop model. 
This however, does not account for the time-contingent element of trade re-
sistance contained in importers’ and exporters’ price indices. Hence, the preferred 
specification includes importer time-varying and exporter time-varying dummies, 
as specified in equation (9). The specification of the trade cost function includes 
the following variables: contiguity, common language, whether the pair was ever 
in a colonial relationship and whether they have been since 1945, whether they 
had a common coloniser, and whether they share a common religion. Additional-
ly, a dummy variable for the trading partners being in a common free trade 
agreement was included. This dummy averages the effect of a number of FTAs 
rather than specifying individual FTAs since the interest is not on the effect of 
particular agreements but in controlling for their effects on bilateral trade flows.  
Estimation results are presented in appendix B. The included regressors are statis-
tically highly significant, exhibit the expected signs and magnitude; save for reli-
gion, which in the pooled model suggests a negative correlation in some samples. 
The coefficients are, however, generally robust across specifications; and the R-
squared, measuring the data’s fit to the regression line, significantly higher for the 
specification including time, importer and exporter and importer-time, exporter-
time dummies, for which also the Root-MSE, a measure of the difference between 
values observed and values predicted, is significantly lower vis-á-vis the pooled 
model. 
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Given the application of the equation on calculation of trade potential, it is, fur-
thermore, pertinent to check the robustness of the estimates of potential trade 
across the specifications, as suggested by Luca de Benedictis and Claudio Vicarel-
li (2004), who have argued that the standardised trade potential index is highly 
sensitive to the estimation procedure of the gravity model (their results showing 
changes in the sign of the SPT values in a significant number of cases (35-40 per 
cent)). In estimations for this analysis, the SPT index is less sensitive to the inclu-
sion of fixed effects with up to 20 per cent of values changing sign from the 
pooled to the estimations including fixed effects. The corresponding shares of 
sign-changing values in the SPT index are 10 per cent and 5 per cent for the sub-
sample of interest, the Central Asian republics (see overview in appendix C).  
The specification of the model chosen is the regression including time, importer-
time, and exporter-time dummies on the sample of 100 countries. This is a robust 
sample size as well as specification both in terms of the gravity equation and its 
estimated coefficients, and the SPT index. The same specification is used in esti-
mating the three alternative gravity equations, the coefficients of which are also 
listed in appendix B. 
3.2 Central Asian intra-regional trade 
The results listed in table 3.1 indicate that intra-regional Central Asian trade is 
higher than expected considering the characteristics of the countries’ bilateral re-
lationships.
25
 Two countries stand out from the general trend as both Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan export around the expected levels to some Central Asian neigh-
bours. Kazakh exports to Kyrgyzstan have roughly conformed to the model’s ex-
pectations since 2000. Tajik exports to Turkmenistan have in recent years tended 
towards the expected level as has its exports to Uzbekistan in the 2010s. This may 
reflect the worsening of political relations between the republics and the closing 
of the border, though a similar effect is not discernible in the opposite direction. 
                                                 
25
 Where values are missing from table 3.1 and following tables this reflects missing data. Where 
the SPT value is exactly -1 this indicates that both or either trade partner reported exports/imports 
to be 0. 
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The findings reaffirm that Central Asia republics continue to over-trade amongst 
themselves, and thus contradict Kurmanalieva and Parpiev’s (2008) conclusion 
that there is now significant unexploited trade potential in Central Asian intra-
regional trade. Their study differs methodologically from the current, for instance, 
by not employing a properly specified gravity model including multilateral re-
sistance terms.
26
 Hence, their results are prone to omitted variable bias, which 
may explain the diverging results. Meanwhile, the results support Felipe and Ku-
mar’s (2010) recommendation that trade facilitation measures are needed to in-
crease intra-regional trade. The interpretation of the higher-than-expected level of 
bilateral trade found in this analysis, is exactly that trade promoting measures are 
needed to extend the frontier of trade potential between economies. 
A drawback of the gravity model is that informal trade is not considered as this by 
its very nature does not figure in trade statistics. Informal economic activity, in-
cluding cross-border trade, is as discussed in chapter 2 significant in Central Asia, 
further supporting the conclusion that the Central Asian economies are trading 
more than the model predicts. The evidence of higher than expected trade flows, 
suggests that the states are trading more than their current bilateral characteristics 
call for under the theoretical assumptions of the model; and that to increase bilat-
eral trade, trade facilitation measures aimed at this must be implemented. 
3.3 Central Asian extra-regional trade 
The following three sections explore Central Asian trade potential with the wider 
regional neighbourhood, Asia and Europe respectively. 
3.3.1 Central Asian trade with wider region 
This section explores Central Asian trade with the wider regional neighbourhood, 
including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Paki-
stan and Mongolia. The results listed in table 3.2 and 3.3 paint a clear, overall 
                                                 
26
 While the appendix of the workpaper by Kurmanalieva and Parpiev demonstrates the derivation 
of the Anderson-van Wincoop model, it is unclear how the authors account for multilateral trade 
resistance in the model estimation. 
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similar, picture of trading patterns and potentials. The Central Asian republics still  
-20 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union-  trade significantly above the 
expected levels with other former Soviet republics. This, thus, also reaffirms the 
findings at the turn of the century of continued over-reliance on trade with other 
former Soviet republics. The trend is least pronounced in the case of Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan, which is perhaps explained by their position at the very edge 
of the FSU and the consequent need to transit several now independent republics 
to trade with other post-Soviet republics. The general tendency to over-trade with 
Russia suggests that policy measures are indeed needed to promote increases in 
trade levels. Consequently, considerations of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan of joining 
the ECU are pertinent, though a decision should rest on the economic merits of 
the specific framework. As outlined above, the current setup of the ECU does not 
appear to positively affect Kazakhstan’s GDP or trade position. The subsequent 
analysis of the impact of potential integration frameworks further explores this. 
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Afghanistan is over-represented in the exports of the Central Asian republics 
throughout the two decades. Tajikistan and to some extent Kazakhstan appear to 
have re-directed some exports to Afghanistan following the USSR breakup, there-
by going from positions of a low degree of over-trading in Kazakhstan’s case, and 
having some unexploited export potential in the Tajik case, to over-exporting to 
Afghanistan, confirming the regional trend. Here, data on bilateral trade of Uzbek-
istan with Afghanistan is missing but is suggested to be significant (Laruelle and 
Peyrouse, 2013: 123), and thus most likely conforming to the regional trend. 
The figures show how already in the early 1990s, Central Asian trade with Turkey 
was above what one would expect given bilateral characteristics, and that the 
trend is largely unchanged. As regards Iran, the CARs appear to have realised a 
previously unexploited export potential, to now over-trade throughout the 2000s 
in all cases. Similarly, the general trend is to over-export to Mongolia, though 
there is some variability in the data. Pakistan is the one partner in the wider re-
gion, where the Central Asian states throughout the 1990s and for much of the 
2000s have unexploited export potential. In the 2000s, though, the pattern begins 
to diverge with Turkmenistan reaching a more balanced relationship, and Tajiki-
stan now appearing to over-trade with Pakistan. 
The described patterns for Central Asian exports to trade partners in their wider 
neighbourhood are largely confirmed in the opposite direction of the bilateral rela-
tionships. The former Soviet republics are over-exporting to Central Asia, as are 
Turkey and, in most cases, Iran. The exception is Pakistan, which also appears to 
have untapped export potential to all Central Asian republics. 
Overall, the findings suggest a need to address the characteristics of bilateral eco-
nomic relationships with neighbouring countries in order to promote Central 
Asian exports. These results add weight to the discussion in previous chapters of 
the need to address conditions for transit in neighbouring economies to improve 
trade potential with the ROW. In the wider neighbourhood, only Pakistan repre-
sents untapped trade potential, which would be expected to fulfil in the long-term 
without policy interventions.  
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3.3.2 Central Asian trade with East Asia and India  
China, the immediate neighbour of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and 
steam engine of the global economy is, generally over-represented in Central 
Asian exports, as table 3.4 below indicates. Whilst the level of apparent over-
exporting to China is less than highlighted above for other neighbouring econo-
mies, including Russia, Afghanistan and Iran, the conclusion is similarly of a need 
for policy interventions to increase exports. Export patterns to Japan and Korea, 
two other significant Asian economies vary between the five Central Asian repub-
lics. For Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan the two Asian economies offer untapped 
export potential, while Uzbekistan in recent years has reduced the level of over-
exporting to Japan and Korea towards the expected level of exports. Kazakhstan 
throughout the 2000s, in the case of Korea, and since 2007-8 in the case of Japan, 
have had reasonably balanced levels of exports to the two economies. The Kazakh 
export level to Japan does however appear to be moving beyond the expected lev-
els, suggesting need for policy intervention to push outward the export potential. 
Tajikistan shows a fluctuating, though overall, fairly balanced level of exports to 
Japan and Korea.  
India presents unexploited trade potential for all Central Asian republics. This is 
clearest in the case of Kazakhstan, which throughout the period has under-
exported to India. Tajikistan appeared to reach its potential for exports to India in 
the late 2000s but shows a remarkable drop in the SPT index in 2011. Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan all exhibit fluctuating levels of exports to India but 
certainly since the mid-2000s have unexploited potential. Exports to ASEAN 
member states generally offers untapped export potential to be realised over the 
long term with no policy interventions needed. The picture is very similar for the 
five Central Asian republics, though Uzbekistan has a more balanced level of ex-
ports to ASEAN members. Uzbek exports to Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia 
appear to be around the expected level. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Singapore 
and the Philippines are yet unexplored markets and offer potential for Uzbek ex-
ports. Kyrgyzstan appears to have realised a hitherto unexploited export potential 
for Indonesia, whilst having seemingly volatile export relations to Laos and Thai-
land. Generally for Kyrgyzstan, there does appear to be unexploited export poten-
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tial with ASEAN members including Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Tajiki-
stan has realised hitherto unexploited trade potential with Indonesia in recent 
years but has untapped potential for exports to other ASEAN members. Latterly, 
also Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan largely has unexploited export potential with 
all ASEAN member states. 
The picture is strikingly clear and similar for Asian exports to Central Asia with, 
for instance, all ASEAN member states enjoying unexploited export potentials to 
Central Asia. Malaysia, only, appears to be reaching or has surpassed its export 
potential to all Central Asian economies save Kyrgyzstan. Indonesia also appears 
to be edging towards realising its export potential to several of the Central Asian 
economies, though Kazakhstan still offers great potential. In Kazakhstan, also 
Lao, Cambodia and Myanmar have largely satisfied their potential, but for all 
three there is untapped potential in the rest of Central Asia. Thailand and Vietnam 
are largely absent from the Central Asian markets. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan 
and increasingly Tajikistan exceed expected levels; however, exports to Kazakh-
stan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are largely balanced. This will in part reflect 
that Kyrgyzstan and increasingly Tajikistan act as entry points for Chinese goods, 
which are then re-exported to the rest of the region and beyond. As much as 75 
per cent of Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan are estimated to be re-exported (Birk-
man et al., 2012: 11). Japan has unexploited trade potential to both Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan but more balanced trade with other CARs. Korea exports largely as 
expected to Central Asia, though over-exporting significantly to Uzbekistan.  
In summary, Asia presents all Central Asian economies with an untapped trade 
potential to be realised over the long term without need for policy intervention. 
This is the case for trade with India and ASEAN member states, and in the case of 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan also Japan and Korea. For other CARs, however, 
the trade potential with Japan and Korea appears realised or surpassed, as is also 
the case with China for all Central Asian republics. In Asia, it is thus particularly 
for trade with China that the CARs may have a shared interest in trade facilitation 
measures. 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4c – SPT values for exports to Asia 
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3.3.3 Central Asian trade with the European Union 
Kazakhstan exhibits a markedly different pattern to its southern neighbours when 
it comes to trade with the EU. For Kazakhstan only four EU member states offer 
unexploited export potential in recent years, namely Belgium, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg and Malta. Kazakhstan overall exports more to the EU than what is ex-
pected given the characteristics of the economic relationship between Kazakhstan 
and EU member states. For other Central Asian republics the pattern is more 
mixed with a number of EU member states offering unexploited trade potential. 
Particularly Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden 
represent untapped potential in recent years. What appears to be the pattern for 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is that the unexploited po-
tential is largely for exports to mid-sized EU member states in Western Europe. 
Whilst the larger Western European economies, such as Germany, France and the 
UK, as well as the Central European economies tend to be markets already well-
served by Central Asian exports.  
European exports to Kazakhstan offer an almost perfect mirror of the pattern of 
Kazakh exports to Europe – higher-than-expected to balanced level of exports 
from all EU member states. For Kazakhstan it is clear that policy intervention 
aimed at trade promotion are needed to increase trade with the EU; a fact reflected 
in the new, enhanced partnership agreement Kazakhstan has negotiated with the 
EU (Satubaldina, 2014). However, few EU member states have noteworthy un-
tapped export potential to the rest of Central Asia, suggesting that trade facilitat-
ing measures may be warranted in the case of all Central Asian republics. 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The analysis throws up a number of interesting findings; first and foremost, that 
the patterns of international trade relationships and potentials for increased ex-
ports of the five Central Asian republics are strikingly similar. Kazakhstan is to 
some extent the exception, for instance, having a bilateral trade relationship with 
the EU significantly exceeding the expected level. However, overall Europe does 
not represent significant untapped export potential for the other Central Asian 
republics either, nor does Central Asia represent much such potential for the ma-
jority of EU member states. Thus, while most pronounced in the case of Kazakh-
stan, trade promotion between Central Asia and the EU, generally, would require 
policy intervention, suggesting that enhanced partnerships should be considered 
for all of Central Asia. 
The Central Asian states appear to all be over-reliant on trade with their immedi-
ate neighbours in Central Asia as well as its wider neighbourhood, including the 
post-Soviet region. The analysis, thus, confirms previous findings that the repub-
lics have been slow to redirect trade after gaining independence. Only Pakistan in 
the wider neighbourhood present untapped trade potential. Asia, India and 
ASEAN member states in particular, are shown to offer the Central Asian repub-
lics potential for increased exports not reliant on policy interventions. This poten-
tial is reciprocated in the sense that Central Asia also represents significant un-
tapped export potential for all ASEAN members but Malaysia. Trade potential 
with China, on balance, appears realised or surpassed; this is also the case for a 
number of the bilateral relationships of Korea and Japan with Central Asian re-
publics. The latter two developed Asian economies do, however, represent some 
untapped potential for Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. 
The findings generally chime well with the pattern of foreign trade outlined ini-
tially, which demonstrated a dominance of Russia, China and the EU in Central 
Asian trade. 
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3.4 Integration scenarios 
The above analysis suggests need for policy action within Central Asia if in-
creased intra-regional trade is to be achieved, and that trade facilitation measures 
are needed to boost trade with larger economies in Europe, Asia and Russia. 
Moreover, it establishes that the pattern of external trade and direction of un-
tapped trade potential is very similar across the Central Asian republics, suggest-
ing cooperation on trade promoting measures beyond the region is pertinent. This 
section considers the impact of suggested intra-regional integration on extra-
regional trade.  
Three scenarios are considered. Firstly integration between the five post-Soviet 
Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. This scenario represents the prospect of Central Asian region-
building, the focus of this thesis. Next a narrower Central Asian grouping is con-
sidered, namely integration between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The 
second scenario reflects the more closed nature of the Uzbek and Turkmen econ-
omies, as well as the more isolationists economic policies pursued, which indicate 
less likelihood of economic integration with neighbouring countries. Latterly, the 
third scenario simulates an extension of the ECU to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajik-
istan. This scenario reflects ongoing political developments with Kazakhstan al-
ready pursuing an Eurasianist integration path, Kyrgyzstan having committed it-
self to joining the ECU, and speculation as to whether Tajikistan may follow. 
Though the estimation results can only give indication of potential economic ben-
efits, exploring the three scenarios in parallel enables a consideration of their in-
dividual merits as well as a comparison of the economic benefits each may offer 
for Central Asian republics.  
Evaluating the effects of economic integration schemes involves measuring the 
net effect on trade. The net effect on trade is composed of the trade creating and 
trade diverting effects of the integration scheme. Trade creation entails trade in 
goods not previously traded between partner economies owing to the elimination 
of trade barriers. As discussed in chapter 1, trade diversion occurs when partner 
economies shift imports from more efficient third parties to less efficient produc-
ers in partner economies. Whilst the best evaluation of the effect of integration 
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involves evaluating changes in intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade factors, this cannot 
be done under current methodology as the integration blocs are treated as one 
economy. The analysis considers the predicted trade flows of alternative equations 
for each suggested integration schemes, which are considered as common market, 
held against the predicted trade flows of the benchmark equation as discussed 
above. Hence, the following analysis is limited to considering extra-bloc trade 
factors. 
3.4.1 Share of imports to GDP ratio 
The share of imports to GDP can be seen as an indicator of an economy’s open-
ness and a relative measure of trade creation and trade diversion. A relatively 
higher share of imports to GDP suggests trade creation, whereas a relatively lower 
share of imports suggests trade diversion (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 37). 
 
Table 3.16 – impact on imports to GDP ratios of integration scenarios 
Table 3.16 shows the imports to GDP ratios for each of the three integration sce-
narios against their respective benchmarks (that is, the total imports to total GDPs 
of the constituent states of each scheme). The simulations suggest that the imports 
to GDP ratios are only marginally affected by the integration scenarios. In the first 
scenario, the ratio shifts between being unchanged, slightly higher or slightly low-
er. The second scenario, on the other hand, appears to involve a slight trade creat-
ing effect in most years. Conversely, the third scenario  -an extension of the Eura-
sian Customs Union to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-  is estimated to involve 
trade diversion with a more marked impact than in the former two scenarios.  





Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union 
extended Benchmark
2002 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.12
2003 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13
2004 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15
2005 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.14
2006 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.15
2007 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.14 0.16
2008 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.18
2009 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.15
2010 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.16
2011 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
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3.4.2 Total trade 
Contrasting the predicted total trade of the integration scenarios with their bench-
mark predictions (that is the predicted total trade (imports and exports) of the con-
stituent economies), the simulations indicate that the first two scenarios  -
integration of all Central Asian republics and integration of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan, respectively-  could push outward the trade potential. Graph 
3.1 illustrates the findings. In six of the last ten years of the sample, the simula-
tions suggest that scenarios 1 and 2 would have implied a larger overall trade po-
tential for the constituent economies than their shared experience on an individual 
basis. In the last two years of the sample, the indication is that the trade potential 
would have been 10-20 per cent higher.  
 
Graph 3.1: Impact on total trade of integration scenarios 
Conversely, the simulation of the third scenario implies that an extension of the 
ECU to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the majority of the ten years would 
have had a negative impact on the bloc’s total trade position to the tune of 5-10 
per cent, though this negative impact in the latest years of the sample turns neu-
tral. 
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3.4.3 Trade balance 
The simulations furthermore indicate that the first integration scenario (integration 
of all five Central Asian republics) would have a positive impact on net trade by 
12-17 per cent in 2009-11, illustrated in graph 3.2. Similarly, an extension of the 
Customs Union, the third scenario, is estimated to have a slightly positive impact 
on the trade balance, though moving into neutral territory in the last years of the 
sample, whilst the second scenario of integration between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan is estimated to have a negative impact in several years. 
 
Graph 3.2: Estimated impact on trade balance of integration scenarios 
3.4.4 Impact on external trade patterns of integration scenarios 
The suggested integration schemes would not significantly alter the pattern of 
extra-regional trade potential and the degree to which actual trade patterns match 
predicted trade. In the first two scenarios, involving only Central Asian republics, 
the SPT value change sign only in up to 3 per cent of bilateral partnerships over 
the period from 1992-2011. In the third scenario of an extended Customs Union, 
the SPT value reverses in 5-6 per cent of the extended Customs Union’s trade 
partnership. In the majority of these cases, across scenarios, which are all listed in 
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appendix E, the changes are minor, the SPT shifting from just above zero to just 
below or vice versa.  
 
Table 3.17 – Changes to SPT sign across integration scenarios 
Consequently, the conclusion above, that purposeful policy measures are required 
to facilitate further trade with FSU economies, the EU, China, Turkey, Iran, Af-
ghanistan, and in some cases Japan and Korea, still stands under the simulation of 
the integration scenarios; as does the conclusion that the Central Asian republics 
have untapped trade potential with ASEAN, Pakistan and India – a potential, 
which one expects fulfilled over the long run without need for policy measures.  
* * * 
Overall, this suggest that the extension of the ECU could reduce the total external 
trade of the bloc and involve trade diverting effects, whilst having a slightly posi-
tive impact on the members’ overall net trade position. Meanwhile, regional inte-
gration between all Central Asian states would boost the total external trade and 
net trade positions of the bloc, while on balance trending towards slight trade di-
verting effects. Integration of only Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the 
other hand tends towards slight trade creating effects and boosts total trade of this 
smaller bloc but tends towards negatively impacting their trade balance.  
The following five sections consider the impact of each of the suggested integra-
tion schemes on the five Central Asian republics individually. The calculations are 
based on the relative shares of exports and imports of each republic within the 
respective groupings in each year. For each republic is estimated its relative share 
of the increase or decrease in predicted net trade and total trade. Tables are pre-
sented in appendix D. 
Changes to SPT signs (%)
Export Import
Integration scenario 1: Central Asia 2.79 2.74
Integration scenario 2: Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan 1.86 3.04
Integration scenario 3: extended Customs Union 5.00 5.89




The figures below estimate the possible impact on Kazakhstan of each of the three 
integration scenarios. Integration with all Central Asian republics tends towards 
an increasingly positive impact on the total trade of Kazakhstan. Though the cal-
culations suggest that it would have had a negative impact in the late 2000s, this is 
turned towards an increasingly positive impact in the 2010s, potentially adding 
more than USD 7 billion to Kazakhstan’s total trade in 2011. The impact of Cen-
tral Asian regional integration on Kazakhstan’s net trade position is estimated to 
be generally positive, in the years 2009-11 in the range of USD 973-1,901 million. 
 
Graph 3.3: Kazakhstan – impact on total trade of integration scenarios 




Graph 3.4: Kazakhstan – impact on trade balance of integration scenarios 
The scenario of integration between only Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
similarly tends towards a positive impact on Kazakhstan’s total trade, also stand-
ing at USD 7 billion in 2011. Meanwhile, the net trade position tends towards a 
worsening vis-à-vis Kazakhstan’s individual net trade, though the trend line indi-
cates only a small impact. Latterly, the third scenario, an extension of the ECU, is 
estimated to have a negative impact on both Kazakh total trade as well as trade 
balance. In all years of the sample, the simulation suggests that Kazakh trade 
would have been significantly lower, up to USD 1.9 billion in 2008 and 2009; 
whilst the net trade position would have been markedly lower since 2006. Overall, 
this suggests, that the integration scenario involving all Central Asian republics, 
may best benefit Kazakhstan’s trade position in comparison with the alternative 
scenarios suggested. 
3.4.6 Kyrgyzstan 
The impact of Central Asian integration (scenario 1) on Kyrgyz total trade is sug-
gested by the calculations to have an increasingly positive impact. Though the 
impact through the second half of the 2000s was slightly negative, this shifts in 
2010 and in 2011, when it is estimated that Central Asian integration could have 
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raised total Kyrgyz trade by USD 131 million and USD 379 million, respectively. 
Kyrgyz net trade would have been higher in nearly all of the last ten years of the 
sample, though the trend line has a negative slope, and the increase is reduced to a 
range of USD 159-237 million in 2009-11 from USD 265-390 million in 2002-
2003. The impact on the total trade position of the Kyrgyz economy of the second 
scenario, integration with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan only, is similar to scenario 1, 
with the trend line, however, indicating a slightly stronger increase in total trade 
towards 2011. However, the impact on the net trade is suggested on balance to be 
negative, though a small improvement is suggested in some years of the sample.  
 
Graph 3.5: Kyrgyzstan – impact on total trade of integration scenarios 
The third scenario, Kyrgyz integration into the ECU alongside Tajikistan, is esti-
mated to cause a decrease in the level of total trade of Kyrgyzstan over the 2002-
2010 period. The impact on the trade balance is estimated as roughly equivalent to 
that of the second scenario, that is, increasingly negative averaging around USD 
100 million in the last six years of the sample period. Overall, this suggests that 
the former scenario would be superior for Kyrgyzstan, though the positive impact 
on the trade balance appears to be decreasing over time. 




Graph 3.6: Kyrgyzstan – impact on trade balance of integration scenarios 
3.4.7 Tajikistan 
The expected impact on Tajikistan of the three suggested scenarios strongly mir-
rors the one outlined for Kyrgyzstan above. That is, the trend effect of the first 
and second scenarios on total trade of Tajikistan are slightly positive and increas-
ing, being stronger for the second scenario involving only Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan. Conversely, the second scenario has a slightly negative and 
worsening trend effect on the trade balance, while the former scenario involving 
all five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, though decreasing over time, is posi-
tive to the tune of USD 80-136 million in 2009-11. Meanwhile, the third scenario 
is suggested to involve a negative impact on the predicted total level of trade for 
Tajikistan of USD 51-86 million over 2006-09, though the impact becomes close 
to neutral in 2010-11. The impact of the third scenario on the trade balance is neu-
tral to negative throughout the ten year period, averaging USD -62 million over 
the years 2005-2011. This, thus, also suggests that on balance, the former scenario 
is likely to bring more benefits to Tajikistan’s trade position than the second or 
third scenario, despite the decreasing trend of the positive effect on the trade bal-
ance. 




Graph 3.7 – Tajikistan – impact on total trade of integration scenarios 
 
Graph 3.8 – Tajikistan – impact on trade balance of integration scenarios 
3.4.8 Turkmenistan 
While Turkmenistan is only suggested to participate in the first of the three sce-
narios, the three graphs below illustrate the expected impact on the Turkmen 
economy also of its neighbours engaging in integration schemes without it. The 
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predicted total trade level of Turkmenistan is estimated to be higher in most years 
under condition of Central Asian integration, the first of the three scenarios. The 
suggested trend is gradually increasing, reaching nearly USD 200 million in 2011. 
The impact on the trade balance is similarly positive in almost all years with a 
boost of USD 268-380 million in years 2009-2011. 
The second scenario in which the Central Asian partners Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan integrate is suggested to have a negative impact on the total trade 
position of Turkmenistan to the tune of around USD 200 million in the later years 
of the sample, while the impact on the Turkmen trade balance is suggested to be 
positive averaging USD 118 million in the last five years of the sample. The op-
posite trend appears for the extension of the Customs Union scenario, which is 
suggested to positively impact on the total trade position of Turkmenistan  -at an 
average USD 53 million in the last three years of the sample-  whilst negatively 
affecting the trade balance to the tune of USD 44-125 million in 2008-2011. 
Though the positive impact on net trade decreases over time only the first scenar-
io, which involves Turkmenistan in regional integration, is suggested to have a 
positive impact on both overall trade levels and the trade balance of the country. 
 
Graph 3.9: Turkmenistan – impact on total trade of integration scenarios 




Graph 3.10 – Turkmenistan – impact on trade balance of integration scenarios 
3.4.9 Uzbekistan 
Lastly, also for Uzbekistan is illustrated the estimated impact of integrating with 
Central Asian neighbours, as well as for standing outside of the suggested integra-
tion schemes. The total trade position of Uzbekistan would in most years of the 
sample be boosted by integration with Central Asian neighbours; integration is 
estimated to enable a boost of total trade of Uzbekistan by up to USD 926 million 
in 2011. The impact on net trade of the suggested Central Asian integration 
scheme would have been almost consistently positive, though decreasing over 
time to USD 354-526 million in years 2009-11.  
Both scenarios, which leave out Uzbekistan, are suggested to impact the total lev-
el of trade for Uzbekistan negatively, and increasingly so over time; this mostly in 
the case of integration between neighbouring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan. Meanwhile, this same scenario is suggested to positively impact the trade 
balance of Uzbekistan, and increasingly so over time – by USD 220-480 million 
in the period 2007-11.   




Graph 3.11 – Uzbekistan – impact on total trade of integration scenarios 
 
Graph 3.12 – Uzbekistan: impact on trade balance of integration scenarios 
The impact on the trade balance of an extension of the Customs Union is more 
varied, positive in some years, negative in others, though on trend slightly positive 
and increasing. Overall, as with Turkmenistan, only the integration scheme in-
cluding Uzbekistan itself has a positive impact on both the country’s total trade 
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and balance of trade positions, though in the latter case of a slightly decreasing 
trend. 
3.5 Summary 
The preceding analysis employs a properly specified gravity model to explore the 
trade relationships within Central Asia and between Central Asian republics and 
external trade partners. The results of the analysis establish that trade levels be-
tween Central Asian republics exceed the levels that one would expect given the 
characteristics of their bilateral economic relationships. The corollary of this is 
that were the Central Asian republics to wish to increase intra-regional trade, poli-
cy actions aimed at this must be implemented. Such actions could be in the form 
of economic integration. The analysis furthermore suggests that the patterns of 
international trade relationships and potentials for increased exports of the five 
Central Asian republics are comparable. The CARs generally trade at levels ex-
pected or higher with partners in the post-Soviet region, China and the EU sug-
gesting there is a need for trade facilitation measures to increase trade with these 
partners. Southeast and South Asia, including with ASEAN economies, India and 
Pakistan, on the other hand offers untapped potential for increased trade without 
taking direct policy measures towards this. For trade with Japan and Korea there 
is significant variability between the CARs for trade in both directions. Thus there 
is not necessarily a shared interest between the Central Asian republics for jointly 
pursuing trade facilitation with either Japan or Korea. 
The analysis then contrasted the predicted trade levels of the benchmark model, in 
which the Central Asian republics are included individually, with predicted trade 
levels of alternative equations, in which the Central Asian republics are simulated 
as engaging in economic integration. The results indicated that current political 
discussions on extending the ECU to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may not 
be beneficial for the two potential entrants themselves. Indeed, the results suggest 
that an extended ECU could have trade diverting effects, and could reduce the 
total external trade levels of the proposed members. By contrast, economic inte-
gration within Central Asia is suggested to have better prospects. Comparing the 
two scenarios for integration within Central Asia, a scheme involving all five re-
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publics could increase their shared level of predicted external trade, as well as 
positively impact their trade balances. On balance, however, this scenario may 
involve trade diverting effects, though in the last year of the sample, the effect is 
suggested to be trade creating. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there 
could be merits also in the smaller scheme involving only these three republics. 
The trend over the period examined is towards trade creation; though the predict-
ed expansion in total trade levels tend towards also slightly worsening their net 
trade positions. For Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, it is suggested by the analysis, 
that standing outside of a Central Asian regional integration initiative could re-
duce their total trade positions but slightly improve their trade balances. 
From the perspective of Central Asia, the findings of this paper suggest that intra-
regional integration would be beneficial on two accounts. Firstly, it could, if de-
signed accordingly, increase the scope for intra-regional trade, and, secondly, 
could increase the shared scope for external trade of the Central Asian republics. 
Consequently, since the CARs generally have similar patterns of over-trading and 
unexploited trade potentials, they may benefit from pursuing trade facilitation 
measures with external partners, notably China, the EU or Russia, collectively. 
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Chapter 4 Demand and supply of economic integration policy 
The preceding chapter suggested that Central Asian republics may benefit from 
economic integration. This chapter explores the underlying dynamics for regional 
integration to occur, that is, whether there is supply of and demand for economic 
integration policies in Central Asia. Following The Logic of Regional Integration 
demand for economic integration is expected to arise from market actors, who 
would benefit from increased opportunities for market exchange, including expan-
sion to foreign markets, economies of scale and specialisation. Supply on the oth-
er hand is expected to derive from national leaders in the form of willingness to 
cooperate on the basis of expected political pay-off, inter alia, linked to national 
economic growth. Additionally, an undisputed regional leader willing to compen-
sate less willing states, and commitment institutions that can enforce agreements, 
raise the likelihood of successful integration. 
Boris Rumer (2005a: 3) suggested that after nearly ten years of independence the 
five CARs had come to the end of their fundamental transition processes resulting 
in stable, roughly alike authoritarian states. Since then, Turkmenistan has seen an 
orderly transition of power following the death of the country’s first president, 
Saparmurat Niyazov; while Kyrgyzstan has gone through upheavals in 2005 and 
2010, the latter resulting in a constitutional change to parliamentary democracy. 
Despite the changes in Kyrgyzstan, the country continues to share a number of 
characteristics with other CARs. Central Asian political structures have been de-
scribed as democratic mimicry (Ibid: 3-5) and ‘Potemkin-style democratic institu-
tions’ (Gleason, 2003: 145). Shirin Akiner (2005: 124), for instance, has suggest-
ed that Central Asian parliaments’ chief function is to rubberstamp presidential 
decrees. This may be undergoing change in Kyrgyzstan. The constitutional chang-
es since the 2010 revolution has to some extent increased openness and plurality 
of policy debates as well as strengthened parliament, the Jogorku Kenesh, as a 
political forum (Chotaev, 2013; Kurmanov and Kurmanov, 2013; i/w Nurlanbek 
(#63/IF); Claytor (#74/FB); Shamiev (#71/LE)). However, implementing parlia-
mentary democracy is a challenging process, which will take time, and authoritar-
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Other attributes of the region include the fusion of political power with economic 
resources (Özcan, 2010: 3; Cooley, 2012: 25-27), and the ruling elites’ focus on 
maintaining the underlying structures of power (Cooley, 2012: 21). Moreover, the 
judicial systems are allegedly used as instruments for the predatory execution of 
power, whilst simultaneously being employed to disguise this predation 
(McGlinchley, 2011: 57).
28
 These characteristics suggest a need to look beyond 
formal political structures when analysing supply as well as demand of policy.  
A key feature shared by the Central Asian states is the fusion of executive power 
and capital (Cummings, 2012: 130). For instance in Uzbekistan elite members 
control the trade of strategic commodities such as gold, cotton and uranium, but 
also basic food products like flour and sugar (i/w Tolipov (#84/AC)).
29
 The organ-
ising principle behind the fusion of economic and political power has over time 
been designated varyingly, for example as clientelism and corruption. Rumer, for 
instance, claimed that corruption lies at the heart of these systems (Rumer, 2000a: 
6). Kathleen Collins (2006), meanwhile, focused on kinship. Prior to Russian col-
onisation and subsequent Soviet rule, Central Asian society was organised 
through kinship ties in the form of tribes, clans and community-level groups such 
as the nomadic aul, rural quishloq, or urban mahalla; but it is contested to what 
degree such ties have survived both Russian colonisation and Soviet administra-
tion.
30
 Akiner (1994: 13) has suggested that kinship ties was ‘almost the only fea-
                                                 
27
 In March 2014 constitutional changes proposed by President Karimov were introduced in Uz-
bekistan, which are suggested to involve a formal shift of power from the post of president to the 
prime minister with the intention of strengthening the role of political parties. There have been 
speculation as to whether such changes are reflective of an upcoming presidential succession but 
the changes have similarly been dismissed as ‘window dressing’ (Hashimova, 2014a).  
28
 The US Commercial Services, for instance, noted that the Turkmen judiciary is directly under 
the control of the president (US Commercial Services, 2012: 3). It is also notable that in the case 
of Kyrgyzstan, the judicial system is still perceived to be subject to political interference (Chotaev, 
2013). 
29
 For an outline of recent developments in the control of Uzbek sugar trade see: Pannier, 2014a. 
30
 See for instance Scott Radnitz (2010: 127-128) and Eric McGlinchley (2011: 41). Their contrary 
findings might be explained by the fact that the modern discourse portrays clans as something 
primitive, as argued by Schatz (2004: xxvi), which could drive people to disassociate themselves 
with the concept and its related concepts such as kinship. 
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ture of pre-Soviet society to survive’ the Soviet period; while Philip Robins (1994: 
59) explained the continuation of tribal and subnational loyalties with the inability 
to develop inclusive notions of citizenship, which would enable the populations to 
identify with the new states, along with the absence of the rule of law, inhibiting 
citizens from relying on the state. In the absence of these factors, Robins suggest-
ed, only kinship ties protect and facilitate access to resources for the individual.  
According to Collins the Central Asian states are based on ‘clan politics’, defined 
as: ‘politics organised by and around informal identity networks commonly known 
as clans’ (Collins, 2006: 1). Clan networks represent the informal institution be-
hind the formal regime through which power is exercised (ibid: 3); as Akiner ex-
plained, kinship on the one hand is dominating because personal allegiance rather 
than issues dominate ways of thinking but also because leaders are bound to re-
ward their kin for their support, a principle that cuts across politics and business 
(Akiner, 1994: 17). Kinship may be ‘fictive’ whereby individuals are included in a 
clan, for instance, by way of marriage, family alliances or school ties (Collins, 
2006: 17). Similarly, Akiner suggested that during the Soviet period membership 
of tribal groupings was extended to individuals who were linked via life experi-
ences, such as through schooling (Akiner, 1994: 16). Collins characterised clans 
by two principles; kinship identity at the core, supplemented by networks as the 
organising principle (Collins, 2006: 25). Thus, she differentiated clan politics 
from clientelism and corruption, which do not include an element of identity, and 
thus represent weaker ties relative to kinship (Ibid: 19, 26). Clan politics, accord-
ing to Collins, overlaps with both clientelistic and corrupt practices but not all 
corruption and clientelism can be considered clan politics, just as the latter cannot 
always be described as corrupt or clientelistic (Ibid: 40).  
Collins’ proposition has been contested by scholars finding less, or contradictory, 
evidence of the importance of kinship ties in Central Asian society.
31
 An alterna-
tive approach to the analysis of Central Asian regimes is that of Pauline Jones 
Luong (2002), who has argued that subnational identities are the more salient po-
                                                 
31
 See previous note. 
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litical identities in Central Asia (Luong, 2002: 17). The analyses of Luong and 
Collins are often held up as oppositional. However, Luong did not deny the con-
tinued prevalence of subnational clan networks, though arguing that such were 
weakened or restricted to the social sphere (Ibid: 52). Rather, as Collins noted 
(2006: 53-54), the singular focus on formal institutions led Luong to ignore the 
informal networks operating within formal institutions.  
Kinship connects the elite and the masses through vertical ties, which are continu-
ously reinforced through repeated, dense interaction. Through such interaction a 
high level of trust is build, based on reciprocity and interdependence, which can 
be easily carried across political, social and economic spheres, thus lowering 
transaction costs. Consequently, a kin-based society is characterised by the blur-
ring of public and private spheres (Ibid: 17, 27-8). Kin groups are characterised by 
a collective identity united in common goals, as well as a socio-economic depend-
ence on the kinship network (Ibid: 30). Understanding the informal regimes be-
hind the formal political structures in Central Asia is critical to the analysis of 
leaders’ preferences and willingness to enact reforms as well as dynamics under-
lying demand for policies. The fusion of political power and economic resources 
affects the interest formation of the ruling as well as the broader elite, which 
keeps the former in power, inclining both towards the status quo, which enables 
the ongoing practice of rent extraction. The dynamics, however, also affect the 
behaviour and interest representation of other groups in society, including emerg-
ing entrepreneurs and mid-sized businesses, who on the one hand may be linked 
to elite networks through vertical ties but more generally face impediments to 
doing business stemming from the fusion of capital and executive power. In the 
following, I shall analyse, first, the demand for and, secondly, the supply of re-
gional integration policies across Central Asia. 
4.1 Demand factors 
Exploring the demand for integration policies in Central Asia, I examine the inter-
ests and lobbying of a series of actors. Firstly, the business community, inter alia, 
through their organised forms: business associations. Secondly, I look at the po-
tential for formation of independent elites, that is, wealthier businessmen, who 
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may have interests separate to those of the ruling elite. Additionally, I look at the 
interests of wider groups of society, including trade unions and migrants; before 
latterly considering the role of foreign investors. The section concludes by consid-
ering the lobbying activity of these actors and effectiveness thereof. 
4.1.1  Entrepreneurs and smaller businesses 
While small businesses are often opposed to regional trade agreements for fear of 
the competition from foreign companies, small businesses in Central Asia may be 
in a position to benefit from regional integration because the small domestic mar-
kets inhibit their growth, while significant trade barriers hinder expansion to other 
markets (CASE-Kyrgyzstan, 2005: 7). Also trade integration could attract invest-
ment and improve access to imports, including technology, more widely creating 
better opportunities for growth (Olimova, Kurbonov, Petrov and Kahhorova, 
2006: 56). This section explores the character, interests and strategies of entrepre-
neurs and small business-owners across Central Asia on the basis of primary re-
search in the region. 
Who are Central Asian entrepreneurs? 
The transition from a command to a market economy, in several Central Asian 
republics, represents a significant rupture in the lives of Central Asians. One Tajik 
interlocutor likened the situation to being a Christian, waking up one morning to 
be told that he is now a Muslim but having no understanding of what that means 
or the norms he should now adhere to (i/w Boymamat (#54/BA)). One manifesta-
tion of this is in the disinclination towards growing business or seeking higher 
profits. To paraphrase a respondent’s characterisation of this mentality: ‘If you are 
comfortable with your business, why grow it?’ (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF)). During 
Soviet times a farmer would never sell excess production for profit; as one entre-
preneur suggested: ‘a man will not hunt, if not hungry’ (i/w EN). The response of 
Kazakh food product manufacturers to the Russian ban on Western food products 
is both illustrative of the supply constraints suffered by Kazakh producers as well 
as the disinclination towards growth. One dairy producer stated: ‘If tomorrow 
someone asks us to supply milk at a 10 percent higher price to Russia instead, we 
will not take the offer because we have our own market here (in Kazakhstan)’ 
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(Tashkinbayev and Satubaldina, 2014). Such disinclination towards business 
growth suggests that smaller businesses in fact are not likely to demand market 
enlargement through regional integration. 
Kinship ties affect the way in which many entrepreneurs do business. On the one 
hand many businesses are family-driven and organised through family links (i/w 
WD). At the same time, entrepreneurs are unwilling to make a profit on friends 
and family, who for their part are prone to seek out the services and goods offered 
by extended family members rather than strangers (i/w Paauwe (#49/IA)). One 
entrepreneur recounted how generosity toward her kin led her first business ven-
ture to bankruptcy, whereby she learned the hard way that her responsibilities first 
and foremost are to her immediate family (i/w Dodhodoeva (#50/BA)). 
The region continues to be affected by a Soviet mentality, whereby the govern-
ment is seen by people, and sees itself, as a provider or father of the nation (i/w 
Madumarov (#2/AC); Claytor (#74/FB); Drakinos (#99/IF)). For instance, an en-
trepreneur recounted how in search of financing for her second business venture, 
she had turned to the local mayor (i/w Abylkasymova (#61/EN)). Citizens of Kyr-
gyzstan and Kazakhstan are said to have escaped the Soviet mentality to the great-
est extent accepting the benefits of entrepreneurialism, having seen that hard work 
can pay off (i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)). For instance, Kyrgyz businesspeople are 
seen to be relatively more worldly and well-educated having had better opportuni-
ties for travel as well as benefiting from WTO membership which, inter alia, has 
facilitated an intensive trade relationship with neighbouring China (i/w IA). In-
deed, in Kyrgyzstan some businesspeople are said to have fully divested them-
selves of the Soviet mentality and taken on a liberal view of government, expect-
ing nothing at all from the state (i/w Claytor (#74/FB)). 
In the 1990s, the period immediately following the fall of Communist rule, it was 
popular to become an entrepreneur (i/w NN). As people saw oligarchs rapidly 
accumulating wealth, people engaged in business hoping to copy the experience 
(i/w BA). While, being money-driven might be said to be the first grain of entre-
preneurialism (i/w Bethom (#37/IA)), one interlocutor suggested that nine out of 
ten small businesses are aimed at making quick money, not developing a long-
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term enterprise (i/w BA). On the one hand, such short-termism may be the result 
of the need to feed your family, but, on the other, naivety and risk-averseness are 
also said to fuel such short-termist drive for profit. Landlords, for instance, leave 
their assets idle by refusing to negotiate on rent levels, thereby foregoing rental 
earnings (i/w Bethom (#37/IA)). The short-termist approach to business not only 
impedes growth-oriented business models but hinders the development of value-
added production in the region (i/w EN; Baimambetova (#81/BA)). People simply 
prefer to engage in trade, where turnaround is quicker and the labour effort less 
(i/w Baimambetova (#81/BA); Paramonov (#96/AC)). An entrepreneur, who pre-
viously sought to build scale in their business by buying inputs from other local 
producers, recounted how the suppliers delivered a quality product the first year 
but the following year shirked, and delivered produce of a lower quality (i/w EN). 
Understanding the market economic business model and working out a business 
plan are significant hurdles for entrepreneurs, particularly those over the age of 40 
(i/w AC; IA; Altaev (#17/GO); Bethom (#37/IA)). One common problem, for 
instance, is to only account for the start-up but not operational costs (i/w Paauwe 
(#49/IA)). Another widespread problem is lack of basic administration and man-
agement skills. For example, bazaar stall keepers frequently do not know what 
their turnover is, while many entrepreneurs do not understand, or see a need, to 
save part of their income for future business development (i/w Dodhodoeva 
(#50/BA); IA). Another issue is in the appreciation of quality and consistency of 
products and the impact thereof on customer retention (i/w EN; LE). For example, 
if one day you buy a green soft drink that tastes of kiwi, the next time you buy it, 
it may taste of mint, and the original product can no longer be found on the mar-
ket (i/w LE). 
Younger generations, who have lived their formative years in more liberalised 
economies, are said to more easily accept and adapt to the liberal mentality and 
market economic approach (i/w AC; Boymamat (#54/BA)). There are many 
young and bright people in Central Asia (i/w WD); particularly, young people 
who have studied abroad (i/w Boymamat (#54/BA); LE). However, in several 
countries, young people often do not return upon completing their studies, particu-
larly if having studied in the West (i/w AC; NN). Students stay abroad because 
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their skills are currently not in demand in their home countries (i/w Boymamat 
(#54/BA)), or because they seek higher salaries abroad (i/w Abylkasymova 
(#61/EN)). By contrast, in Turkmenistan, where the return rate of students is high 
(i/w 2xIO; Drakinos (#99/IF)); there is a sense that foreign-educated people are 
not trusted, but instead seen as disloyal renegades (i/w LE).
32
 One academic sug-
gested that young people are held back in their entrepreneurial endeavours by par-
ents, who not only fail to appreciate the market economy, but doubt their chil-
dren’s abilities to conduct business, and hence interfere with their business man-
agement (i/w AC). Indeed, while young people may have a good theoretical un-
derstanding of business, they lack practical experience (i/w 2xAC; 2xBA; IA).  
Despite these difficulties in adjusting to the way of doing business in a liberal 
market economy, the Central Asian republics do all exhibit evidence of a belief 
that over time the requisite mentality will take hold and successful enterprises 
develop (i/w AC). A foreign businessperson, claimed to have witnessed great de-
velopment of the skills of local entrepreneurs. Where in Kyrgyzstan in the early 
2000s an entrepreneur might present a factory floor plan as their business plan, the 
interlocutor suggested that most now appreciate the concept of a business plan and 
are able to develop such (i/w FB). Similarly, businesses are beginning to appreci-
ate the value of product consistency, standards and certification (i/w Uskenbaeva 
(#83/BA); NN). The push for higher standards and certification is market driven 
indicating the importance of integration with global markets. (Potential) suppliers 
of multinational companies or foreign customers are forced to adopt standards and 
have products certified in order to sell their goods (i/w NN; TT). Export-oriented 
businesses are increasingly aware of the need to reach international quality stand-
ards, and the demand for consultancy services in this domain is increasing (i/w 
NN). This suggests that integration into GVCs could contribute significantly to 
development of competitive businesses in Central Asia. 
                                                 
32
 Reasons given for why the return rate of students is perceived to be high in Turkmenistan var-
ied. Some interlocutors believed it was out of fear for what would happen to students’ families if 
they did not, while others pointed to strong family bonds, the requirement to do so, when having 
studied on a government grant, or the risk of losing citizenship (i/w 2xIO; NN; DI). 
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Concerns and interests of Central Asian entrepreneurs 
While the mentality and skills of entrepreneurs may present challenges for busi-
ness development, so do a range of factors in the business environment. On paper, 
the business environments may, in some cases, appear relatively attractive but 
while legislation may conform to international standards, implementation often 
does not (i/w AC; Bethom (#37/IA)). The business environment varies across the 
region in terms of its restrictiveness. For instance, the business environment in 
Kyrgyzstan is perceived as being relatively good (i/w 2xGO; FB; Shamiev 
(#71/LE); Zhunushov (#68/IF)) though the country’s economic development is 
stymied by political instability (i/w IA; GO). In Uzbekistan, on the other hand, 
businesses are said to ‘not grow in the same way as in other countries’ (i/w AD). 
A diplomat suggested that while in Kazakhstan businesses are allowed to grow as 
long as they do not challenge authorities, in Uzbekistan the approach is discre-
tionary; a business is allowed to grow as big as the authorities deem appropriate, 
and business expected to show gratitude in exchange (i/w WD).
33
 In Turkmeni-
stan, space for the private sector is opening up. However, while the rhetoric fa-
vours the development of a private sector, the occasional arrest of a CEO and sei-
zure of the company the person runs, signals a lack of full commitment on part of 
authorities (i/w LE). Moreover, opposition news sources claim that small private 
businesses are finding it increasingly difficult to operate in Turkmenistan 
(Khronika Turkmenistana, 2014). Nevertheless, there is a sense in the country that 
the development of the private sector is only a matter of time (i/w NN; WD; 
Drakinos (#99/IF)). 
While all business environments are uncertain because of (potential) changes to 
legislation, legislative changes in Central Asia happen with incredible regularity 
(i/w BA; Claytor (#74/FB); Khakimzhanov (#6/BP); Tungatarov (#66/BA)). Thus, 
while technically the business climate may be good, political and/or legislative 
instability hurts the perception of the business climate (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA); 
                                                 
33
 This notion was confirmed by a local journalist, who suggested that the impetus to hide one’s 
success varies across the region. He claimed that while in Kazakhstan, authorities take only a small 
amount from you at the indication of improving living standards (such as purchasing larger quanti-
ties of meat)  in Uzbekistan, they will take everything; thus the incentive to hide success is rela-
tively higher in Uzbekistan (i/w Askarov  (#27/JO)). 
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Claytor (#74/FB)). A survey in Tajikistan suggested that 18 per cent of investors, 
domestic and foreign, refrain from investing because of frequent changes to the 
legislative framework (i/w AC); by way of example, the tax code is said to have 
changed three times in one year with no positive impact (i/w IA). Similarly, indi-
cators such as the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ are criticised for missing the 
point by not measuring the issues that actually matter but, nevertheless, indicating 
improvements from year to year, which are not experienced by people on the 
ground (i/w WD). For instance, one indicator measures access to credit, without 
acknowledging that having the right connections is critical to obtaining a loan (i/w 
WD; Lermusiaux (#4/FB)). Such discrepancy between legislation and practice, 
formal and informal institutions, and contradictions between different legislative 
acts, is prevalent across the region (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF); Madumarov (#2/AC); 
Tungatarov (#66/BA); WS). One aspect of this is varying interpretations of the 
same legislation by subnational authorities (i/w BA; WD; Spechler, 2008: 49), or 
the lack of commitment by ministers to legislation or obligations made by their 
predecessors (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA); IO). 
Across the region, bureaucracy represents a challenge for entrepreneurs arising, 
inter alia, from a Soviet mentality in government or seemingly inappropriate 
regulation (i/w BA; Lermusiaux (#4/FB)). Entrepreneurs repeatedly note the com-
plicated bureaucracy involved for instance in registering a business or acquiring 
necessary documentation for export (i/w Abylkasymova (#61/EN); EN). One en-
trepreneur noted the inefficiencies of government recalling five different tax in-
spectors working on her case within one year with no hand-over between them; or 
queuing for official stamps on documentation with the clerk not even looking at 
the document before stamping (i/w Abylkasymova (#61/EN)). In Turkmenistan, 
while the scope for the private sector is growing, many businesses cannot operate 
without explicit approval. For instance, in using printing or conference facilities, 
at least foreign representatives, require explicit permission from authorities issued 
to specific businesses for the latter to supply goods and services (i/w WD; IO). 
Meanwhile, in the pharmaceutical sector in Kazakhstan, products are only li-
censed for three years, which in some cases may be less than the sell-by-date of 
the products, which thus require re-licensing to stay on the market (i/w BA). 
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Moreover, businesses acting as suppliers to the public sector are limited in their 
ability to plan long-term because government procurement contracts run for short 
periods, such as three years (i/w BA).  
The tax codes in several of the Central Asian republics are criticised for being 
complex and subject to frequent changes (i/w 2xNN; BP; GO; 2xBA). In several 
Central Asian republics tax codes have been re-written with support of interna-
tional donors. Despite this, they are reputed to read unprofessionally and be un-
workable (i/w NN; Claytor (#74/FB)). While in Turkmenistan the tax level is 
praised for being particularly low, thus allowing the private sector to grow (i/w 
NN), generally across the region the tax level is said to be so high that conducting 
one’s business fully within the law becomes unprofitable (i/w BP; BA). Bureau-
cracy also presents a challenge in the form of corruption, a form of indirect taxa-
tion. On one level, this is about survival with public servants finding supplemen-
tary revenue streams to their low salaries or their agency’s operating budget, and 
businesses paying bribes to be allowed to operate; as such creating a vicious cycle 
(i/w Agan (#80/DI)). Businesses are, for instance, often faced with requests for 
financial contributions by public bodies or political parties, and feel pressurised 
into paying for fear of otherwise losing their business (i/w Umarov (#45/AC); 
GO; IA; NN).  
Inspections of tax, health and safety or fire authorities represent another obstacle 
to business development. A survey of Kyrgyz SMEs suggested that 73 per cent of 
SMEs and 57 per cent of individual entrepreneurs faced at least one inspection in 
2011; while inspected SMEs and individual entrepreneurs averaged four and sev-
en inspections in 2011, respectively (IFC, 2013: 25-26). Inspections may in some 
cases be one-off opportunities for authorities to extract bribes but the frequency of 
such occurrences pushes many businesses into the shadows and bankrupts others 
(i/w 2xBA; NN; Tungatarov (#66/BA); Mambetalin (#28/OP)). Inspections which 
are supposed to occur annually are, in effect, often imposed on businesses month-
ly (i/w BA); and inspectors can become confused if a businessperson presents 
them with the books, rather than cash (i/w AC). The problem is supposedly in-
creasing in Tajikistan as well as Kazakhstan (i/w 2xBA). One business association 
has suggested that 15,000 businesses in Kazakhstan have closed under pressure 
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from civil servants, and related corruption. For example, a business which may 
lawfully have been issued a KZT 30,000 fine, may in practice face a fine of KZT 
3 million (Akuov, 2013). 
In other cases, inspections may be an indicator of an imminent attempt at corpo-
rate raiding or racketeering. The approach followed varies little across the region, 
where companies are confronted with inspections, sometimes after being asked to 
sell. Subsequently claims of wrong-doing lead to prosecution, which in some cas-
es can be avoided by paying bribes (i/w WS; Khakimzhanov (#6/BP)). Infringe-
ment of property rights are less an issue for small businesses in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, who are primarily faced with inspections or customs-related corrup-
tion (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE); AC). In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan businesses of all 
sizes and shapes are considered targets (i/w AC); and while in Kazakhstan busi-
nesses reliant on inalienable human capital are less at risk (i/w Khakimzhanov 
(#6/BP)), in Uzbekistan Gulnara Karimova’s Fund Forum was said to have run a 
racket in the arts and crafts industry by offering partnerships against a share of 
profits. In exchange all barriers to export would be eliminated but should a busi-
ness decline the offer, it would simply be shut down (i/w NN).
34
  
With judicial systems across the region perceived as corrupt, businesses have no 
recourse against hostile takeover attempts (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE)). Moreover, 
trials are expensive, and thus beyond reach for smaller companies (i/w BA). Judg-
es are said to be poorly-educated and, as an expression of a lingering Soviet men-
tality, expected to support government (Ibid). One interlocutor, doubting claims 
that Kyrgyz judges accept bribes, suggested that judges either side with authori-
ties, or with the side that gets its story to the judges first – usually the prosecutor 
(i/w Claytor (#74/FB)). Another suggested that a judge will rule in favour of the 
person paying the bigger bribe in some cases, while in others the ruling will de-
pend on the relative degree of influence held by the claimant and defendant (i/w 
Shamiev (#71/LE)). An interlocutor, who had experienced winning a case against 
a local authority, suggested that judges do in fact listen, consider and give rea-
                                                 
34
 With Fund Forum being under pressure following the arrest of Gulnara Karimova (Sindelar, 
2013), this may now have changed. 
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soned arguments for their judgements. He remarked that while there clearly is 
logic behind such verdicts, it may be a ‘Mad Hatter’ logic (i/w Claytor (#74/FB)). 
Consequently, the judicial system is one of the least trusted institutions across 
Central Asia (McGlinchley, 2011: 57). 
A range of shortages and imperfections in enabling conditions for businesses also 
negatively affect business growth. This includes inconstant access to electricity 
(i/w 3xWD; AC), inadequate infrastructure (i/w Kadamshoev (#51/GO); Drakinos 
(#99/IF), Nurlanbek (#63/IF)), and limited access to land or work space (i/w LE; 
US Commercial Services, 2012: 39) as well as credit (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF); 
NN; Abylkasymova (#61/EN); Umarov (#45/AC)). Often money follows busi-
ness, in the sense that no credit is given before a business has proved itself (i/w 
WS). In other cases, particularly if requiring larger loans, it is possible to access 
credit only if one has the right connections (i/w WD; Lermusiaux (#4/FB)). Also 
lending processes are long and cumbersome, and interest rates high (i/w BA). 
Most lending is short term, and though it is possible, at least in parts of the region, 
to access long-term loans it is difficult, particularly for manufacturing companies 
(i/w Zhunushov (#68/IF); Dodhodoeva (#50/BA); AC). In Tajikistan over 50 per 
cent of lending is said to go to the trading sector (i/w WS) supporting the bazaar 
economy and traders crossing into China to purchase consumer goods for resale. 
Many people do not trust banks and bank-client relationships are difficult to de-
velop; people are said to require education on how banks work (i/w WD; BA; IF). 
Instead, some turn to family networks or pawnbrokers for lending, in the latter 
case, facing even higher interest rates (i/w NN; BA). Businesses that are ‘politi-
cally exposed’, typically larger businesses, face further obstacles, such as lower 
capital limits on lending than the average business, as banks guard themselves 
against the political risks involved (i/w FB). In keeping with the policy to expand 
the private sector, the Turkmen government is subsidising loans resulting in inter-
est rates as low as 5 per cent (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF)). However, Turkmen entre-
preneurs face similar issues to other Central Asian businesses in accessing finance 
relating to corruption and patronage (i/w LE). 
Across the region, business growth is stymied by the small size of domestic mar-
kets. The small size of populations in most Central Asian republics, combined 
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with low purchasing power, result in weak demand in the domestic market (i/w 
Boymamat (#54/BA); Nurlanbek (#63/IF)). For instance, in Turkmenistan it is 
noted that the government’s policy of expanding the private sector has so far been 
successful but that the low-hanging fruits have now been picked and that a larger 
market is needed for the sector to develop further (i/w NN). With small domestic 
markets, businesses look for customers and markets beyond national borders, par-
ticularly to immediate neighbours in the region (i/w NN; Tolipov (#84/AC); 
Shamiev (#71/LE)).  
Trade 
Following 70 years of Soviet integration, people-to-people links continue to be 
strong but politically imposed obstacles to both social and business interactions 
risk rupturing these links over coming generations (i/w AC). The Fergana Valley 
can be described as being home to a natural division of labour, which has been 
disrupted by the erection of national borders (i/w NN). The obstacles to trade hit 
small-scale entrepreneurs particularly hard, who in some cases are, or were histor-
ically, particularly reliant on markets in neighbouring countries (i/w EN; NN).  
There is a high level of interest in trade within Central Asia, particularly between 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbek businessmen are said to be keen 
to develop trade particularly with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (i/w Tolipov 
(#84/AC); DI). When a Kyrgyz airline opened direct flights between Bishkek and 
Tashkent, the demand proved so high that a second weekly flight was added with-
in months (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE)). Nevertheless, politically induced hindrances 
and fear of authorities impede trade by making it highly risky (i/w Tolipov 
(#84/AC); Shamiev (#71/LE); DI). For instance, Uzbekistan, located in the middle 
of Central Asia and having the region’s largest population, in principle represents 
an attractive market for entrepreneurs in neighbouring countries (i/w Shamiev 
(#71/LE); BA). However, the political difficulties in some bilateral relationships 
of Uzbekistan as well as the strict trade regime imposed by the Uzbek government 
lead many entrepreneurs to discount of the opportunities altogether (i/w BA). A 
Kyrgyz civil servant suggested that despite bilateral agreements on trade, verbal 
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orders from high levels of the Uzbek government hinder trade in practice (i/w 
GO). 
Visa requirements and poor treatment of travellers and entrepreneurs on border 
crossings, particularly minorities and diaspora communities, reduce people-to-
people exchanges (i/w GO; Kislyakova (#44/BA)). One government official readi-
ly admitted that citizens are harassed by border guards and that crossing a border 
can take up to six hours (i/w GO). An academic described border guards as oper-
ating by a bribe extracting-logic rather than serving the national interest (i/w AC). 
The treatment is said to have such an impact on some citizens that they refuse to 
ever cross regional borders again (i/w TT). However, the biggest obstacle to trad-
ing is often said to be cumbersome customs procedures, which in some cases in-
volve duplicate certificates from different authorities (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). 
Moreover, given the frequent changes to legislation and regulation, officials are 
often unaware of current regulations (i/w BA). 
Problems in regional trade are, however, not restricted to obstacles to the move-
ment of goods and people. The foreign exchange limits imposed by the Uzbek 
government make it unattractive for entrepreneurs in neighbouring countries to 
trade with Uzbeks as payment in UZS are worthless to foreign businesses (i/w 
Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). Nevertheless, the currency regime and trade restrictions 
pose obstacles to Uzbek businesses first and foremost (i/w LE); receiving permis-
sion to exchange currency can take weeks or even months (i/w AD). Other re-
strictions characterising Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, include requirements of 
upfront payments on exports and payments on imports only allowed following 
goods’ arrival in the country (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF); BA). Thus, businesses are 
reliant on the trust of foreign trade partners, which is often absent given the lack 
of established partnerships (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF)). These restrictions are particu-
larly harsh on small businesses (i/w BA). Moreover, periods in which all imports 
are forbidden can be imposed at the discretion of authorities, for instance in case 
the government is running low on cash (i/w WD). 
Political risks also affect the attractiveness of trading with neighbouring markets. 
The political instability in Kyrgyzstan negatively affects the perception of the 
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country in the region. Kyrgyz democracy is described as anarchy, and it discour-
ages businesses communities in neighbouring countries from seeing opportunities 
in bilateral trade (i/w Boymamat (#54/BA); BA). For instance, in Kazakhstan 
there is concern that Kyrgyz entry to the ECU will increase the inflow to Kazakh-
stan of contraband (i/w BA). Similarly, as described above, the economic policy 
pursued by the Uzbek government discourages business communities in neigh-
bouring countries from pursuing trade.  
Geography, infrastructure and people-to-people links to a certain extent determine 
the trade orientation. While there is significant trade between Murgab in the Gor-
no-Badakhshan Autonomous Province (GBAO) of Tajikistan and Osh in Kyrgyz-
stan, in part facilitated by ethnic Kyrgyz living in the Murgab region, but also the 
geography of the mountain region (i/w Boymamat (#54/BA); GO), the opening of 
road links between GBAO and China, Afghanistan and Dushanbe has reduced 
Badakhshan’s trade level with Osh oblast markedly (i/w Boymamat (#54/BA)). In 
southern Tajikistan the interest in trading with Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan is 
high (i/w Boymamat (#54/BA); Kadamshoev (#51/GO)). Tajiks find it easy to 
trade with Afghans given their shared language and other cultural similarities, in 
addition to sharing a long border which is easy to cross (i/w Soliev (#31/GO)). 
Cross-border markets provide a good opportunity for Tajik traders to sell consum-
er products not accessible in Afghanistan, including soft drinks, mineral water and 
alcohol; and the traders are able to sell at a higher profit at the markets, than in 
their local shops. Many of the consumer products sold at the market are sourced 
from China creating opportunities for re-export trade for Tajik traders (i/w Paau-
we (#49/IA)). There are plans to open more markets in the future, though the se-
curity situation in Afghanistan does limit the trading opportunities (i/w Boymamat 
(#54/BA)). The impact of the security situation is however, more marked in 
Turkmenistan, where the border regions are considered no-go areas because of the 
drug trade, which is perceived to be controlled by crooked Committee for Nation-
al Security of Turkmenistan (KNB) officials, giving no one access to the area (i/w 
LE). With strong restrictions on cross-border trade with Afghanistan, Turkmen 
traders and consumers appear oriented towards shuttle trade with Iran and Turkey 
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(i/w LE; Badykova, 2005: 69). Turkmen private entrepreneurs are reportedly keen 
to have their opportunities for international trade widened (Annayev, 2013). 
The Kyrgyz also look to the Afghan market for agricultural produce. In this case, 
it is perhaps less a question of geography as it is scale. Russian distributors re-
quire purchases at scale, which small-scale farming does not easily facilitate. 
Consequently there are discussions on whether to open a market for Kyrgyz-
Afghan trade in Osh oblast in southern Kyrgyzstan (i/w GO). The ECU is per-
ceived to disrupt trade links with Kazakhstan and Russia (i/w AC). The re-export 
trade and the Kyrgyz textile industry, whose primary markets are Russia and Ka-
zakhstan, have, for instance, felt the pinch. In recent years, it is said that up to 30 
per cent of the textile industry has shut down owing to rise in duties, some of 
these businesses relocating to Russia taking their Kyrgyz workers (i/w Shamiev 
(#71/LE)). Also the meat and dairy sector in Kyrgyzstan is said to suffer from loss 
of Russian and Kazakh markets because the Kyrgyz producers cannot live up to 
the technical requirements but also because of allegations of sick livestock (i/w 
BA; Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). Also, for Uzbek businesses the Kazakh market has 
become less attractive (i/w Altaev (#17/GO)) 
Kazakh entry into the ECU has proved a disappointment for many Kazakh busi-
nesses, which find that their existing supply networks are being disrupted by trade 
barriers erected towards third countries, while transaction costs within the ECU 
have not reduced for many businesses, and higher external tariffs are making Ka-
zakh companies less competitive (Rakhmatulina, 2011; i/w 2xBA; Khakimzhanov 
(#6/BP); WD). Customs procedures with third countries have become more com-
plicated increasing the amount of time spent on declarations from 15 minutes to 
one hour (Rakhmatulina, 2011). Moreover, cross-border procedures within the 
ECU continue to be complicated, so that for instance, Russian certificates of 
origin must be replaced by Kazakh certificates when arriving from Russia and 
vice-versa (Ibid). Kazakh companies also face relatively higher transport fees in 
Russia than do domestic companies (Ibid), and there are increasing concerns re-
garding non-tariff barriers, which hinder access to ECU markets, Russia in partic-
ular (i/w WD; BA; BP; Zhunushov (#68/IF)). One example is quotas and pre-
payment of excise duties on alcohol imports to Russia (see Forbes 2013b, 2013c). 
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The ECU is, thus, said to create artificial barriers to trade in Central Asia (i/w 
Mambetalin (#28/OP)), which in Kazakhstan particularly affect businesses in the 
south for which the natural market in many cases lie in Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan 
(i/w BA). Consequently, the ECU is perceived to mostly benefit business in 
northern Kazakhstan (i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)). 
Businesses fear the higher quality requirements of the ECU, which given their 
reliance on Kazakh and Russian markets, many businesses must adapt to regard-
less of whether they join the Union or not (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF)). Kyrgyz busi-
nesses appear split on the issue of whether to join the ECU, in part reflecting the 
industries they represent as well as their trade orientation (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE); 
GO). Traders who import from non-ECU markets fear that membership would 
damage their business, while businesses in the production sector hope for a posi-
tive impact, though also fearing loss of access to Western and Asian technology 
and competition from Russian and Kazakh producers (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE); 
BP). As such Kyrgyz re-exporters are a countervailing force to those stakeholders 
who lobby for Eurasian integration. Such distinctions are, however, not clear-cut. 
The textile industry may gain better access to its markets through joining the 
ECU, though risks losing access to cheap inputs from non-ECU markets (i/w 
Zhunushov (#68/IF)), thus illustrating the complexities of anticipating the impact 
of membership on the economy overall. 
Coping strategies 
Some businesses find that when they stay on the right side of the law, and know 
their rights, conducting ‘clean’ business is possible. More generally, however, 
businesses employ a range of coping mechanisms in the face of the restrictions 
and obstacles described above. These can be divided into three types of approach-
es. Firstly, businesses stay small to avoid unwanted attention from authorities. 
Secondly, businesses employ various ‘tricks’ to circumvent cumbersome or pro-
hibitive regulation and, thirdly, many businesses conduct at least part of their op-
erations informally. 
Small businesses in particular, may have freedom to operate if they stay compliant 
with regulations. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan it was suggested that the conditions 
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are there to do business and the challenge is for business to use the conditions 
properly (i/w Zhunushov (#68/IF)). This is, at one level, a question of business 
people knowing their rights. While knowing one’s rights may not fully protect 
businesses, there is a sense that one at least stands a better chance (i/w Tolipov 
(#84/AC); NN; IFC, 2013: 21). Even in Tashkent it was suggested that businesses 
can operate below the radar of authorities, though this does not extend to other 
parts of Uzbekistan (i/w BA). Nevertheless, operating above board is not easy. 
Legislation is complicated, intransparent and often contradictory; while the regu-
latory system and tax level make it difficult to operate at a profit in the legal 
economy (i/w NN; Claytor (#74/FB)). Infringements allow officials to blackmail 
businesses, exploiting their weak points. If authorities seek errors or unlawfulness, 
they are likely to find it given the many contradictory and inconsistent regulations 
(i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF); FB; NN).  
Larger businesses are, arguably, subject to higher levels of scrutiny by authorities, 
and therefore benefit from a sponsor to protect their business. For instance big 
business was described as ‘politically exposed’ (i/w FB). Consequently keeping a 
business small to some extent allows entrepreneurs to operate outside the watchful 
eyes of authorities (i/w NN). While smaller businesses may not be frequent targets 
of hostile takeover attempts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, mid-sized businesses 
are aware of the risk to larger businesses and thus often avoid growing their busi-
ness (i/w IA; GO; Shamiev (#71/LE)). One interlocutor suggested, that entrepre-
neurs in a certain industry were content with net profits of USD 4,000 knowing 
that if they were to double that, they would become subject to the attention of au-
thorities, while reaching profits five times that would see their business shut down 
(i/w NN). 
Across Central Asia, but particularly in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, entrepre-
neurs are forced to employ a range of tricks in order to do business (i/w Tolipov 
(#84/AC); AD; IO). One way of reducing the tax bill is to put every member of 
the family, including grandparents and small children, on the payroll, paying eve-
ryone at the minimum tax threshold level to reduce the family’s tax bill overall 
(i/w WD). Restrictions on foreign financing and payment restrictions on import 
and export in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan can be circumvented via use of for-
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eign bank accounts (i/w Tolipov (#84/AC); Drakinos (#99/IF)). A foreign account 
allows a business an intermediate bank account from which to make payments for 
imports in advance of receipt in the country, or to pay itself upfront for exports. 
Such intermediate accounts in foreign banks are also used to expatriate profits 
(i/w BA). Another trick is to headquarter one’s business in a foreign country. Lo-
cation in a neighbouring country reduces the risk of raiding or racketeering in the 
home country, and may in some cases also offer less cumbersome start-up proce-
dures relative to Uzbekistan, for instance. Headquartering further afield, in for 
instance Western countries, also may offer a degree of international protection in 
case of authorities’ intervention in the business (i/w EN). Generally, engaging in a 
GVC is said to bestow businesses some protection as authorities will understand 
that the operation of the business relies on international relationships and that ex-
porting businesses bring in foreign currency (i/w NN; WD). This would suggest 
that deeper integration with the world economy via value chains may force better 
domestic business environments. 
The bias towards operating in the shadows is caused by the factors described such 
as incomplete rule of law processes, deficient protection of property rights, cor-
ruption, and a heavy tax burden (Olimova, Kurbonov, Petrov and Kahhorova, 
2006: 21; Rumer, 2000a: 12). Moreover, the politics is accepted as fact and obsta-
cles to trade are sought overcome through corruption (i/w BA; TT; Shamiev 
(#71/LE)). A business association representative claimed that the main reason 
why businesses operate in the informal economy is unwillingness to pay tax (i/w 
Baimambetova (#81/BA); BP). Tax avoidance is claimed to have become so cul-
turally entrenched that re-education of the public will be necessary to stamp out 
the practice (i/w WD). A survey among Kyrgyz businesses has suggested that ‘the 
share of SMEs resorting to unofficial methods to comply with regulations’ fell 
from 76 per cent in 2008 to 52 per cent in 2011 (IFC, 2013: 4). This downward 
trend would suggest that simplification of regulation as pursued in Kyrgyzstan 
does have a positive impact in terms of bringing businesses in from the shadows 
(Ibid). In Uzbekistan regulation is considered so complex and demanding that full 
compliance will render any business unprofitable (i/w NN, BA; Bendsen 
(#97/IA)). Interlocutors estimated that at least 50 per cent of economic activity in 
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Uzbekistan is conducted informally (i/w WD; NN). Similarly in Tajikistan it was 
suggested that while all, or most, businesses are likely to be registered, they will 
conduct significant activity outside the formal economy (i/w IF).  
Competitive pressures from businesses operating in the informal economy are 
likely to force many businesses to also operate in the shadows. For instance, if the 
general practice in a sector is to use informally imported inputs, employing legal 
imports at higher cost would make a business uncompetitive (i/w NN). Marketing 
is another indicator of the bias towards the shadows. Marketing is commonly con-
ducted through social connections, partly as a consequence of the fragmentation 
of domestic markets and an intuitive reliance on kin, but also because entrepre-
neurs are dissuaded from bringing attention to their businesses as this leads to 
scrutiny from authorities (Özcan, 2010: 80-82). The domination of cash in the 
economies also contributes to this bias (i/w IF). People do not trust banks, and 
therefore keep their funds in cash, often in US dollars. The latter particularly in 
Uzbekistan because of the currency exchange system (i/w WD). The Uzbek au-
thorities have sought to stem the cash dominance by forcing retailers, hoteliers, 
restaurateurs and other service trades to regularly  -daily or weekly depending on 
sector-  deposit income in banks, ensuring that the banking system and the gov-
ernment has sufficient cash liquidity (i/w BA; Bendsen (#97/IA)). Businesses are 
faced with a sales quota, which they have to fulfil, facing inspections if they do 
not. Almost predictably these procedures themselves stimulate the informal econ-
omy, with businesses fulfilling their sales quota and keeping sales above this level 
off the books (i/w BA). 
Similarly, despite the restrictions and official statistics indicating declining bilat-
eral trade, cross-border trade continues informally (i/w WD; IA; Tungatarov 
(#66/BA)). Uzbek products in high demand across the region include fertiliser, 
and fruit and vegetables, which are traded either through unofficial border cross-
ings or by bribing of customs officials. The extensive people-to-people links, par-
ticularly families split by national borders, facilitate such trade (i/w Tolipov 
(#84/AC); EN; AC). The currency restrictions in some cases lead to barter trade 
(i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)), while the region-wide restrictive trade regimes lead 
to innovative methods of concealing trade such as transporting liquid goods across 
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borders in petrol tanks for customs officials to think it is merely fuel for the jour-
ney (i/w EN). 
*** 
Smaller businesses and entrepreneurs in Central Asia often are not driven by a 
desire to grow their business. This, partly, is explained by short-termist inclina-
tions towards earning quick profits and a lack of appreciation of market-economic 
business models. It also, however, reflects the business environment, where barri-
ers to business development include bureaucratic and political hindrances induc-
ing businesses to stay small or operate in the informal economy to avoid attention. 
This applies also to the potential for cross-border trade, in which there is notable 
interest, but which is often conducted informally to circumvent political and bu-
reaucratic barriers. The establishment of the ECU has to some extent countered 
this trend towards informal regionalisation by increasing trade barriers between 
Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbours. Mentality, domestic and cross-
border trade barriers, thus, align against growth-oriented business models, induc-
ing businesses to stay small or operate in the informal economy. Together these 
factors suggest that entrepreneurs and smaller businesses are unlikely sources of 
demand for market enlargement and regional integration, despite their interest in 
cross-border trade. 
4.1.2 Business associations 
An avenue for collective identity and action is business associations. Such exist in 
Central Asia, though established literature would have it that such organisations 
are largely ineffective as they are often continuations of Soviet-era institutions 
(Özcan, 2010: 146-168, Kourmanova et al., 2008:7). The general trend across the 
region is, indeed, for business associations to have limited independence of au-
thorities, if any. In some instances, this may derive from the Soviet legacy, for 
instance the chambers of commerce and industry, which typically are based on 
distinct legislation (i/w BA) but also governments being a source of funding, as 
suspected in the case of the Turkmen Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 
(SPPT) (i/w NN; LE). Often the chambers of commerce and industry are de-
scribed as part of the regime or as quasi-governmental organisations that do not 
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represent the views or interest of their members (i/w WS; WD; IO; NN, BA; 
Bendsen (#97/IA)). There are nevertheless perceived differences in the degree of 
independence enjoyed by chambers of commerce and business associations more 
widely. While some describe the Tajik Chambers of Commerce (TPP) as quasi-
governmental it is said to enjoy a higher degree of independence than Uzbek and 
Turkmen Chambers (i/w WD).
35
 The Kyrgyz Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
is perhaps perceived as the most independent Chamber in the region, described by 
some as one of a handful of effective business associations in the country (i/w 
Zhunushov (#68/IF)).  
The Turkmen business community is extremely weak, made up of few small busi-
nesses and shuttle traders who are poorly, if at all, organised and hold no political 
voice (Badykova, 2005: 69). As a representative of an international organisation 
noted, the organisation is not engaged in private sector development partly be-
cause there are no implementing partners or NGOs to work with (i/w IO). In 2008 
the SPPT was founded (Halnazarova, 2013). Membership of the union is volun-
tary, although rhetorical pressure for businesses to join is increasing. The SPPT 
can be said to act as a replacement for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry  -
described as a toothless body without mandate-  in the sense that had the latter 
fulfilled its purpose, the former would be redundant (i/w NN). Similarly to the 
chambers of commerce in the region, the SPPT is established by law (Law of 
Turkmenistan, 21 May 2011), and by some described as a government institution 
as nothing in Turkmenistan is truly private (i/w DI).  
In 2005 Atameken Union, National Economic Chamber of Kazakhstan, was 
founded on the initiative of President Nazarbayev (Central Communications Ser-
vice, 2014). Atameken organises sectoral and regional business associations as 
well as individual entrepreneurs (i/w GO). While officially, membership of Ata-
                                                 
35
 The TPP maintains that it is independent and non-governmental, funded solely by membership 
fees and consultancy and service charges. According to a TPP representative, one of its largest 
members, Talco, however, pays as little as TJS 1,000 in membership fee (i/w Kislyakova 
(#44/BA)), arguably raising doubts as to whether the organisation can sustain itself through fees 
and charges. Indeed, a Tajik business association representative claimed that the TPP were subject 
to the same level of state control as that of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (i/w BA). 
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meken is voluntary, it has always been semi-mandatory for big businesses, and 
Atameken has been perceived to have strong state backing (i/w Khakimzhanov 
(#6/BP)). In summer 2013, the Kazakh Majilis (lower house of parliament) adopt-
ed legislation on the formation of a new National Chamber of Entrepreneurs (Law 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 4 July 2013). By some accounts, the measure is 
aimed at addressing a market failure by which businesses have failed to organise 
voluntarily despite needing collective representation (i/w BA). The initiative is 
being implemented through Atameken, which was considered the appropriate im-
plementing partner because its regional leaders are trusted locally and hold author-
ity and respect (i/w GO). While the word mandatory is not appreciated in gov-
ernment circles, membership of ‘the new Atameken’ will be compulsory (Ibid). 
The organisation is expected to undergo three phases of development: one year of 
foundation followed by two to five years of transition before becoming fully 
fledged. In the interim period, the government will be represented in the presidi-
um, while the new Atameken gradually assumes responsibilities currently held by 
the government (i/w BA).  
The initiative came as a surprise to some in the business community and has been 
met with some scepticism (i/w BA); first and foremost as regards to how it will 
work. While some recognise the need for improving the level of organisation and 
representation of business, there are questions particularly as to how the new At-
ameken will effectively represent the interest of small business and whether it will 
crowd out civil society outfits (i/w 2xBA, NN; AC). More importantly, question 
marks remain over the organisation’s independence as well as its ability to face up 
to strong akimats (local authorities) (i/w WD; AC; BA). Within the Kazakh oppo-
sition, there is suspicion that the true aim of the initiative is to turn Atameken into 
a political force for presidential son-in-law Timur Kulibayev by endowing it with 
financial resources (i/w Mambetalin (#28/OP); BA). Indeed, a government official 
acknowledges the risk of Atameken developing into a political party noting both 
the strong membership base and the financial resources it will have; contrasting 
this with the dominant political party Nur Otan, which has a small membership 
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and dearth of capital (i/w GO). Atameken has supposedly in the past been encour-
aged (but resisted) to create or turn itself into a political party (i/w BA).
36
 These 
concerns can be said to echo the situation in Turkmenistan, where the SPPT was 
ordered by Berdymukhamedov to set up a political party representing the private 
sector (i/w WD). While the two Turkmen outfits are organisationally separate, 
there are strong personal links between them (i/w NN). 
In Uzbekistan, associations nominally considered to be in the third sector, are said 
to be bottom-up driven only in principle, existing mainly as organs of control and 
with a view to extracting taxation through so-called membership fees (i/w 2xNN). 
A foreign businessman described Uzbek society as ‘frozen’, implying that it is 
impossible to organise industry organisations (i/w FB). In Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Kazakhstan, on the other hand, there appears to be a move towards interest-
driven, bottom-up processes, though the change is not occurring at a rapid pace 
(i/w 2xBA; NN; Zhunushov (#68/IF); Dodhodoeva (#50/BA)). Kyrgyzstan pro-
vides the clearest example, where some business associations seem to effectively 
represent business interest (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA); Zhunushov (#68/IF)). The 
extent to which businesses are organised in Kyrgyzstan is relatively high, which 
by some is explained by the comparatively higher levels of freedom enjoyed by 
Kyrgyz civil society (i/w Zhunushov (#68/IF)). In fact it was suggested that Kyr-
gyzstan has too many associations of which only five to ten are effective (i/w 
Tungatarov (#66/BA); Zhunushov (#68/IF)).  
The volatile events in 2010 had differing impacts on the business community in 
Kyrgyzstan. In the south a well-functioning business community, protecting and 
promoting the rights and interests of businesses, was led by strong businessmen 
prior to the ethnic clashes. In the aftermath, the community appears to have disin-
                                                 
36
 Whichever way one turns it, the fate of the new Atameken appears intimately linked with that of 
Timur Kulibayev. It was presumed prior to Kulibayev’s election to the presidium in September 
2013 (Zhumzhumina, 2013) that he would lead also the new Atameken (i/w BA). One interlocutor 
suggested that while on the one hand, the establishment of a credible and independent National 
Chamber of Entrepreneurs was dependent on the strong stewardship of Kulibayev in the initial 
phase of formation, and thus his maintained interest in and commitment to the project; the new 
structure would, at the same time, represent a potential political instrument for Kulibayev, should 
he wish to employ it (i/w NN). 
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tegrated as many skilled businessmen left. Now, though, businesses are starting to 
reorganise, particularly around the Association of Young Entrepreneurs (JIA) (i/w 
IA). In Bishkek, on the other hand, the 2010 events led to the formation of a new 
business association. Retailers were unable to pay suppliers for goods lost in rela-
tion to riots, and claimed force majeure. This led a group of distributors and sup-
pliers to organise and seek compensation. While the results they achieved were 
not fully to their satisfaction, the negotiations with retailers and government led to 
a realisation of the value of collective representation, and the creation of a perma-
nent association (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). Kyrgyz business associations are not 
only considered to be effective, but also engage in mutual cooperation (i/w 
2xBA). Lately a group of associations have developed an advocacy programme 
together. A representative of one such association argued that the worsening busi-
ness climate acts as an impetus for the associations to cooperate (i/w BA). This 
consolidation of the Kyrgyz business community appears to centre on the Interna-
tional Business Council (IBC), the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Bish-
kek Business Club and JIA (Ibid). 
In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan the voluntary sectors appear underdeveloped and 
weaker relative to Kyrgyzstan but nonetheless under formation (i/w Kha-
kimzhanov (#6/BP); Madumarov (#2/AC); WS). One business association repre-
sentative estimated that Kazakhstan has as many as 800 different business asso-
ciations, in part spurred by legislation in 2006, which established a right to con-
sultation for registered business associations (i/w BA). A threat of increased tar-
iffs on import of harvesters at the ECU level also led to the rapid creation of a 
strong business lobby on the issue (i/w WD). However, a representative of one 
association, which operates independently, suggested that it has limited scope to 
represent its members (i/ BA). In Tajikistan many business associations do exist 
but several are inactive and considered ineffective, and many associations are said 
to not have developed a nature of representation, partially explained by the lack of 
a lobbying mentality. Only some engage with the public and government in active 
discussions about the regulatory environment (i/w GO; WS).  
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Underdevelopment of business associations 
To the extent independent associations exist, they are hobbled by certain weak-
nesses. One source of weakness of associations is lack of funding. Some Kyrgyz 
business associations, notably JIA and IBC, sustain themselves solely via mem-
bership fees and or service charges (i/w 2xBA; Tungatarov (#66/BA)). Beyond 
this, examples are few and far between, others struggling to cover their operating 
costs (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). Some business association representatives 
claim that many businesses are willing to pay fees and for services of good quality 
(i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA); Dodhodoeva (#50/BA); Baimambetova (#81/BA)). 
Others suggest that businesses do so at best begrudgingly (i/w Claytor (#74/FB)), 
or that businesses’ reluctance to pay membership fees is the biggest obstacle to 
the development of associations (i/w BA). A business association representative 
noted that for many businesses, membership of an association is solely about the 
rights they gain from it, with many not accepting having to pay fees to obtain 
these rights, and that even a small fee would put businesses off membership (i/w 
BA).  
An alternative source of funding for associations seeking to maintain independ-
ence of government is through donor grants. It was suggested that as many as 100 
associations in Kyrgyzstan operate on donor funding (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA)). 
While running a strong and effective association on donor grants is possible (i/w 
Tungatarov (#66/BA); Zhunushov (#68/IF)), it renders associations vulnerable. 
Moreover, inefficient associations are propped up by donor funding, undermining 
the incentive for businesses to pay the membership fees and service charges that 




Latterly, many entrepreneurs may simply not know of business associations or the 
benefits of being a member (i/w Abylkasymova (#61/EN)). Some entrepreneurs, 
                                                 
37
 It should be noted that this narrative was not accepted by all interlocutors in the region. One 
business association chairman drew parallels between the donor funding received by Central Asian 
business associations and state support for associations in Western countries, arguing that Central 
Asian businesses are not sufficiently developed to sustain their own business associations (i/w 
Boymamat (#54/BA)). 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
217 
 
for instance, do not see benefits of membership, while others may say that they 
are or have been members of a business association but be unable to say which, or 
what benefits were derived from membership (i/w GO; Paauwe (#49/IA)), sug-
gesting that some associations simply do not offer value for money and possibly 
weaken the image of the sector. 
Below, I will explore factors holding back the development of civil society more 
generally in Central Asia, focusing on the absence of independent business asso-
ciations in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan specifically. Uzbeks are said to be pa-
tient people waiting for better times (i/w Khusainov (#26/AC); 2xNN); this ech-
oes Gül Berna Özcan, who argued that the deteriorating economic situation in 
Uzbekistan leads entrepreneurs to be increasingly submissive to authorities as the 
success of their venture is reliant upon the state (Özcan, 2010: 114). Contrary to 
Özcan, Eric McGlinchley (2011: 134, 141-143) has found that there could at the 
local level in Uzbekistan be scope for dissent against government. Indeed, Özcan 
herself recognised that there is a widespread feeling of contempt for the political, 
administrative and business elites among entrepreneurs in Central Asia, who are 
angry at their inferior position in society (Özcan, 2010: 59). McGlinchley argued 
that the interpersonal trust, which exists locally, enables local businesses to grow, 
and as they do entrepreneurs can create local, independent bases of power. In 
Andijon, for instance, 23 local businessmen provided employment and charity 
through successful enterprise, which gave them a strong local support base, and 
seemingly shifted the allegiance of the regional governor from President Karimov 
to the entrepreneurs (McGlinchley: 2011: 13, 122-123).
38
 Whether the 2005 
events in Andijon relating to the imprisonment of these businessmen have dam-
aged the potential for such alternative power bases to develop in the future, the 
fact remains that they were of a vertical nature reflecting traditional kin-based 
forms of allegiance, and thus not indicative of horizontal, interest-based organisa-
tions. 
                                                 
38
 It should be added, however, that no political ambitions or interests other than financial gain 
apparently lay behind the charity work of the businessmen (Radnitz, 2010: 172); and even if sub-
versive interests had been present, Karimov effectively obliterated the rising alternative power 
base. 
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The sense of fear of speaking out is palpable in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In 
Uzbekistan, interlocutors suggested that between one in ten, and one in four, are 
employed as informers by the security services, and monitoring of communica-
tions pervasive (i/w NN; BA). The tendency towards conducting economic activi-
ty in the shadows further contributes to people’s fear of speaking freely (i/w NN). 
There is little or no feedback from civil society to government. Rather than protest 
the lack of employment opportunities domestically, Uzbeks prefer to work abroad 
under poor conditions (i/w DI). Uzbekistan is said to be primed for revolution but 
for cultural reasons, or mental unpreparedness, upheaval does not happen (i/w 
Lermusiaux (#4/FB); BA; DI). Uzbeks simply aspire to leave the country (i/w 
BA) though an array of underground networks is suspected to exist (i/w WD). 
A lack of dissent also dominates in Turkmenistan, which can be described as a 
police state with no freedoms (i/w WD). International representatives often feel 
hindered from engaging with local society, authorities breaking up even small 
seminars, as they fear discussions may centre on the overthrow of government 
rather than, for instance, development of business skills (Ibid). While the internet 
is allegedly kept slow to reduce the impact of foreign influences (i/w WD), Turk-
mens are not wholly isolated in a hermit kingdom. Internet access has increased 
through smartphones, and access to non-Turkmen media is widespread in both 
urban and rural areas through satellite dishes receiving mostly Russian and Turk-
ish signals (i/w WD; LE). Recent media coverage suggests, correspondingly, that 
Turkmens increasingly are willing to speak up, anonymously, about their concerns 
(Najibullah, 2014). Nevertheless, there is some way to go before civil society de-
velops a forceful voice. 
Role played by business associations 
Business associations in Central Asia define their role much like business associa-
tions elsewhere. Many define their primary role as lobbying for the interests of 
businesses and protecting their rights (i/w 3xBA; Kislyakova (#44/BA); Usken-
baeva (#83/BA)). Others focus on assisting their members, or businesses more 
widely, in creating national and international networks as their primary, or one of 
their main, functions (i/w 2xBA; Kislyakova (#44/BA)). In many instances, how-
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ever, the main activity of business associations appears to be providing training 
and seminars on business skills (i/w BA; Dodhodoeva (#50/BA); Baimambetova 
(#81/BA)). Additionally, many business associations provide practical support for 
businesses, such as information dissemination and sharing, and individual support 
through consultancy services (i/w 4xBA; Baimambetova (#81/BA); Uskenbaeva 
(#83/BA); Abylkasymova (#61/EN)). An additional but important function of 
business associations is the protection membership offers from arbitrary interven-
tions by authorities (i/w Abylkasymova (#61/EN)).  
Numerous business associations define their primary role as promoting and de-
fending the rights and interests of businesses. One representative simply stated 
that without effective interest representation, the organisation would not be able to 
attract members (i/w BA). Kyrgyz associations are judged to be relatively more 
active, and effective, than their regional peers (i/w AC; FB). Some Kyrgyz associ-
ations operate on an analytical basis, on knowledge of the needs and circumstanc-
es of businesses (i/w AC; BA). Financially weak associations can sometimes ben-
efit from individual businesses commissioning analysis in support of the associa-
tion’s ideas and arguments (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). Despite the perception of 
associations like Atameken and SPTT being top-down driven and state-linked, 
they do get some credit for promoting private sector interests, even if they as as-
sociations cannot be considered representative (i/W Madumarov (#2/AC); Kha-
kimzhanov (#6/BP); BA; LE; NN). 
Associations engage in the policy making process by commenting on draft legisla-
tion, specifically outlining support and disagreements, and changes sought (i/w 
3xBA), or raising to the attention of policy makers, as well as the wider public, 
issues of concern to entrepreneurs (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA); BA). Associations 
generally reflect the concerns of business outlined above. Lobbying thus focuses 
on reduction of administrative procedures and regulation, including inspections, 
as well as simplification and improving consistency of legislation and regulation; 
improvement of the investment climate; stronger quality control; and improve-
ments of the education system as well as improved access to government pro-
curement (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA); Kislyakova (#44/BA); Tungatarov 
(#66/BA); Boymamat (#54/BA); 4xBA).  
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Protection of the rights of businesses is a key concern across the region. In Ka-
zakhstan, for instance, associations are lobbying for an ombudsman institution to 
protect the right of businesses; some inspired by the alleged success of a similar 
institution in Russia (i/w 2xBA; Akuov, 2013).
39
 In Khorog, Tajikistan a local 
business association has introduced a contract between the administrators of and 
vendors at the local bazaar which offers protection of vendors’ rights. The con-
tract insures vendors against theft outside of market opening hours and against fire 
in the bazaar (i/w Dodhodoeva (#50/BA)). Following North (1990: 124-125) this 
may be seen a development towards a dispute resolution mechanism with judicial 
enforcement that may over time strengthen the formation of business groups 
based on shared interests if the scheme proves itself viable and popular. As of 
September 2013 only 70 of 1,000 stall-keepers had, however, signed up (i/w Dod-
hodoeva (#50/BA)), and no similar initiatives were observed elsewhere during 
fieldwork. 
A few business associations raised a more fundamental concern, namely the struc-
ture of the national economy and its reliance on services and trade, suggesting that 
there was need for a stronger public debate on and effort towards refocusing the 
economy on production industries (i/w BA; Baimambetova (#81/BA)). Overall, it 
is clear that the main concern for businesses across Central Asia is the domestic 
business environment, partly because many businesses only or primarily operate 
in domestic markets (i/w BA). Nevertheless, some associations do focus on issues 
of cross-border trade, including customs procedures and trade integration, which 
will be explored further below (i/w 2xBA). 
Many business associations define one of their main justifications as helping 
businesses to network nationally and internationally (interviews with BA; Kislya-
kova (#44/BA)). The TPP, for instance, organises foreign trips, which are free for 
                                                 
39
 While the Kazakh government has previously declared intentions to introduce an ombudsman, 
the implementation is still outstanding. A reason behind this may be the difficulty in finding a 
person of sufficient integrity to establish and lead the institution. Local stakeholders question 
whether such a person exists in Kazakhstan (i/w BA; WS). At the same time, the government is 
accused of dragging its feet because a potential ombudsman would defend the rights of entrepre-
neurs’, currently lingering in Kazakh jails, whom the government does not wish to free (i/w BA). 
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their members (i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA)). Similarly, the SPPT organises exhibi-
tions and trade fairs, and enable Turkmen companies to establish international 
contacts, including through participation in international fairs (i/w NN). One in-
dependent association focuses particularly on creating networks for rural busi-
nesses, which are seen to have stronger needs owing to their remote locations. The 
association initially builds local links between businesses, before seeking to estab-
lish national and latterly international links. A particular emphasis is put on con-
necting entrepreneurs who have studied abroad with those who have not (i/w BA). 
The educational function of Central Asian business associations often has both a 
practical and a theoretical stream. The younger generations are seen to have a 
good theoretical understanding of market principles but lack the practical experi-
ence (i/w 2xBA). Associations address this through lectures by experienced entre-
preneurs, by running their own school, in cooperation with universities or through 
ad hoc seminars, and some facilitate internships with their member businesses 
(i/w 2xBA; NN). In Turkmenistan, the SPPT is seeking to establish the first pri-
vate sector university offering MBAs, which is considered potentially revolution-
ising in the Turkmen context (i/w LE). The initiatives also cover practical issues 
such as how to start a business, create a business plan or conduct accounting, as 
well as training in vocational skills (i/w 2xBA; Dodhodoeva (#50/BA); Baimam-
betova (#81/BA)).
40
 The educational initiatives and experience over time are seen 
to have increased business skills in the region (i/w Dodhodoeva (#50/BA); BP), 
and entrepreneurs whose skills improve are prone to come back to improve them-
selves further (i/w Dodhodoeva (#50/BA)). 
In addition to educational offers, many business associations engage in infor-
mation sharing. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, associations may hold roundtables 
where the impact of potentially joining the ECU may be discussed (i/w Usken-
baeva (#83/BA)); while in Tajikistan seminars may focus on Tajikistan’s WTO 
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 Often such training and seminars are offered on the basis of donor grants or provided by foreign 
aid delivery agents (i/w NN; IA; LE; Zhunushov (#68/IF); Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). 
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entry (i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA)).
41
 Another means of information sharing is data-
bases organised by associations, which give members the opportunity to list job 
advertisement or to share information about dishonest former employees (i/w BA; 
Uskenbaeva (#83/BA)). Individual support for businesses include chargeable ser-
vices such as consultancy or judicial support, which also provide the associations 
with a separate revenue stream, and often is open to non-members (i/w BA; Kis-
lyakova (#44/BA); Baimambetova (#81/BA)). One association sells accountancy 
services to members, which over 80 per cent of members make use of (i/w BA). 
The chambers of commerce, typically, issue certification, for instance on origin 
(i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA); BA). 
Membership of a business association affords a certain degree of protection for 
businesses. A membership certificate in a business office can, for instance, deter 
unwarranted inspections but more generally membership of a business association 
contributes to entrepreneurs’ understanding and knowledge of their rights, ena-
bling them, for instance, to demand documentation from inspectors (i/w 
Abylkasymova (#61/EN); NN; Lermusiaux (#4/FB)). Moreover, businesses indi-
vidually may struggle to obtain redress from government, which is more likely to 
respond to complaints made by business associations on behalf of members (i/w 
Tungatarov (#66/BA)). Also, in some countries membership of certain business 
associations, for instance SPPT in Turkmenistan, may facilitate businesses obtain-
ing access to land, getting loans, buying equipment or landing government pro-
curement contracts (i/w NN; LE). 
Additional functions of business associations include cross-border cooperation. 
Mostly such initiatives are aimed at creating cross-border networks for businesses 
and sharing of resources, for instance linked to skills development (i/w 2xBA; 
Baimambetova (#81/BA); Kislyakova (#44/BA)). Such networks also serve to 
exchange information on obstacles faced by businesses to cross-border trade or on 
shared challenges, such as the development of an insurance industry (i/w Kislya-
kova (#44/BA); BA). These networks, nevertheless, do not include Turkmenistan 
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 Again, this is a type of initiative supported by donors, who work closely with business associa-
tions to provide roundtables and seminars on the business climate and how to improve it (i/w NN). 
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and there are also complaints about the difficulty in cooperating with Uzbek asso-
ciations, which are not independent of government (i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA)). 
*** 
Representation of private sector interests is in some countries, notably Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan, dominated by top-down led business association which do get 
some credit for pursuing private sector interests. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan has a 
relatively strong group of bottom-up driven business associations, while similar 
developments are taking place in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, where such associa-
tions, however, are perceived to be weaker. Associations define their role as lob-
bying for business interests as well as providing training and other services to 
their members. 
4.1.3 Independent elites  
Owners and representatives of larger commercial structures are also likely to have 
an interest in the development of a regional market. However, there is often con-
vergence between these actors, and those who benefit from existing trade barriers 
by means of rent-extraction and corruption. There is a great amount of rent seek-
ing involved in high level business dealings in Central Asia, which counteract the 
logic of market integration. As argued by Eshref Trushin and Eskender Trushin 
(2005: 332), owners of businesses secured in post-independence privatisation pro-
cesses quickly learned that rather than advancing these businesses or engaging in 
new economic activities, there were much larger profits entailed in securing privi-
leges from the political elite. The question is, whether in Central Asia an ‘inde-
pendent elite’  -defined by Scott Radnitz (2010: 17) as not formally a member of 
the ruling elite but holding significant resources, of which they are wholly in con-
trol, and who exercises power in society on the basis thereof-  has developed. In-
dependent elite members look very similar to members of the ruling elite but may 
pursue diverging interests (Ibid). A prominent example of such an individual, in 
the Russian domestic context, is arguably Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
Early liberal reform allowed the Kazakh elite to gain control of resources and en-
terprises. This capture of resources, and the rent extraction it allows, has meant 
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that the business elite subsequently has been less in favour of further economic 
and political liberalisation, as this would undermine their oligarchic hold on pow-
er and resources (Auty, 2006a: 6). It follows that the majority of the elite in Ka-
zakhstan supports the status quo both in terms of policies and ruling elite. Demon-
strating the fusion of economic and political power, one civil servant pointed to 
the potential conflict of interests of elected politicians, when stating that it is an 
open question whether one is an entrepreneur because of opportunities derived 
from political office, or if one seeks political office to protect one’s business in-
terests (i/w GO). The Kazakh political system has, however, seen some degree of 
dissidence, but many of the more prominent non-conformists  -such as Rakhat 
Aliev, Akezhan Kazhegeldin or Olzhas Suleimenov-  do not meet Radnitz’ defini-
tion of independence given their official posts within the formal power structures. 
One might consider Mukhtar Ablyazov an independent elite agent. Ablyazov was 
in the early 2000s instrumental in establishing a, in name, democratic party, thus, 
challenging President Nazarbayev’s political agenda (Hagelund, 2008: 91). What 
each of these elite agents’ stories have in common, however, is that they demon-
strate Nazarbayev’s skills for co-opting or coercing potentially independent elites; 
Aliev, Kazhegeldin and Ablyazov were all eventually driven into exile, while Su-
leimenov was co-opted (Ibid: 73, 76, 93; Lillis, 2009). 
Radnitz claims that Kyrgyzstan developed an independent elite in post-Soviet 
years of independence; the development of which was facilitated by the liberal 
policies of former President Akayev. According to Radnitz (2010: 54, 70-76), the 
independent elite was instrumental in driving the changes of government follow-
ing the Tulip Revolution. Former President Bakiyev, when coming to power in 
2005, however, did not change the rules of the game but sought to replace the rul-
ing elite (Ibid: 204-205). Similarly, the elite disagreements in today’s Kyrgyzstan, 
despite formal changes to the political regime, appear to centre on obtaining con-
trol of power, not subverting it (Dyatlenko, 2014).  
In Tajikistan the elite is fragmented, resting on corrupt and mafia-like practices 
(Collins, 2006: 206, 279, 290), though President Rakhmon increasingly appears to 
be firmly in control of the entire country (Marat, 2006: 25; i/w IO; WS). Zayd 
Saidov in the early 2010s developed into what may be interpreted as an independ-
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ent elite actor. Saidov was a successful businessman and former adversary of 
President Rakhmon during the civil war who subsequently proved himself able to 
cooperate with Rakhmon, holding various government positions through the 
1990s and 2000s. As Saidov, a wealthy businessman of independent means, be-
came head of an association of business groups and founded a political party in 
advance of presidential and parliamentary elections he became subject to political 
persecution (Kadirov, 2013). The prosecution of Saidov (Najibullah, 2013) may, 




In Uzbekistan foreign trade is dominated by large businesses (CASE-Kyrgyzstan, 
2005: 23) which tend to benefit from existing trade barriers either through partici-
pation and rent-extraction in the shadow economy or by engaging in the import-
substituting industries (Paramonov et al., 2006: 23; i/w Tolipov (#84/AC)). The 
Uzbek elite considers private entrepreneurs to be a challenge to their own eco-
nomic interests, which explains the high barriers to entrepreneurship in the coun-
try (Trushin and Trushin, 2000: 140). Radnitz describes the Uzbek state as the 
’sole bastion of power’ (Radnitz, 2010: 57), where centralised control of govern-
ment bodies and security services’ monitoring of society have been barriers to the 
formation of independent elites and collective action (Ibid: 68-69). In Turkmeni-
stan, where the private sector is only now starting to develop, it is clear, that an 
independent elite does not exist. As interlocutors suggested, an oligarchy is not 
permitted to develop in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan (i/w 2xDI). 
Thus, independent elites are not yet a feature of Central Asian society. However, 
they may develop over time. In Uzbekistan the rents with which the regime can 
maintain the loyalty of the wider elite are slowly being exhausted, for instance, 
through declining yields on the cotton production (McGlinchley, 2011: 140). As 
this happens, the incentives for the wider elite to stay loyal to the ruling elite may 
decrease (Radnitz, 2010: 66). Nevertheless, even to the extent that an independent 
elite develops, it will not necessarily be an obvious source of demand for market-
                                                 
42
 It has been rumoured that Saidov was prosecuted because Rahmon felt Saidov had the support 
of the Kremlin (i/w WS). 
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oriented reforms or regional integration policies owing to their precarious position 
in society. As Radnitz has noted (2010: 18), establishing the rule of law is a col-
lective action problem; lobbying by independent elites attracts attention from au-
thorities, which is often-times best avoided; Khodorkovsky being a case in point. 
Indeed, while Kazakh wealth owners may not feel that their fortunes are secure, 
they expatriate their funds via foreign investments (i/w BA) rather than voice de-
mands for the rule of law and protection of property rights.  
4.1.4 Groups within wider society 
Social groups such as consumers, workers, labour migrants and ethnic minorities 
are potential beneficiaries of regional integration (Olimova, Kurbonov, Petrov and 
Kahhorova, 2006: 19). However, civil society in Central Asia is generally weak, 
often controlled by authorities, and such groups as labour migrants and ethnic 
minorities lack both a collective voice as well as bargaining power to influence 
policy (Badykova, 2005: 69). Furthermore, interests may vary within groups. 
While employees in export-oriented businesses would derive benefits from open 
markets, employees of import-substituting businesses or in industries protected by 
existing trade barriers may not (CASE-Kyrgyzstan, 2005: 20). Moreover, the po-
tential benefits from regional integration are spread across a large section of con-
sumers and employees, lessening the impetus for collective action. 
Central Asians are considered to be tolerant people, few of whom would question 
the system. The majority prioritises stability over political engagement (i/w Kha-
kimzhanov (#6/BP); 2xBA; 2xWD): ‘To be silent is democracy in Kazakhstan’ 
(i/w BA); or as an Uzbek saying describes the national character: ‘Think lots, say 
little’ (‘Kob oylä, az soylä’) (Spechler, 2008: 2). People do not perceive govern-
ment as being representative and there is no social contract between government 
and people on which to hold the former to account (i/w WS; Madumarov 
(#2/AC)). Instead, people rely on kin to protect and represent their interests (i/w 
WS). The dominance of kinship ties across public and private spheres in Central 
Asia provides a part-explanation for the difficulty of horizontal interest groups 
developing. The impersonal trust that traditionally underlies civic associations is 
low; people predominantly interact through networks of kin. Local interlocutors 
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pointed to this lack of interpersonal trust and the local culture as obstacles to the 
development of a voluntary sector (i/w BA; NN; Khakimzhanov (#6/BP)); one 
suggesting that also the nominal nature of the rule of law, that is frequent viola-
tions thereof, undermine trust within society (i/w BA). Radnitz (2010: 3-6) ob-
served the high level of distrust between citizens in Central Asia, as well as an 
overwhelming preoccupation with immediate concerns: poor people are more 
likely to mobilise over material and parochial concerns than abstract issues (i/w 
DI).  
While the public in Central Asia may generally tend to accept policy innovation 
as a given, there are signs that Kazakh and Kyrgyz civil societies are relatively 
more vibrant. In Kazakhstan there has increasingly been displays of strong feel-
ings against the ECU (i/w Khakimzhanov (#6/BP)) reflecting a general sense of 
public discontent following price increases on a range of consumer products, 
which tend to be imported (i/w 2xBA). Already in spring of 2010 members of the 
media, NGOs and Kazakh opposition parties in an open letter urged President 
Nazarbayev to leave the ECU (Laruelle, 2012: 9). A Kyrgyz business association 
representative also suggested that the public increasingly distrusts the government 
because of attempts to join the ECU (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA)), and spring 2014 
has seen Kyrgyz activists protest against ECU membership, reflecting an active 
public debate. Kazakhs meanwhile have demonstrated against the EaEU (Lillis, 
2014a) as well as in response to the 2014 currency devaluation (RFE/RL, 2014j; 
Lillis, 2014a). Earlier in 2013, a campaign against pension reform in Kazakhstan 
was perceived victorious, when President Nazarbayev returned the law to parlia-
ment and sacked the responsible minister (Mukhametrakhimova, 2013b). 
Nevertheless Kyrgyz government surveys of public opinion are said to indicate 
public support for the course towards ECU membership (i/w GO; Ahmetova 
(#70/GO)). The EDB surveys of public opinion confirm such public support for 
the ECU across Central Asia; 72 per cent of the Kyrgyz public support member-
ship according to the EDB survey, as do 75 per cent of Tajiks. Only 14 per cent of 
the Kyrgyz public are opposed to ECU membership, a sentiment shared by just 3 
per cent of Tajiks. In Uzbekistan, public support for joining the ECU is even 
higher with 77 per cent claiming they wish to see their country do so; only 5 per 
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cent of the public are opposed. The Turkmen public are the least excited about the 
ECU, though as many as 50 per cent are in favour of joining the ECU, whilst 28 
per cent are opposed (EDB, 2013: 13). In Kazakhstan public opinion appear to be 
slowly shifting against ECU membership since the Union’s formation. 73 per cent 
of the public were in 2013 positively disposed towards the ECU, representing a 
reduction by 7 percentage points since 2012. Similarly the share of the public 
negatively minded towards ECU membership has grown 2 percentage points to 6 
per cent, while 15 per cent are indifferent (up from 10 per cent) (Ibid: 12).  
The shares of the Central Asian publics which believe that greater convergence 
within the post-Soviet space will actually occur are, however, significantly small-
er. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 50-51 per cent of the publics believe 
that economic convergence between FSU republics is likely, while 30 per cent, 28 
per cent and 23 per cent, respectively, believe divergence is more likely (Ibid: 20). 
In Uzbekistan, the confidence in convergence is significantly higher at 60 per cent 
of the public, while only 14 per cent expect divergence (Ibid). The Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks have from 2012 to 2013 grown more confident in convergence, while the 
opposite trend is discernible in the cases of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan (Ibid). In 
Turkmenistan, 41 per cent believe convergence to be most likely, 21 per cent that 
the FSU economies will move away from each other (Ibid).  
The public support for Eurasian integration may reflect a positive view of eco-
nomic links with CIS countries. Across the region, there is a high preference for 
goods from CIS countries (from 59 per cent in Kazakhstan to 67 per cent in 
Turkmenistan). This, however, is questioned by anecdotal evidence, such as com-
plaints that Russian and Kazakh goods are poor value, relative to cheap Chinese 
consumer goods (i/w BP). Others, though, maintain that Russian and Kazakh 
goods are of a higher quality (i/w NN). 
The preference for Eurasian integration may also reflect the widespread consump-
tion of Russian news, which may arguably bias the public in favour of pro-
Russian policies, including Eurasian integration (Rickleton, 2014b). This may also 
go some way toward explaining why Turkmens are relatively less favourable to-
wards Eurasian integration, as many satellite dishes there are tuned into Turkish 
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channels. Nevertheless, caution may be warranted in relying on the evidence pro-
vided by the EDB surveys. The EDB was founded by the Russian and Kazakh 
governments, and has as its specific purpose to support Eurasian regional econom-
ic integration. Consequently, the EDB itself has an interest in presenting evidence 
in pro-Eurasian integration sentiments. 
There is little consensus on the likely impact of joining the ECU for the Kyrgyz 
consumer. While some suggest that tariff increases to the ECU level will result in 
up to five-fold price increases (i/w GO; NN), others point to the fact that food-
stuffs already are imported primarily from Russia and Kazakhstan, and that the 
inflationary impact of joining the ECU will therefore mainly be on luxury goods 
from the West (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF)). With rural people being accustomed to 
sustaining themselves through subsistence farming, they are likely to more easily 
adjust to the changes that ECU membership might bring, whereas the urban pro-
fessionals in particular may find it difficult to adapt to the cost of living changes 
potentially brought by ECU membership (i/w IA).  
In Uzbekistan, people face the same living standards as they did at independence, 
having enough to eat but lacking drinking water and electricity. Thus the public, it 
is suggested, know that the country is not developing well (i/w WD). While ener-
gy supply constraints are problematic for businesses, they also seriously affect 
daily lives. Trees lining the streets of Tashkent are missing branches, because 
people cut them down to use as firewood, while diesel cars are being converted to 
run on gas (Ibid; Yusupov, 2013). Inflation in the country is high, one interlocutor 
suggested that inflation over the 20 year period since independence has amounted 
to 1,000 per cent (i/w NN) with annual rates estimated to be around 20 per cent in 
recent years (i/w WD). Public sector pay and pensions are raised twice a year, 
officially with a view to raising living standards but it is claimed that the increases 
in practice merely compensate for corresponding increases in gas and electricity 
prices. The overall effect is to boost inflation, as market prices go up in response 
to the wage increases (i/w NN). Thus, whereas, at independence, Uzbeks had eu-
phoric dreams of a better life ahead, they are said today to be dreaming of Soviet 
times as there is no social protection, employment levels are lower and inequality 
high (i/w DI; Paramonov (#96/AC)). Despite the pressure on living standards, 
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there is a demand for higher quality products, including Russian foodstuffs, which 
the presence of Russian companies in the country is testament to (i/w NN). One 
interlocutor explained the popular support for economic integration with the ECU 
with reference to expectations that prices would fall and travel would become 
easier with an integrated market (i/w NN).  
The current developments in Ukraine could, however, change the pro-Eurasian 
sentiment across the region. While the dominance of Russian media in Central 
Asia may limit the extent to which the publics take a negative view on Russia’s 
role in the crisis, there are signs of opposition to Russian actions. For instance in 
Astana, the Kazakh authorities ended a demonstration against Russia in front of 
the Russian embassy (Bohr, 2014), and activists have launched an anti-Eurasian 
Union movement (Ibid; Altynov, 2014a). Meanwhile Farkhod Tolipov suggests 
that sentiment expressed on social media in Uzbekistan is anti-Russian (Central 
Asia Program, 2014: 5). Nate Schenkan (2014) has noted how Putin’s remarks on 
the relative novelty of Kazakh statehood at an August 2014 live Q&A session 
were phrased in ethnic tones, which is likely to further inflame Kazakh national-
ism and anti-Eurasianism.  
With diaspora communities dotted around the region, regional integration may be 
considered particularly beneficial to ethnic minorities. As already described 
above, the kinship ties across borders are currently a means to facilitating cross-
border trade in face of restrictive border regimes but many suffer from the treat-
ment of border guards. Ethnic communities are in some cases subject to distrust 
and discrimination, which may ultimately lead to clashes, as seen in southern 
Kyrgyzstan in 2010. Ethnic minorities do not have effective means of representing 
their interests. While authorities in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and Khorog, Tajikistan coop-
erate, including on conditions for their respective minorities, not all such relations 
are said to be functional. For instance, relations are tense between authorities in 
Osh and Sughd oblast in Tajikistan given the local territorial disputes (i/w 
Boymamat (#54/BA)), as has most recently been borne out in the summer of 2014 
(Yuldoshev, 2014). Similarly the Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan have a strong 
dislike of the Uzbek government and its policies, a dislike which is said to be mu-
tual (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE)).  
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Labour migrants form another significant constituency in many Central Asian 
countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in particular. This may be an-
other reason, why popular support for Eurasian integration is high, with most mi-
grant labourers seeking out the Russian and, secondarily, the Kazakh labour mar-
kets (i/w NN). Trade unions are generally weak in Central Asia (Ergashev, 2011). 
It has been suggested that unions are relatively strong within some sectors in Ka-
zakhstan, such as the oil industry as was illustrated by strikes in Mangistau 
(Khamidov, 2011; i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)). Disputes of concern to them include 
the use of Chinese migrant workers by Chinese companies, and the resolution of 
such conflicts by the payment of bribes to the Kazakh regulator (i/w Madumarov 
(#2/AC)), as well as pension reform and cheap illegal labourers (Ergashev, 2011). 
However, recent legislation in Kazakhstan has restricted the freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining rights of trade unions (Ekzarkhova, 2014).  
While several groups have interests related to integration, including migrants, 
diaspora communities, and consumers, these are large groups, generally not or-
ganised, thus having significant participation costs relative to the widely dispersed 
benefits that would accrue to such groups. 
4.1.5 The foreign investor43 
Foreign investors may also be argued to have an interest in Central Asian market 
integration. Market sectors such as tourism, manufacturing and agriculture could 
have potentially significant rate of returns for investors in a regional market-
scenario (CASE-Kyrgyzstan, 2005: 47).  
Regional market 
Foreign investors do not necessarily look to Central Asia as a regional market, 
though many recognise the similarities in taste and culture, and some, notably 
East Asians, describe Central Asia as a regional market (i/w AD; NN). One dip-
lomat for instance likens Central Asia, and Russia, to one big swimming pool fea-
                                                 
43
 This section relies on interviews with foreign businesspeople from Asia and the West as well as 
representatives of business associations representing both foreign and domestic companies and 
diplomats from a wide spectrum of countries. 
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turing arbitrary borders across which the water and the fish are the same, from 
time to time floating from one side to the other, with connections intact from be-
fore the borders were erected (i/w DI). Many foreign businesses are said to oper-
ate a regional headquarter in Kazakhstan and have sales operations across Central 
Asia, in some cases operating at a loss currently but positioning themselves for the 
future (i/w Khakimzhanov (#6/BP); WD; BA).  
The businesses are keen to do business in the region but find that governments 
make it difficult. The issues holding foreign investors off, however, are related 
more to the individual domestic business environments rather than cross-border 
issues or market segmentation (i/w BA). As implied by the swimming pool-
metaphor for many foreign investors the interest in Central Asia may start from 
Moscow, though headquartering in Moscow may also be a means of avoiding be-
coming embroiled in regional rivalries within Central Asia (i/w Yuzo (#15/AD); 
BP; FB; 2xW; NN). Some conversely see Kazakhstan as an entry point to the 
Russian market with the latter being difficult to operate in because inefficient pro-
ducers are heavily subsidised (i/w Yuzo (#15/AD); BP; WD). 
The ECU is not seen to have (yet) had a significant impact on the practices of for-
eign investors in the region. One businessman indicated that this was largely be-
cause technical regulation was yet to be harmonised; something that would how-
ever expectedly have a significant and positive impact on the business (i/w FB).   
Interests and concerns 
While it is recognised that economic integration, such as through the ECU, can 
ease market access across the region, integration or the concept of a regional mar-
ket in terms of similar taste, is not the key to whether foreign businesses will en-
gage in Central Asia. The consumption level, in other words, the size of the mar-
ket is essential (i/w FB). There is wide agreement that Kazakhstan is the more 
attractive market in the region; one diplomat suggesting that the interest in the 
Kazakh market is four to five times higher than in other Central Asian markets put 
together (i/w WS; WD). As one Western diplomat suggested, while it may not be 
the primary export market for Western countries it is seen to offer good opportu-
nities, despite difficult operating conditions (i/w WD). 
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The attractiveness of Kazakhstan stems first and foremost from its significant sub-
soil resources but also the relatively high degree of political stability and the back-
ing up of political intentions with government investment as well as the potential 
for Kazakhstan to become a transit hub between Europe and Asia (i/w Madu-
marov (#2/AC); WS). The preference for Kazakhstan does not merely reflect good 
business opportunities but also the heterogeneity of the region, including relative-
ly better circumstances for doing business in Kazakhstan as well as higher pur-
chasing power (i/w WD). In Uzbekistan, the currency regime is a particular deter-
rent, while in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the markets are small and the geography 
difficult leading to high transaction and transportation costs (i/w 2xWD; TT; Ma-
dumarov (#2/AC)). In other words, with Kazakhstan being attractive enough in 
itself, there is no need for foreign investors to look south, and the best Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan can hope for, seemingly, is a spill-over effect (i/w FB; 2xWD). 
This does, however, not signal a complete lack of interest in other Central Asian 
markets. Uzbekistan is considered to have great potential, though currently a 
small market owing to limited purchasing power of the large population, and in-
terest in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan is growing (i/w Shamiev 
(#71/LE); Agan (#80/DI), AD; DI; 4xWD; BA; NN).  
Despite the widely recognised potential of Uzbekistan, companies, which estab-
lished themselves in the country in the 1990s, waiting for the business climate to 
improve, while bleeding money, have now started to leave. Examples include 
PETRONAS and KNOC which withdrew from Uzbekistan in 2013. While the 
official reason  -concern about the actual level of gas reserves-  surely has played 
a role, political risk is suspected to be the main reason; as one interlocutor noted: 
‘they are tired of all the crap’ (i/w WD; BA).44 The departure of these companies 
leaves the Uzbek natural reserve industry open for Russia and China to increase 
their positions through LUKOIL, CNPC and Gazprom (Kim, 2014). Meanwhile, 
in Kyrgyzstan, political instability including frequent changes in government in 
recent years has deterred investment (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE); Tungatarov 
                                                 
44
 Tethys also withdrew from Uzbekistan early 2014 out of concerns for the business environment 
after the Uzbek government opened a criminal case against the company in November 2013 (Kim, 
2014). 
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(#66/BA)). As one diplomat suggests, the yardstick in Kyrgyzstan is different to 
what is familiar among many foreign businessmen: in Bishkek, if only a handful 
of people enter the White House, you have a revolution, whereas in other coun-
tries thousands can demonstrate, and they merely reflect a healthy civil society 
(i/w Agan (#80/DI)). Regardless of where in the country volatile events occur, 
they affect the overall image of the country negatively in the eyes of investors (i/w 
IA; GO). More specifically the enmity of the Kyrgyz public towards foreign in-
vestment, along with a reputation for hot tempers, is holding investors back (i/w 
IA; AC; Zhunushov (#68/IF)). One 2013 local investment fair saw no foreign in-
vestors attend, though it did enjoy foreign diplomatic attendance (i/w IA). As a 
local academic explains, while Western investors officially demand democratic 
practices from countries, they invest in, in reality, they are seeking stability and 
thus often invest in countries with ‘predictable dictators’ (i/w TT).  
In Tajikistan the civil war had a significant impact on the country’s investment 
climate (i/w AC). Today, the investment climate continues to suffer, partly from 
proximity to Afghanistan  -as one civil servant noted, investors fear that the Tajik 
government cannot keep investments safe from terror and instability (i/w Soliev 
(#31/GO))-  but also from the arbitrariness or predation of executive powers, such 
as the arrest of the businessman Saidov in winter 2013 (i/w WD). 
Many of the concerns facing domestic businesses are problematic also to foreign 
companies and investors in Central Asia, including small markets, skills shortag-
es, inadequate infrastructure and energy shortages, corruption, the shortcomings 
of judicial systems, inconsistent and intransparent legislation, and restrictions on 
foreign exchange (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE); TT; DI; NN). Nevertheless, foreign 
investors also face a set of specific challenges. Local content regulation and ob-
taining work permits is a key concern (i/w WS; Lermusiaux (#4/FB); Shamiev 
(#71/LE)).
45
 These issues may be most pertinent in the initial phases of foreign 
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 In Kazakhstan, for instance, 90 per cent of employees must be Kazakhstani citizens, though at 
management level the required ratio is lower at 70 per cent; the proportion of goods and services to 
be sourced from Kazakhstan is said to increase from 50 per cent to 85 per cent by 2020 (US EIA, 
2013: 4). The establishment of the CES with Russia, however, means that foreign companies can 
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business engagement, when expertise is needed but local staff not yet trained (i/w 
Yuzo (#15/AD)). Some authorities are said to simply not appreciate the value of 
foreign employees, deliberately imposing obstacles to businesses obtaining visas 
and work permits (i/w WD; Lermusiaux (#4/FB)). Furthermore, local content reg-
ulation is specific to each of the Central Asian republics creating a distinct level of 
market segmentation in the region (i/w BP). 
While many sectors offer opportunities across the region, and some companies, as 
described, do see Central Asia as a regional market, national governments are said 
to exert pressure on companies to establish registered offices in their jurisdictions 
(i/w WD). Furthermore, operating in Central Asia as a foreign investor typically 
necessitates having a local partner, which can be time-consuming to find (i/w WS; 
NN; BA; 3xDI). This may be a formal or informal requirement. In Turkmenistan, 
for instance, foreign investors must enter a partnership with a local company, and 
within strategic sectors such as oil, gas and construction have contacts in govern-
ment (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF); WD). In other cases, it may not be a requirement as 
such but a necessity to make operations run or to simply get started (US Commer-
cial Services, 2012: 3, 11). In a 2006 survey of foreign investors in Tajikistan, 
around 90 per cent suggested that they refrained from making investments if they 
did not have a formal agreement with a local business partner (i/w AC). Similarly 
in Kazakhstan, high-level relationships facilitate investments in strategic sectors 
and may involve a certain degree of quid pro quo. For example, companies keen 
to engage in the extraction of one particular mineral, may see themselves invest-
ing in the extraction of other types of mineral or other productive activities, which 
the Kazakh government are keen to see developed or attaining the technology and 
training of local staff for (i/w WD). 
A major concern for foreign investors in Central Asia is the security of their in-
vestments and the lack of property protection (i/w WD; DI; AD; Agan (#80/DI)), 
including creeping appropriations such as attempts by governments to raise the 
                                                                                                                                     
now source employees and supplies from Russia and Belarus. It has been suggested that increasing 
numbers of investors make use of this opportunity (Wiśniewska, 2013: 16). 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
236 
 
national stake in agreements on natural resource extraction (i/w Shamiev 
(#71/LE)). In Uzbekistan, the risk of arbitrary interference by authorities and 
racketeering is seen as being particularly high (i/w BA, Khakimzhanov (#6/BP)); 
and while political connections are necessary to operate a business, it is not guar-
anteed to keep your investment safe (i/w BA). As with domestic businesses, for-
eign businesses struggle to make profitable business if operating fully legally, and 
face the same difficulties in doing so arising from contradictory regulations (i/w 
NN). Some of the high-profile cases in Uzbekistan, such as the closures of the 
Turkish shopping centre Demir and the Turkuaz trade centre in 2011 and the ex-
propriation of MTS in 2013, are said to have been conducted fully legally, the 
authorities taking the companies to court exploiting infringement of legislation 
(Ibid). Meanwhile, MTS provides a similar tale of corporate harassment in Turk-
menistan, where authorities after sustained pressure on the company eventually 
withdrew the company’s licence and declined a review of the company’s compen-
sation claim (Crude Accountability, 2011).  
Authorities across the region are prone to resort to unilateral regulations and re-
quirements, which can change at any time, or simply not abide by commitments 
made to large investors (i/w AD; DI; Khakimzhanov (#6/BP); WD). One compa-
ny was for instance said to have reached agreement with Uzbek authorities on 
selling a modern, efficient consumer product and given reassurances of achieving 
certification. It later transpired that legislation only allows the sale of Russian 
units. While the company keeps receiving reassurances, nothing happens and their 
investment is locked in storage (i/w WD). In both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 
there is particular concern about the lack of recourse to international regulation 
and arbitration (i/w AD; DI; WD; NN). Even if access to international arbitration 
is specified in a contract, it may not be possible for the company to achieve re-
dress from the government (i/w WD). This reluctance towards international arbi-
tration is by some explained as an attempt to protect the country’s image by pre-
ferring informal solutions to problems (i/w DI). Informal solutions may often re-
quire bribes. For instance, it is speculated that MTS was allowed back into Uzbek-
istan by passing shares to the president (i/w WD). Perceived high levels of corrup-
tion also deter foreign investors. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the climate is said to 
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have improved since the change of government regime in 2010 but the high levels 
of corruption and corporate raiding during the Bakiyev era continue to deter in-
vestors (i/w Zhunushov (#68/IF)). 
Sub-national variation in implementation is another issue for foreign businesses. 
This is said, in part, to reflect whether an akimat (district government) is invest-
ment-oriented or not (i/w WD), for instance some akimats do not value foreign 
employees and impede businesses obtaining visas and work permits (i/w WD). 
While requirements recently were relaxed on foreign representative offices, the 
regulation has been arbitrarily enforced, and visa regulations simultaneously 
tightened creating further barriers (i/w BA). 
The prevalence of informal solutions and corruption in the region means that it is 
easier for smaller businesses, which face less public scrutiny, and non-Western 
companies, particularly Chinese and Turkish, to navigate the Central Asian mar-
kets (i/w FB; BA). For instance, in cases where the local skills base is insufficient, 
solutions are reduced to a company’s willingness to bribe authorities to ignore 
local content regulation (i/w BA; NN). Western companies are deterred in their 
ability to please the powers that be by anti-bribery acts in their home jurisdiction 
(i/w 2xWD). Moreover, it is claimed that Western businesses are often impeded 
by a lack of appreciation of the norms underpinning the local business environ-
ment, and thus struggle to adapt to it (i/w DI). Larger American, Chinese and 
Russian companies may benefit from the backing of their governments (i/w Kha-
kimzhanov (#6/BP)). Only large foreign companies, who can count on their gov-
ernment’s support stay in Uzbekistan; SMEs stay small or sell up and go (i/w DI). 
The currency restrictions pose particular difficulties for SMEs in Uzbekistan (i/w 
NN). 
Representation 
Foreign businesses and investors are organised through international business or-
ganisations, such as Eurochamber and AmCham, judged to be of varied useful-
ness, some merely offering networking opportunities (i/w BP). In Turkmenistan 
such foreign NGOs are not allowed (i/w DI). Larger companies often engage with 
Central Asian governments directly, finding this to be the more affective approach 
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(i/w BP; DI). Some foreign governments represent the interests of their businesses 
on an ad hoc basis or through intergovernmental commissions, while others en-
gage on behalf of individual companies as and when needed (i/w 2xWD; DI; NN). 
Other countries maintain bilateral business councils, which advise the govern-
ments and make recommendations on behalf of constituent members (i/w NN). 
*** 
There is no consensus among foreign investors as to whether Central Asia consti-
tutes a current or potential regional market, though there are companies who are 
interested in operating in all countries but generally find obstacles to doing so. 
Nevertheless, preoccupation is with improvement of domestic business environ-
ment, and foreign investors do not constitute a force for demand for integration. 
4.1.6 Lobbying for trade facilitation or integration 
While business communities are mostly concerned with domestic business envi-
ronments, trade has risen on the agenda in recent years (i/w Tungatarov 
(#66/BA)). Trade facilitation and integration initiatives are fundamentally wel-
come by business communities and some business associations do claim to priori-
tise this highly in their lobbying efforts (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA); Baimambeto-
va (#81/BA); BA; AC; Madumarov (#2/AC)). Meanwhile, in what may appear a 
thinly veiled criticism of the Eurasian integration projects, the business communi-
ty cautions against engaging in integration schemes under any conditions, particu-
larly conditions dictated by others but also whether Central Asian integration is 
feasible with markets being relatively small (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA); 
Boymamat (#54/BA)). Arguably Central Asia is by many still seen to be an eco-
nomic region, but the countries are not making the most of this fact through cur-
rent policies (i/w Madumarov(#2/AC)). Businesses are most keen on improving 
conditions for both trade and investment with their immediate neighbours (i/w 
Baimambetova (#81/BA); BA). This is particularly the case for small businesses 
(i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)).  
Interlocutors highlighted the following sectors as having good potential for re-
gional trade and potentially development of regional value chains: energy, tex-
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tiles, agriculture, light industry and services (i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA); Baimam-
betova (#81/BA); BA). Additionally, there is demand for better integration of la-
bour markets. The agricultural sector in the south of Kazakhstan, as well as the 
construction industry, seeks Uzbek and Kyrgyz labourers, who are considered 
more productive. Without an active lobby promoting an open labour market, the 
Kazakh government has, however, tightened legislation (i/w BA; Askarov 
(#27/JO)). 
With administrative procedures in the domestic context being one of the most 
significant barriers to exports (i/w BA; EN; LE), business associations appear 
predominantly concerned with addressing these, rather than aiming at harmonisa-
tion or integration. The costs of export, including customs procedures and transit, 
may treble the cost of a product, possibly rendering the product too highly priced 
for exports to be viable (i/w EN). This is partly an issue of scale. For instance, 
shipping costs per unit are relatively higher for smaller shipments (Ibid). Produc-
tion at scale is a particular problem in agriculture (i/w Altaev (#17/GO)), while 
achieving international standards and certification affects a wider range of sectors 
(i/w WD; Zhunushov (#68/IF); NN). These issues both lead to foreign products 
being more competitive internationally (i/w LE, Zhunushov (#68/IF)).  
The business association most actively engaged in trade integration is Atameken 
in Kazakhstan. The association has as one of its main priorities to promote Eura-
sian integration, and has representation at the Eurasian Commission (i/w BA). 
Among priorities for Atameken at the ECU level are to ensure representation on 
all expert committees of the Commission, and to establish a structure for Union-
wide business representation (Ibid). Nevertheless, there are question marks raised 
over effective business interest representation in both Belarus and Russia (Ibid) 
with the latter said to be dominated by vested interests propping up NTBs on Ka-
zakh imports (i/w BP). 
The majority of Kazakh businesses are suggested to be mostly negatively minded 
towards the ECU (i/w 2xBA). Though there are supportive voices (i/w BP), it is 
doubtful that Kazakh entry into the ECU reflects a response to demand on part of 
the business community, which rather is voicing domestic concerns and, since the 
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ECU formation, complaints surrounding its operations. In Kyrgyzstan business 
associations are demanding greater clarity about the impact of joining the ECU, 
including by sector (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA)). As in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
business community appears, at best, to be sceptical. One business association 
representative points to the difficulty in integrating, when the economies operate 
on different conditions  -some being WTO members and others not-  and notes 
that most people fear the prospect with Kazakh entrepreneurs advising their Kyr-
gyz colleagues against joining (Ibid). One study has pointed to overall negative 
effects of joining the union, though in the end it will depend on the conditions of 
entry and the ability of businesses to adapt to ECU standards (i/w Zhunushov 
(#68/IF)). In Tajikistan, scepticism towards the ECU is also marked, including 
among the business community (i/w Kadamshoev (#51/GO); Boymamat 
(#54/BA)). Particularly in the GBAO region, where the ECU is described as re-
mote, and the prospect of Tajikistan joining unrealistic (i/w Kadamshoev 
(#51/GO)). 
One mode of operation for some business associations is regional networks. One 
regional network of associations conducted a joint assessment of obstacles to re-
gional, cross-border trade and produced a set of recommendations for the Central 
Asian governments (i/w BA). Other such networks stay clear of trade facilitation 
issues, which they consider to be of a political nature (i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA)). 
Overall, while businesses are indeed keen to improve conditions for regional 
trade, to the extent that business associations focus on lobbying for trade facilita-
tion this is largely aimed at reducing barriers in the domestic context, such as re-
ducing necessary export documentation. 
4.1.7 Effectiveness of business lobbying 
Lack of transparent governance in Central Asia makes it difficult to clearly ascer-
tain the extent to which the lobbying efforts of the business community and others 
pay off (i/w NN; AC). The private sector’s gross capital formation as a share of 
GDP may be used as an indicator of the strength of the private sector in an econ-
omy (Stevenson, 2010: 117). As table 4.1 suggests, on this measure, the private 
sector in most CARs does not diverge significantly from other low and middle 
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income countries; though it appears to be in decline across the region and is par-
ticularly weak in the case of Tajikistan. This may indicate a lesser role and impact 
on policy making. One interlocutor suggested that while the government will nev-
er say no, few suggestions made to it are accepted as the government simply does 
as it pleases (i/w IA). 
 
Table 4.1 – Gross fixed capital formation, private sector, per cent (World Bank, 2013)  
On the other hand, a government official claimed that officials often find them-
selves in agreement with the demands of businesses (i/w GO). Similarly, to para-
phrase a business association representative, it was suggested that ‘more may sink 
in, than what one thinks’ (i/w BA). The governments of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan appear willing to listen and stakeholders find that governments 
generally are appreciative of their concerns (The Business Year, 2012; i/w GO; 
Ahmetova (#70/GO); WD; BA). At higher levels, authorities are judged to be re-
ceptive of suggested changes (i/w BA). While such receptiveness may also in-
creasingly be the case at lower levels of government, the business community 
regularly complain that appreciation of their concerns is less common among au-
thorities at lower levels, including provincial authorities, leading to implementa-
tion issues (i/w BA; WD). In Tajikistan, where the international donor community 
is present, business associations may address this by monitoring the activities of 
the mid-level bureaucracy and send letters to both government and donor organi-
sations, when experiencing implementation issues. When donors raise the issues 
with governments, this can be an effective approach (i/w BA). Such need for ex-
ternal support for the business community’s dealings with government reinforces 
the notion of a particularly weak business community in the case of Tajikistan. 
In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, there is little if any feedback from society to 
government (i/w AC; LE). As noted by Martin Spechler in the case of Uzbekistan: 
‘Corruption and state capture prevent … cooperation between business and gov-
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Kazakhstan 21.9 20.7 18.8 20.7 23.4 25.7 24.4 21.1 22.3 19.3 16.1
Kyrgyz Republic 11.7 10.5 9.0 9.9 9.6 18.5 20.3 22.3 23.5 21.1 18.5
Tajikistan 4.0 0.9 1.5 2.3 6.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 4.0 7.0 7.0
Turkmenistan 22.7 19.3 5.1 7.0 24.1 18.1 15.5
Uzbekistan 20.3 15.3 16.5 18.9 18.7 15.4 17.7 17.2 23.0 22.6 20.2
Lower middle income 16.1 15.4 15.9 18.1 18.9 19.6 20.8 20.3 18.9 19.5 19.4
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ernment’ (Spechler, 2008: 34). With the private sector largely dependent on pub-
lic sector support for its operations, businesses generally cannot lobby govern-
ment independently (i/w AC), and there is no public debate about economic poli-
cy (i/w AD). The government in neither country is ready to be challenged (i/w 
LE; DI).  
The methods with which the business community in other CARs engage with 
government vary across the region, though there are also similarities. In both Kyr-
gyzstan and Kazakhstan legislation which impacts on business must undergo a 
consultation process with registered business associations (i/w Zhunushov 
(#68/IF); GO); while such privileged access to policy making is said to be more 
exclusive in Tajikistan (i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA)), again supporting the notion of 
a relatively weak private sector. Another recurrent method of interaction is institu-
tionalised meetings between high-level government officials and business associa-
tions. Atameken, for instance, meets with the president and other high-ranking 
officials on an annual basis (i/w BA), while a Business and Investment Council 
act as a quarterly platform for dialogue between government and business in Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF)).
46
 Such channels are also created 
on ad hoc basis, for instance in relation to the 2050 strategy for Kazakhstan’s de-
velopment (i/w GO) or in the form of the Kyrgyz National Council for Sustaina-
ble Development, which supports the work of the National Strategy for Sustaina-
ble Economic Development (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA), Ahmetova (#70/GO)). In 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan business associations also seek to lobby 
parliamentary deputies directly as well as public opinion more widely through 
social and mass media (i/w NN; Shamiev (#71/LE); BA, Kislyakova (#44/BA)).  
Despite the lack of public debate in Uzbekistan, there may be some degree of in-
put to economic policy making from certain parts of society. On the one hand, 
nominally arms-length bodies such as the Centre for Economic Research and the 
Chambers of Commerce may facilitate external input to policy making through 
their research. Secondly, there may be feedback from society to government 
                                                 
46
 The secretariats for these Councils are funded by the EBRD. 
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through personal connections (i/w BA). Moreover, in at least one sector of the 
economy, the government has an institutionalised platform for dialogue with the 
private sector. Tourism operators meet annually with government and raise their 
concerns regarding the tourism industry; and there are clear indications that the 
government acknowledge the importance of the concerns raised. For instance, 
operators have previously complained about the travel time and road conditions 
for accessing Khiva, to which the government responded by introducing plane and 
train links in the tourist season. This likely reflects an acknowledgement on part 
of the government that the tourism industry brings jobs and income to the country 
(i/w Bendsen (#97/IA)). Also at the local level, there may be isolated cases of 
interaction between industry and government. In Khorezm, a donor-led tourism 
development project channels the concerns of local businesses to the Director of 
Tourism, and the project administrators have offered recommendations on the 
local tourism strategy. It is unclear, however, to what extent such inputs affect 
policy making (Ibid). 
In Turkmenistan, the establishment of the SPPT is considered progressive and 
revolutionary in the domestic context as a signal that the private sector must be 
accommodated (i/w LE). Nevertheless, the SPPT is said to function like a ministry 
with right of initiative for legislation and the Chairman attending the Cabinet of 
Ministers. The SPPT is considered responsible for implementing the govern-
ment’s stated aim of increasing the private sector’s share in the non-oil and gas 
share of the economy (i/w LE; Drakinos (#99/IF); IF; NN). Nevertheless, the 
Chairman, personally, and the SPPT more widely, are well-respected for their 
efforts to promote the private sector (i/w LE; NN). 
Kyrgyzstan represents the other end of the spectrum, where business associations 
generally are considered to have a real, effective impact on policy making (i/w 
AC, Tungatarov (#66/BA); Nurlanbek (#63/IF); Zhunushov (#68/IF)). Results of 
their lobbying efforts are said to include a single window for customs procedures, 
a new law on subsoil and amendments to the tax code as well as reductions to red 
tape generally (i/w Uskenbaeva (#83/BA); Tungatarov (#66/BA); BA). It has also 
been suggested that the opposition of civil society groups, including re-export 
traders, to Eurasian integration has prompted a delay of Kyrgyz Customs Union 
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entry (Marat, 2014). Particularly the IBC, which has both Kyrgyz and foreign 
businesses as members, is seen to be highly influential (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE)) 
with ministers publicly acknowledging the views of the IBC and high-level offi-
cials proactively engaging the IBC to learn of their views (i/w Tungatarov 
(#66/BA)). The Business and Investment Council, which in Kyrgyzstan is headed 
by the Prime Minister is also judged to be an effective platform for dialogue be-
tween the public and private sectors. Recommendations made by businesses in 
this forum are generally well-accepted (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF); Tungatarov 
(#66/BA); BA). A foreign businessman, nevertheless, cautions that while the gov-
ernment is always willing to listen, and sometimes takes advice on board, only 
recently has there been real debate about policy making, and that often, the gov-
ernment is more focused on sounding out support for its own policies than accept 
external suggestions (i/w Claytor (#74/FB)). 
The corresponding Investment Council in Tajikistan is also judged to be effective 
(i/w BA). Business associations more widely consider themselves to be effective; 
as do their counterparts in government, influencing for instance the establishment 
of free economic zones and the creation of a one-stop-window for customs proce-
dures (i/w BA; GO). Nevertheless, associations also feel that the government does 
not easily accept their recommendations but require direct evidence from busi-
nesses. For instance one association had to establish its credibility on an issue by 
firstly letting businesses en masse directly present their concerns to authorities 
(i/w BA), another that the state tax committee initially rejected their recommenda-
tions, only to reconsider them subsequently (i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA)). On the 
other hand, smaller businesses may often work around business associations. For 
instance, it was suggested that three to five businesses would visit the head of a 
hukumat (provincial authority) department daily with their concerns because local 
business associations largely are ineffective (i/w NN). Similarly, large companies 
across the region often engage directly with government, not through their busi-
ness associations (i/w NN). One businessperson suggested that this can be more 
effective, though recognising that governments usually respect associations (i/w 
FB).  
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In Kazakhstan the interaction between the business community and government is 
led by Atameken, which can be said to function as an umbrella organisation con-
federating different interests (i/w GO; BA). While Atameken may not be seen as 
fully independent, it does get credit for lobbying on behalf of business, for in-
stance on the tax system and advocating a simplification of licensing (i/w Madu-
marov (#2/AC); Khakimzhanov (#6/BP); BA). Other associations are pessimistic 
as regards the government’s responsiveness to their concerns (i/w 2xBA). At high 
levels, the Kazakh government is perceived to be highly receptive to issues being 
raised, though the receptiveness is not necessarily translated to lower levels of 
government where business-government interactions typically occur (i/w Yuzo 
(#15/AD)). Government-business relations in Kazakhstan have been criticised 
particularly in relation to negotiations surrounding Kazakh entry to the ECU. For 
instance, it has been suggested that associations were not given opportunity to 
participate in the drafting of agreements, and consequently the integration scheme 
is seen as imposed upon business (Rakhmatulina, 2011). 
A series of factors are seen to counteract lobbying efforts across the region. Gen-
eral conditions such as freedom of speech and an independent media through 
which to voice concerns are not fully present in all countries. While Kazakhstan, 
for instance, is perceived to have freedom of speech, this is considered to have its 
limits. To paraphrase a business association representative: ‘if the authorities wish 
to imprison you, they will always find a reason for it’ (i/w BA). Moreover, media 
freedom in Kazakhstan is perceived to be under pressure (Birjanova, 2013; 
Baituova, 2014). In Tajikistan, the political opposition has come under increasing 
pressure also, possibly directly related to the presidential election in November 
2013, and the parliamentary election due February 2015 (Pannier, 2014b). Addi-
tionally there may be cultural factors inhibiting open criticism and public debate. 
Akiner has, for instance, suggested that ‘the very idea of criticising and openly 
challenging established authority is [considered] deeply distasteful’ (Akiner, 
1994: 18). While such barriers may change over time, it is likely to require a gen-
erational shift.  
Skills and capacity affect not only businesses directly but also business associa-
tions (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA)). This is an issue of being spread thin across 
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working group attendance, participating in many consultations simultaneously 
combined with a low supply of qualified staff (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA); BA). 
More specifically, vested interests and corruption obstruct the impact of civil so-
ciety interest representation by manipulating or limiting discussions of issues or 
through stalling implementation (i/w Zhunushov (#68/IF); Bethom (#37/IA)).  
The position of an association like the IBC stems from the clout of its members, 
who contribute significantly to the Kyrgyz economy through employment and tax 
revenue with big businesses as members; other business associations representing 
the many smaller businesses have less clout (i/w Tungatarov (#66/BA)). This 
means that even with an organised push for a lessening of trade barriers, they do 
not have much bargaining power. A topical example of the lack of bargaining 
power of entrepreneurs was calls for the Uzbek authorities to end the blockade of 
rail traffic to Tajikistan. Several businessmen, including of the Uzbek Society of 
Tajikistan, have urged president Karimov to lift the blockade to no avail 
(RFE/RL, 2012b). The paradox is that the only real bargaining chip they hold  -the 
legalisation of informal trade, which could for instance significantly boost tax 
uptake-  is difficult to wager as it would mean exposing their businesses to the 
authorities’ scrutiny and arbitrary exercise of power. Businesses operating, in part 
or full, in the informal economy reduce the leverage of the business community 
overall but also certain constituencies, such as re-export traders, in particular (i/w 
AC; Baimambetova (#81/BA)). The business communities generally accept that 
they have limited power to push trade facilitation measures. For instance, a busi-
ness association representative, involved in the drafting of recommendations on 
cross-border trade by a group of regional business associations, felt that their rec-
ommendations may have had limited impact, if any, because a fundamental shift 
in attitudes is needed among governments (i/w BA). Another suggested such net-
works do not touch trade integration issues because they are political questions 
(i/w Kislyakova (#44/BA)). 
4.1.8 Summary 
While many groups in society  -from migrants to consumers-  may benefit from 
regional economic integration, businesses are the only stakeholder group suffi-
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ciently organised to potentially lobby for integration policies. There is some de-
mand among regional businesses for better opportunities to trade within Central 
Asia, and at least one regional network of business associations has sought to 
promote measures for improvement. However, the majority of businesses are not 
growth-oriented, either owing to a lack of free market-mentality or attempts to 
circumvent or avoid barriers to business growth, domestically and internationally. 
This is indicative of limits to the demand for market enlargement on part of busi-
nesses, which often stay small or operate informally. Moreover, Central Asian 
societies appear inclined towards stability, and in many cases stakeholders, thus, 
prefer to remain silent, or opt for exit rather than voice.  
The degree of organisation and effectiveness of business associations varies sig-
nificantly across the region. Kyrgyzstan has a number of strong associations that 
operate in a representative manner, reflecting through bottom-up processes the 
interests of their members. Similar associations are developing in Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan; though they appear on the whole to be relatively weaker. Such busi-
ness associations often consider lobbying governments for the protection and 
promotion of rights of their members their primary function; however, their ef-
forts are mostly focused on domestic business environments. In Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan the voice of the private sector is dominated by top-driven, more or 
less state-directed associations, the SPPT and Atameken. Both are to varying de-
grees considered to promote private sector interests despite their links to political 
authorities. Generally the strength of a business association or group of businesses 
reflects their contribution to the national economy. Thus, for instance, the IBC is 
considered powerful in Kyrgyzstan. Even in Uzbekistan it appears that private 
sector interests representing significant contributions to national income, not least 
foreign currency, namely the tourism operators, can influence policy making. On 
the whole, however, the influence on policy making of business associations ap-
pears to be limited. 
The existence of the most vibrant and best organised business community of Cen-
tral Asia in Kyrgyzstan may appear to contrast with the country’s relatively poor 
economic performance. As reflected in the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom 
(referenced inter alia in section 2.1.2), it is today widely believed that prosperity 
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is linked to economic freedom, which might lead one to suspect that the more plu-
ral society would also be the more prosperous. However, a number of intervening 
factors may explain the divergence. For instance, Kyrgyzstan’s lesser economic 
record when comparing with for instance Kazakhstan in part reflects the latter’s 
natural resource endowment. Cultural factors such as a longer history of sedentar-
ism and economic specialisation in Uzbekistan may have fostered stronger tradi-
tions of entrepreneurialism relative to the Kyrgyz experience. Latterly, the con-
flictual political environment in Kyrgyzstan, which has led to two revolutions, 
may have curtailed the country’s growth potential.  
4.2 Supply factors 
Before considering the willingness of each country’s leadership to offer regional 
integration, it is worth dwelling on the commonalities of the five regimes. All five 
Central Asian republics, for instance, are authoritarian states with power vested in 
the presidency, though the style by which the ruling elites exercise power and the 
degree of power diffusion differ (Cummings, 2012: 63-64). While Kyrgyzstan has 
formally introduced parliamentary democracy, and plurality and open debate are 
largely seen to be increasing in the political arena (Chotaev, 2013; Kurmanov and 
Kurmanov, 2013), there are also signs that the president retains wider power than 
what is formally granted the role.
47
  
Sovereignty is a rather new phenomenon for the CARs, suggesting that leaders 
may be inclined towards protecting the relatively new-found independence of 
their states (Akiner, 2001: 200). Indeed, nation- and state-building has in all coun-
tries been characterised by attempts at differentiating oneself from neighbours 
(i/w AD; 2xWD; NN), and cooperation on shared challenges been seen to threaten 
national sovereignty (Cummings, 2012: 158). The leaderships are also compara-
tively inexperienced at international relations, or certainly were upon gaining in-
dependence. Not only were the international relations of the USSR handled from 
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 For instance, the plan for economic development was formulated by the presidential administra-
tion and subsequently discussed by government and parliament, not driven forward by the prime 
minister’s office as constitutionally prescribed (i/w Ahmetova (#70/GO)). 
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Moscow but also inter-republican affairs were dealt with by Moscow and thus not 
in the republican capitals (Akiner, 2001: 188). Leaders, therefore, were unaccus-
tomed to international cooperation, including playing for the long-term gains that 
cooperation can entail (CASE-Kyrgyzstan, 2005: 52-53). Moreover, the republi-
can leaders did not have well-functioning working relationships amongst them-
selves on the eve of independence. The lack of experience in international rela-
tions extends to the bureaucracy, which may not acknowledge the impact certain 
government policies have on bilateral or multilateral relations (Akiner, 2001: 188, 
200; i/w NN). The question is whether 20 years of independence have eased the 
tendency towards guarding sovereignty in absolute terms, and improved the expe-
rience of conducting international relations. 
With their newfound sovereignty, the countries have not only sought to develop 
distinctive national myths but also embarked on different trajectories of economic 
development, which negatively impacts on the prospects of integration in different 
ways (i/w FB; 2xWD; BA; Khusainov (#26/AC)). The divergence in terms of 
macroeconomic structure, for instance, is a significant obstacle to integration be-
cause it increases the costs involved in consensus-building (Libman and Vinoku-
rov, 2012: 125). 
The potential for unleashing entrepreneurship and business growth as well as in-
creasing tax uptake through legalising the shadow economy, is shared by all Cen-
tral Asian governments. With significant cross-border trade occurring informally, 
trade facilitation could play a role in this. It has been argued that vested interest in 
existing trade barriers, are not the only impediment in this regard, but that also 
there is a lack of common understanding of the costs and benefits of regional inte-
gration (Trushin and Trushin, 2005: 358), which the conduct and dissemination of 
cost-benefit analyses could alleviate (i/w Paramonov (#96/AC)). However, the 
Central Asian leaders are also generally perceived as unwilling to take the risks 
entailed in implementing far-reaching changes. The elites keeping presidents in 
power have vested interest in maintaining the status quo, which would only be 
threatened by reforms in the political or economic spheres (Johnson and Auty, 
2006: 121; Rumer, 2000a: 3-4, 18). Likewise, bureaucrats have no clear interest in 
reforms as the trade barriers and extensive procedural regimes in place allow for 
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extensive bribe-taking (Johnson and Auty, 2006: 125). Consequently, it is to be 
expected that the governments of Central Asia are unlikely to provide for trade 
policies that involve economic or political reform – yet, both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan have committed to integrating their economies through the ECU and 
subsequently EaEU. The following sections will consider the political dynamics 
behind the potential for integrationist policies in each of the CARs.  
4.2.1 Kazakhstan 
It has been suggested that President Nazarbayev never believed in the communist 
cause, despite having climbed the Kazakh Communist Party ranks, but to have 
had both clear intentions and strategies for liberalising the Kazakh economy fol-
lowing independence (i/w AC). Indeed, upon independence the Kazakh govern-
ment rapidly defined a market-oriented reform plan (Nazarbayev, 2008: 10-11). 
Moreover, Nazarbayev has consistently expressed his belief that economic growth 
necessitates integration with the global economy. Already in 1994 Nazarbayev 
promoted the idea of Eurasian economic integration (Allison, 2001: 223), while 
also, as noted in chapter 2, in 1994 initiating regional cooperation with Kyrgyz-
stan and Uzbekistan. To some extent, then, Kazakhstan has since the early days of 
independence pursued both Central Asian and Eurasian regionalism.  
In these early years of independence, Kazakhstan experienced negative economic 
growth as shown in table 4.2, which may have been a contributing factor to inte-
grationist policies.  
 
Table 4.2 – Annual GDP growth, 1991-2000, per cent; Kazakhstan (World Bank, 2013) 
Since the early 2000s, Kazakhstan has experienced high levels of economic 
growth, though the global financial crisis had a marked, negative impact in 2008 
and 2009.
48
 Growth is projected to remain high for the foreseeable future, though 
at a more modest 5-6 per cent per annum. Despite the impressive growth rates, the 
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 The following tables for GDP growth in the period 2002-2012 are replicated from chapter 2. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
-11 -5.3 -9.2 -13 -8.2 0.5 1.7 -1.9 2.7 9.8
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Kazakh leadership continues to push for and engage in integration schemes, indi-
cating that economic growth is not a sufficient explanatory variable. Nazarbayev, 
for instance, is said to have pushed for accelerating the formation of the ECU with 
Russia and Belarus (Amirov, 2010: 76), and Prime Minister Masimov to actively 
have promoted Kyrgyz entry (RFE/RL, 2011). The pursuit of integration with 
Russia may be a means of protecting Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, given the signifi-
cant ethnic Russian minority residing along the border with Russia. As Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea suggests, maintaining good relations with Russia may be 
considered a political imperative for Kazakhstan. 
 
Table 4.3 – Annual GDP growth, 2001-2011, per cent; Kazakhstan (World Bank 2013) 
 
Table 4.4 – GDP growth projections, 2012-2019, per cent; Kazakhstan (IMF, 2014) 
While there is a supposed belief on part of the President that Kazakh economic 
development requires integration with larger markets (i/w NN), there is wide 
acknowledgement that the ECU, and subsequent EaEU, is a politically, rather than 
economically driven project (i/w GO; BA; NN). Wiśniewska (2013: 28-29) sug-
gests that Kazakhstan’s motivation for engaging in Eurasian integration is based 
inter alia on the dependence on Russian transit routes, an aim to balance the eco-
nomic influence of Russia and China, along with a wish to gain improved access 
to the Russian market. The political motivations behind the willing supply of inte-
grationist policies on part of the Kazakh government, contrasting with the absence 
of demand from the business community, point to a shortcoming of the theoretical 
framework. Indeed, it appears that demand for integration policies arises from the 
very actor that also supplies such policies, that is, the government. 
President Nazarbayev is believed to be firmly in control of factions within the 
ruling elite, which are said to all favour Nazarbayev’s leadership owing to the 
uncertainty surrounding the outcome of a political transition process (i/w BA; 
Mambetalin (#28/OP)). Through frequent rotations among government posts of a 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
13.5 9.8 9.3 9.6 9.7 10.7 8.9 3.3 1.2 7.3 7.5
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
5.0 6.0 5.7 6.1 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.4
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small ruling elite, Nazarbayev maintains a balance among the elite factions 
(Smagulov, 2013). Moreover, Kazakhstan has sufficient resources for Nazarbayev 
to maintain the loyalty of the elite through patronage and should he need to resort 
to repression, he has demonstrated his ability to co-opt and coerce potential chal-
lengers before they become dangerous (McGlinchley, 2011: 31, 151).  
The political elite is enmeshed in the natural resource industries, and engaged in 
associated rent extraction activity (Gleason, 2003: 57, 153-154). The Kazakh elite 
used the privatisation processes during the 1990s to amass the country’s resources 
for personal benefit and thus have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo 
rather than increasing transparency and competition (Auty, 2006c: 71). Indeed, 
dissatisfaction with the ECU within the ruling elite inter alia relates to fear of 
Russian oligarchs capturing the Kazakh market (i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)). This 
fear may not be unwarranted. Allegedly, Russian interests impact directly on the 
power configurations within the Kazakh ruling elite. For instance Mukhtar 
Dzhakiev, the former head of KazAtomProm, was allegedly neutralised because 
he was acting against Russian interests in the nuclear industry (Ibid). Many in the 
elite are said to be privately arguing that Kazakhstan should not enter the EaEU 
because this will represent only Russian interests, and is perceived to be a means 
for Russia to dominate the Kazakh economy (i/w Khuasinov (#26/AC); Askarov 
(#27/JO); AC; NN, WD; Laruelle, 2012: 9). The elite reportedly worries that this 
eventually will lead to Russian domination also politically (i/w Yuzo (#15/AD)).  
Critics of the ECU see WTO membership as more important for Kazakhstan, rela-
tive to the ECU, and expect membership terms to be contradictory (i/w NN; 
Mambetalin (#28/OP)). The preference for WTO membership may reflect that it is 
seen as a means for Kazakhstan to balance Russian power within the ECU (i/w 
WS; Voloshin, 2014b). Nevertheless, Nazarbayev has succeeded in signing Ka-
zakhstan up to Eurasian integration despite such elite-level resistance, which has 
been reflected in the persistent refusal by Kazakh authorities that the EaEU in-
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volves political integration (i/w Yuzo (#15/AD); WD).
49
 The elite may, however, 
be seen to obstruct the implementation of the ECU and the EaEU, for instance, by 
using government posts to not approve measures (i/w NN). Last year, Nazarbayev 
through Samruk-Kazyna commissioned a research project on the impact of the 
ECU on the Kazakh economy the results of which has not been publicised (i/w 
Khusainov (#26/AC)) but may be seen as an attempt to assuage internal dissent. 
Moreover, the suggestion made by a civil servant that Kazakhstan receives bene-
fits from ECU membership that are not referenced in public (i/w GO), may be 
indicative of rent transferals to acquiesce the elite.  
At the formal institutional level bureaucrats are said to be less prone to rent seek-
ing than the business elite (Auty and de Soysa, 2006(b): 143). This might indicate 
a potential source of support for implementation of regional integration schemes 
against the interests of a status quo-oriented elite. Indeed, it was suggested to me 
that in negotiating the ECU agreement, bureaucrats may have been keen to please 
President Nazarbayev, thus hastily concluding negotiations (i/w Khusainov 
(#26/AC)). Kazakhstan is perceived to have played its cards poorly with a negoti-
ation team, not sufficiently understanding the Kazakh economy and business in-
terests, consequently giving away many Kazakh interests (i/w NN; Khusainov 
(#26/AC); Karibzhanov, 2013). With the ECU resting on political rationales, and 
Russia aggressively pushing through a hurried process, little detailed work was 
done on the economics of the project (i/w Khusainov (#26/AC)); certainly in Ka-
zakhstan, there were no initial attempts to analyse the potential economic effect of 
the ECU (i/w WD; Khusainov (#26/AC); NN). This may reflect the inexperience 
of the Kazakh bureaucracy in handling international relations, as suggested above. 
Indeed, following negotiations on the EaEU, the Kazakh government has been 
keen to promote an image of a successful negotiating team excluding issues such 
as common currency and common border policy from the EaEU treaty (Kasenova, 
2014). 
                                                 
49
 President Nazarbayev has for instance made clear that Kazakhstan is only interested in econom-
ic integration (Forbes, 2013d). 
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Uncertainty surrounding political transition in the country owes itself to the lack 
of both informal and formal institutions (i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)). The uncer-
tainty has potentially significant implications not only for Kazakh domestic poli-
tics but also international relations. Which direction Kazakhstan turns to interna-
tionally has historically depended on the dynasty in power (i/w GO). Change in 
political leadership may lead to Kazakhstan pulling back from Eurasian integra-
tion (i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)). Prominent businessman Aidan Karibzhanov 
(2013) has, for instance, publicly argued that it may be as easy leaving the ECU as 
it was joining. Indeed, President Nazarbayev himself in August 2014 stated that 
‘Kazakhstan has the right to quit’ the EaEU (Trilling, 2014d). The recent return of 
ex-Premier Karim Masimov to the post of Prime Minister has been interpreted as 
a signal that Nazarbayev wishes to deepen economic and political links with Chi-
na, perhaps as a counterbalance to Russia in the wake of events in Ukraine. 
Masimov is described as a China expert; having previously studied in Beijing, he 
speaks the language and has retained strong links (Altynov, 2014b). 
The pro-integrationist policies of Kazakhstan appear in large part driven by politi-
cal considerations and President Nazarbayev personally, rather than the wider 
ruling elite nor economic imperatives as seen through GDP growth rates. This is 
not to suggest that the Kazakh economy would not benefit from integrating with 
the Russian economy with which it trades significantly. However, as related in 
chapter 2, the current make-up of the ECU and CES does not appear to offer sig-
nificant benefits to Kazakh businesses or the economy more widely. The foreign 
policy direction of Kazakhstan, including Eurasian integration, is unlikely to 
change under the presidency of Nazarbayev but with significant dissatisfaction in 
elite circles, as well as among the wider business community as seen in the previ-
ous section, it is not a given that this trajectory will continue following a political 
transition, which is inevitably on the horizon considering the age of the presiden-
tial incumbent. 
4.2.2 Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan also experienced negative economic growth in the early 90s, which 
may have encouraged the political leadership to integrate economically both with 
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its neighbouring Central Asian republics as well as opening up to the global econ-
omy. 
 
Table 4.5 – Annual GDP growth, 1990-2000, per cent; Kyrgyzstan, (World Bank, 2013) 
Over the past decade, economic growth of Kyrgyzstan has been highly variable, in 
part most likely reflecting political instability with negative annualised growth 
rates in 2005 and 2010, when the country experienced changes in government. 
Projections suggest annualised growth rates of around 5 per cent for the next five 
years. However, the economy may be more fragile than such headline figures 
suggest. A government official noted in an interview how the Minister of Eco-
nomics speaks eloquently of economic development while the economy collapses 
around him (i/w GO). Economic growth rates in themselves, however, do not nec-
essarily point towards political will to integrate economically with partners. 
 
Table 4.6 – Annual GDP growth, 2001-2011, per cent; Kyrgyzstan, (World Bank, 2013) 
 
Table 4.7 – GDP growth projections, 2012-2019, per cent; Kyrgyzstan (IMF, 2014) 
According to economic rent theory, non-resource rich developing countries will 
tend towards developmental states seeking economic growth through reform of 
the economy (Auty, 2006b: 20-22). In fact Kyrgyzstan not only implemented lib-
eral reforms of the economy but also signalled a desire to integrate with the world 
economy through WTO membership in the 1990s. In part these reforms were 
driven through owing to international pressure: in exchange for international fi-
nancial aid, the Kyrgyz government implemented market economic reforms (i/w 
NN). By accepting the international community’s quid pro quo of liberal reforms 
for financial assistance, Kyrgyzstan came to rely on so-called geopolitical rent, 
which became subject to a tug-of-war within the ruling elite. President Akayev, 
for instance, during the early years of independence balanced the elite clans keep-
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
5.7 -7.9 -13.9 -15.5 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 5.4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
5.3 0.0 7.0 7.0 -0.2 3.1 8.5 8.4 2.9 -0.5 5.7
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-0.9 10.5 4.4 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2
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ing him in power through appointments to bureaucratic positions, which con-
trolled various sources of foreign aid (McGlinchley, 2011: 94). It has been sug-
gested that the American leasehold of the Manas airbase introduced a different 
type of geopolitical rent, which the Akayev family appropriated for itself, eventu-
ally leading to discontent among the wider elite and the fall of the Akayev regime; 
the same dynamic is said to have characterised the Bakiyev era (ibid: 12, 81; Coo-
ley, 2012: 35-36). 
While clans continue to play an important role the north-south clan division, dom-
inant during the Bakiyev era, is now considered a simplistic narrative with the 
elite further factionalised (i/w AC). For instance, elite members in the south have 
turned against the former Mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, with a view to in-
creasing their own power (Mukhametrakhimova, 2013a; Abdug'ofurov, 2014). 
Whereas the 2005 Tulip Revolution may be described as a change only of the per-
son in charge, the events of 2010 can be seen as a real revolution, whereby the 
rules of the game were changed (i/w WD). A plurality of views are being ex-
pressed in public debate and within parliament, which may be construed as a sign 
of democracy along with the fact that political conflicts are now resolved in the 
legislative chamber rather than on the street (i/w Nurlanbek (#63/IF); Chotaev 
2013; Kurmanov and Kurmanov, 2013). On the other hand, this indicates a frag-
mented elite. Each ministry is controlled by different parties, pursuing each their 
interests, undermining the coherence of government and the pursuit of a shared 
national interest (Dyatlenko, 2013; i/w 2xGO; Ahmetova (#70/GO); Shamiev 
(#71/LE); Tungatarov (#66/BA)). Kyrgyz political parties do not represent ideo-
logies but personalities and shared interests of kinship groups. The political re-
forms, however, mean that informal agreements between such groupings can be-
come formalised within the Jogorku Kenesh (Avcu, 2013; Chotaev, 2013).  
The distinct interests being pursued by various factions of the elite reflect the 
prevalence of corruption and vested interests (i/w IA; AC; Shamiev (#71/LE)), 
which lead to economically unproductive, political decisions and actions on part 
of the ruling elite (i/w AC; BA). With the end of American presence at the Manas 
airbase, and the drying up of associated geopolitical rent, the Kyrgyz political elite 
may be looking for new sources of income. Indeed, as suggested by Western dip-
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lomats, the ruling elite is not believed to have made financial contingency plans 
(i/w WD). Consequently, one government source considered Kyrgyzstan to have 
no choice but to formally join the ECU (i/w GO). ECU membership could posi-
tion Russia as a new source of geopolitical rent as demonstrated by the credit lines 
extended by Russia to Kyrgyzstan in connection with the road map for Kyrgyz 
entry to the Eurasian integration projects (further discussed below). Indeed, there 
are rumours of elite members being ready to join the ECU at any price (i/w AC).  
Opposition to Kyrgyz entry to the ECU at elite level, on the other hand, reflects 
vested interests in existing trade barriers, which if lifted could reduce the power of 
some groups in society (Dyatlenko, 2013). Prime Minister Ortobayev has report-
edly threatened officials who do not readily implement the roadmap for Eurasian 
integration with dismissal (Forbes, 2014). Like the Kazakh government, Kyrgyz 
President Atambayev emphasises that Eurasian integration is solely economic, not 
political, and hence not a threat to Kyrgyz sovereignty (Rashid, 2014). At the 
same time, Atambayev has reportedly emphasised how Kyrgyz membership of the 
ECU would reduce interdependencies in Central Asia by reducing the importance 
of ties with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Toktonaliev, 2014). 
The Kyrgyz government accepts that membership of the ECU may have some 
negative impact on the economy but expects positive effects to dominate 
(RFE/RL, 2014e). Official policy emphasises the need to shift the economy away 
from reliance on re-export trade, boosting productive capacity of the economy 
(i/w GO). The Kyrgyz government believes that implementation of the roadmap 
for Kyrgyzstan to join the ECU will cost USD 400 million; money which the 
Kyrgyz government does not have (RFE/RL, 2014f). Russia has allocated USD 
200 million to assist Kyrgyzstan in implementing the roadmap alongside a USD 1 
billion loan (Forbes, 2014).
50
 Moreover, the economy’s heavy reliance on remit-
tances from migrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan has further supported the 
rationale for Kyrgyz integration with the ECU (i/w Shamiev (#71/LE); Ahmetova 
                                                 
50
 It has later emerged that Russia will provide Kyrgyzstan with USD 500 million in financial aid 
to ease integration into the Eurasian community; it is unclear however, how this relates to the 
previous announcement of a USD 1.2 billion package (Rickleton, 2014c). 
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(#70/GO); GO). Russia recently tightened regulation on CIS migrant workers; 
regulations that do not, however, apply to ECU members (Standish, 2014). It ap-
pears that Russia has employed both stick and carrot in attracting Kyrgyzstan to 
join the Eurasian integration project.  
The Kyrgyz trajectory towards economic integration with the EaEU, also points 
towards a shortcoming in the theoretical framework applied. Again, it appears that 
the government itself is the main source of demand for integration policies, not 
the supplier of policies demanded by wider society as stipulated by The Logic of 
Regional Integration. 
Kyrgyzstan appears firmly on the path towards Eurasian integration, turning away 
from regional neighbours Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This, in part, reflects an eco-
nomic policy which seeks to reduce the economy’s reliance on re-export trade, but 
may also indicate the need of the elite to establish a new source of geopolitical 
rent. 
4.2.3 Tajikistan 
Tajik economic growth was, as previously discussed, significantly hampered by 
the civil war in the 1990s. However, the country quickly resumed positive annual 
GDP growth following the 1997 peace agreement. Since Tajikistan has achieved 
impressive economic growth rates with annual GDP growth at over 7 per cent in 
2011, forecast to stay at 6-7 per cent in the immediate future. The economic 
growth rates, thus, do not suggest a strong impetus for economic integration. 
 
Table 4.8 – Annual GDP growth, 1990-2000, per cent; Tajikistan, (World Bank, 2013) 
 
Table 4.9 – Annual GDP growth, 2001-2011, per cent; Tajikistan, (World Bank, 2013) 
 
Table 4.10 – GDP growth projections, 2012-2019, per cent; Tajikistan (IMF, 2014) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
-0.6 -7.1 -29.0 -16.4 -21.3 -12.4 -16.7 1.7 5.3 3.7 8.3
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
10.2 9.1 10.2 10.6 10.5 -15.7 21.7 21.2 3.9 6.5 7.4
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
7.5 7.4 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
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Populations in the provinces Rasht and Badakhshan perceive the Dangara clan of 
President Rakhmon as having usurped power and the 1997-settlement an unjust 
peace agreement (i/w Bjorvatn (#47/IO)). Indeed it is claimed that Rakhmon has 
favoured his kin since 1997, thus, inflaming such impressions (Auty and de 
Soysa, 2006(b): 145). Scholars have claimed that Rakhmon, thus, has failed to 
extend his authority across Tajikistan and establish internal legitimacy of his re-
gime. Rakhmon, it has been suggested, has so little authority outside of Dushanbe 
that the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan in reality can be considered 
to be an autonomous state (Collins, 2006: 286, 290). Indeed, the ruling elite is 
nervous about the role played by Aga Khan in the Badakhshan region (i/w WS; 
Bjorvatn (#47/IO)), where successful and impactful donor projects by his founda-
tion are boosting his popularity (i/w WS). Erica Marat (2006: 25), however, has 
argued that Rakhmon is in ‘solid control’ established through exclusion of the 
opposition from government posts and parliamentary seats. Marat accepted the 
presence of some organised criminal groups outside of the regime’s control but 
noted that these do not represent a threat to the regime (Ibid: 108, 114-116). The 
key difference in the two arguments is the interpretation of what consequences the 
exclusion of other elite groups from formal power structures has. Collins, Richard 
Auty and Indra de Soysa argued that this demonstrates lack of control; whereas 
Marat interpreted it as a sign of control.  
Marat’s argument is supported by Nargis Kassenova (2009: 6-7), who suggests 
that Rakhmon gradually established full control, and has marginalised the opposi-
tion to an extent that leaves it unable to challenge him. Filippo De Danieli (2011: 
139-141) has argued that the international assistance to counter drug trafficking 
through Tajikistan has enabled President Rakhmon to strengthen the internal secu-
rity apparatus and create a symbiotic relationship between the political elite and 
vertically integrated criminal organisations, and that this has contributed to the 
consolidation of the President’s power. Indeed, the government is currently per-
ceived to be fully in control across the country having strengthened its position 
through operations in Rasht and Badakhshan over the last five years (i/w IO; WS). 
The 2012 incident in Khorog reflected a conflict between Rakhmon’s emissary in 
the region and local drug traffickers (i/w Bjorvatn (#47/IO); WS). These opera-
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tions are described as clumsy and in breach of human rights commitments but are 
seen to have strengthened the government’s own perception of control, enabling a 




The fusion of economic and executive powers in Tajikistan is said to firmly rest in 
the hands of the presidential family. President Rakhmon and his family are said to 
personify the corrupt practices of the ruling elite with the president’s son running 
the Customs Service, a daughter acting as Deputy Foreign Minister, a son-in-law 
believed to control certain toll roads, another son in charge of the rail network, 
and another daughter running both one of the country’s main banks and a nation-
wide television channel. Rakhmon’s most powerful relative is said to be his 
brother-in-law, who controls a number of major companies and strategic busi-
nesses (Sodiqov, 2011). The presidential family sits atop a pyramidal structure of 
corruption feeding off inter alia drug trafficking and the state aluminium compa-
ny Talco (Marat, 2006: 7; Trilling, 2014c; i/w Bjorvatn (#47/IO)). The existence 
of both an official and an unofficial budget is reflected in informal economic ac-
tivity such as the large scale construction projects seen in the capital Dushanbe. A 
Western source in the country suggested that real GDP of Tajikistan is higher than 
official figures convey and the ruling elite hesitant to promote or accept foreign 
investment fearing that foreigners will steal the ‘family silver’ (i/w WS). 
Political power in Tajikistan is also centred on president Rakhmon. There are two 
notions of government in the country – the formal and the actual. As one interloc-
utor related, ministers do not consider themselves to be government representa-
tives but refer to the president as ‘the government’ (Ibid). Consequently, govern-
mental institutions are weak and informal, reliant on personal connections and 
networks. For instance, representatives of the international community find that 
ministers or civil servants enter agreements in a personal capacity; if a reshuffle 
introduces a new person to the post, the agreement is considered null and void 
(i/w IO). As such, the government is seen to often go back on promises made, and 
                                                 
51
 2014 has also seen unrest in Khorog after a drug trafficking related shooting led to public pro-
tests (Asia-Plus, 2014). 
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stakeholders may frequently be in the dark as to whether the negotiations are only 
just starting or nearing a resolution, possibly reflecting internal power struggles 
(i/w WD). While official policies may be sound, implementation is hindered by 
vested interests creating a gap between reality and official documents (i/w Uma-
rov (#45/AC); Bethom (#37/IA)). Marat suggested that heavy state control with 
the agricultural sector, for instance, reflects the elite’s intention to maintain rents 
from cotton production, whereas privatisation would likely see farmers shift to 
other crops (Marat, 2006: 31). 
International representatives detect an understanding on part of the government of 
the need for Tajikistan to integrate with the world community and the benefits this 
would bring (i/w IO; WD).
52
 Tajik entry to the WTO may on the one hand reflect 
such appreciation of the need for integration with the world economy, and poten-
tially, a preference for unilateral liberalisation over regional integration. Indeed, 
while having signed the most recent CIS FTA, Tajikistan has not yet ratified it, 
awaiting a proper analysis of the implications of this in the light of WTO entry 
(i/w Soliev (#31/GO)). However, one Western diplomat suggested that the main 
motivation, crudely, for Tajik WTO entry was to create barriers to ECU entry in 
an attempt at avoiding the latter (i/w WD). Officially, Tajikistan is seeking to ful-
ly understand the probable implications of potential ECU membership before 
formulating its opinion on this, being highly aware of the problems experienced in 
Kazakhstan (i/w WD). It has been suggested that Dushanbe considers any poten-
tial benefits, such as increased Russian investment (Qoraboyev, 2010: 219-220), 
from integrating with the ECU, to be outweighed by the risks of increased Russian 
leverage over the Tajik economy and ruling elite (Wiśniewska 2013: 31-32; Laru-
elle, 2012: 9). Moreover, bilateral agreements with Russia already ensure the 
working conditions of Tajik labour migrants in Russia (Wiśniewska 2013: 31-32). 
The Tajik leadership’s disinclination towards allying itself with Russia relates, for 
                                                 
52
 Capacity to understand technical issues is a problem for the Tajik civil service (i/w WD), how-
ever, Rakhmon’s economic advisers are said to have a good understanding of the economy (Ibid), 
though whilst acknowledging developmental problems, the leadership, it is suggeseted, does not 
appreciate how deep such problems run (i/w IO). Specifically, the government lacks understanding 
of the private sector and how to support it (i/w IA). 
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instance, to the thorny issue of border control. To paraphrase a Western source in 
the country ‘he who controls the border, controls the drug trade’ (i/w WS).  
Ikboljon Qoraboyev (2010: 219-220) has suggested that Tajikistan is more inter-
ested in Eurasian integration than Central Asian integration because of fear of 
being dominated by Turkic peoples in an exclusively Central Asian grouping. 
Similarly, Laruelle (2012: 9) suggests that Tajikistan is adverse to what is per-
ceived as pro-Turkic and thus Uzbek-dominated integration schemes. The above 
discussion, however, does not indicate an interest on part of the Tajik ruling elite 
to engage in any regional integration scheme, let alone one led by Russia. Indeed, 
one Western interlocutor pointed to hesitancy on part of the Tajik leadership in 
facilitating cross-border trade as a reflection of their vested interests in, inter alia, 
earnings from drug trafficking (i/w WS). However, one government official sug-
gested that Russia does not allow Tajikistan to make independent economic deci-
sions, holding leverage both through the presence of Tajik labour migrants in 
Russia but also heavy reliance of Tajikistan on Russian energy imports (i/w Soliev 
(#31/GO)). Consequently, while the Tajik government appears averse to any form 
of regional economic integration, it may in time find itself facing an offer it can-
not refuse. 
4.2.4 Turkmenistan 
The first years of Turkmen independence offered negative economic growth, 
though this did not induce the government to pursue an integrationist policy as the 
theoretical framework would suggest. 
 
Table 4.11 – Annual GDP growth, 1990-2000, per cent; Turkmenistan, (World Bank, 2013) 
Since 2005 the growth rate has exceeded 10 per cent annually, save for 2009 and 
2010 following the global financial crisis. Projections suggest that the country will 
retain high growth rates in the immediate future. While there may be doubt about 
the credibility of statistics, the IMF recently praised the Turkmen government for 
improvement in their statistical standards (IMF, 2013), and there certainly is eco-
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
35.4 -4.6 -15.0 1.5 -17.3 -7.2 6.7 -11.4 7.1 16.5 5.5
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nomic development in the country. As one Western diplomat stated, Turkmenistan 
does not need our money – in terms of aid or capital investment (i/w WD; 
Drakinos (#99/IF)); as the country earns sufficiently on natural gas exports (i/w 
LE). Thus, economic development does not on the surface suggest a motivation 
for engaging in regional integration projects. 
 
Table 4.12 – Annual GDP growth, 2001-2011, per cent; Turkmenistan, (World Bank, 2013) 
 
Table 4.13 – GDP growth projections, 2012-2019, per cent; Turkmenistan (IMF, 2014) 
President Berdymukhamedov appears to be firmly in power and personally direct-
ing the policy of the government (i/w LE; DI; Badykova, 2005: 67; Fitzpatrick, 
2011a).
53
 Nicholas Kunysz (2010: 4-5) has suggested that this control inter alia 
has been achieved through empowerment of his clan, the Ahal-Teke. Ministers 
appear unable to take independent initiative, save perhaps the foreign minister 
who to some appears the second most powerful (i/w DI). One Western diplomat 
noted that ministers will request that external inputs are provided, which they can 
take forward, avoiding sticking their own neck out (i/w WD). Moreover, 
Berdymukhamedov has, in contrast to former president Niyazov, centralised con-
trol with the hydro-carbon sector and revenue streams from it (Crude Accounta-
bility, 2011: 7). According to the Law on Hydro-carbon Resources only 20 per 
cent of the total revenue of the agency managing hydro-carbons are transferred to 
the state budget; the remaining revenues are at the discretion of the agency, which 
is directly answerable to Berdymukhamedov (Ibid: 29-31).  
While stability is prioritised over freedom, there is openness and political will on 
part of the president to grow the private sector as a means towards diversifying the 
economy (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF); LE; IF; NN; WD). Nevertheless, the policy is 
                                                 
53
 One Western diplomat suggested that the country is ruled by a collective rather than President 
Berdymukhamedov individually, as appears to have been the case under Niyazov (i/w WD). This 
version was firmly denied by multiple other interlocutors (i/w DI). 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
4.3 0.3 3.3 5.0 13.0 11.0 11.1 14.7 6.1 9.2 14.7
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
11.1 10.2 10.7 12.5 9.6 7.8 7.8 8.3
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stymied by another stream of thought in government favouring the status quo (i/w 
WD). The state is dominant in the Turkmen economy  -state-owned oil and gas 
related activities are estimated to make up as much as 90 per cent of the economy 
(i/w Drakinos (#99/IF))-  enabling the ruling elite to derive rents from the coun-
try’s economic activity. Such vested interests hinder the implementation of eco-
nomic reforms (i/w LE). Testimony suggests that President Berdymukhamedov 
understands the bias towards status quo among the wider elite, and seeks to work 
around it to achieve his aims. For instance, it was suggested that Turkmenistan’s 
hosting of the Asian Games in 2017 is being used as a means to exempt visa con-
trol from the jurisdiction of the security services (i/w LE). With state-owned oil 
and gas related activities estimated to make up as much as 90 per cent of the 
economy, the government’s aim to privatise 70 per cent of non-oil and gas activi-
ties will still see the state dominant by 2020 (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF)). Having cen-
tralised the control with hydro-carbon revenue streams under the presidency itself, 
Berdymukhamedov is thus able to maintain his ability to buy the loyalty from the 
wider elite as needed. 
Turkmenistan is currently considering whether to join the WTO, supported by the 
international community in preparing the basis for decision-making. Commenting 
on Turkmen considerations of joining the WTO, an official of the Ministry of 
Economic Development is reported to have commented that the country’s ‘leader-
ship has at last begun to understand the importance and necessity of integration 
into the world's economic and political processes’ (Annayev, 2013). All ministers 
have been asked to assess the consequences of WTO entry in terms of legislative 
and economic impact and sectoral studies are also being considered (i/w IF; WD, 
NN). WTO entry is not viewed by the government as an aim in itself but as a 
means for diversifying the economy (i/w NN). Of particular concern to the Turk-
men elite is the impact on strategic sectors of the economy, including agriculture, 
textiles, oil and gas, as well as the implications for the subsidy programmes (Ibid). 
If the government is convinced that there are no negative consequences for the 
economy, such as impact on the gas trade, the expectation is that decision will be 
for entry (i/w WD; Drakinos (#99/IF)). Potential WTO entry is believed to reflect 
a genuine desire to integrate with the world economy (i/w WD; Drakinos 
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(#99/IF)). This is driven by Berdymukhamedov, who is said to recognise that 
Turkmenistan is not exceptional and that the long term plans for economic devel-
opment require international engagement as well as that without trust foreign in-
vestors will not come (i/w LE). To some extent, Turkmenistan has been com-
pelled to open its economy. Disruption of gas exports to Russia induced Turkmen-
istan to pursue new export markets; moreover, continued gas exploration and pro-
duction requires international engagement, as the country needs foreign expertise 
to develop offshore fields (Chatham House, 2011: 8). However, the government 
also recognises the limit of gas dependency in the longer term and hence the need 
to diversify the economy (i/w Drakinos (#99/IF)). 
The government takes the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality very serious conducting 
its foreign relations in respect thereof (i/w WD; Anceschi, 2009: 9). While the 
qualifying adjective ‘positive’ supposedly indicates an active and cooperative ap-
proach to regional and international relations (Anceschi, 2009: 28), the policy in 
practice represents an emphasis on bilateral over multilateral relations, which part-
ly explains Turkmen inactivity in the regional fora it participates in (Badykova, 
2005: 80). Turkmenistan’s passive conduct in the CIS framework is indicative of 
this, and there is no immediate prospect of the country joining a regional integra-
tion framework such as the ECU (i/w LE; IF).  
4.2.5 Uzbekistan 
It is suggested that Uzbekistan actively engaged in integration processes through 
the 1990s, for instance in CACO (i/w Tolipov (#84/AC); Soliev (#31/GO)); the 
negative economic growth rates experienced in the early years of independence 
may have motivated such policies. Correspondingly, as discussed in chapter 2, 
Uzbekistan was in the early years of independence implementing market-oriented 
economic policies.  
 
Table 4.14 – Annual GDP growth, 1990-2000, per cent; Uzbekistan, (World Bank, 2013) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1.6 -0.5 -11.2 -2.3 -5.2 -0.9 1.7 5.2 4.3 4.3 3.8
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However, 2005 has suggested to have been at breaking point in Uzbek interna-
tional relations since when the country has taken an isolationist stance (i/w 
Tolipov (#84/AC)). The events in Andijon may partly explain this (Ibid), though 
there is a risk of overestimating the impact of these events on government policy. 
The colour revolutions in the preceding years may have had a greater impact in 
entrenching the isolationist stance of Uzbek policy (i/w WD). On the face of it, 
Uzbekistan has experienced impressive economic growth rates in recent years 
with over 8 per cent annual GDP growth in the years 2009-2012. Similarly growth 
projections for the coming years are high, though decreasing to 5.5 per cent by 
2017, thus, not suggesting a strong impetus for opening the economy or imple-
menting reform.  
 
Table 4.15 – Annual GDP growth, 2001-2011, per cent; Uzbekistan, (World Bank, 2013) 
 
Table 4.16 – GDP growth projections, 2012-2019, per cent; Uzbekistan (IMF, 2014) 
The statistics are, however, widely considered to be unreliable (i/w 2xWD). While 
one Western diplomat cautioned against evaluating the economic activity by 
Western standards, suggesting there are some signs of growth (i/w WD); many 
people on the ground see no evidence in the real economy of the claimed high 
levels growth, nor on people’s living standards. Instead, they suggest that eco-
nomic development is in reverse with the decline accelerating (i/w DI; WD; Par-
amonov (#96/AC)). With both gas and cotton output levels decreasing, the out-
look is perhaps worsening (i/w WD), and as such, one might speculate that eco-
nomic reforms that could reinvigorate economic development in the country, were 
in the interest of the ruling elite.  
The political pay-off, however, to the ruling elite is not directly linked to econom-
ic growth rates and the impact or the lack thereof on the real economy. The failure 
to develop strong, autonomous economic institutions has left the economy as a 
domain of presidential authority (Melvin, 2000: 73). Whilst ‘the Uzbek Way’ sug-
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
4.2 4.0 4.2 7.7 7.0 7.3 9.5 9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
8.2 8.0 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.5
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gests the subordination of politics to economics, the reality is an economic policy 
often dictated by a political need to avoid the accumulation of resources in the 
hands of forces that may threaten the current constellation of power (Ibid: 86). 
Pomfret (2006: 80) claims that Karimov as a trained economist takes pride in run-
ning the country’s economy competently; however Karimov and his inner circle 
are also claimed to dread the prospect of liberalisation, not only because it endan-
gers vested interests, but because it will halt Uzbek economic growth before the 
economy would be able to profit from its advantages in an open trading regime 
(Rumer, 2002: 23). Trushin and Trushin (2005: 370, 375) suggest that privatisa-
tion could be a means to overcome Uzbek vested interests by creating new rents. 
Such potential shifts in the opportunities for rent extraction may lead to political 
instability with clans fighting over spoils. Consequently, Karimov is likely disin-
clined to any economic reforms as such may endanger the status quo and his hold 
on power. As Pomfret has argued: ‘The negative consequences of these policies 
were recognized by Uzbekistan, but once in place they were hard to change be-
cause key individuals and groups benefited from exchange controls and barriers 
to imports’ (Pomfret, 2011: 136). In other words, in Uzbekistan economics is poli-
tics (i/w BA; DI), and though the elite is formally, and informally (Radnitz, 2010: 
6, 59), in control of the Uzbek economy, this control is not monolithic.  
President Karimov builds his support on a Soviet era elite, which benefits from 
economic distortions (Blackmon, 2011: 9). Radnitz (2010: 28) suggested that the 
Samarkand clans, to which Karimov himself belongs, control the raw materials 
sectors, while the Tashkent and Fergana clans are in control of the trade and fi-
nance ministries; which are significant power bases in a command economy 
(Blackmon, 2011: 39). These clans have enriched themselves through their politi-
cal privileges and are thus hostile to the idea of liberalisation as private entrepre-
neurs are considered a threat. Instead, the clans ensure the introduction and con-
tinuation of the trade barriers, which have allowed them to build monopolies and 
capture rents (Collins, 2006: 266; i/w NN; WD; Tolipov (#84/AC)). For instance, 
the protection of car production is a means of monopolising rents (i/w NN; DI). 
Thus, the wider elite may be fragmented but have shared interests in maintaining 
rent extraction opportunities. 
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While the ruling elite continues to have a strong grip on power, this is slowly, but 
gradually weakening (i/w NN). President Karimov’s authority was challenged in 
1992 by the Tashkent-clan (Luong, 2002: 90), and despite Karimov’s attempts to 
weaken the rival clans’ hold on power, he has not been successful (Collins, 2006: 
270-71, 276). Nevertheless, President Karimov is reportedly in good health (i/w 
2xWD); and the current intrigue embroiling the Karimov family is by local inter-
locutors said not to be a reflection of political instability but a personal vendetta of 
Rustam Iniyatov and the security services (SNB) he leads, against Gulnara Kari-
mova (i/w DI; WD).
54
 However, Collins (2006: 262, 276) has suggested that Ka-
rimov has faced increasing demands from clans as the economy flat-lined and 
Gulnara Karimova rose to prominence through blatant corruption. Moreover, the 
decline of cotton yields and foreign aid limits the availability of funds to use for 
patronage (McGlinchley, 2011: 140).
55
 One expects the decline in the gas industry 
to have a similar effect. A few powerful reformers currently have limited scope to 
enact small-scale reform such as seeking to merge official and black market ex-
change rates (i/w WD). One diplomat suggested that where before Uzbekistan was 
‘a silent lake with no movement’, there are now ‘waves’ on the lake (i/w DI). 
Some within the wider elite are said to have an understanding of the realities of 
economic decline, and the need for reform of the economy and international coop-
eration; for instance, one faction of the elite is said to be pro-Eurasianist, but fears 
speaking out (i/w NN). Setting oneself against the presidential line risks harsh 
punishment (i/w NN; DI; WD).  
As noted above, economic policies of the Uzbek government widely are believed 
to derive directly from President Karimov personally, who only trusts a close cir-
cle of allies (i/w WD; NN; AC). According to Karimov (1997: 180-181) the ques-
                                                 
54
 Interlocutors report that the events reflect revenge by the SNB after Karimova criticised the head 
of the SNB Rustam Iniyatov in front of his staff. The SNB allegedly handed president Karimov a 
file on Karimova, which angered the president leading him to personally sanction the ongoing 
events (i/w BA; WD). Arrests of senior law enforcement officers in September 2014 may however 
indicate that the events surrounding Karimova’s troubles are developing into a wider infighting 
within the elite (Lillis, 2014e). 
55
 McGinchley on this note appears confused as he simultaneously argues that Karimov need not 
worry about the elite’s disloyalty as this can be dealt with through reshuffles given the size of the 
elite (2011: 116), while also arguing that the age of the Soviet era elite as well as the drying up of 
economic rents represent looming challenges to Karimov’s rule (ibid: 114, 140-141). 
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tion is not whether Uzbekistan should participate in a global trend of integration 
through multilateral organisations but to ensure that such interactions comply with 
the interests of an independent Uzbek nation. Consequently, Karimov has de-
nounced integration that is directed by external actors, and stressed the ability to 
engage in parallel processes of integration at global or regional level and with 
different international partners in a positive-sum spirit. Specifically Karimov is 
critical of the creation of supra-national institutions suggesting that intergovern-
mental associations do not need such powers to function effectively, and that su-
pranational powers undermine sovereignty and independence (Ibid: 188-189). 
Karimov has repeated such caution in response to Putin’s proposal for the Eura-
sian Union describing it as an attempt to revive bygone empires (Fitzpatrick, 
2011c), and recently suggested that the EaEU inevitably involves political integra-
tion, possibly as a rebuke to President Nazarbayev who, as noted, insists other-
wise (The Financial Express, 2014). 
Karimov has described Uzbekistan as ‘the core of Central Asia’ (Karimov, 1997: 
138) which can lead fraternal cooperation in the region and act as the gateway to 
international integration of the region (Ibid). This indicates an intention to be the 
regional leader of Central Asia, as discussed below. Specifically, Karimov has 
noted that regional integration of the CARs is not a vision but ‘a reality which 
needs only organizational, legal and political forms’ (Ibid: 192). Nevertheless, 
Karimov in practice appears to prioritise wider international partners such as the 
UN and the EU as well as bilateral relationships with the USA, European and 
Asian countries (Ibid: 181-187). Uzbekistan recently bound itself to reducing 
trade barriers within the CIS framework (RFE/RL, 2013a). This was surprising to 
many, given Uzbekistan’s historic reluctance to practically engage with multilat-
eral integration frameworks, particularly those propagated by Russia (Melvin, 
2000: 110), but reflects a realisation in government that trade restrictions in CIS 
markets were causing problems for key industries (i/w NN; Paramonov 
(#96/AC)), which elite factions rely on for rent extraction. It is intransparent, 
however, whether provisions are being implemented; and while the multilateral 
CIS FTA involves a general agreement, everything practically happens on a bilat-
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
270 
 
eral basis (i/w Paramonov (#96/AC)). This may explain why Uzbekistan signed 
the agreement despite reluctance to take part in multilateral cooperation (i/w WD). 
While the Uzbek economy appears to be in decline, there are few signs to suggest 
that the country under the leadership of President Karimov will enter multilateral 
integration schemes. With the wider elite highly fragmented and economic rents 
declining, there is potential for significant future political instability as well as a 
change of economic and foreign policy.  
*** 
As discussed in the preceding sections, internal politics in Central Asian republics 
diverge significantly as regards political inclinations toward economic integration 
policies. Kazakhstan is pursuing a strongly pro-integrationist policy, though not 
focused on integrating with Central Asia but rather focused on a wider Eurasian 
region, encompassing Russia. This agenda is driven by President Nazarbayev per-
sonally. Kyrgyzstan is preparing to join the Eurasian integration project, though 
less out of a basic support for the idea, than economic realities and the need for 
Russian financial support.  
While Tajikistan is opening its economy through integration into the WTO, the 
country’s leadership is highly reluctant towards regional economic integration, 
both in the Eurasian form, led by Russia, and supposedly in a Central Asian vari-
ant, as this would be dominated by Turkic nations. Nevertheless, government 
sources recognise the leverage held by Russia over Tajik policy, indicating that 
the country may eventually join the Eurasian integration project. Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan also are both politically disinclined towards multilateral economic 
integration. In Uzbekistan a fragile balance between factions of the elite creates an 
implicit pressure for unchanged economic policies that enable the maintenance of 
vested interests in rent extraction. On the other hand, while Turkmenistan under 
President Berdymukhamedov is introducing liberal reforms to economic policy, 
including the consideration of WTO membership, the leadership has reaffirmed its 
commitment to the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, thus, rejecting multilateral 
alliances. 
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Three notions of economic integration may be said to co-exist in Central Asia: 
global integration through the WTO, Eurasian integration with Russia and Central 
Asian integration within the region itself. Only the former two are reflected in 
current trends, however. Moreover, the promotion of Eurasian integration by Ka-
zakhstan and adoption of the scheme by Kyrgyzstan point towards fragmentation 
of the Central Asian region with the former joining a Eurasian region dominated 
by Russia, while Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan standing aside. 
4.2.6 Regional relationships and leadership 
This section considers the regional relationships within Central Asia, and the im-
pact this has on the potential for regional cohesion. As is clear from the preceding 
sections, both the concepts of a Eurasian and a Central Asian region are present in 
Central Asia. At the political level, the concept of Eurasian regionalism appears 
currently to have stronger resonance, thus potentially reducing the likelihood of 
Central Asian regionalism. The section moreover considers the notion that the 
presence of an undisputed regional leader increases the likelihood of an integra-
tion scheme being successful, as suggested by The Logic of Regional Integration. 
A regional leader can facilitate a cooperative spirit by offering compensation to 
less enthusiastic members who may, for instance, be anticipating trade diversion 
as a consequence of integration. 
Political relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are judged to be positive 
(i/w Bjorvatn (#47/IO)), despite ongoing border skirmishes relating to the out-
standing border delimitation.
56
 Nevertheless, no particular interest was observed 
at national levels in furthering cooperation, indeed as noted above, President At-
ambayev has emphasised how Eurasian integration will reduce the country’s de-
pendence on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan is perceived, across the re-
gion, not least in Uzbekistan, as a source of instability owing to its history of tu-
multuous change of governments but also, what many described as ‘anarchic’ 
governance (i/w LE; Boymamat (#54/BA); NN). Such sentiments disincline 
                                                 
56
  In August 2014 the border related conflict led to two Tajik casualties (RFE/RL, 2014h). The 
border skirmishes negatively impact on trade, see for instance Chorshanbiyev, 2014a. 
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neighbours towards cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, it is speculated that 
the constitutional changes in Kyrgyzstan also have raised obstacles to engagement 
with neighbours who fear that ideas of open government, democracy and parlia-
mentary rule will spread and destabilise neighbouring governments (i/w GO; 
Tungatarov (#66/BA); WD; Mambetalin (#28/OP)).  
Reflecting an acknowledgement of ongoing informal trade and the potential for 
labour migration within the Fergana Valley, the Kyrgyz government claims to be 
very interested in developing relations, including trade relations, with Uzbekistan 
(i/w Ahmetova (#70/GO)). Currently the two governments are said to be discuss-
ing a simplification of border crossing procedures, though the interest on part of 
Uzbekistan appears to be limited (i/w Ahmetova (#70/GO); TT). At the same 
time, a civil servant of the Kyrgyz government suggested that trade is not a prime 
concern in bilateral relations from the Kyrgyz perspective, reflecting the Eurasian 
policy preference suggested, and that official relations are poor (i/w GO), marred 
by an asymmetric power relationship which sees Kyrgyzstan reliant on Uzbeki-
stan for energy supplies (i/w TT). Uzbekistan in April 2014 halted supplies of 
natural gas to Kyrgyzstan, and the Kyrgyz government has consequently called on 
businesses and households to prepare themselves for use of coal as fuel over the 
2014/15 winter in case Uzbekistan will not resume deliveries (RFE/RL, 2014g). 
Kyrgyzstan is potentially facing severe energy shortages the winter of 2014/1015 
as Kazakhstan has curbed petrol exports, Uzbekistan is withholding gas supplies 
and Kyrgyzstan itself is experiencing a drought inhibiting hydro-electricity gener-
ation (Eurasianet, 2014). This poor bilateral relationship and the serious conse-
quences for the Kyrgyz public and the economy may contribute towards the gov-
ernment’s preference for integration in a Russian-led Eurasian framework. Para-
doxically, while President Karimov has rhetorically expressed a desire to be lead-
er of Central Asian integration, as noted above, Uzbekistan’s policy appear to 
push its neighbour towards Russia. 
Despite the mistrust and differences between national governments, cooperation 
is, however, taking place at a sub-national level. This may be most visible in the 
case of cooperation between authorities in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and GBAO, Sughd 
and Jirgatal oblasts in Tajikistan, where local authorities cooperate on issues in-
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cluding trade, education and science spurred on by prevalent people-to-people 
links driven by ethnic diasporas (i/w GO, Boymamat (#54/BA)). For instance, two 
ethnic Kyrgyz of Tajik nationality represent Tajikistan in different Osh (Kyrgyz) 
administrative bodies (i/w GO). Attempts have similarly been made for coopera-
tion between Osh and Andijon, Uzbekistan, though less successfully. Whereas the 
Kyrgyz national government is seen to be open to such initiatives and actively 
supporting them, cooperation is less forthcoming from the Uzbek side because 
local authorities do not act without explicit approval from the national govern-
ment, which may be slow in coming or entirely absent (i/w GO; IA). Moreover, 
existing agreements, for instance on bilateral trade, are reportedly hindered by 
verbal orders from the Uzbek government (i/w GO). Currently a proposal for a 
Dostyk (friendship) trade centre enjoys rhetorical support by both governments, 
but no practical agreement exists (i/w GO). This perhaps exemplifies a suggested 
gap between rhetoric and reality prevalent on the issue of integration in Central 
Asia. As a diplomat based in the region noted, all republics officially prioritise 
relations with their neighbours highly but the policy pursued is opposite (i/w DI); 
in fact the republics all prioritise relations with third parties (i/w Paramonov 
(#96/AC)). 
Tajikistan is in a difficult position owing to its geography and legacy of Soviet 
infrastructural links on the one hand, and political conflict with Uzbekistan on the 
other. This conflict to a large extent centres on disagreement over the suggested 
Rogun hydro-power project, which Tajikistan is pursuing as a means to end do-
mestic electricity shortage as well as to realising an electricity export opportunity, 
but Uzbekistan fiercely opposes. Uzbekistan is widely perceived as behaving un-
constructively inter alia by making overstated claims about the impact of Rogun 
as well as taking drastic measures disruptive for Tajikistan (i/w 3xWD; AD). For 
instance, when shutting off electricity supply in 2009, the Uzbeks are said to have 
physically cut the cable. Similarly, a rail track was dismantled rather than rebuilt 
following an alleged terror attack; and only two border crossings are now open 
(i/w WS; WD). Thus, neither in the case of Uzbek-Tajik relations do Uzbekistan’s 
policies in practice appear to promote a role of regional leadership as ‘the core’ of 
Central Asia. 
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The conflict between the countries is reflective of particularly poor relations be-
tween the countries’ presidents. President Karimov is said to have supported 
Rakhmon during the Tajik civil war but have turned against him, when Rakhmon 
did not subsequently pay the expected deference to Uzbekistan nor Karimov per-
sonally (i/w 3xWD). Both presidents are said to have dug in their heels in on the 
issue of Rogun and a change in leadership is thus believed to be a necessary, 
though possibly not sufficient, precondition for improving bilateral relationships 
(i/w WD; WS). The concern for Karimov and Uzbekistan is that the construction 
of the Rogun dam would enable Tajikistan to shut off the water supply to Uzbeki-
stan, on which it is heavily reliant for its cotton production, effectively changing 
the bilateral power dynamics (i/w Bjorvatn (#47/IO); AD). In a climate of distrust 
such a concern does, however, make the conflict look intractable regardless of the 
personalities in charge. Uzbekistan, furthermore, has security concerns over the 
control of the Afghan-Tajik border (i/w WD). It has, however, been suggested that 
a small thaw in relations may be forthcoming as President Karimov seeks to bal-
ance his criticism of Russian actions in Ukraine with more conciliatory policy 
towards Tajikistan (Mukhametrakhimova and Faskhutdinov, 2014).
57
 With Uzbek 
opposition to Rogun unchanged, it is likely to have limited impact on relations 
(Hashimova, 2014c). 
World Bank studies have recently confirmed the feasibility of the Rogun hydro-
power project as well as Kambarata-1 in Kyrgyzstan leaving finance as the main 
outstanding issue – alongside Uzbek objections (Hashimova, 2014b). The worsen-
ing of relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and the effective blockade this 
imposes on northward trade for Tajikistan, is pushing the country towards devel-
oping alternative infrastructure links, including a rail link via Afghanistan to 
Turkmenistan. Indeed, it may be speculated that over time, the protectionist poli-
cies of the Uzbek government can also drive the Tajik government towards Eura-
                                                 
57
 At the September 2014 SCO summit President Karimov surprised observers by suggesting that 
Russia had legitimate interests in Ukraine (Lillis, 2014c). The pronouncement came as a surprise 
as Karimov has otherwise been highly critical of Russia’s role in Ukraine without, however, lam-
basting the Kremlin directly (Lillis, 2014d). 
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sian integration, though Tajik policy currently is aimed at avoiding this as dis-
cussed above. 
Turkmen relations with Tajikistan are friendly and potentially deepening with 
considerations of a railroad linking the two countries via Afghanistan, which 
would ease Tajik dependence on Uzbekistan for export routes (Chorshanbiyev, 
2014b). While the Turkmen willingness to engage with the Tajiks is said to cause 
some consternation in Uzbekistan (i/w LE), the country generally uses its policy 
of positive neutrality to maintain good relations with all countries in the region 
(i/w LE; NN; Drakinos (#99/IF)). For instance, Karimov is suggested to personal-
ly approve of Berdymukhamedov because the latter does not have ambitions for 
regional leadership (i/w DI). The leadership change in Turkmenistan, thus, facili-
tated improved bilateral relations between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Sady-
kov, 2013c). In line with Turkmenistan’s policy of opening up, the country has 
recently announced intentions to deepen diplomatic ties within Central Asia by 
establishing an embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic (RFE/RL, 2014i). Similarly 
Turkmenistan has intensified relations with Kazakhstan in recent years. Reflecting 
the parallels between the countries’ strategic interests, President Berdymukha-
medov noted during a 2013 state visit to Kazakhstan that ‘The positions of Turk-
menistan and Kazakhstan practically always coincide’ (Weitz, 2013b). Particular-
ly cooperation on export pipelines has strengthened the neighbours’ interdepend-
ence, while reducing their reliance on Russia (Ibid). Strengthening of relations is 
now centred on the construction of a railway giving Kazakhstan and Turkmeni-
stan access to the Persian Gulf via Iran (Delovoy Kazakhstan, 2014). Despite such 
improved relations and budding interdependencies between Turkmenistan and its 
Central Asian neighbours, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality suggests that these 
relationships will continue to grow on a bilateral basis. 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have long been perceived as rivals for the position of 
regional leader in Central Asia (i/w 3xWD; DI; Soliev (#31/GO)). In the 1990s, 
Uzbekistan was seen to be on a more prosperous economic path than Kazakhstan 
but the latter is now considered the economic powerhouse of the region (i/w Ma-
dumarov (#2/AC); DI; WD; Soliev (#31/GO)). This imbalance is suggested to 
discourage Uzbekistan from regional integration as it does not wish to subordinate 
© Camilla Hagelund                                          King’s College London, Department of War Studies 
276 
 
itself to Kazakhstan (i/w Madumarov (#2/AC)), but, conversely, is keen to contest 
Kazakh leadership of the region (i/w DI). This rivalry affects also individual busi-
ness ventures thus reducing the potential for regionalisation between Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan, where it is suggested that Kazakh investors in Uzbekistan are 
more likely victims of racketeering as Uzbek authorities do not appreciate Ka-
zakhs succeeding (i/w Khakimzhanov (#6/BP)).  
Uzbekistan is the only state which borders all other CARs as well as Afghanistan. 
Reflecting the Uzbek centrality to Central Asian integration schemes, a World 
Bank working paper assessed the Uzbek application to join EurAsEC, which led 
to the merger of CACO with the former, as improving the likelihood of Central 
Asian integration (Byrd and Raiser, 2006: 8) – though in effect it promoted the 
trend towards Eurasian regionalism at the expense of Central Asian regionalism. 
A Tajik civil servant portrayed it as an example of Uzbekistan acting like a spoiler 
and wrecking the integration processes of EurAsEC (i/w Soliev (#31/GO)). In-
deed, Uzbekistan subsequently suspended its membership; and is widely believed 
to be the main obstacle to integration of Central Asia (i/w DI). Trushin and Trush-
in (2005: 358) have, for instance, argued that the Uzbek import substitution strat-
egy is the main reason for regional disunity, while Stine Torjesen (2007: 315) 
finds Uzbekistan to have been ‘a particularly unconstructive partner in coopera-
tion efforts’.58 The protectionist policies of Uzbekistan mean that neighbouring 
countries are erecting infrastructural links around Uzbekistan, as described above 
(i/w Soliev (#31/GO); DI), which may over time reduce the informal regionalisa-
tion between Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbours as it improves linkages 
circumventing the country and thereby lose Uzbekistan some of its strategic ad-
vantage derived from the central location in the region. As suggested above Uz-
bekistan may also, at a political level, be undermining the potential for regional 
cohesion in Central Asia as Kyrgyzstan seeks to join the Eurasian Customs Union 
and relations with Tajikistan worsen. 
                                                 
58
 For a similar argument see also Gleason, 2001: 1087. 
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Some suggest that the Uzbek disinclination towards cooperation stems from Ka-
rimov himself, not only with regards to Tajikistan but also in the case of Kyrgyz-
stan, where Karimov is said to lack belief in President Atambayev and conse-
quently have effectively ended bilateral relations (i/w DI). Despite the rivalry with 
Kazakhstan, the two countries are said to have respectful working relations (i/w 
2xWD), though a Kazakh government official suggested that the relationship ex-
hibits a strong element of façade (i/w GO). Indeed, Kazakhstan for its part is said 
to also be wary of integrating with Uzbekistan, fearing cultural assimilation given 
the small size of its population relative to that of Uzbekistan (i/w Madumarov 
(#2/AC)) as well as of entrepreneurial Uzbeks outcompeting them (i/w BA). 
Whereas Uzbekistan prefers bilateral measures, Kazakhstan is willing to engage in 
and seeks multilateral cooperation (i/w WD; Paramonov (#96/AC)). Multilateral-
ism is the instrument by which Kazakhstan can present itself as a bridge between 
the east and the west, the south and the north; establishing itself as the archetype 
of a Eurasian state (Schmitz, 2009: 17). Such argumentation points to the Kazakh 
leadership defining Kazakhstan as part of a Eurasian, not an exclusive Central 
Asian region.  
Kazakhstan acknowledges that its prosperity is dependent upon the prosperity of 
its neighbours (Weitz, 2008: 13) though the search for regional leadership is based 
not only on economic interests but also on the aim of achieving political stabilisa-
tion across the region (Schmitz, 2009: 5). This suggests a contrast with the poli-
cies of Uzbekistan, which seeks to isolate itself from the neighbours, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, which it considers unstable. As such, Kazakhstan may be more 
likely to emerge as the regional leader of any Central Asian integration efforts 
(i/w WD). In order to project a self-image of a regional power, Kazakhstan seeks 
to position itself as a leader in regional cooperation, and has for instance encour-
aged its closest partner in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan, to join the ECU (Ibid). The 
putative basis for such regional leadership is to be found in Kazakhstan’s image of 
itself as the regional source of stability and economic growth (Jafar, 2004: 201). 
Indeed, Kazakhstan is seen to be leading the region in terms of soft power, attract-
ing labour migrants (Vinokurov and Libman, 2011: 56; i/w WD)  -in 2013 Ka-
zakhstan eased registration procedures for migrant workers employed by house-
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holds or microbusinesses (Weitz, 2014b)-  and investing across the region, for 
instance in mineral extraction and financial services in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
(i/w GO; Madumarov (#2/AC); NN; Norling, 2012; Weitz, 2013c). Kazakhstan is 
willing not only to invest in the Kyrgyz hydro-power project Karamba-ata but 
believes it can contribute to controlling tensions between other Central Asian 
states by doing so (i/w WD). Moreover, Kazakhstan has introduced a develop-
ment aid vehicle mostly focused on Kyrgyzstan (i/w WD; BA). Similarly, Ka-
zakhstan is seeking to establish itself as a credible partner of Tajikistan, where it 
has few economic interests (i/w WD), possibly more security related concerns 
(i/w WS). President Nazarbayev recently announced that Kazakhstan has become 
an important trade and investment partner for Tajikistan with Kazakh investment 
in Tajikistan exceeding USD 125 million. Nazarbayev emphasised the intention to 
further increase ties with a particular emphasis on agricultural and food produc-
tion as well as construction materials (KazInform, 2014). 
Nevertheless, while Kazakhstan sees itself as the leading state in Central Asia, it 
does not exclusively consider itself as a part of a Central Asian region but rather 
as an essential player in a wider Eurasian region including Russia (Bohr, 2004: 
493).This is evident from the active participation in the Russian-led Eurasian inte-
gration schemes. Considering the above-discussed reluctance of both Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan, not to mention Turkmenistan, to engage in Russian-led multilat-
eral fora, the Kazakh orientation may contribute to the disintegration of Central 
Asia as a region, and undermine Kazakhstan’s potential to emerge as a regional 
leader. By participating in and promoting the Russian-led Eurasian integration 
scheme, Kazakhstan is putting itself in a position of regional leadership inferior to 
that of Russia. As discussed above, political transition in Kazakhstan may result in 
a change of direction of foreign economic policy. In the meantime, however, there 
are also signs that the isolation of Russia following events in Ukraine is leading 
the Kazakh government to refocus attention towards Central Asia. Kazakh For-
eign Minister Idrisov in April 2014 spoke of the need to promote Central Asian 
integration, interpreted by local analysts as a response to the threat of sanctions 
against the Russian economy (Kapital, 2014). For now, however, both Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan appear to be contributing to the fragmentation of Central Asian 
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regional cohesion; Kazakhstan through the promotion of the competing Eurasian 
project, which alienates Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Uzbekistan through protec-
tionist and isolationist policies that may be pushing at least Kyrgyzstan towards 
Eurasian integration. 
4.2.7 Other areas of cooperation 
While obstacles to integration may vary little from policy area to policy area, 
some suggest that there is more interest in cooperating on security matters. How-
ever, self-contradictorily, security is defined as self-reliance (i/w AC). The em-
phasis on self-sufficiency corresponds to a short-termist approach that inhibits the 
development of cooperative behaviour (Paramonov, 2006b: 57). Access to and use 
of the region’s water resources is a critical case in point. While many believe that 
agreement on the sharing of the region’s water would benefit all, potentially 
changing the political landscape of the region, cooperation on the issue appears 
unattainable despite attempts at mediation from external actors (i/w WD; AC; 
FB). To be sure, some suggest that control over resources, such as water, lie at the 
heart of the intraregional differences (i/w IO); and, as suggested by the Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG) the issue has become securitised to the extent that use 
of force is considered a real possibility (ICG, 2002: ii; i/w Bjorvatn (#47/IO)). 
Indeed, one interlocutor in the region suggested that the international community 
in Tajikistan was more concerned with reactions from Uzbekistan regarding the 
Rogun dam, than the impact of potential instability in Afghanistan post-2014 (i/w 
Bjorvatn (#47/IO)).  
The tendency towards self-sufficiency is not only explained by the emphasis put 
on protecting national sovereignty but also in a widespread feeling of mistrust 
between the states. For instance, the Uzbeks doubt the ability of the Kyrgyz and, 
particularly, the Tajik governments to control radical elements of society, which 
to some degree explains the harsh border controls imposed by the Uzbek regime 
(i/w WD; Bendsen (#97/IA)). As such promoting cooperation on issues of security 
is, at best, equally challenging. 
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4.2.8 The prominent role of the state 
Following The Logic of Regional Integration, the theoretical framework applied 
to the analysis, bottom-up demand for regional coordination is a “critical” ingre-
dient and requisite condition for economic integration (Mattli, 1999: 190). The 
framework also emphasises the need for demand forces to be complemented by 
supply conditions  -that is willing governments, regional leadership and commit-
ment institutions-  for integration to be successful (Ibid). The preceding analysis, 
however, questions whether these parameters accurately capture the dynamics 
behind the development of integration frameworks in the case under study. 
In Kazakhstan, for instance, there appears to be a high level of scepticism and 
opposition among businesses towards the integration scheme pursued by the gov-
ernment, suggesting that bottom-up driven demand is absent or weak and that the 
driver behind integration therefore is state demand. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, 
where the business community is comparatively strong and vibrant, the govern-
ment preference for Eurasian integration does not reflect bottom-up driven de-
mand for this. Thus, again, it appears that the state is the main or sole driver be-
hind integration policy.  
That top-down preferences dominate over bottom-up demands as regards the for-
mulation of integration policy may reflect that it is considered an issue of foreign 
policy, not merely commercial policy, and thus a subject area off limits for busi-
ness lobbies. Doubtless, the marginalisation of the business voice stems from its 
weakness. Generally business communities across Central Asia are weakly organ-
ised, in some countries business sector advocacy is even dominated by state-
sponsored organisations, particularly in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through 
Atameken and the SPPT, respectively. Thus, on the surface it may appear that the 
business community in Kazakhstan supports the official policy with Atameken 
directly involved in the process – but as discussed in section 4.1, dissenting or 
sceptical voices dominate the business community beyond Atameken.  
While the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan may not be 
pursuing regional integration policies, the analysis here is similar. Particularly in 
Uzbekistan, there is arguably an unarticulated demand for better conditions for 
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regional trade, if not directly regional integration; yet the government pursues a 
policy of economic isolation. This discrepancy may in part be explained by the 
unarticulated nature of businesses preference for international trade but additional-
ly reflects the privileged position of the state in society.  
The prominence of the state implies that economic integration is unlikely to func-
tion as a trust-building mechanism that would enable integration in Central Asia 
to spill over into other areas of cooperation as has been the case in Europe and 
Southeast Asia. 
4.2.9 Summary 
As suggested in the introduction to the section, the nature of political regimes in 
Central Asia would suggest that elites in power will impede political or economic 
reforms, seeking to maintain vested interests. Indeed, the analyses of each CAR 
confirmed such tendencies among the national economic and political elites. 
However, the dynamics were tempered by other mediating factors enabling the 
governments in some countries to pursue policies, which parts of the elite find 
detrimental to their interests. Kazakhstan is the prime example of this, where Pres-
ident Nazarbayev is pursuing a policy of regional economic integration with Rus-
sia, which many within the elite find unpalatable and a risk to their vested inter-
ests. Conversely, the Uzbek leadership appears to be tied into its economic policy 
because disruption to current rent appropriating patterns may upset the political 
balance. In Kyrgyzstan opposition to Eurasian integration exist within a fragment-
ed elite but with the need for international financial aid, the Kyrgyz government 
appears to consider itself without other choice than to integrate with its northern 
neighbours. Tajikistan is similarly vulnerable to Russian leverage, though for 
now, the political elite resists the idea of joining the ECU with political and eco-
nomic power effectively centred on the presidency. Latterly, the Turkmen gov-
ernment is continuing its policy of neutrality, though at the same time seeking to 
extend international political and economic relations on a bilateral basis.  
In the light of such internal political situations, it appears unlikely that one of the 
underlying factors working against regional integration in Central Asia is the lack 
of knowledge and shared understanding among the leaderships of the cost and 
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benefits involved, as some have suggested (above). Indeed, there appears in sev-
eral cases to be a full understanding of the potential disruption reforms would 
bring to the status quo and vested interests that are holding back change. Howev-
er, other factors suggested  -such as the importance attached to sovereignty-  may 
indeed continue to play a role. The absence of border delimitation between several 
Central Asian states continues to affect both bilateral relations at national levels 
but also disrupt cross-border trade patterns. Even in Kazakhstan, arguably the 
country whose government is most comfortable with regional integration, the 
leadership is jealously guarding its political sovereignty while accepting pooling 
of economic policy-making powers. Twenty years of independence has naturally 
improved the experience of leaders and bureaucracies as regards conducting inter-
national relations, though at the political level, some bilateral relationships con-
tinue to suffer from personal animosities. At the bureaucratic level evidence is 
mixed. It is clear, for instance, that in the case of Kazakhstan’s negotiations with 
Russia and Belarus on Eurasian integration, the negotiating team has been heavily 
criticised for a lack of appreciation of Kazakh interests. However, more recently 
in negotiations around the EaEU, the Kazakh negotiators have claimed a series of 
successes. 
Kazakhstan is emerging as a regional leader in Central Asia through both the soft 
power of attraction and active investments in neighbouring countries. However, 
by pursuing Eurasian integration, Kazakhstan may be undermining its potential 
for regional leadership in Central Asia, as it subordinates itself to Russia in this 
framework. Moreover, while Kyrgyzstan is assuming an adoptive pose vis-à-vis 
Eurasian integration, the project is alienating Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan, suggesting that Eurasian regionalism may be driving disintegration of 
Central Asia as a region. In this context, the role of WTO membership is also in-
teresting. In Kazakhstan, opposition to the ECU and EaEU see the WTO as a 
means of balancing Russian influence on the Kazakh economy. Similarly, it was 
suggested that Tajikistan entered the WTO with a view to fending off Russian 
attempts to attract Tajikistan to the ECU. Latterly, Turkmenistan  -averse to any 
regional integration scheme-  is also considering integration in the global econo-
my via the WTO. Thus, three competing notions of economic integration may be 
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considered at play in Central Asia: Central Asian, Eurasian and global; the former 
enjoying the least support among the political elites. 
4.3 Summary 
The analysis of present chapter has explored the demand for and supply of region-
al integration policies in Central Asia in the sphere of economic policy. While 
many groups in society  -from migrants to consumers-  may benefit from regional 
economic integration, businesses are the only stakeholder group sufficiently or-
ganised to potentially demand market integration. There is some demand among 
regional businesses for better opportunities to trade within Central Asia, and at 
least one regional network of business associations has sought to promote 
measures for improvement. However, the majority of businesses are not growth-
oriented, either owing to a lack of free market-mentality or attempts to circumvent 
or avoid barriers to business growth, domestically and internationally. This is in-
dicative of limits to the demand for market enlargement on part of businesses, 
which often stay small or operate informally. Moreover, Central Asian societies 
appear inclined towards stability, and in many cases stakeholders, thus, prefer to 
remain silent, or opt for exit rather than voice.  
The degree of organisation and effectiveness of business associations varies sig-
nificantly across the region. Kyrgyzstan has a number of strong associations that 
operate in a representative manner, reflecting through bottom-up processes the 
interests of their members. Similar associations are developing in Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan; though they appear on the whole to be relatively weaker. Such busi-
ness associations often consider lobbying governments for the protection and 
promotion of rights of their members their primary function; however, their ef-
forts are mostly focused on domestic business environments. In Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan the voice of the private sector is dominated by top-driven, more or 
less state-directed associations, Atameken and the SPPT. Both are to varying de-
grees, considered to promote private sector interests despite their links to political 
authorities. Generally the strength of a business association or group of businesses 
reflects their contribution to the national economy. Thus, for instance, the IBC is 
considered powerful in Kyrgyzstan and in Uzbekistan it appears that private sec-
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tor interests significantly contributing to national income, namely the tourism op-
erators, can influence policy making. On the whole, however, the influence on 
policy making of business associations appears to be limited. 
The supply of economic integration policies in Central Asia varies significantly. 
All Central Asian republics are characterised by a fusion of economic and politi-
cal power, but the interests of and constellation of the domestic elites lead to di-
verging policies. In Turkmenistan, President Berdymukhamedov is firmly in pow-
er and controls the country’s hydro-carbon resources, enabling him to dictate poli-
cy, while maintaining the wider elite in check. While gradually opening the coun-
try’s economy, the government maintains the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality, 
thus, restricting potential for any form of regional integration. President Rakhmon 
is believed to be firmly in control of Tajikistan, and the country’s economic and 
political resources. The leadership appears keen to limit Russian influence in the 
country, and is thus seeking to avert membership of Eurasian integration institu-
tions. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, appears resigned to having no choice but to 
join the Russian-led ECU; needing external financial resources to sustain the 
country’s economy but also seeking to reduce dependencies on regional neigh-
bours Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
In Uzbekistan, President Karimov’s hold on power appears to be less firm. Con-
sequently, the government is maintaining current economic policy, ensuring that 
the fragile balance between elite factions is maintained through safeguarding of 
vested interests in rent seeking. This restricts any notion of economic integration 
with neighbouring countries. Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s protectionist policies 
may be contributing to fragmentation of Central Asia at a political level, for in-
stance adding impetus to Kyrgyzstan’s Eurasian integration path. Kazakhstan is 
pursuing the most pro-integrationist policy in the region, actively driving forward 
the Eurasian integration project, including encouraging Kyrgyz membership. Ka-
zakhstan is keen to be seen as the regional leader in Central Asia, though perceiv-
ing itself as a member not of an exclusive Central Asian region but a wider Eura-
sian community. The Kazakh promotion of Eurasian regionalism may undermine 
its contention for regional leadership. Firstly, Eurasian integration, not only over-
laps geographically with the notion of Central Asian regionalism but appears to be 
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driving a wedge between Central Asian states with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan unwilling to engage. Secondly, Kazakhstan inevitably plays a sec-
ondary role to Russia in the ECU and EaEU. At the same time, however, the sus-
tainability of Kazakhstan’s pro-Eurasian integration path is uncertain. With signif-
icant uneasiness in the Kazakh elite surrounding increasing Russian influence in 
the country, it is unclear that a post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan will continue along 
the same path. Moreover, the economic isolation of Russia following annexation 
of Crimea may be inducing Kazakhstan to shift priorities towards Central Asia. 
The analysis questions the basic framework applied by revealing the governments 
of Central Asia as the sources of demand for integration – to the extent that de-
mand is present. With demand for integration in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  
-the only CARs pursuing regional integration-  led by the countries’ governments, 
the analysis suggests a shortcoming of the theoretical framework, according to 
which governments are (potential) suppliers of policies demanded by wider socie-
ty, business communities in particular. The privileged position of the state in Cen-
tral Asia, and the tendency for most governments to block Central Asian econom-
ic integration, also questions the notion that trade facilitation and economic inte-
gration may act as trust-building mechanisms that could aid cooperation in other 
areas.  
Current dynamics in terms of demand for and supply of regionalism as well as the 
constellation of regional leadership dynamics do not favour Central Asian region-
alism. Rather the competing notion of Eurasian integration is gaining ground, 
though also challenged by aspirations for wider global economic integration via 
the WTO. Nevertheless, the subsequent chapter will consider the primary research 
question posed. That is, whether external actors may facilitate regional integration 
in Central Asia.   
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Chapter 5 Central Asian regionalism through interregionalism? 
A number of external actors are currently engaging Central Asian republics 
through regional approaches. For instance, Japan through the Central Asia plus 
Japan Forum, Korea through the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, and the 
EU through its Central Asia strategy. Moreover, China and Russia are engaging 
the CARs through the SCO, a regional organisation, while Russia is also leading 
other regional outfits, including some or all CARs such as the CIS and the ECU. 
The previous chapters have explored whether the underlying dynamics enabling 
region-building are present for such wider or inter-regional frameworks to build 
on in the area of trade as well as the trade patterns of the CARs and the potential 
impact on such of regional economic integration. Following on from this, this, 
last, chapter explores the potential for external actors to promote regional trade 
facilitation and integration in Central Asia. 
An external actor may imbue enforcement capacity and credibility to regional 
reform attempts, as suggested by the literature on developed-developing country 
integration. As such, this would be a function akin to commitment institutions 
which, according to The Logic of Regional Integration, are a critical feature of 
successful regional integration schemes, which ensure that all participants act ac-
cording to agreed rules. Interlocutors in the region are cognisant of this very dy-
namic. Entering international obligations give domestic stakeholders, such as 
business associations, an anchor by which to hold governments to account. Put-
ting pressure on government to comply with international obligations made can be 
an effective means of affecting policy and ensuring implementation (i/w Usken-
baeva (#83/BA)). Similarly, foreign investment can be the trigger of political 
change as it gives external actors a stake in the economic development of a coun-
try, or indeed, region (i/w AC). As suggested in the previous chapter also integra-
tion with GVCs may contribute to economic development by raising compliance 
with international quality standards and may protect businesses from government 
interference, as governments acknowledge the risk of disrupting such international 
business links.  
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The preceding analysis of trade relations of the Central Asian republics suggested, 
on the one hand, that increasing intra-regional trade requires active trade facilita-
tion. The CARs continue to over-trade amongst themselves, and would thus bene-
fit from taking cooperative measures aimed at regional trade facilitation. From the 
perspective of Central Asia, the findings suggest that intra-regional integration 
would be beneficial on two accounts. Firstly, it could, if designed accordingly, 
increase the scope for intra-regional trade, and, secondly, could increase the 
shared scope for external trade of the Central Asian republics. The analysis, fur-
thermore, indicated that the CARs may benefit from negotiating and entering ex-
ternal trade agreements collectively. The countries’ patterns of over-trading and 
having unexploited trade potential beyond the region are very similar. The repub-
lics’ have a shared interest in pursuing trade facilitation measures with former 
Soviet partners, Europe and China and to some extent Japan and Korea. Mean-
while, Southeast and South Asia generally offers unexploited potential to be 
tapped into without necessarily taking policy measures. The analysis indicated 
that the proposed integration scenarios would not significantly alter the pattern of 
extra-regional trade. Latterly, the analysis suggested that an extension of the ECU 
to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could have trade diverting effects and could 
reduce the total external trade of its members, while indicating that Central Asian 
integration may boost external trade levels. Meanwhile, integration between Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it was suggested, could lead to trade crea-
tion.  
The analysis of Central Asian demand for and supply of regionalism policies 
found that demand for market enlargement and regional integration is limited and 
that, to the extent that it has voice, it is generally ineffective in swaying govern-
ment policies. While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are both pursuing economic 
integration policies aimed at Eurasian integration with Russia, this does not direct-
ly reflect demand of business communities, and may be driven more by political 
calculations than business demand. Vested interests in the status quo are signifi-
cant obstacles to opening trade regimes across the region, particularly in Uzbeki-
stan and Turkmenistan. The analysis, thus, suggests that for regional integration to 
develop organically in Central Asia, deficiencies on both the demand and supply 
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side must be addressed. Vested interests hinder governments from pursuing eco-
nomic reform, including trade facilitation or indeed integration measures; and the 
same vested interests, manifest in weak business environments, inhibit growth-
oriented business models. While the economic analysis indicated that the CARs 
could benefit from collectively pursuing trade agreements with external actors, the 
analysis of demand and supply of regional integration policies, thus, question the 
likelihood of such course of action. Indeed, the primary obstacle to economic re-
forms, including trade facilitation measures, appears to be vested interests in the 
status quo. With regional dynamics working against Central Asian regionalism 
and region-building are efforts by external actors aimed at improving coordination 
within the region premature?  
Below the European, Japanese and Korean as well as Russian and Chinese initia-
tives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in or beyond Central Asia will be 
reviewed in the light of these findings. This will be informed by the theory of in-
terregionalism, particularly, the functions of balancing, institution-building and 
collective identity formation. The former suggest that interregional frameworks 
can be used inter alia as a tool for balancing the influence of other actors, while 
collective identity formation suggest that an interregional dialogue can build or 
strengthen the regional identity of one or both actors. This may happen as ‘region-
alism through interregionalism’, whereby the interregional cooperation forces 
coordination on the weaker of the two engaging regions, as well as individual 
states pursuing a regionalist agenda through the interregional fora. Collective 
identity formation, alternatively, may occur through external cogency arising ei-
ther from expected benefits from integration or a common external threat. The 
analysis of the frameworks are summarised in table 5.1 according to the functions 
of interregionalism as discussed in chapter 1. 
5.1 Central Asia plus Japan 
The Central Asia plus Japan dialogue celebrated its tenth anniversary this year 
with a reaffirmation of the commitment to strengthen regional cooperation in Cen-
tral Asia from all Central Asian Foreign Ministers at the dialogue’s biannual 
summit (Central Asia plus Japan, 2014). While a Japanese diplomat describes the 
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Central Asia plus Japan Forum as effective, he also cautions that success requires 
much more facilitation (i/w Yuzo (#15/AD)), and there is no direct evidence to 
suggest that ten years of dialogue through the forum has contributed to collective 
identity or institution-building at the regional level. As discussed in section 2.3.4, 
the limited impact of the dialogue may be due to the wide variety of issues cov-
ered and the lack of mutual understanding. Moreover, as uncovered in the previ-
ous chapter, a primary obstacle to regionalism in Central Asia is the vested inter-
ests in the status quo. While Japan does support democratic reforms, it does not 
apply conditionality on aid and investment, as discussed in section 2.3.4; the fo-
rum, therefore, maybe ill-equipped to promote regionalism. 
Japan does not seek to compete with other external actors for influence. However, 
as discussed in section 2.3.4 the shift in emphasis from Eurasia to Central Asian 
regionalism does suggest the deliberate exclusion of Russia. Moreover, the forum 
serves the purpose of balancing the influence of Russia and China from the per-
spective of the Central Asian republics (i/w 2xWD). 
Central Asian republics are mostly interested in imports from Japan, particularly 
of investment and technology (i/w TT; AC). As a Central Asian civil servant ex-
plained: if you want to change the structure of your economy, the Asia-Pacific is 
one region to look to (i/w GO). While Japan has unexploited trade potential to 
some Central Asian republics, notably Kazakhstan, there is no collective need for 
trade facilitation measures from the perspective of the CARs. It is, therefore, un-
clear that there is mutual interest in pursuing a common platform for trade and 
investment facilitation, which might provide positive external cogency for Central 
Asian regionalism. However, a recent decision by Toyota to locate knock-down 
production facilities in Kazakhstan, possibly spurred on by Kazakhstan’s integra-
tion with Russia through the ECU (i/w Yuzo (#15/AD)), suggests some potential 
for integration into Japanese-led RVCs. 
Though the dialogue forum has not encouraged regionalism in Central Asia, the 
joint statements from biannual summits indicate that the forum performs other 
functions typical to interregional frameworks. Particularly, rationalising and 
agenda-setting in relation to other multilateral fora with, for instance, repeated 
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emphasis on the need for reform of the UN system (Central Asia plus Japan, 
2012; Central Asia plus Japan, 2014). 
Overall, the Central Asia plus Japan Forum offers little potential for facilitating 
regional cohesiveness in Central Asia through collective identity formation or 
institution-building. There is not a clear picture of shared interest in pursuing 
trade facilitation, which could provide positive external cogency.  
5.2 Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum 
The Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, launched in 2007, has a more dis-
tinct economic focus with discussions including economic zones, trade, invest-
ment, energy and tourism in addition to ecology and cultural exchanges (i/w NN; 
AD). Generally, the CARs are considered to take an active interest in the forum, 
not engaging as passive participants but giving input and bringing initiatives to the 
fore (Ibid). The forum serves the purpose of balancing the influence of Russia and 
China from the perspective of the Central Asian republics (i/w 2xWD). Korea 
itself does not seek to compete with or replace Russian and Chinese influence in 
the region but aims to develop trade links (i/w NN).  
As both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have reached their export potential to Korea, 
they may enjoy a shared interest in pursuing a common trade facilitation frame-
work. Korea, similarly, may see an interest in this having exceeded its export po-
tential to Uzbekistan, notably, but also reached its potential for exports to other 
CARs. However, while Korean businesses do consider Central Asia a regional 
market, it is mostly SMEs that are active, which perhaps are less likely to push for 
a Korean common trade facilitation framework (i/w NN; AD). Korean businesses 
are particularly interested in the agribusiness, textile, mining and health sectors in 
Central Asia (i/w NN; AC). This is reflected in sub-forums on cooperation within 
for instance textiles. This group originally included only Kazakhstan, Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan but Kyrgyzstan is now looking to join (i/w NN). Thus, the 
Forum appears to foster functional cooperation among the Central Asian repub-
lics. The active participation of Uzbekistan is taken as a sign of this, as the coun-
try is usually considered relatively less cooperative (Ibid). The CARs are mostly 
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interested in imports and investment from Korea (i/w TT); as one civil servant 
noted Asia-Pacific is a region to look to, if you want to change the structure of 
your economy (i/w GO). The annual meetings of the Forum provide a platform on 
which the CARs in turn provide presentations on their economies and investment 
opportunities for a Korean audience (i/w NN). These presentations are seen to 
increase the interest of Korean business in the Central Asian markets and widen 
this interest beyond Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Ibid). 
Despite the active interest and participation in the forum, there is no direct evi-
dence that it has contributed to collective identity formation in Central Asia. Ko-
rea has sought to institutionalise the Cooperation Forum suggesting in 2013 to 
establish an organisational framework to support the Forum. The Central Asians 
have not formally agreed to this and no concrete measures have yet been taken. 
The CARs are described as having neither approved, nor disapproved of the sug-
gestion for institutional development (i/w NN), thus it is too early to say if Korea 
will be successful in this endeavour; indeed Korea expects that this at best will 
evolve over the long term (ibid).  
There may be potential for shared economic benefits through cooperation on trade 
facilitation, and some functional cooperation occurs in certain economic areas. 
Indeed, the areas of interest of Korean businesses in Central Asia, to a certain ex-
tent, overlap with the potential comparative advantages discussed in chapter 2. 
However, the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum has not yet contributed to 
regional cohesiveness in Central Asia through either identity formation or institu-
tion-building. 
5.3 EU and Central Asia – a new interregional partnership? 
‘The European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ main-
tained an intention for the EU to facilitate dialogue and cooperation in Central 
Asia, as discussed in section 2.3.4. This does not suggest that the CARs are seen 
as being similar but reflects recognition of the transboundary nature of many chal-
lenges facing the region (i/w WD). The EU’s advantage in approaching issues on 
a regional basis lies in its understanding and experience of multilateralism (i/w 
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AC). Nevertheless, as suggested above, the EU’s approach to Central Asia is 
pragmatic. Transboundary challenges are considered difficult to handle at the re-
gional level, and in practice are approached bilaterally (i/w WD); to the extent that 
some would suggest the strategy is not reflective of reality (i/w NN). For instance, 
technical assistance on border delimitation in the Fergana Valley was offered on 
bilateral basis in the form of equipment and training; yet Uzbekistan still opted 
not to engage (i/w WD). Moreover, as was discussed in section 2.3.4, the EU’s 
engagement on border and security-related challenges may be counter-productive, 
contributing to the securitisation of borders. Also, De Danieli’s assertion that the 
strengthening of security apparatuses through anti-drug trafficking programmes 
has enabled the entrenchment of the ruling elite’s hold on power in Tajikistan, 
suggests that such initiatives are counter-productive to trade facilitation because 
of the elite’s vested interests in the status quo.  
Former EU Special Representative for Central Asia Patricia Flor herself appeared 
sceptical as to whether the EU could play a mediating or facilitating role in intra-
regional relations, suggesting that the EU’s role is to offer advice and examples 
from its own experience on how to improve cooperation (Flor, 2013: 5). Moreo-
ver, Flor has stressed that external partners must have patience with Central Asian 
republics, who take a long term, or slow-pace, approach to reform (Muckenhuber, 
2013). The ambitions of the EU in terms of contributing to region-building, or 
collective identity-formation, in Central Asia are thus limited.  
The EU’s leverage rests on the attractiveness of European modernity. As one dip-
lomat notes, if one aspires to modernity in the form of the rule of law and security 
of investment, one does not turn to China (i/w WD). This sentiment was echoed 
by a Central Asian civil servant suggesting that Europe was a region to look to if 
one aspired to reform a country’s economic structure (i/w GO). The EU is seen to 
have much to offer in terms of technical assistance to lift product standards, im-
prove transit times as well as on softer issues of marketing, including product 
placement and branding (i/w WD). Indeed, Central Asian states are perceived to 
aspire to the EU’s rule of law norms and educational and technological standard 
(i/w WD); the power of attraction of European norms are seen for instance in Ka-
zakhstan’s 2050 Strategy, where the word ‘European’ is typically followed by 
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‘standards’ (i/w WD). However, there are limits to attractive power with Central 
Asian states reacting negatively to the European attempts of human rights promo-
tion (i/w WD). Indeed by pushing the Central Asian states on human rights norms, 
the EU is seen to park itself on the side-lines (i/w WD). This suggests that there 
are limits to the potential for an external actor to promote regionalism in Central 
Asia. Issues of human rights, the rule of law and democracy can be considered 
key to breaking the vested interests behind the status quo. If an external actor, 
such as the EU, cannot realistically influence the Central Asian republics in this 
regard, it is unlikely that it will be able to further regional cohesiveness through 
facilitation of cooperation or integration. Moreover, as Laruelle and Peyrouse 
(2013: 59) have suggested, the exclusion of Central Asia from the Eastern Part-
nership programme removed the potential for positive external cogency through 
the partnership by limiting the carrots available to the CARs. Indeed, the EU is 
not perceived as a big player in the region, for instance, in Tajikistan, where the 
EU  -by its own standards-  are spending significant sums, it is not perceived as 
such by Tajiks (i/w 2xWD).  
The EU also is a difficult entity for CARs to engage with. On the one hand, there 
may be a preference to deal with member states rather than the Brussels bureau-
cracy (i/w WD; WS) but more fundamentally Central Asian governments are said 
not to fully appreciate the difference between bilateral and multilateral relations 
(i/w 2xWD), and in extreme cases perceive of the EU as a separate European state 
(i/w WD). Meanwhile, rivalry between Russia and China in the region is seen to 
serve EU interests (i/w WD) creating a space for manoeuvre in which the EU’s 
relative distance to the region also plays to its advantage (i/w WD; NN). Indeed, 
the CARs are keen to use relations with the EU to balance the influence of Russia 
and China (i/w 2xWD). For Kazakhstan, the EU is its largest trade and investment 
partner, and key to balancing the economic influence of Russia and China (i/w 
WS). Consequently, Kazakhstan is not pushing to shift its dialogue with the EU to 
the ECU level (i/w NN), where Russia would influence the negotiations. From the 
perspective of the EU Kazakh ECU membership is, however, problematic. While 
the EU, being a customs union itself, values the economic principles thereof, the 
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ECU is perceived as a political project hindering members’ relations with third 
parties (i/w WD).  
The EU instead has agreed an enhanced partnership agreement with Kazakhstan, 
said to be largely identical to the agreements reached with Moldova and other 
Eastern Partnership countries (i/w WD). The preceding analysis of trade relation-
ships suggest that similar trade facilitation measures are warranted with regards to 
each Central Asian republic, and thus proposing a collective framework for trade 
facilitation between the EU and the CARs may be a means by which the EU could 
provide positive external cogency for Central Asian region-building. There is 
some European interest in agribusiness and in the production and sales of textiles 
in Central Asian agribusiness in Central Asia (i/w AC; WD; EN; DI), again corre-
sponding to the discussed potential for creating new comparative advantages. It 
will, however, require significant investment in Central Asia to enable production 
at quality standards required for export to the EU (i/w BA) limiting the impact of 
such potential positive cogency. Nevertheless, there may be potential for location 
of assembly or production of equipment, machinery and vehicles for sale in the 
region, as does already happen to a limited extent (i/w 2xNN; DI). One interlocu-
tor cautioned, however, that currently some assembly production has only been 
located in the region to appease the local government, not because it is a profita-
ble investment (i/w NN).  
Despite the proclamations, the implementation of the EU strategy in Central Asia 
does not practically aim for either collective identity formation or regional institu-
tion-building. On the one hand, this reflects pragmatism about what may be 
achieved; on the other, it reflects limited interest on part of the EU. While the EU 
would like to cast itself as a world player, and therefore is active across the globe; 
economically, the EU has only one interest in Central Asia: Kazakhstan (i/w WD). 
Moreover, initiatives in the sphere of security may be undermining initiatives 
aimed at trade facilitation. 
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5.4 Russia and Eurasian integration 
Russia’s relationship with Central Asia does not sit comfortably under the notion 
of interregionalism. To the extent that Russian policy towards Central Asia aims 
at framing collective identity this is aimed at a shared Eurasian orientation with 
Russia at the core. For instance, in a Q&A session, live broadcast in August 2014, 
Putin reminded viewers that the Eurasian integration project is based on the phi-
losophy of Eurasianism, which has Russia at its heart, and is something the Ka-
zakhs have decided to join (Putin, 2014). Eurasian integration, perhaps more im-
portantly, serves to promote certain tangible Russian interests (i/w NN) such as 
creating an Eastern buffer zone towards China (i/w Khusainov (#26/AC)). As 
such it has a balancing function of reducing the influence of China in Central 
Asia, and arguably is intended to serve a similar purpose in relation to the EU’s 
impact in Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus. Other direct Russian interests 
include opening neighbouring markets to Russian business and establishing con-
trol over these economies (i/w Askarov (#27/JO); Shamiev (#71/LE); WD). Cen-
tral Asian manufacturers struggle to compete in the Russian market but there is 
demand for Central Asian agricultural and food produce (i/w Altaev (#17/GO)); 
even more so since Russia embargoed Western food imports (Rickleton, 2014a). 
As discussed, Central Asia could build comparative advantage in agribusiness, 
and having access to a large market in Russia may facilitate this.  
Russian policy does not provide external cogency for Central Asia as a whole; in 
fact, Russian policy appears to have almost a directly opposite effect driving a 
wedge, in the form of the Eurasian integration project, between Central Asian 
republics. Kazakhstan pursues the Eurasian integration path based on an expecta-
tion to benefit from it, and has itself been a driving force of such integration. The 
Kyrgyz response is also adoptive as the country seeks to join the ECU. Tajikistan, 
on the other hand, is  -for now-  taking a reactive stance against Eurasian integra-
tion – as are Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. As discussed above, Tajik WTO entry 
may be seen as a means by which to complicate a Eurasian integration path. Thus, 
Russian foreign policy through the pursuit of Eurasian integration is inhibiting the 
cohesion of a Central Asian region. Russia has significant leverage in its relations 
with Tajikistan (as well as Kyrgyzstan) as both are highly reliant on Russia for 
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labour migrant remittances as well as energy and fuel deliveries (i/w Khusainov 
(#26/AC); Soliev (#31/GO); WS; 2xWD; Ahmetova (#70/GO); Shamiev 
(#71/LE)). To paraphrase one Tajik official: ‘Russia does not allow Tajikistan to 
make independent economic decisions’ (i/w Soliev (#31/GO)), which suggests 
that the Tajik government’s stance on Eurasian integration may change over time. 
Nevertheless, paradoxically, Russia appears, at the same time, to contribute to 
Turkmenistan’s rapprochement with other Central Asian republics. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are increasingly cooperat-
ing on infrastructural projects, which reduce their dependence on Russia for trans-
it, thereby increasing their interdependence. 
Russia’s current policy with regards to separatist forces in Ukraine is unsettling 
Central Asian governments, and may to some extent be causing a degree of re-
gional re-alignment within Central Asia. Uzbekistan has refrained from backing 
Russia in this regard, which may paradoxically lead to improved relations with 
Tajikistan. It has been suggested that to balance its implicit critique of Russia’s 
role in Ukraine, the Uzbek government is becoming more forthcoming towards 
Tajikistan, inter alia, enabling increasing food exports from Tajikistan to Russia 
(Mukhametrakhimova and Faskhutdinov, 2014). More widely, however, the gen-
eral impact of Russia’s policies towards Ukraine is likely to deepen Uzbekistan’s 
orientation towards East Asian and Western partners (Lillis, 2014d). Erlan Karin 
suspects that the situation in Ukraine is entrenching Kazakh reluctance to deepen 
integration with Russia (Central Asia Program, 2014: 3). Indeed as Annette Bohr 
(2014) has emphasised, the concerns are particularly pertinent for Kazakhstan, 
which has a long land border with Russia and the second largest ethnic Russian 
population outside of Russia. This proposition is further emphasised by Russia’s 
announcement primo September 2014 to hold military exercises near the border to 
Kazakhstan (Lillis, 2014b). As suggested above, there are signs that the economic 
isolation of Russia following events in Ukraine is leading the Kazakh government 
to refocus attention towards Central Asia. Kazakh Foreign Minister Idrisov in 
April 2014, thus, spoke of the need to promote Central Asian integration, inter-
preted by local analysts as a response to the threat of sanctions against the Russian 
economy (Kapital, 2014). Russia also is seen to be holding up Kazakh WTO 
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membership (i/w WD) out of concern that the Kazakh market should become 
more competitive than Russia; the latter not seen to be implementing its WTO 
commitments (i/w WD). As elite opposition to Eurasian integration favours Ka-
zakh WTO membership, such policy may also be entrenching opposition to the 
EaEU in the Kazakh elite, just as Russia’s Ukraine policy is driving anti-Eurasian 
sentiment in the wider public, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Russian policy appears to have a mostly divisive impact on Central Asia. Through 
the promotion of Eurasian regionalism, the potential for Central Asian regional-
ism is undermined, while the prospect of the collective inclusion of all five Cen-
tral Asian states in the Eurasian project appears remote. The question remains, 
however, whether the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s role in this may be 
tempering this trend 
5.5 China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Russia has traditionally been the dominant external power in Central Asia, but is 
increasingly challenged by China’s economic influence. China is now seen as one 
of two main strategic partners for the CARs (i/w 2xGO; 2xNN). One interlocutor 
described China as ‘the silent merchant’ and Russia as ‘the reluctant soldier’ (i/w 
NN), neatly indicating the dominance of China in economic affairs, where Russia 
is seen to be relatively less active (i/w Umarov (#45/AC)) despite its efforts to-
wards integrating the Central Asian economies into the ECU. Such images rein-
force a suspicion that Eurasian integration is not driven by economic but political 
objectives. 
While much of China’s activity in Central Asia is conducted under the SCO um-
brella, the approach is largely bilateral (Kaukenov, 2013). The regional element of 
the SCO is perceived as part of China’s effort to raise its political credibility by 
raising its profile and legitimacy through technical assistance. This is pursued for 
instance through the idea of an SCO development bank, which has hitherto been 
blocked by Russia (i/w AC). The SCO is increasingly active in the economic 
field, the 2013 summit, for instance, leading to agreements on economic coopera-
tion on the creation of a land bridge, railway construction, technical aid and a gas 
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pipeline (i/w AD). China is supported within the SCO for this economic refocus-
ing of the agenda by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (i/w Agan (#80/DI)) perhaps 
indicative of the Central Asian republics use of the SCO to balance Chinese and 
Russian influence. At the same time, the Central Asian republics are wary of eco-
nomic domination by China, which has been suggested to explain the CARs reluc-
tance towards creating a free trade area among SCO members (Laruelle and Pey-
rouse, 2013: 5, 33). 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, China recognises that regional disagreements and 
barriers are contrary to Chinese interests, thus, seeking to resolve the issues. 
However, there are limits to Chinese engagement, which suggest that China does 
not generally seek to promote Central Asian regional cohesion but only engage as 
and when it sees a direct interest in doing so. For instance, Laruelle and Peyrouse 
(2013: 34) point to China’s refusal to mediate in the conflict over water usage in 
Central Asia. In fact, the impact of Chinese engagement may be to increase the 
independence of Central Asian republics, thereby not (in the short term) increas-
ing regional cohesiveness. For instance, Chinese engagement is perceived to aid 
Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s abilities to act independently while kerbing arro-
gance on part of Uzbekistan (i/w NN; Bjorvatn (#47/IO)). At the same time, the 
many infrastructural projects linking Central Asian countries not only with China 
but also each other may over time increase regional interdependencies, and 
through this regional cohesion. The lack of conditionality applied to Chinese in-
vestments and loans also reduce the potential for China to provide positive exter-
nal cogency. Central Asian leaders are strongly interested in Chinese investments 
exactly because they are considered to be ‘no strings’, as the Chinese generally do 
not push the Central Asians on issues which are sensitive for the governments (i/w 
BP; 2xWD). One Tajik official described Chinese loans and investments as ‘mon-
ey for free’ or mostly credit at low rates (i/w Soliev (#31/GO)). Conversely, the 
typical example of positive external cogency, the Marshall Plan, came with condi-
tionalities that encouraged economic integration with the donor, the USA. 
As a strong country neighbouring the region, China may alternatively provide 
negative external cogency for Central Asia to the extent that the country is con-
sidered a common threat to the CARs. While Central Asian governments for now 
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appear content to accept Chinese loans and investment, there is also concern, even 
fear, about the long term impact and whose interests are really served (i/w 
2xWD). Particularly in Tajikistan where it is suggested that China is Tajikistan’s 
biggest lender with up to 50 per cent of Tajik debts, unofficially, owed to China; 
and significant bilateral transactions are conducted intransparently without official 
agreements (i/w 2xWD; Umarov (#45/AC)). In Kyrgyzstan critique of Chinese 
investments in transit roads centre on the claim that these do not match the infra-
structural needs of Kyrgyzstan itself (i/w FB; AC). Moreover, citizens across Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent Tajikistan, are hostile towards Chi-
nese migrants (i/w Madumarov (#2/AC); Askarov (#27/JO); Umarov (#45/AC); 
NN; WD). Indeed, Kazakhstan’s enthusiasm for economic partnership with Rus-
sia may be assessed as an expression of balancing Chinese economic power (i/w 
WD). China represents a huge market – but a strongly competitive economy per-
haps more likely to export its goods to Central Asia than to increase its imports, 
and thus potentially a threat (i/w 2xNN). Similarly, it is suggested that Kyrgyz 
intentions to join the ECU reflect distrust of China and its influence (i/w Claytor 
(#74/FB)). Officials suggested that ECU membership will be a way of reshaping 
economic relations between Kyrgyzstan and China by attracting Chinese invest-
ments in production facilities and no longer acting as a mere conduit for trade (i/w 
2xGO). To the extent that China, thus, does provide negative external cogency, it 
appears to some extent to lead to Eurasian rather than Central Asian regionalism. 
The 2014 SCO summit readied the organisation for future expansion with India or 
Pakistan the most likely countries to become full members (Lillis, 2014c). Such 
expansion is likely to reduce the efficacy of the organisation further to the extent 
that it is intended to work on a multilateral basis. The leaders at the summit signed 
a joint declaration on restoration of peace in Ukraine. However, this may be inter-
preted as a hollow victory for Russia since the summit also reflected the concerns 
of other member states over Russia’s role in the conflict (Ibid). Indeed this exem-
plifies the limits to using the SCO for rationalising and agenda-setting at the in-
ternational level, which is most strongly seen in the emphasis on non-interference 
of foreign states in domestic affairs of members. A principle undermined by Rus-
sian actions in Ukraine. 
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China may be argued to offer the potential for positive as well as negative external 
cogency for Central Asia. China is a source of significant investments and also 
contributes to increased interdependency in Central Asia through infrastructure 
projects. At the same time, as a large economy bordering the region China is to 
some extent considered a threat. However, rather than unite internally, the CARs 
use Russian membership of the SCO, and in some cases the prospect of Eurasian 
integration, as a means by which to balance the influence of China. At the same 
time, China is used to balance against Russia’s influence in the region. 
5.6 Discussion 
Table 5.1 above summarises the functions of the five frameworks and external 
actors discussed. A critical condition of Central Asian openness to cooperation or 
integration frameworks with external actors appears to be an understanding that 
the external actor is a facilitator and not pushing its own agenda (i/w Yuzo 
(#15/AD)). There is a sense that the Soviet experience is remembered as a nega-
tive experience of integration; an imposition by an external actor, one which did 
not sufficiently value the contributions of Central Asia to the Union with, for in-
stance, natural resources being under-priced (i/w WD). This is reflected in the 
regional concerns that both Russia and China are pursuing agendas that narrowly 
promote their own interests and as the use of Japan, Korea and the EU to balance 
against such influences.  
Stakeholders in these processes suggest that there is a genuine interest on part of 
Central Asian governments for externally facilitated dialogue (i/w Yuzo 
(#15/AD); NN; AD; GO); though also acknowledging that the interest is less keen 
in the cases of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, both described as difficult to coop-
erate with and reluctant participants (i/w 2xWD; Yuzo (#15/AD)). There is a 
sense that the pendulum has shifted away from a regional approach to Central 
Asia over the past decade with international actors increasingly engaging CARs 
on a bilateral basis (i/w IO), as evidenced by the EU’s more pragmatic approach. 
Often the regional approaches involve bilateral meetings seeking to enable both 
bilateral and regional dialogue (i/w WD; NN); even in the case of the SCO, which 
has organisational structures behind it, much appears to happen through bilateral 
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channels. On the one hand, this trend may reflect a need to maintain progress in 
bilateral relations (i/w NN) but it may also reflect recognition that a regional ap-
proach is not fruitful in practice. While many challenges are transnational, at-
tempts to address them in a regional context are often perceived as futile (i/w IO; 
DI). For instance, an attempt to bring Uzbekistan on board with investments in 
hydro-power plants in Kyrgyzstan, by offering Uzbekistan some decision-making 
rights in control of the operations, floundered due to principled political objection 
to the project within the Uzbek government (i/w DI).  
Progress in Central Asian regional relations ultimately hinges on domestic dynam-
ics, which as the preceding analysis suggested are not conducive to regionalism. 
Central Asian leaders have failed to recognise that their neighbourhood must be 
prosperous for each of the states to grow or at least to take ownership of making 
necessary changes (i/w WD). The preceding analysis indicated that the CARs 
have similar trade patterns and may benefit from collectively pursuing trade facili-
tation measures with key global trade partners. Following the theoretical notion of 
integration with developed economies being preferable, the CARs should focus 
their attention on entering into such trade facilitation agreements with the EU, 
Japan, Korea, as well as, China, which relative to Central Asia has a higher stock 
of technology from which the CARs could benefit. Russia on the other hand is 
less likely to be a source of knowledge transfer and, more widely, does arguably 
not represent an economic model to emulate (RFE/RL, 2013b).  
EU-Central Asia trade is dominated by natural resource exports and exports of 
consumer goods to Europe would require production to high quality standards. 
Moreover, European consumer goods and technology is more expensive relative 
to what Asian markets may offer. Such factors may limit the relative attractive-
ness of partnering with the EU. The mutual interests in pursuing shared trade fa-
cilitation frameworks with Japan and Korea is less clear, given that some bilateral 
pairs are characterised by unexploited trade potentials. As discussed above, eco-
nomic sanctions against Russia in the wake of the annexation of Crimea may lead 
to adjustments in policy within Central Asia. It also may affect the geopolitical 
landscape. For instance, German Chancellor Merkel has suggested that the EU 
may reconsider its energy partnership with Russia (RFE/RL, 2014k). This could 
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create an impetus behind the so-called Southern Gas Corridor, which has been 
envisioned to bring gas from the Caspian region to the EU. However, while such a 
development may increase European engagement with Central Asian energy rich 
countries, this may not impact regional cohesion in Central Asia, though it may 
strengthen the alignment of Kazakh and Turkmen interests. Moreover, an energy 
partnership may not foster the long term economic development through diversifi-
cation that a wider trade partnership with external economies could, as it does not 
foster integration in GVCs for instance. 
Thus, China may be the preferable trade partner. The country has the capacity to 
supply Central Asia with consumer products at low prices (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 
2013: 37), while at the same time offering technology that is relatively cheap and 
considered of superior quality to Russian technology, which in Central Asia is 
perceived to be in decline (i/w Askarov (#27/JO); BA; Paramonov (#96/AC)). 
Considering the regional concern regarding China’s rising economic power in the 
region, it is a relationship that certainly would require stronger regional cohesion 
to strengthen collective bargaining power vis-à-vis a larger neighbour.  
5.7 Summary 
The theoretical chapter suggested that an external actor may imbue enforcement 
capacity and credibility to regional reform attempts, to some degree replicating 
the functions of commitment institutions which improve the likelihood of success 
of regional integration. The lack of demand for and supply of Central Asian re-
gionalism, particularly the strength of vested interests in the status quo, however, 
suggests limited scope for such mechanisms in the region. Indeed, the above dis-
cussion suggests that external actors such as Japan, Korea and the EU do not have 
an impact on the regional cohesion in Central Asia in the form of collective identi-
ty formation or institution-building. While there may be potential for positive ex-
ternalities through joint trade facilitation between Central Asia and these external 
actors, the prospect of this appears distant. Russian policy towards Central Asia 
on the other hand is primarily fostering regional divisiveness. The Eurasian inte-
gration project is eliciting diverging responses from the Central Asian republics 
with Kazakhstan engaging in and even promoting the project, and Kyrgyzstan 
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seeking to join, while Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan show no interest. 
Consequently, Eurasian regionalism is reducing the prospects for Central Asian 
regionalism in the immediate future. 
China, on the other hand, to some extent may foster regional cohesion through 
increased interdependencies shaped by infrastructure projects criss-crossing Cen-
tral Asia. The lack of conditionality on Chinese investments in the region, howev-
er, reduces the potential for positive external cogency. Moreover, while China 
may represent a potential market and source of investment and technology for 
economic development in Central Asia, China at the same time may be considered 
a potential force for negative external cogency to the extent that the country is 
seen as a common threat. Paradoxically, however, the Central Asian republics 
appear to rely more on Russia than each other to counter-balance this perceived 
threat from China, thus further reinforcing the dynamic of disintegration in the 
region. 
  





Over the past ten years states external to post-Soviet Central Asia have sought to 
facilitate regional, economic cooperation between the Central Asian republics 
through interregional frameworks, including Central Asia plus Japan, the Korea-
Central Asia Cooperation Forum and the EU strategy for engagement with Central 
Asia. Others, notably neighbouring Russia and China, have sought to integrate 
with Central Asia through wider regional frameworks including the CIS, and cur-
rently the Eurasian Customs and Economic Union, as well as the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization. Meanwhile attempts at regional integration amongst the 
CARs alone have failed. The Central Asia Cooperation Organization, for instance, 
was eventually submerged into the Eurasian Economic Community. Nevertheless, 
scholarly literature has given little consideration to the prerequisites for economic 
integration in the post-Soviet space. Consequently, this thesis has explored such 
underlying dynamics for regional economic integration in Central Asia.  
Firstly, it was asked whether economic integration may impart economic benefits 
to the Central Asian republics. Given limitations on statistical data, this question 
was explored through an analysis of trade patterns and potential for increasing 
intra- and extra-regional trade, including through economic integration. 
Secondly, the thesis has explored whether there is demand for regional integration 
policies within the region, and whether there is potential supply of integration 
policies on part of Central Asian governments. Demand is expected to arise from 
economic actors, who would gain from the further opportunities for market ex-
change offered by integration. Such demand may be counteracted by vested inter-
est in the status quo, such as from import-competing industries. Supply for inte-
gration policies is likely to arise where economic performance is poor, and the 
political leadership expects political pay-off from economic integration through 
higher economic growth. Supply of integration policy may also be counteracted 
by strong interests against; for instance, vested interests in the status quo which do 
not directly relate to growth of the wider economy. Latterly, it was explored 
whether there is regional leadership to drive a process of regional integration. 




In the light of the analysis, the thesis then discussed the role of external actors in 
facilitating regional integration in Central Asia and whether such actors may sub-
stitute for commitment institutions, which are theoretically expected to be critical 
to the success of regional integration schemes. 
Statement of originality 
The thesis contributes to existing literature as it explores the presence or absence 
of requisite factors for integration to occur in Central Asia. Previously, the focus 
of academic literature on Central Asian regionalism has been on specific regional 
structures, explaining their success or failure. Obydenkova has similarly explored 
requisite factors for integration in the post-Soviet space but focusing on the CIS. 
The primary contribution to literature may, however, be in the analysis of Central 
Asian business communities based on an extensive series of interviews in all five 
post-Soviet Central Asian states. Existing literature on the business community in 
Central Asia is very limited, including for instance Özcan’s study of the bazar 
economy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  
Another contribution is in the methodology applied in the quantitative study of 
trade relationships, where alternative gravity models were estimated to simulate 
the effect of hypothetical integration schemes. Usually ex ante studies of econom-
ic integration employ CGE models but the lack of necessary detailed data forced 
the application of innovative methodology. 
Region-building and economic development 
Region-building can occur through two complementary processes: regionalisation 
and regionalism. The former denotes bottom-up processes of interaction between 
economic actors, whilst regionalism denotes a top-down process of intentional 
policies designed to manage the process of regionalisation. The main focus of this 
thesis has been on regionalism. Regional economic integration involves market 
enlargement, which can boost competition, enable economies of scale and in-
crease consumer choice. The driving forces behind regional integration include 
obtaining access to larger markets and markets protected by high trade barriers, 




creating a focal point or credibility behind domestic reforms, and political objec-
tives, such as shared use of resources. 
Unilateral liberalisation may, however, be a more effective means of improving 
economic performance; therefore, supply of integration policy is likely to require 
demonstrable economic benefits over and above those of unilateral economic re-
forms. On the other hand, regional integration may offer additional benefits such 
as raising the credibility of economic reforms and tying such into an international 
framework, or non-economic benefits such as building trust or sharing resources. 
For transition economies, problems of economic development include low domes-
tic demand, barriers to export markets, supply limitations and the need to build 
supply ahead of demand. Enlarging markets may alleviate some of these concerns 
by increasing potential demand and gaining access to foreign technology. Access 
to technology and investment is more likely to arise when developing economies 
integrate with larger, developed economies. Such knowledge transfers are more 
likely to lead to productivity gains for the developing economy, and thereby 
growth. An added benefit of integrating with a developed economy may be that 
this adds credibility to the commitments and any related economic reforms. Ac-
cessing FDI requires a strong institutional and credible environment. Where re-
forms are not seen to be credible, economic actors are unlikely to respond. Thus, 
theory would suggest that for the Central Asian economies, there may be merit in 
pursuing trade integration with a developed economy external to the region, which 
could both provide technology and investment, and enforce commitments to re-
form or, indeed, integrate. 
Economic benefits from integration 
Diverging economic transition paths since gaining independence have led to devi-
ating economic environments in Central Asia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan both 
followed so-called shock therapy transition paths introducing liberal reform poli-
cies quickly upon independence. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the other hand 
followed more gradualist approaches to economic transition. Tajikistan’s transi-
tion was delayed by the country’s civil war but since 1997, the country has pur-




sued a liberalising economic policy. Despite such variation, the Central Asian 
republics still face similar challenges in terms of institutional reforms, all suffer-
ing from poor corruption standards, weak governance and absence of enterprise 
restructuring. The capture of economic rents by elites have also contributed to a 
delay of economic diversification and sustainable economic growth; and in all 
five republics substantial economic activity is pushed into the informal economy 
depriving governments of budget income. 
In the formal economy, trade integration within Central Asia is limited and 
asymmetrical. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan export significant amounts to neigh-
bours, Kazakhstan in particular, which also represents noteworthy import shares 
in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Trade integration (regionalisation) in 
Central Asia is, however, driven by the informal sector. The shadow economy 
deprives all Central Asian governments of budget revenues, which illustrates how 
they could benefit from bringing informal businesses into the formal economy. 
Enterprises are not only driven into the shadows by weak governance and corrup-
tion but also by the diverging trade and border restrictions. Formalising it and 
improving business opportunities for growth, would benefit the general public as 
well as state coffers. Indeed, the analysis has suggested that domestic business 
environments as well as the obstacles to cross-border trade are hindrances to a 
growth-oriented business model, thus inhibiting economic development. 
The analysis conducted in this thesis suggests that the Central Asian republics 
over-trade between themselves. Using a gravity model approach the study sug-
gests that Central Asian republics trade more between themselves than the model 
predicts, according to theoretical expectations following from their bilateral eco-
nomic relationships. The corollary of this is that should the Central Asian repub-
lics seek to increase intra-regional trade, policy actions aimed at this must be im-
plemented. Such actions could be in the form of economic integration.  
The study, thus, considered the potential impact on trade of economic integration 
in Central Asia. Given limited access to relevant statistical data it has not been 
possible to examine the impact on intra-regional trade under conditions of eco-
nomic integration. Instead, the gravity model was employed to explore the poten-




tial impact on extra-regional trade of Central Asian and Eurasian integration. The 
key measures for evaluating the benefits of economic integration revolve around 
the notions of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade diversion indicates that 
trade is shifted from more to less efficient producers, while trade creation reflects 
improved resource allocation through new trade or shifts in trade to more efficient 
producers. The results suggest that current political discussions on extending the 
ECU to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may not be beneficial for the two po-
tential entrants themselves. Indeed, the results suggest that the ECU may have 
trade diverting effects, and could reduce the total external trade levels of its mem-
bers. By contrast, economic integration within Central Asia may be more benefi-
cial. Comparing the two scenarios for integration within Central Asia, a scheme 
involving all five republics may increase their shared level of predicted external 
trade, as well as positively impact their trade balances. On balance, however, this 
scenario may also involve trade diverting effects, though in the last year of the 
sample studied, the effect is suggested to involve trade creation. For Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there could be merits also in the smaller scheme in-
volving only these three republics. The trend over the period examined is towards 
trade creation; though the predicted expansion in total trade levels tend towards 
also slightly worsening their net trade positions.  
From the perspective of Central Asia, the findings suggest that intra-regional inte-
gration would be beneficial on two accounts. Firstly, it could, if designed accord-
ingly, increase the scope for intra-regional trade, and, secondly, increase the 
shared scope for external trade of the Central Asian republics. Consequently, 
since the CARs generally have similar patterns of over-trading and unexploited 
trade potentials, they may benefit from pursuing trade facilitation measures with 
external partners, notably China, and the EU, collectively. 
Supply of and demand for economic integration 
The analysis of supply of, and demand for, integration policies highlighted a 
dearth of growth-oriented businesses in Central Asia and the weakness of organ-
ised business voices. On the one hand this reflects a gradual conversion to market 




economic principles on the part of businesses and entrepreneurs, who may take a 
short-termist approach or lack business skills, but it is also a consequence of the 
domestic business environments, which encourage businesses to stay small or 
operate informally so as to avoid attention from authorities, which may either in-
volve bureaucratic hindrances, bribes or racketeering and raiding. This business 
environment, on the other hand, is a reflection of the fusion of economic and po-
litical power, which has created vested interests in the status quo among the polit-
ical elites. Consequently, demand for integration does not widely exist in an or-
ganised and articulated form, despite Central Asian businesses and entrepreneurs 
being interested in opportunities for intra-regional trade. 
All Central Asian countries have businesses organised in interest organisations. 
However, the nature of such business associations varies markedly. In Uzbekistan, 
all groups are considered to be controlled by state authorities, and not reflecting 
the interests of the private sector. In Turkmenistan the SPPT similarly is believed 
to be an extension of the state apparatus, though at the same time given credit for 
actively promoting private sector interest; while in Kazakhstan Atameken is con-
sidered at best quasi-governmental, despite to some extent working positively for 
private sector interests. Kyrgyzstan has the most developed sector of business 
associations driven by interests of its constituent members. Such independent as-
sociations are also developing in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, though they are not 
yet as strong. 
Business associations generally focus the main part of their lobbying activity on 
promoting and protecting business interests in the domestic environment. Conse-
quently, while trade facilitation measures may be pursued, this is primarily in the 
domestic context, such as easing of export licensing requirements. The business 
association most actively engaged in promotion of trade integration is Atameken 
in Kazakhstan, which works at the level of the Eurasian Customs Union. Some 
business associations cooperate in regional networks. These are primarily focused 
on information sharing, though one network assessed jointly the obstacles to re-
gional trade and put forward recommendations to governments. Such lobbying 
attempts have, however, not proved effective, and there is a sense that trade policy 




is so political that business associations prefer to not raise obstacles to cross-
border trading. In the face of obstacles to regional trading, businesses, thus, turn 
to alternative strategies, including corruption, operating and trading informally, 
and keeping their business small, which is detrimental to the countries’ economic 
development. 
The governments of Central Asian republics are pursuing different foreign poli-
cies. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are both open to integrating with the global 
economy through, on the one hand, unilateral measures such as WTO membership 
but also regional integration. As regards the latter, both countries are currently 
focused on Eurasian integration. Kyrgyzstan appears resigned to having no choice 
but to join the Russian-led ECU; needing external financial resources to sustain 
the country’s economy. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, is pursuing the most pro-
integrationist policy in the region, actively driving forward the Eurasian integra-
tion project, including encouraging Kyrgyz membership. Kazakhstan is keen to be 
seen as the regional leader in Central Asia, though prioritising Eurasian regional-
ism over Central Asian regional cohesiveness. Indeed, Kazakhstan is emerging as 
an integration core in its own right, that is, independent of Russia, through in-
vestment in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and attraction of labour migrants. It is un-
likely however, that Kazakhstan can establish itself as a driver of integration with-
in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s prioritisation of Eurasian integration is alienating 
other Central Asian republics, notably Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, 
which are more wary of Russian influence. Thus, by promoting Eurasian regional-
ism, Kazakhstan is, perhaps inadvertently, contributing to fragmentation in Cen-
tral Asia. The erection of trade barriers in Central Asia through ECU membership 
also has reduced the scope for regionalisation in Central Asia.  
The current Uzbek leadership shows little inclination towards international eco-
nomic integration. President Karimov’s hold on power appears to be relatively 
weak. Consequently, the government is maintaining current economic policy, en-
suring that the fragile balance between elite factions is maintained through safe-
guarding of vested interests in rent seeking. Moreover, the protectionist policies of 
Uzbekistan are also contributing to fragmentation of Central Asia at the political 




level as well as reducing the scope for informal regionalisation. While Tajikistan 
has become a WTO member, it is unclear whether integration with the world 
economy is a dedicated aim of the government, or if WTO membership was seen 
as a means by which to prevent or delay participation in Eurasian integration, as 
Russia is perceived to be pressurising the country’s leadership in this direction. 
President Berdymukhamedov maintains the Turkmen Doctrine of Positive Neu-
trality, thus, restricting potential for any form of regional integration. The coun-
try’s leadership appears committed, however, to undertaking economic reform 
and potentially joining the WTO as an instrument towards that.  
The conclusion that governments rather than business communities are the drivers 
of regional integration in Central Asia points towards inadequacies of the theoret-
ical framework applied, which considers both bottom-up driven demand and gov-
ernment supply of policy requisite factors for integration to occur. The weakness 
of organised business voice, in part, accounts for the discrepancy between obser-
vations and theory but also points to the need for further work on theoretical 
frameworks that can better account for integration dynamics in states with rela-
tively weak civil societies. 
Three notions of economic integration appear present in Central Asia: global inte-
gration through the WTO, Eurasian integration with Russia, and Central Asian 
regionalism. The latter, however, does not currently have traction among political 
elites. A shortage of growth-oriented businesses seeking market enlargement 
across Central Asia and vested interests in the status quo among the Central Asian 
elites combine to weaken the potential for Central Asian regionalism. This trend is 
further entrenched by the promotion of Eurasian regionalism, which is contrib-
uting to fragmentation in Central Asia both at the political level but also among 
businesses wishing to trade across borders.  
Regionalism through interregionalism 
The geographic isolation of Central Asia makes the republics dependent on transit 
countries which can enable or inhibit trade beyond the immediate neighbourhood. 
This demonstrates a need for cooperation not only within the region but beyond it. 




Diverging trade policies and complicated customs procedures increase transporta-
tion costs as does the poor density and quality of transport infrastructure. Transit 
opportunities, in turn, affect the competitiveness of local production. The fact that 
the global economy is increasingly dominated by supply chain trade entrenches 
the disadvantage of isolation and landlockedness. Integrating with regional or 
global chains necessitates a comprehensive approach to trade facilitation which 
addresses tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers, quality standards and infrastructure. 
As such, policy integration aimed at reducing market segmentation arising from 
regulatory regimes is increasingly important. 
Commitment institutions are considered critical to locking in policies of integra-
tion, thus increasing the likelihood of success. An alternative to commitment insti-
tutions may be integrating with a developed economy, which can act as enforcer 
of agreed norms or rules, and infuse credibility to an integration project. This may 
be considered under the framework of interregionalism, which studies the interac-
tion of regions. Interregionalism can be aimed at balancing in international rela-
tions, institution-building within or between regions, rationalising or setting inter-
national agendas, and contributing to collective identity formation. The latter may 
be referred to as regionalism through interregionalism, whereby the cohesiveness 
of the weaker of two regions is strengthened through interaction with another. 
Also relevant to this is the idea of external cogency, where an external actor either 
incentivises (positive cogency) or stimulates through threat (negative cogency) 
collective identity or region-building.  
The analysis in this thesis suggests that the Central Asian republics share patterns 
of international trade relationships and potentials for increased exports. Russia, 
and increasingly China, are the main trading partners of the Central Asian repub-
lics. The EU and Turkey are also significant trade partners, the former particularly 
for Kazakhstan. The CARs generally trade at levels expected or higher with part-
ners in the post-Soviet region, China and Europe suggesting there is a need for 
trade facilitation measures to increase trade with these partners. For trade with 
Japan and Korea there is significant variability between the CARs for trade in 
both directions. The study of potential integration schemes did not suggest that 




such would significantly alter the pattern of extra-regional trade, and that integra-
tion between Central Asian countries only would be least likely to do so, com-
pared to Eurasian integration. The ECU appears to have had a negligible effect on 
trade within Central Asia but Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek exports to Russia have 
been hit by the new trade barriers. The ECU does not represent significant trade 
liberalisation and has not brought with it palpable improvements in investment 
climates. Rather, the process has been focused on restricting trade with third coun-
tries. As such, the scheme reinforces the geographical isolation of Central Asian 
countries, which are participating in the framework, and Russia, the dominant 
economy in the scheme, is unlikely to play the role of external enforcer of institu-
tional reform. Nor is it likely to offer significant productive investment or techno-
logical transfer.  
Russian policy towards Central Asia is primarily fostering regional divisiveness. 
As Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan adopt the Eurasian regionalism framework, while 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are alienated by it, it drives a wedge 
through Central Asia. Consequently, Eurasian regionalism is reducing the pro-
spects for Central Asian regionalism in the immediate future. However, while 
Eurasian integration represents the current trajectory of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan, it is not clear that this is a sustainable option for the long term. Scepticism or 
outright opposition to the direction is notable within the Kazakh ruling elite, and 
the business communities in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan exhibit strong 
measures of opposition. It is, thus, not certain that, for instance, a post-
Nazarbayev Kazakhstan will continue along the same path. Moreover, the current 
trajectory of Russian foreign policy may also be discouraging the Central Asian 
republics from aligning themselves too closely with the Kremlin. As discussed in 
previous chapters, the conflict in Ukraine is a forceful reminder of Russia’s ability 
to meddle in the internal affairs of FSU republics. 
Japan, Korea and the EU all engage with Central Asia in frameworks that can be 
considered interregional. From a Central Asian perspective, one benefit of such 
engagement is to balance the influence of neighbouring powers, Russia and Chi-
na. The analysis of trade patterns suggested that particularly in the case of the EU, 




the CARs may benefit from pursuing trade and investment facilitation jointly. 
However, in the current formats, none of the three interregional fora are facilitat-
ing stronger regional cohesiveness in Central Asia, with limited positive external 
cogency offered by Japan, Korea and the EU. China may provide a form of exter-
nal cogency for Central Asia – simultaneously negative and positive in nature. 
China’s growing influence in Central Asia is viewed with apprehension, high-
lighting the potential for negative external cogency. Over time, Central Asian re-
publics may come to acknowledge the opportunities in coordinating their policies 
vis-à-vis their larger neighbour. At the same time, China offers positive cogency 
in the form of investment and technology transfers and cheap consumer goods.   
If Central Asian republics are to develop new comparative advantages that build 
on the region’s resources, this is likely to be in agribusiness, chemical industry 
and textiles. The distance to the EU, Japan and Korea, reduces the potential for 
Central Asia to integrate in their RVCs or GVCs. That these actors are primarily 
interested in gaining access to the region’s raw materials, energy in particular, 
further diminishes any prospect for increasing value added production in Central 
Asia through integration with these external actors. Thus, integration with Russia 
or China are the most likely options for the Central Asian republics, as well as 
offering better potentials for increasing value added production. Engagement with 
either of their large neighbours is perceived to involve risks in the form of politi-
cal and economic dominance, thus representing potential negative cogency. 
Drivers of regional disintegration in Central Asia 
In conclusion, drivers of regional disintegration in Central Asia can be found at 
both the domestic, regional and international levels. Domestically, the authoritari-
an political structures, which fuse economic and political power, inhibit private 
sector growth and the development of a growth-oriented business community, 
which may become a force for market enlargement. Moreover, these political 
structures reinforce vested interests in existing trade barriers, and thus inhibit both 
regionalisation and regionalism.  




Regionally, the protectionist policies of Uzbekistan are alienating neighbours, 
particular Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Partly as a consequence, Kyrgyzstan is pur-
suing Eurasian regionalism, which has already, through Kazakh participation, 
constrained the potential for Central Asian regionalisation. Furthermore, Kazakh-
stan’s promotion of Eurasian regionalism is also driving Central Asian political 
fragmentation, as other Central Asian republics are averse to the Russian influ-
ence this scheme brings with it. Russian policy, thus, also contributes to the frag-
mentation of Central Asia. At the international level, moreover, China is on the 
one hand promoting Central Asian interdependence through infrastructural pro-
jects linking the region together. At the same time, however, Chinese engagement 
is seen to strengthen the independence of the individual countries, notably Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan, thus also lessening regional interdependence and frag-
menting the region. 
Further research 
Determining which factors are requisite for regional integration to occur may be 
considered only a first step in a wider research programme to identify and sketch 
options for progression towards integration. With the missing prerequisites for 
regional integration laid bare, further research could centre on how to foster artic-
ulated demand for regionalism as well as research on how to incentivise govern-
ments towards adopting integration-oriented policies. This could be research into 
finding an effective means for economic and political liberalisation, since the 
main barrier has been found to be the political structures based on the fusion of 
economic and political resources among narrow elites, and the dominance of the 
state over civil society.  
The above conclusions suggest that the policy frameworks of external actors, Ja-
pan, Korea and the EU, aimed at fostering regional cohesiveness in Central Asia 
are at best premature as the requisite conditions for Central Asian regionalism are 
not present. The question, thus, arises if these external actors could pursue their 
interests in the region in a more productive fashion. For instance, to the extent that 
these actors are genuinely interested in promoting regional integration, might not 




be a better use of resource to ensure a successful transition to parliamentary de-
mocracy in Kyrgyzstan, which can serve as positive example in the region? 
A more detailed study exploring specifically the impact on Russian foreign policy 
and the pursuit of Eurasian integration may be particularly warranted as this was 
found to be one of the key drivers of disintegration in Central Asia. Further re-
search questions on regionalism in Central Asia may also arise from current polit-
ical developments in the post-Soviet space, and beyond. The conflict in Ukraine 
may, as suggested, make Central Asian governments question their alignment 
with Russia. On the one hand, Russian policy towards Ukraine is a forceful re-
minder of its interest in and ability to meddle in former Soviet republics’ internal 
affairs. On the other hand, sanctions against Russia may weaken the attraction of 
integrating with the country economically. The question is whether this may cre-
ate negative external cogency in Central Asia, inducing the states to collective 
action. Related to this is the question of the impact of Russian policy on Russia-
China relations, and thus China’s policy towards Central Asia.  
A more detailed study of the potential for development on new comparative ad-
vantages in Central Asia is pertinent. Such research, based inter alia, on factor 
endowments and their relative costs, may provide governments with a more robust 
framework for considering the potential for development of regional value chains 
in Central Asia, and which trade partners could offer relevant investment, tech-
nology and expertise in this regard. Moreover, it may be explored whether the 
Central Asians could apply lessons learned from AFTA with a view to integrating 
in global supply chain trade through the development of RVCs. 
As regards economic development the thesis has pointed to the lack of growth-
oriented businesses and the need to improve business skills in the region. Devel-
opment agencies and financial institutions have in Africa through innovative 
means spread awareness of financial services as well as sought to raise the busi-
ness skills within particular sectors. For instance, in the TV series Shamba Shape-
Up farmers are visited by agricultural experts and inspired to improve their pro-
duction through adopting new business methods. The production of Shamba 
Shape-Up is supported by a group of donors, including the EU, and a series of 






 Another initiative sees popular soap operas advocate the use 
of financial services products to improve financial inclusion. For instance in South 
Africa Standard Bank marketed their products by integrating them in the storyline 
of TV and radio soap operas (Standard Bank, 2013). It may be explored whether 
similar initiatives could reach a broad audience in Central Asia improving finan-
cial and business skills and through that contributing to economic development. 
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 See http://www.shambashapeup.com/. 
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Appendix A – Data sources 
Trade statistics 
Data is derived from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). The database 
contains two figures for each one-way trade flow as reported by the importer and 
exporter respectively. In estimation is used the average of the two reportings; if 
only one partner has reported for a given year, that reporting is used. Gravity 
model analyses are often based on a weighted average of the two reportings in 
which the reporting by the importer is given higher weight than the exporter. This 
is based on the assumption that importers are more reliable reporters – the poten-
tial violation of this assumption is then corrected for by reversing the weights in 
cases of particularly unreliable (for statistical reporting purposes) importers. 
However, since 1993 changes to EU trade accounting has meant that EU member 
states’ export data is now deemed more reliable than their import data (Baldwin 
and Taglioni, 2006). Also in the case of Central Asian economies, export data is 
considered more reliable; as exports are not liable to taxes, it is more likely re-
ported (Mogilevskii, 2012a: 13). Thus, the rule no longer holds. In estimating the 
gravity equation both a simple and a weighted average of trade data was tested, 
which did not have significant effect on the estimation results. 
The data set contains 192 countries over the years 1992 to 2011. The starting 
point is chosen based on the fact that the countries of interest became independent 
in that year; using an in-sample approach, a longer time span would not be possi-
ble. Note that for Belgium and Luxembourg trade was reported jointly until 1998; 
these reportings have been assigned to Belgium. 
GDP data 
GDP data is derived from the World Development Indicators. 
Country- and pair specific, time-constant data 
Data on country and pair specific characteristics such as whether a country is 
landlocked, if two partners share borders, common language, colonial links, bilat-




eral distances etc. are derived from the CEPII database. Bilateral distances are 
calculated by great circle formula. For further details, see CEPII guidance docu-
ment. The commercial centres, rather than capitals, were used as basis for this for 
economies with various options; e.g. for Kazakhstan, Almaty’s location, not Asta-
na was the basis of calculation. 
For the simulations of the integration scenarios, this data was adapted by the au-
thor. Distance data in scenario 1, involving all Central Asian republics, and sce-
nario 2, involving Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is based again on Al-
maty as the commercial centre, as Kazakhstan can be considered the largest econ-
omy of the five, three respectively, and hence both the economic and financial 
centre of Central Asia. For the third scenario, Moscow is considered the economic 
capital of the extended Customs Union. 
Religion 
Data on common religion is taken from the UNCTAD’s trade analysis material 
(http://vi.unctad.org/tpa/). 
Free trade data 
The included free trade dummy is based on active agreements as listed by the 
WTO on their website. The dummy averages the effect of all active free trade 
agreements rather them singling them out individually. This simplification was 
chosen in that the analysis is not interested in the effect of any individual agree-
ment but in controlling for the effect of such agreements, generally. The data was 
approximated in the integration scenario simulations so that a free trade agree-
ment was interpreted to exist from the year that one of the economies entered one 
such. 
  




Appendix B – Estimation Results 
 
Table B1 – Pooled OLS regression 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lexports lexports lexports lexports
lgdp_origin 1.179*** 1.189*** 1.220*** 1.168***
(0.00321) (0.00284) (0.00214) (0.00179)
lgdp_destin 0.963*** 0.964*** 0.942*** 0.880***
(0.00321) (0.00286) (0.00216) (0.00171)
ldist -1.100*** -1.143*** -1.242*** -1.270***
(0.00652) (0.00606) (0.00529) (0.00497)
contig 0.871*** 0.824*** 1.091*** 1.023***
(0.0281) (0.0272) (0.0251) (0.0236)
comlang_ethno 0.503*** 0.592*** 0.679*** 0.622***
(0.0206) (0.0176) (0.0129) (0.0113)
colony 0.379*** 0.317*** 0.388*** 0.581***
(0.0340) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0308)
comcol 1.528*** 1.282*** 0.923*** 0.965***
(0.0340) (0.0296) (0.0193) (0.0160)
col45 0.982*** 0.973*** 1.141*** 1.189***
(0.0532) (0.0493) (0.0437) (0.0404)
religion -0.141*** -0.0426*** 0.0775*** -0.0204*
(0.0173) (0.0150) (0.0123) (0.0110)
landlocked_origin -0.119*** -0.146*** -0.241*** -0.376***
(0.0183) (0.0174) (0.0128) (0.0115)
landlocked_destin -0.388*** -0.451*** -0.587*** -0.666***
(0.0180) (0.0171) (0.0125) (0.0109)
fta_together 0.255*** 0.180*** 0.149*** 0.329***
(0.0133) (0.0125) (0.0110) (0.0106)
Constant -28.06*** -27.95*** -27.42*** -24.36***
(0.127) (0.117) (0.0924) (0.0792)
Observations 134,656 164,996 304,767 395,261
R-squared 0.662 0.660 0.642 0.638
Root MSE 2.0878 2.1114 2.3358 2.4164
Countries in sample 90 100 150 192
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Table B2 – OLS regression with importer, exporter and time dummies  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lexports lexports lexports lexports
ldist -1.168*** -1.270*** -1.416*** -1.520***
(0.00843) (0.00787) (0.00661) (0.00576)
contig 0.496*** 0.422*** 0.619*** 0.597***
(0.0279) (0.0282) (0.0260) (0.0244)
comlang_ethno 0.463*** 0.583*** 0.612*** 0.475***
(0.0202) (0.0178) (0.0137) (0.0122)
colony 0.320*** 0.223*** 0.283*** 0.466***
(0.0347) (0.0314) (0.0293) (0.0286)
comcol 1.680*** 1.371*** 1.019*** 1.015***
(0.0297) (0.0266) (0.0186) (0.0156)
col45 1.309*** 1.301*** 1.356*** 1.290***
(0.0552) (0.0511) (0.0427) (0.0389)
religion 0.366*** 0.376*** 0.429*** 0.359***
(0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0129) (0.0117)
fta_together 0.376*** 0.281*** 0.314*** 0.427***
(0.0133) (0.0124) (0.0108) (0.0102)
Constant 17.96*** 18.94*** 20.37*** 19.61***
(0.113) (0.107) (0.0975) (0.124)
Observations 139,690 170,574 318,006 415,999
R-squared 0.758 0.754 0.729 0.717
Root MSE 1.7801 1.8087 2.0335 2.1336
Countries in sample 90 100 150 192
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Table B3 – OLS regression with importer-time, exporter-time and time dummies  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lexports lexports lexports lexports
ldist -1.169*** -1.271*** -1.416*** -1.520***
(0.00843) (0.00786) (0.00660) (0.00575)
contig 0.498*** 0.427*** 0.618*** 0.591***
(0.0281) (0.0284) (0.0262) (0.0246)
comlang_ethno 0.456*** 0.578*** 0.608*** 0.468***
(0.0201) (0.0176) (0.0136) (0.0120)
colony 0.327*** 0.229*** 0.292*** 0.481***
(0.0350) (0.0317) (0.0291) (0.0283)
comcol 1.685*** 1.376*** 1.028*** 1.020***
(0.0295) (0.0263) (0.0184) (0.0155)
col45 1.293*** 1.286*** 1.335*** 1.266***
(0.0550) (0.0509) (0.0424) (0.0386)
religion 0.374*** 0.379*** 0.433*** 0.363***
(0.0167) (0.0152) (0.0127) (0.0115)
fta_together 0.377*** 0.283*** 0.330*** 0.453***
(0.0145) (0.0133) (0.0113) (0.0106)
Constant 17.67*** 19.34*** 15.78*** -49.20
(0.865) (0.602) (0.782) (3,356)
Observations 139,690 170,574 318,006 415,999
R-squared 0.774 0.768 0.744 0.732
Root MSE 1.7419 1.7725 1.995 2.0943
Countries in sample 90 100 150 192
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Table B4 – OLS regression with importer-time, exporter-time and time dummies for integration scenario 
1: economic union of all Central Asian republicsTable B5 – OLS regression with importer-time, exporter-

























Countries in sample 96
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Table B5 – OLS regression with importer-time, exporter-time and time dummies for integration scenario 
























Countries in sample 98
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





Table B6 – OLS regression with importer-time, exporter-time and time dummies for integration scenario 
























Countries in sample 96
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Appendix C – SPT index comparisons 
 
Table C1 – Sign changes of SPT indices on different model estimations; full sample 
 
Table C2 – Sign changes of SPT indices on different model estimations for sub-sample of Central Asian 
economies; sub-sample of Central Asian republics 
Sample size









90 19.75% 20.24% 8.60%
100 18.87% 19.32% 8.17%
150 14.30% 14.59% 6.08%
192 10.52% 10.88% 4.75%
Sample size









90 7.45% 10.39% 5.42%
100 6.80% 9.66% 4.85%
150 6.18% 7.93% 3.32%
192 5.47% 6.54% 2.60%




Appendix D – Impact of integration scenarios on total trade and 
trade balance of Central Asian republics 
Total trade 
 
Table D1a – estimated impact of integration scenarios on total trade of the Central Asian republics 
  
Kazakhstan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 945,891,978 614,062,008 -352,098,223
2003 1,265,851,246 813,306,701 -441,261,119
2004 1,175,888,926 1,157,376,825 -740,564,319
2005 1,927,345,749 1,507,096,414 -738,098,292
2006 -1,204,075,907 -1,240,667,781 -983,979,390
2007 -2,603,351,269 -1,374,202,397 -1,919,668,284
2008 59,121,161 -262,369,003 -1,925,719,260
2009 -1,056,757,195 -270,507,303 -1,045,073,166
2010 2,441,979,922 2,914,873,644 -240,106,727
2011 7,205,785,994 7,010,098,962 183,428,861
Kyrgyzstan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 42,256,732 27,693,152 -16,260,887
2003 53,169,221 34,501,785 -19,247,433
2004 51,788,638 51,432,257 -34,301,599
2005 89,141,840 69,996,108 -34,953,086
2006 -63,110,533 -65,441,537 -54,425,924
2007 -86,772,415 -46,084,827 -68,711,401
2008 2,596,764 -11,559,367 -89,737,903
2009 -51,965,899 -13,319,050 -54,224,580
2010 131,195,111 156,811,391 -13,557,022
2011 379,122,058 369,193,173 10,142,866
Tajikistan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 39,965,478 26,938,633 -17,327,466
2003 62,955,210 41,862,901 -25,123,880
2004 59,398,918 60,599,822 -44,230,633
2005 91,295,883 73,201,224 -40,511,161
2006 -59,138,401 -62,487,186 -56,883,473
2007 -91,205,146 -49,465,279 -80,067,002
2008 2,244,914 -10,120,509 -85,714,534
2009 -44,843,531 -11,615,806 -51,028,189
2010 99,885,767 120,935,859 -11,262,691
2011 192,801,534 190,474,002 5,716,828









Table D2a – estimated impact of integration scenarios on trade balances of the Central Asian republics 
 
Turkmenistan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 81,437,649 -59,000,000 -35,000,000
2003 153,899,922 -69,000,000 -32,000,000
2004 133,837,179 -108,000,000 -27,000,000
2005 136,334,280 -84,000,000 2,000,000
2006 -86,127,613 -26,000,000 127,000,000
2007 -110,151,918 -108,000,000 -47,000,000
2008 3,472,811 -192,000,000 -4,000,000
2009 -128,699,232 -151,000,000 75,000,000
2010 244,464,202 -194,000,000 34,000,000
2011 583,803,173 -245,000,000 51,000,000
Uzbekistan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 164,924,778 -94,000,000 -123,000,000
2003 254,383,030 -100,000,000 -119,000,000
2004 265,731,684 -152,000,000 -136,000,000
2005 304,165,855 -169,000,000 -131,000,000
2006 -174,341,687 -220,000,000 -200,000,000
2007 -406,384,487 -400,000,000 -340,000,000
2008 9,593,460 -680,000,000 -480,000,000
2009 -188,401,199 -459,000,000 -359,000,000
2010 422,950,670 -406,000,000 -250,000,000
2011 926,047,097 -413,000,000 -163,000,000
Kazakhstan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 -451,193,851 -544,590,984 -17,005,546
2003 -2,037,514,963 611,366,488 -189,514,678
2004 642,381,312 345,130,363 11,375,384
2005 -32,757,517 -269,416,921 47,890,830
2006 2,522,348,468 1,395,120,503 -560,677,991
2007 4,148,018,054 3,330,873,336 -1,754,066,362
2008 -541,605,465 -2,756,295,553 -115,335,460
2009 1,617,428,440 245,206,995 -1,042,165,010
2010 973,171,433 -1,597,008,699 -673,615,346
2011 1,901,624,487 253,408,422 -543,585,493





Table D2b – estimated impact of integration scenarios on trade balances of the Central Asian republics 
Kyrgyzstan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 264,830,657 281,772,758 2,529,237
2003 390,020,227 -110,083,744 15,606,697
2004 119,492,268 67,251,035 19,320,524
2005 -40,412,138 -420,644,923 -18,927,313
2006 330,793,790 185,595,073 -96,568,785
2007 223,520,639 181,109,933 -107,515,838
2008 -95,258,536 -501,762,322 -29,269,614
2009 162,333,594 24,922,753 -122,376,108
2010 158,773,227 -265,357,882 -131,979,264
2011 236,914,256 31,923,530 -81,922,717
Tajikistan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 39,124,204 34,818,226 120,970
2003 278,306,843 -77,282,744 11,398,229
2004 61,644,507 32,618,602 8,981,076
2005 -23,412,735 -239,938,156 -11,305,785
2006 227,315,316 128,284,423 -71,847,335
2007 175,459,108 141,016,731 -89,598,137
2008 -89,064,986 -473,942,125 -30,495,073
2009 135,741,974 20,870,252 -110,790,462
2010 104,885,459 -175,633,419 -93,627,416
2011 79,983,987 10,668,048 -29,162,498
Turkmenistan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 624,343,160 35,000,000 7,000,000
2003 2,045,454,321 43,000,000 18,000,000
2004 440,992,388 72,000,000 -7,000,000
2005 -53,827,475 30,000,000 -62,000,000
2006 328,227,132 -26,000,000 -173,000,000
2007 285,642,578 72,000,000 13,000,000
2008 -97,741,077 108,000,000 -44,000,000
2009 380,084,203 89,000,000 -125,000,000
2010 267,926,415 146,000,000 -66,000,000
2011 334,134,855 175,000,000 -109,000,000
Uzbekistan
Integration scenario 1: 
Central Asia
Integration scenario 2: 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
Integration scenario 3: 
Customs Union extended
2002 571,895,830 30,000,000 -13,000,000
2003 1,132,733,572 20,000,000 -19,000,000
2004 553,489,525 48,000,000 -36,000,000
2005 -92,590,135 71,000,000 -51,000,000
2006 373,315,295 80,000,000 -60,000,000
2007 812,359,621 220,000,000 60,000,000
2008 -269,329,937 480,000,000 200,000,000
2009 526,411,789 341,000,000 181,000,000
2010 354,243,466 254,000,000 30,000,000
2011 449,342,415 267,000,000 -43,000,000




Appendix E – Changes to SPT signs for extra-regional trade un-
der integration scenarios 
 
Origin Destination Year Integration scenario 1 Benchmark
CAR AFG 1994 0.170 -0.250
CAR AGO 2010 -0.037 0.041
CAR ARG 2007 -0.047 0.036
CAR ARG 2011 -0.104 0.106
CAR BEL 1994 0.069 -0.028
CAR BEL 1999 -0.005 0.045
CAR BEL 2001 0.062 -0.037
CAR BGR 1992 0.074 -0.357
CAR BRA 2011 -0.086 0.140
CAR BRN 2010 -0.278 0.015
CAR CIV 2011 -0.067 0.110
CAR COL 1999 -0.098 0.037
CAR COL 2003 -0.003 0.161
CAR COL 2004 -0.105 0.026
CAR CYP 2007 -0.081 0.035
CAR DEU 1992 0.159 -0.219
CAR DNK 2010 -0.114 0.057
CAR DNK 2011 -0.156 0.081
CAR ECU 1999 -0.001 0.072
CAR EGY 1997 -0.075 0.055
CAR EGY 2006 -0.125 0.087
CAR GBR 1995 0.055 -0.012
CAR GRC 1994 0.020 -0.103
CAR GRC 1995 0.016 -0.114
CAR GTM 2004 -0.028 0.069
CAR HKG 1995 -0.064 0.030
CAR HKG 1996 -0.067 0.122
CAR IDN 1997 -0.102 0.013
CAR IRN 1993 0.050 -0.119
CAR IRN 1994 0.175 -0.076
CAR IRQ 2008 0.033 -0.012
CAR JPN 2009 -0.090 0.003
CAR JPN 2011 -0.056 0.158
CAR KOR 2004 -0.077 0.095
CAR KOR 2005 -0.088 0.013
CAR KOR 2006 -0.067 0.038
CAR KOR 2007 -0.067 0.026
CAR KOR 2011 -0.236 0.004
CAR LBY 2009 -0.080 0.069
CAR LTU 2003 0.099 -0.012
CAR MAR 1995 0.004 -0.018
CAR MAR 1999 -0.054 0.115
CAR MAR 2009 -0.076 0.163
CAR MLT 1996 -0.184 0.048
CAR PHL 2005 -0.110 0.005
CAR SAU 1999 -0.078 0.062
CAR SAU 2007 -0.060 0.141
CAR SYR 1996 -0.084 0.047
CAR SYR 2002 -0.042 0.155
CAR SYR 2003 -0.090 0.125
CAR SYR 2009 -0.082 0.076
CAR TUN 2000 -0.044 0.105
CAR USA 2007 -0.046 0.013




Table E1 – Changes to SPT sign for exports, integration scenario 1: Central Asia 
 
Origin Destination year Integration scenario 1 Benchmark
AFG CAR 1994 0.139 -0.186
AFG CAR 1997 0.350 -0.105
AFG CAR 1998 0.051 -0.365
AFG CAR 2000 0.192 -0.047
ARG CAR 2007 0.043 -0.037
AUT CAR 1992 0.042 -0.075
BEL CAR 1996 0.112 -0.091
BEL CAR 2002 0.008 -0.013
BGD CAR 2000 -0.029 0.156
CHE CAR 1993 0.074 -0.024
CHL CAR 1996 0.157 -0.024
CHN CAR 2003 -0.090 0.012
CHN CAR 2005 -0.066 0.071
CIV CAR 2007 0.009 -0.111
DNK CAR 1993 0.101 -0.010
DNK CAR 1998 0.071 -0.068
DNK CAR 2006 0.034 -0.054
DNK CAR 2007 0.022 -0.067
ECU CAR 2001 -0.052 0.007
EGY CAR 1996 0.133 -0.056
EGY CAR 1997 0.015 -0.132
EGY CAR 2001 -0.085 0.014
ESP CAR 2004 0.002 -0.018
ESP CAR 2009 0.062 -0.010
FRA CAR 1993 0.079 -0.020
GRC CAR 2000 0.002 -0.079
IRL CAR 2005 -0.094 0.018
IRL CAR 2008 -0.029 0.006
IRN CAR 1992 0.158 -0.110
ITA CAR 1994 0.109 -0.009
ITA CAR 1997 0.001 -0.158
JOR CAR 1992 0.097 -0.021
JOR CAR 2008 -0.055 0.014
KWT CAR 1998 0.078 -0.045
LKA CAR 2011 -0.031 0.048
MEX CAR 2000 -0.127 0.048
MEX CAR 2005 -0.068 0.178
MEX CAR 2008 -0.006 0.196
MLT CAR 1999 -0.011 0.111
MLT CAR 2001 -0.012 0.200
NLD CAR 1994 0.046 -0.064
NLD CAR 1996 0.181 -0.019
PAK CAR 1996 0.108 -0.089
PAK CAR 1997 0.093 -0.028
RUS CAR 2011 0.071 -0.008
SAU CAR 2003 0.001 -0.047
TUN CAR 2011 -0.123 0.014
UKR CAR 1993 0.135 -0.256
USA CAR 1992 0.016 -0.060
USA CAR 1994 0.069 -0.026
USA CAR 1998 0.105 -0.026
ZAF CAR 2000 0.052 -0.017




Table E2 – Changes to SPT sign for imports, integration scenario 1: Central Asia 
 
Table E3 – Changes to SPT sign for exports, integration scenario 2: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
 
Origin Destination Year Integration scenario 2 Benchmark
KKT AGO 1999 0.003 0.000
KKT ARE 2006 -0.085 0.119
KKT ARE 2009 -0.091 0.087
KKT ARE 2011 -0.293 0.009
KKT BEL 1994 0.069 -0.021
KKT BGD 2003 -0.127 0.135
KKT BGD 2005 -0.116 0.108
KKT BGD 2006 -0.191 0.030
KKT BGD 2007 -0.203 0.059
KKT BGD 2010 -0.140 0.097
KKT BGD 2011 -0.162 0.174
KKT BGR 1992 0.102 -0.166
KKT BHR 1996 -0.128 0.049
KKT BRN 2010 -0.133 0.104
KKT CHE 1993 0.054 -0.075
KKT DEU 1993 0.097 -0.028
KKT DNK 2011 -0.041 0.142
KKT EGY 1997 -0.022 0.156
KKT EGY 1999 -0.009 0.191
KKT EGY 2011 -0.031 0.303
KKT FRA 1993 0.102 -0.013
KKT GBR 2005 -0.011 0.043
KKT HRV 2008 0.007 -0.045
KKT KOR 1995 0.000 0.058
KKT KOR 1997 -0.034 0.025
KKT KOR 2004 -0.101 0.002
KKT KOR 2006 -0.009 0.039
KKT KOR 2010 -0.041 0.006
KKT MYS 1993 0.057 -0.024
KKT NGA 2003 -0.045 0.044
KKT PHL 1996 -0.035 0.040
KKT PHL 2005 -0.004 0.053
KKT SAU 1997 -0.034 0.134
KKT SYR 1999 -0.090 0.102
KKT SYR 2010 -0.189 0.030
KKT UZB 1993 0.363 -0.029





Table E4 – Changes to SPT sign for imports, integration scenario 2: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
Origin Destination Year Integration scenario 2 Benchmark
ARE KKT 1995 -0.023 0.024
ARG KKT 2005 -0.023 0.079
AUT KKT 1992 -0.016 0.058
BEL KKT 1993 0.003 -0.072
BEL KKT 2002 -0.065 0.008
BGD KKT 1995 -0.061 0.061
BHR KKT 2011 -0.254 0.000
CHN KKT 2000 -0.064 0.008
CHN KKT 2003 -0.037 0.039
CHN KKT 2004 -0.062 0.016
CHN KKT 2005 -0.009 0.109
CIV KKT 1998 0.027 -0.010
DNK KKT 1993 0.014 -0.059
DNK KKT 1998 0.019 -0.005
DNK KKT 2005 -0.020 0.079
DNK KKT 2011 -0.013 0.090
EGY KKT 1997 -0.024 0.006
EGY KKT 2001 -0.080 0.164
EGY KKT 2002 -0.008 0.251
EGY KKT 2003 -0.091 0.151
EGY KKT 2004 -0.174 0.091
EGY KKT 2005 -0.153 0.094
EGY KKT 2007 -0.114 0.044
EGY KKT 2009 -0.110 0.085
EGY KKT 2011 -0.030 0.235
ESP KKT 2005 -0.049 0.065
ESP KKT 2008 -0.073 0.006
ESP KKT 2011 -0.046 0.057
FIN KKT 1993 0.021 -0.040
FIN KKT 1994 -0.010 0.004
GRC KKT 2011 -0.073 0.047
IRL KKT 2002 -0.057 0.041
IRL KKT 2004 -0.023 0.083
ISR KKT 1997 0.015 -0.064
ISR KKT 2001 -0.096 0.052
ITA KKT 1997 0.029 -0.076
JOR KKT 2002 -0.213 0.032
JOR KKT 2005 -0.203 0.069
KHM KKT 2011 -0.105 0.005
KOR KKT 2004 -0.081 0.005
LKA KKT 2001 -0.029 0.078
LKA KKT 2003 -0.050 0.023
LKA KKT 2010 -0.012 0.095
MAR KKT 2010 -0.239 0.031
MAR KKT 2011 -0.250 0.032
MEX KKT 2002 -0.051 0.062
MMR KKT 2011 -0.062 0.065
NOR KKT 2004 -0.027 0.052
OMN KKT 2011 -0.049 0.208
SWE KKT 2000 -0.047 0.023
SYR KKT 1997 -0.010 0.025
TUN KKT 1995 -0.021 0.047
TUN KKT 2005 -0.216 0.052
TUN KKT 2007 -0.022 0.158
TUN KKT 2009 -0.190 0.015
TUN KKT 2010 -0.072 0.195
TUN KKT 2011 -0.031 0.248
UKR KKT 1993 0.272 -0.018
USA KKT 2001 -0.051 0.020





Origin DestinationYear Integration scenario 3Benchmark
CUE ARE 1999 -0.109 0.074
CUE ARE 2002 -0.118 0.012
CUE AUT 1997 0.061 -0.007
CUE AUT 1998 0.068 -0.014
CUE BGD 1992 -0.036 0.056
CUE BGD 1993 -0.007 0.078
CUE BGD 2001 -0.113 0.028
CUE BGD 2003 -0.071 0.023
CUE BGD 2008 -0.098 0.053
CUE BGD 2009 -0.097 0.066
CUE BGD 2011 -0.085 0.091
CUE BRA 1996 0.030 -0.052
CUE COL 1996 0.064 -0.024
CUE CRI 1993 0.020 -0.100
CUE CRI 1995 0.099 -0.048
CUE DOM 1998 0.064 -0.042
CUE DZA 2005 0.000 0.172
CUE DZA 2011 -0.108 0.086
CUE ECU 2010 -0.004 0.009
CUE EST 1998 0.015 -0.134
CUE EST 2000 0.031 -0.054
CUE EST 2005 0.058 -0.013
CUE FIN 1995 0.084 -0.007
CUE FRA 2011 -0.012 0.017
CUE GBR 1992 0.048 -0.048
CUE GEO 1998 0.135 -0.010
CUE GEO 2008 0.018 -0.096
CUE GEO 2010 0.071 -0.033
CUE GRC 2004 0.007 -0.043
CUE HKG 1998 0.016 -0.023
CUE HKG 1999 -0.015 0.016
CUE IDN 2010 0.006 -0.017
CUE ISR 2009 -0.007 0.059
CUE ITA 1993 0.034 -0.051
CUE ITA 2002 0.014 -0.005
CUE ITA 2003 0.024 -0.018
CUE ITA 2004 0.015 -0.031
CUE JOR 2000 -0.107 0.141
CUE JOR 2003 -0.071 0.087
CUE JOR 2005 -0.183 0.018
CUE JOR 2010 -0.120 0.110
CUE JPN 1992 0.107 -0.006
CUE JPN 1995 0.088 -0.027
CUE JPN 1996 0.090 -0.004
CUE JPN 1998 0.016 -0.041
CUE KHM 2008 0.010 -0.014





Table E5 – Changes to SPT sign for exports, integration scenario 3: extended Customs Union 
CUE KOR 1995 0.087 -0.025
CUE KOR 1996 0.094 -0.008
CUE KOR 1997 0.032 -0.009
CUE KOR 1998 0.066 -0.004
CUE KOR 2004 0.026 -0.022
CUE KWT 2002 -0.036 0.162
CUE LTU 1993 0.225 -0.018
CUE LTU 1998 0.139 -0.047
CUE LTU 2002 0.018 -0.090
CUE LTU 2007 0.046 -0.056
CUE LTU 2010 0.081 -0.023
CUE LUX 1997 0.031 -0.043
CUE LVA 2004 0.065 -0.080
CUE LVA 2006 0.043 -0.050
CUE MAC 1994 -0.022 0.102
CUE MAC 2003 -0.033 0.028
CUE MAR 1999 -0.004 0.148
CUE NGA 2006 0.000 0.029
CUE NGA 2007 -0.012 0.008
CUE NGA 2011 -0.020 0.030
CUE PAK 1992 -0.010 0.093
CUE PAK 1994 -0.064 0.086
CUE PAK 1995 -0.087 0.002
CUE PAK 1996 -0.087 0.016
CUE PAK 1999 -0.119 0.011
CUE PER 1993 0.044 -0.065
CUE PHL 1996 0.071 -0.036
CUE SGP 1993 0.005 -0.052
CUE SGP 1994 -0.040 0.044
CUE SGP 1996 0.018 -0.018
CUE SWE 2010 -0.034 0.014
CUE SYR 2000 -0.074 0.088
CUE SYR 2001 -0.064 0.081
CUE SYR 2002 -0.041 0.110
CUE THA 1993 0.018 -0.090
CUE THA 1999 0.009 -0.057
CUE THA 2009 0.001 0.000
CUE TKM 2006 -0.134 0.105
CUE TUR 1994 -0.048 0.161
CUE UKR 1992 0.090 -0.217
CUE UKR 1996 0.174 -0.070
CUE UKR 1997 0.144 -0.067
CUE UKR 1998 0.169 -0.052
CUE UKR 2000 0.061 -0.100
CUE UKR 2002 0.013 -0.155
CUE UKR 2003 0.012 -0.180
CUE URY 1995 0.045 -0.082
CUE URY 1996 0.075 -0.037
CUE VEN 1998 0.043 -0.037





Origin DestinationYear Integration scenario 3Benchmark
AGO CUE 1992 0.100 -0.049
ARE CUE 1994 -0.010 0.126
ARE CUE 2002 -0.034 0.079
ARE CUE 2006 -0.056 0.035
ARG CUE 1995 0.048 -0.033
AUS CUE 1999 0.020 -0.053
AUS CUE 2005 0.027 -0.054
AUT CUE 1996 0.022 -0.024
AUT CUE 1997 0.048 -0.078
AUT CUE 1998 0.078 -0.103
BEL CUE 2001 -0.020 0.018
BGD CUE 2006 -0.035 0.026
BRN CUE 2003 -0.079 0.074
CAN CUE 2005 0.055 -0.017
CAN CUE 2008 0.021 -0.020
CHE CUE 2005 0.006 -0.034
CHE CUE 2006 0.033 -0.011
CHL CUE 1999 0.016 -0.031
CHN CUE 2002 0.019 -0.077
CHN CUE 2004 0.006 -0.066
CHN CUE 2005 0.075 -0.038
CHN CUE 2006 0.018 -0.116
CHN CUE 2007 0.051 -0.082
CHN CUE 2009 0.003 -0.103
COL CUE 1994 -0.019 0.006
DEU CUE 1999 0.043 -0.017
DEU CUE 2000 0.065 -0.003
DZA CUE 2005 -0.006 0.150
EGY CUE 2002 -0.057 0.130
EGY CUE 2005 -0.014 0.127
EGY CUE 2010 -0.108 0.105
ESP CUE 2011 -0.003 0.040
EST CUE 2000 0.062 -0.027
FRA CUE 2001 -0.032 0.028
FRA CUE 2003 -0.027 0.028
FRA CUE 2010 -0.020 0.010
GBR CUE 2003 -0.042 0.012
GRC CUE 2007 0.027 -0.025
GRC CUE 2008 0.015 -0.019
GRC CUE 2009 0.021 -0.026
GRC CUE 2011 -0.011 0.043
HKG CUE 1993 0.014 -0.046
IND CUE 2005 0.015 -0.089
IRL CUE 1997 0.067 -0.042
IRL CUE 1998 0.045 -0.103
IRL CUE 2001 -0.092 0.008
IRL CUE 2003 -0.062 0.012
IRN CUE 1992 -0.062 0.040
IRN CUE 2000 -0.054 0.078
IRN CUE 2001 -0.179 0.020
IRN CUE 2003 -0.031 0.179
IRN CUE 2004 -0.030 0.154
IRN CUE 2005 -0.053 0.095
IRN CUE 2008 -0.053 0.122
IRN CUE 2010 -0.050 0.156
ISR CUE 2002 -0.008 0.022
ITA CUE 2000 0.016 -0.045





Table E6 – Changes to SPT sign for imports, integration scenario 3: extended Customs Union 
JOR CUE 2009 -0.025 0.183
JOR CUE 2010 -0.238 0.005
JOR CUE 2011 -0.216 0.040
JPN CUE 2009 0.061 -0.008
KOR CUE 1992 0.055 -0.038
LAO CUE 2007 0.070 -0.033
LTU CUE 2007 0.101 -0.072
LTU CUE 2009 0.007 -0.154
LTU CUE 2010 0.021 -0.136
LTU CUE 2011 0.027 -0.120
LUX CUE 1997 0.009 -0.119
LUX CUE 1998 0.055 -0.138
LVA CUE 1992 0.244 -0.023
LVA CUE 1998 0.249 -0.020
LVA CUE 2005 0.028 -0.070
LVA CUE 2007 0.007 -0.094
MAC CUE 2009 -0.061 0.018
MAC CUE 2010 -0.091 0.024
MAC CUE 2011 -0.034 0.103
MAR CUE 1996 -0.113 0.034
MEX CUE 2003 -0.038 0.008
MLT CUE 2004 -0.007 0.058
MMR CUE 2006 0.009 -0.069
MYS CUE 2010 -0.028 0.003
NGA CUE 1997 0.078 -0.022
NGA CUE 2010 -0.063 0.009
NLD CUE 2007 0.036 0.000
NZL CUE 2000 0.010 -0.055
NZL CUE 2006 0.093 -0.007
OMN CUE 2001 -0.051 0.078
PER CUE 1997 0.017 -0.097
PER CUE 1998 0.149 -0.028
PHL CUE 2005 0.040 -0.005
PRT CUE 2006 0.010 -0.025
PRT CUE 2010 -0.049 0.016
PRT CUE 2011 -0.028 0.057
ROM CUE 1993 0.060 -0.017
ROM CUE 2006 0.057 -0.008
SYR CUE 1994 -0.022 0.124
SYR CUE 2002 -0.052 0.130
SYR CUE 2003 -0.092 0.125
SYR CUE 2004 -0.191 0.025
TKM CUE 1993 -0.003 0.018
TUN CUE 2000 -0.073 0.091
TUN CUE 2005 -0.101 0.080
TUN CUE 2007 -0.156 0.031
TUN CUE 2009 -0.149 0.050
TUR CUE 2010 -0.030 0.210
TUR CUE 2011 -0.075 0.181
UKR CUE 1994 0.182 -0.019
UKR CUE 1995 0.201 -0.031
UKR CUE 1996 0.037 -0.158
URY CUE 1993 0.043 -0.058
USA CUE 1992 0.085 -0.047
ZAF CUE 2000 0.073 -0.027




Appendix F – Interviewee key 
AC = Academic 
AD = Asian diplomat 
BA = Business association representative 
BP = Businessperson 
DI = Diplomat 
EN = Entrepreneur 
FB = Foreign businessperson  
IA = Representative of international aid delivery agency 
IF = Representative of international financial institution 
IO = Representative of international organisation 
GO = Government official 
JO = Journalist 
LE = Local employee of foreign embassy 
NG = Representative of non-governmental organisation 
NN = Anonymous 
OP = Opposition politician 
TT = Think tank employees 
WD = Western diplomat 
WS = Western source 
